

PÁNINI :

HIS PLACE IN SANSKRIT LITERATURE

PANINI

HIS PLACE IN SANSKRIT LITERATURE

AN INVESTIGATION

OF SOME

LITERARY AND CHRONOLOGICAL QUESTIONS

WHICH MAY BE SETTLED BY A STUDY OF HIS WORK

A SEPARATE IMPRESSION OF THE PREFACE TO THE FAC SIMILE OF MS. NO. 17 IN THE LIBRARY
OF HER MAJESTY'S HOME GOVERNMENT FOR INDIA, WHICH CONTAINS A PORTION OF
THE MANAVA KALPA SUTRA WITH THE COMMENTARY OF KUMARILA SWAMI

BY

THEODOR GOLDSTÜCKER

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TO

RUDOLF VIRCHOW,

THE GREAT DISCOVERER AND DEFENDER OF SCIENTIFIC TRUTH

THIS BOOK IS INSCRIBED

AS A TESTIMONY OF RESPECT AND ADMIRATION

BY HIS AFFECTIONATE FRIEND

THEODOR GOLDSTUCKER

THE present pages form the Preface to the Fac-simile of the
Manava-Kalpa-Sūtra, as mentioned on the title-page. The separate
impression has been taken at the suggestion of my publishers and other
friends, who thought that it would be desirable to make their contents
more easy of access than they are in the original work.

This circumstance will explain the apparent incongruity of pre-
senting them without the Manuscript which they describe.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LONDON,

November 2, 1860.

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THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT OF THE JAO-SIMILE

WHEN collecting materials for a History of the Mīmānsā philosophy, I happened to find in the Library of the East India House a Manuscript (No. 17), formerly belonging to the collection of Mr. Colebrooke, which bore on its outer page the remark : "श्रवेदकुमारेलभाष्यसं २२००," (i.e. "the number, of 32 syllables, in this commentary of Kumārela on the Rigveda is 2,200"), and ended on leaf 120 with these words : "मध्यसंख्या ॥ २२०० ॥ छ ॥ कुमारेलभाष्यं समाप्तं ॥" (i.e., "the number, of 32 syllables, in the book is 2,200 ; end of the Commentary of Kumārela"). The remark of the title, which differs in its handwriting from the rest of the book, seems to have been made by a Hindu, who, with much exactness, counted the number of the syllables for the copying of which he had to pay his scribe; but it certainly did not come from one conversant with Sanskrit literature. Nor can a better opinion be entertained of the Shaikh who finished copying this volume—"Sunwat 1643 (or 1586 after Christ), when the sun was progressing south of the equator, in the autumn season, during the light fortnight of the month Kārtikī (October-November), in the city of Benares, for the perusal of Devayīka (Devaliya?), the son of Jāni and Mahīdhara"—or of the writer of his Manuscript,—since the Shaikh professes to have copied the latter with the utmost accuracy, faults and all ;—for neither were the contents of this volume a commentary on the Rigveda, nor would a learned man have mis-spelt several words, and very common ones, too, of his own composition, and, above all, the name of one of the most celebrated authors of India. In short, the Manuscript in question contained no other matter than a portion of the Mānava-Kalpa-Sūtras, together with a commentary of Kumārila-Swāmin, the great Mīmānsā authority.

A discovery of this ritual work, which had thus remained latent under a wrong designation, would at all times have been welcome to those engaged in the study of Vaidik literature ; it gained in interest from the facts that a doubt had been raised, I do not know on what grounds, whether a copy of it had survived, and that a commentary of Kumārila on these Sūtras, had, so far as my knowledge goes, never yet been spoken of in any European or Sanskrit book.

It was but natural, under these circumstances, that I should think of making the knowledge I had obtained generally available, by editing this manuscript, but, to my utter disappointment, I soon perceived, after having examined it in detail, that it belonged to that class of written books, the contents of which may be partially made out and partially guessed, but which are so hopelessly incorrect that a seeming restoration of their text would require a greater amount of conjecture than could be permitted to an editor, or might be consistent with the respect due to the author of the work itself.

When, therefore, another copy of the Mānava-Kalpa-Sūtras with the Commentary of Kumārila was not to be procured, and when I began to surmise that the volume in the possession of the East India House

CONTENTS OF THE MANUSCRIPT

Of the work itself I have but little to say, for the Sanskrit scholars who will take an interest in it are well acquainted with the general characteristics of those ritual books which bear the name of Kalpa Sūtras, and they know, too, that the Mānava-Kalpa-Sūtras teach the ceremonial connected with the old recension of the Yajurveda, the Taittirīya-Sūmhitā. The portion of these Sūtras contained in the present fac-simile comprises the first four books of the whole work: the first or Yājamāna book, in two chapters (from fol 1 to 54 a, and 54 a to 55 b); the second on the Agnyādhāna (from fol 55 b to 81 b); the third on the Agnihotra (from fol. 81 b to 106 a); and the fourth on the Chāturmāsya sacrifices, in six chapters (from fol 106 a to 108 a, from there to the end of fol. 109 a, from 109 b to 112 a, from there to 113 a, from 113 a to 115 a, and hence to the end)*. That these books are the

measures $9\frac{1}{2}$ inches in length and $3\frac{1}{2}$ inches in breadth, with the exception of fol 62 which is 4 inches broad. The surplus of margin in the fac simile belongs therefore to the latter. The binder, in reducing the leaves of the original to the size stated has in various instances encroached upon the writing, and cut away either portions of letters or even whole letters, which circumstance will account for the defects in the marginal additions of, especially, fol 1 3a, b, 5b, 11a, 12a, 13a, 14a 25a, 26a, 32b, 33a, 34a, 48a, b, 50b 52a 53a, 54a 58a, 60a, 61a 62a 66b, 68a, 70b, 74b, 80b 81a 80b, 89b, 107b, 108b, 113a. Another destructive animal the white ant, has also added to the work of devastation in the interior of the Ms, but much more rarely, on the margin of fol 16a two strokes (=) indicate the eaten portion. Towards the end of the MS, especially from fol 90 upwards, the original has the appearance of having been smeared or powdered over, and this carelessness caused no doubt by putting the leaves together before the writing was dry, has produced in several instances the errors of the fac-simile, especially as it became sometimes difficult or even impossible to tell whether a dot represented an original anuswāra or a smear. I have to mention, besides that the leaves of the original are bound so as to read downwards and that the same arrangement has been preserved in the present work, in order not to allow it to deviate from the appearance of its modern prototype. There is good reason, however, to suppose that the ancient Hindus had the leaves of their MSS arranged so as to read in the reverse or upward direction. For one liberty which has been taken in the fac-simile I am personally answerable. The remark on the outside page mentioned above, with its mis spelling of the name of Kumārila and its literary error, will not be found in this volume, its place is filled by the likeness of the god of literary accuracy who is invoked in the commencement of the work.

* There occur in the text and commentary of these books the following words for sacrifices, sacrificial and other acts connected with them अशु, अप्रिच्यन, अप्रिपरिस्तरण, अप्रिप्रस्तरण, अप्रिमन्यन, अप्रियज्ञ, अप्रिष्टेम, अप्रिसंस्कार, अग्निहोत्र (दशहोत्राग्नि होत्र, प्रथमाग्निहोत्र), अप्रिहोम, अग्न्याधान, अग्न्याधेय (आग्न्याधेयिक), अग्न्याधेयेष्टि, अप्रापक, अतिरात्र, अधियज्ञ, अधिश्येण, अनुतापन, अनुमन्त्रण, अनुयाय, अन्वाधान, अन्वारम्भणीया, अभिघार, अभिघारण, अभिनिर्वाप, अभिमर्शन, अभ्यञ्जन, अभ्युचण, अभ्यूहन, आग्नेययाग, आग्नेयेष्टि, आग्न्याधेयिक, आग्न्याधेय, आज्ञाहोम, आज्ञाहुति, आयान, आमन्त्रण, आरम्भणीया, आत्वपन, आवस्थ्य, आस्तरण, आहुति (यूपा०), आहान, इष्टि (पैष्टिक), उपवन, उद्देनन, उद्धाव, उद्धूलन, उद्धासन, उद्धाह (औद्धाहिक), उज्ज्यवन, उपकल्पि, उपचार, उपयमन, उपयाम, उपवपन, उपवसथ, उपसद, ऐष्टिक, काकहोम, काम्प्येष्टि, कृष्णलपाक, गोदोह (गोदोहन),

first portion of the Mânavâ-Sûtrâ results not merely from the matter treated in them, but also from a fact which accidentally came to my cognizance after the printing of the present volume had been completed.

चर्विष्टि, चातुर्मास्य, चान्द्रायण, जप, तुपविमोक, तुपावाप, दर्श, दर्शवैर्यमास, दशहोत्राशिहोत्र, दीक्षा, देवयज्ञ (०नी), दोह (गो०), द्वादशाहिक, नाराशंस, नित्यहोम, नियतभोजन, निर्माण, निर्वपण (निर्वाप), निष्टप्त, निष्पावन, पक्षीसयाज, परिमाजन, परिवापण, परिपेक, परिस्तरण, परिहरण, पर्यन्तिकरण, पर्युद्धण, पशुबन्ध, पशुधपण, पाक, पाकयज्ञ, पाणिप्रहण, पिण्डनिधान, पिण्डपितृवृत्त, पितृकार्य, पितृमेध, पितृयज्ञ, पिष्टपेपण, पिष्टलेप, पूर्णाहुति, पौर्णमास, प्रणयन (अभिं०), प्रथमाशिहोत्र, प्रायश्चित्त, प्रे॒प, प्रोक्षण, प्रोहण, फलीकरण, बहिःप्रहरण, बहिःस्तरण, बलिहरण, ब्रह्मवरण, भक्तदान, मन्त्रहोम, म-ग्रावृत्ति, यज्ञ (यज्ञिय), याग, यूपवेष्टन, युपसमाजन, यूपाहुति, राजसूय, राक्षभूत, वपन, वरण (व्रहा०), वस्त्रप्रधास, वपट्कार (वपट्कृत), वस्त्रविन्यास, विहार (वैहारिक), वेदिकरण, वेदोपयाम, व्रतविमोक, व्रतोपायन, श्रुतासीर्य, शमश्रुवपन, श्रपण, संस्कार, सस्पर्श, स्त्र, संनहन, संनिधन, साकमेध (०धिक), सान्तप्तन (०नीय), सोमपान, सोमाधान, सोमेष्टि, स्तरण, स्याहाकार, स्विष्टहृत, होम, for *sacrificial substances, implements, prayers, or objects incidentally mentioned as referring to them* अस्ति (आहवनीयास्ति, आहितास्ति, उद्यतास्ति, गार्हपत्यास्ति, दक्षिणास्ति, शालास्ति), अग्निष्टु, अग्निहोत्रवृणी, अज, अश, अधर्थ, अष्टाकपाल, आज्ञ्य, आनन्दुह, आमिक्षा, आहवनीयास्ति, आहितास्ति, इडा, इधम, इप्ताशहिंस, इष्टिपशु, उत्तरयेदि (आैत्तरयेदिक) उद्यतास्ति, उपभूत (आपभूत), उपल, उलूपल, उर्णा, एकपाल, शोदन, योपयि, कपाल, (आष्टा०, एक०, दश०, नव०, पञ्च०, पट्ट०, सप्त०), कपूर, वांस्य, काष्ठ, उण्डल, कुम्भी, कृष्णाजिन, कौम, खनिन्यै, खादिर, खलेवाली, गार्हपत्यास्ति, गुग्गुतु, गोसीर, गोमय, ग्रामन् षुत, घमू, चर, चरस्याली, चर्मन्, चात्वाल, जपमन्त्र, जरदूय, जुहु (जोहर), तण्डुल, तिल, तुप, दक्षिणा, दक्षिणातार, दक्षिणास्ति, दक्षिणापाठ, दण्ड, दधि, दर्म, दर्मसिज्जूत, दर्मरग्गु, दर्वी, दशकपाल, दित्यग्रह (दिलौहा), दृपद, द्रूप, धान्य, धिलय, भूया (भौय), नदकपाल नवनीत, पशुकपाल, परिधि, पर्णशासा, पवित्र, पशु, पशुपुरोदाश, पात्र (पात्री), पिज्जूल (दर्म०), पिण्ड, पूतीक, पृथुपात्र, प्रणीता, प्रस्तर, प्राचीनार्तीत, यहिंस यलि, घोहोदन (घालौदनिक) भन्न, भद्रसुच्, भस्मन्, भुषुपर्क, मन्त्र, महाहविष्य, मास, माप, मुहु, मुदगर, मुसन्न, मूल, मूग, मृदह, मैपी, मैन्ज्जा, यषायस्ति, यज्ञोपवीत (०तिन्) यज, यजाग्, याज्यानुयाक्या, यूप योक्त, रम्जु, रथ, लेता, लेप, लेमन्, वस, वस्त्र, याम देव्य, वारतन्तीय, येदि (उत्तरयेदि वेत्तिश्रोणि), येत्त, यीहि, शक्ट, शतमान, शतागुण, शमी (शमीशाता०), शर, शाराय, शाता०, शाला॒मि, शुलू, शूर्प, रमश्रु, रथामाण, रथनी, पटकपाल, सहकराज, समिष्टयकुम्, सेभार, साज्जाय, सोम, स्वर्वयुम्, सुच् (सूच०), सुय, स्मय, हविर्धन, हविम, हिरण्य, for the time of *sacrificial acts* अनुमती, अमायास्या, वपस्काळ, हृतिका, र्षीया, दक्षिणातार, यापारूपीयी, दुनर्मन्, प्रातरू, पालगुर्नी, भुवम्, भू, माप्यन्दिन, मागरार्तीय, गृगगिरग्र, रापि, वर्षाः (यार्षिं०), रेपी, रेहिर्णी, यसन्त, यंशार्णी, युष, शरद्, शिशिर, शुनावीर, मेषम्यर, सप्त शाल, सायम्, युर्योदय, स्वरू, स्वर्ण, इमन्तः for *rituals, sacrificer, etc.* अभ्यु॒ (साप्तयं॒),

Professor Muller, who is engaged in writing a history of Vaidik literature, had met among the MSS of the East India House, which he consulted for his labour, one (No 590) which bore at its end the intimation of being a part of the *Manava Sūtra*; and when he showed me the MS, I saw at once that it was written by the same writer who had copied the original of the present fac simile, in a similar, though smaller and less elegant, handwriting and immediately after he had copied the first four books. For he states himself in his closing words that he finished copying "the fifth part of the *Agnishtoma* book of the *Manava Sūtra*, Samvat 1643 (or 1586 after Christ), when the sun was progressing north of the equator, in the winter season, during the light fortnight of the month *Pūrush* (December January), on the fifteenth lunar day, in the city of Benares", and the next syllable immediately succeeded by a blank in the MS, makes it probable that he wrote this portion, too, for the perusal of the son of *Mahidhīra*. His conscience, however, seems to have been more sensitive regarding the accuracy with which he had performed his task, at the end of the *Agnishtoma* portion, than it was before, since he makes a very touching appeal to the indulgence of the reader, and is even modest enough to count himself amongst the scribes of limited intellect.*

CONTENTS OF ANOTHER MANUSCRIPT OF THE MANAVA KALPA SŪTRA

The contents of this latter manuscript, viz., the description of the *Agnishtoma* rites in five *Adhyāyas*,* now, too, explain the meaning of

आप्नीध, आधनविंश, उद्गातु, ब्रह्मिज्, चमसाध्वरु, पत्रो, पुरोहित, प्रतिप्रस्थातु, ब्रह्मन् (प्रद्वात्), यजमान (याज्ञमान), यज्ञपति, यष्टि, हातु (हीत), for *divi iti's* (and their derivatives) अग्नि, अग्नियोगीय, अग्नीन्द्र (इन्द्राग्नि), अदिति, अपानतृ, अपेनसृ (अपेनसृय) आग्नेन्द्र, आग्नेय, आदिय, आधिन, इन्द्र, इन्द्राणी, ऐन्द्र, ऐन्द्राम, गन्धर्व, तनुपाद, यम्यक, देव, देवता, पूर्ण, वनदेव, यहुदेवत, यृहपति, मरुत् (मारुत), महेन्द्र, मैत्रावरण, मैत्रायण, रत्नम्, रद, वरुण, (वारुण), वायु, वेशदवा (विशदव), विष्णु, वैशानर, सूर्य (सैर्य), साम, सामपौत्र्य, सेष्यवारण, हिरण्यगर्भ।

* I subjoin a literal copy of the last page (37) of this Ms. with all the faults which will give some idea of the unhappy fate of these *Manava Sūtras* in the hands of their ignorant transcriber याद्वा पुस्तक ईश्वरा तादृश लिपित मया ॥ यदि शुद्धमशुद्ध वा मम दोषो न दीयते ॥ १ ॥ अद्व्यभागामनि विभ्रमाद्वा ॥ यदर्थहीन लिपित मयात् । तत्सर्वमायै परिशोधनीय कोप न कुर्यात्वलु लेपकस्य ॥ २ ॥ व्यासतुलयोऽपि यो वक्ता नानाशास्त्रविशारदः । सुष्ठुते लिपमानोऽपि कि पुन स्वल्पदुद्य ॥ आ वस्ति ॥ सवत् १६४३ वर्षे शाके । प्रवर्त्माने उत्तरायणे हेम त वर्ती महामग्न्यप्रद ॥ पौष्मासे शुक्लपचे १५ मास्यो तिथौ अद्येह कश्चिवास्त्व्य मोदहातीय ॥ जा ... ॥ लिपिसम् । लेखकपाटकयो शुभ भवनु ॥ मानवसूत्रय अग्निष्ठोमाव्यस्य पचमभागाव्यस्य पुस्तकमलेति ॥ श्री ॥ च ॥ च ॥ चमसाध्वर्य । होता ३ ब्रह्म २ उद्गाता ३ यजमान ४ प्रराज्ञ ५ वाह्यावृद्दसि ६ पेता ७ नेष्ट ८ आप्नीध ९ अद्व्यावाक । १७ पृते दश चमसाध्वर्य , and after this last piece of scholarship is added in a different hand "स्यपुस्तक ॥ सौमसूत्र ॥ अप्या २" (1)

* Whether the work which is mentioned in the Catalogue of the Sanskrit MSS at

the concluding words of our MS (fol 120 b) : प्राग्सोमभाव्यं संगृण (which ought to be प्राग्सोम०) for they clearly point to a continuation, treating on the Soma rites, which continuation is given in the MS 599, so far as the text of the Sūtras goes, though this MS does not contain any further commentary of Kumārila

THE COMMENTARY OF KUMARILA

The text of the first four books of the Sūtras in our MS is, unhappily, only fragmentary. Sometimes, but rarely, a Sūtra is given in full before the gloss of Kumārila, for the most part, however, the copy of the text, as is the case with many manuscripts of Commentaries on Sūtras, starts from the assumption that the reader possesses a MS which contains the words of the Sūtra, and refers to them by merely giving the first and the last word of the sentence which is the subject of the commentary. Now and then, it is true, some further words of the Sūtra emerge from the gloss of Kumārila, but, though it is possible to understand the purport of his comment, it would be a fruitless task to try to construe from it the full detail of the text, since much of the latter is left unnoticed, as requiring, apparently, no gloss.

The interest connected with the present volume centres, therefore, chiefly in the commentary of Kumārila, and in the fact itself that it is this great Mīmānsā writer who composed a commentary on the Mānava Sūtras of the Taittirīya Samhitā. For, since in Sanskrit literature, commentaries on works which involve scientific convictions or religious belief were, as a rule, written by those alone who shared in these convictions or meant to defend this belief, it is a matter of significance that this celebrated representative of the Mīmānsā doctrine, who lived before Śāṅkara, the commentator of the Vedānta Sūtras,⁵ should have attached his remarks to a Sūtra belonging to the Black-Yajus School.

That this circumstance cannot be accidental is rendered probable by collateral facts. Kumārila quotes on two occasions (fol. 11 a and 85 b) the opinion of Śīvara Svāmin on passages in the Sūtras, and as it is not the commentary of this author on the Jaimini-Sūtras to which he refers, his quotation can only imply that Śīvara had composed, besides, a gloss either on the Mānava, or on other Sūtras of the same school. Śīvara, however, is, like Kumārila whom he preceded, one of the principal authorities of the Mīmānsā philosophy.⁶ Mādhyava also, the commentator on the Vedas, who may be

Banaras p. 118 under the title सोमनृपद्यविधानम् (No. 203) be the same as the Agnīshoma portion of the Mānava Sūtras I have had no means of ascertaining. The same Catalogue records the existence of the मानवात्मदम् (p. 78 No. 761) but without naming the Commentary of Kumārila.

⁵ Compare the Preface to the first edition of Wilson's Sanskrit Dictionary, p. xviii seqq.

⁶ I may mention on this occasion, other quotations made by Kumārila. He speaks several times of other ākhyas without however specifying them (f. 1 91-17 a 23 a 26 b 41 b etc etc) once even of a kṛtr̥asākhyā, (fol. 50 a); of other teachers (śāstričcharyas, fol. 43 b-44 a, 65 a, Vṛddhīśvarya 110 a), of the Varīha Sūtras

considered as the first writer of eminence on the Mîmânsâ, composed or indited a commentary on another Sûtra work of the Taittirîya-Samhitâ, the Sûtra of Brûdhâyana. Of commentators on other Sûtras of the Black-Yajur-veda I do not speak, since they have not attained a prominent rank among the Mîmansists. But it ought not to be left unnoticed, on the other hand, that neither the Kalpa works connected with the Rîgveda, nor those belonging to the Sîma-, or White-Yajur-veda, had commentators who, at the same time, wrote Mîmânsâ works.

CONNECTION BETWEEN THE KALPA-SÛTRAS OF THE TAITTIRIYA SAMHITA • AND THE MIMÂNSÂ

It would seem, therefore, and I shall have to advert to this point in detail in a more appropriate place, that the Kalpa-Sûtras of the Taittirîya-Samhitâ represented or countenanced, more than other Kalpa Sûtras, the tenents and decisions of the Mîmânsâ philosophers.

AUTHOR OF THE VÂNAVA KALPA SÛTRAS

This intimate connection between the two will enable us, then, not merely to remove all doubt, if any exist, as to the identity of the author of the present commentary with the author of the Vârttikas on the Jaimini Sûtras,—even if this identity were not proved by the peculiar style of Kumârila's composition, by his writing alternately in prose and sloka, by his pithy remarks, and his strong expressions, but it will throw light, too, on the nature of the commentary itself.

It is not a commentary in the ordinary sense, merely explaining obsolete or difficult words, and giving the meaning of the sentences; it is often nothing else than a regular discussion and refutation of divergent opinions which were probably expressed in other Kalpa works. And the constant use it makes of current Mîmânsâ terms, in their Mîmânsâ sense, such as *apûrva*, *paramapûrva*, *âha*, *bâdha*, to which may be added also, *vidhi*, *anuvâda*, *arthavâda*, *purushârtha*, *kratîwartha*, *bheda* (*mantrabheda*, *vakyabheda*), on account of the frequent application these latter words find in the Mîmânsâ writings,—impresses on the discussions of Kumârila the full stamp of a Mîmânsâ reasoning.

There is one fact which deserves special mention, though it has only an indirect bearing on the present work. In the Sûtras I 3, 10 12, Jaimini treats of the question whether the Kalpa works have the same

(fol 75 a 93 b, 120 b) the Bhâshyakâra who is probably the same as Sabara (fol 115 a) the Brahmanabhashyakâra (fol 60 b 63 a 75 b) the Grihyabhashyakâra (fol 60 a), the Hâritabhashyakâra (fol 75 b), he names the Bahv Richâs (20 a 23 b), the Yajurveda (fol 9 a and b) and Yajurvedâka (fol 12 b 67 a) the Kithaka (fol 9 a, 98 b) the Taittirîyaka (fol 60 a 61 b 66 b) a Brâhma (fol 114 b), and the Sâmaveda (fol 9 b) Manu is usually called by him Sâtrakâra or Sâtrakrit (e.g. fol 43 b 71 b 75 a, etc. 29 a 32 a 33 b, etc), other authors of Sûtras Sûtrakâras or Sûtrakritas (fol 33 a 77 b)

authority as the Veda or not ; in other terms whether they must be ascribed to divine or to human authorship, and decides in favour of the latter alternative. Kumārila, in his Vārtikas on this chapter, gives instances of the works of several authors which would fall under this category ; he names, in the course of his discussion, the Sūtras of Baudhāyana, Vaiśāha, Maśaka, Āśvalāyana, Vaijavāpi, Drāhyāyana, Lātyāyana, Kātyāyana, and Āpastamba, but though his "*et cætra*" imply that he did not intend to give a complete list, it is certainly remarkable that he should not have named the Mānava-Sūtras, which he has commented upon, more especially as he makes reference to the Dharmasāstra of Manu.

Sabara, also, his predecessor, who mentions, in his Bhāṣya on the same Sūtras of Jaimini, the Maśaka-, Hāstīka-, and Kaundinya-Kalpa-Sūtra, does not speak of the Mānava. And, to conclude, the same omission strikes us in the Jaiminīya nyāya-mālā-vistara of Mādhaba, who names the Baudhāyana-, Āpastamba, Āśvalāyana-, and Kātyāyana-Kalpa-Sūtras, but makes no allusion to our work.

It may be, and it even is probable that Kumārila wrote his gloss on the Mānava-Kalpa Sūtra after he had finished his Vārtikas on the Sūtras of Jaimini. But this circumstance alone cannot account for the omission of this Kalpa work from his Vārtikas, nor does it offer any explanation of the general silence in regard to it of the other renowned writers on the Mīmāṃsā philosophy.

I believe that the reason for this silence must be sought for in the decision of Jaimini, and in the legendary character of Manu, the reputed author of our Kalpa work. At the time of Sabara, Manu was no doubt already viewed by his countrymen in the same light in which he appears in the Dharmasāstra that bears his name but professes distinctly not to be the immediate work of Manu himself, and consequently, could be safely alluded to. This mythical character, however, of Manu results from the legends connected with a personage of this name in the Sūtrapathabrahmāṇi and the Rigveda itself. To prove, therefore, on the one hand, that the Kalpa Sūtras are human work, and to hold before the reader's eye the name of an individual who, if less than a god, was, at all events, believed to be more than a man, would have been a proceeding which might either have shaken the conviction which it was intended to produce, or tinged the doctrine of the propounders with a hue of heresy which certainly neither Sabara, nor Kumārila, nor Mādhaba meant to impart to his commentary. Probably, therefore, it appeared safer to evade this awkward illustration of the human character of a Sūtrakāra, and to be satisfied with instances of a more tangible and less delicate kind.

From our point of view, however, and I conclude from the point of view of the Mīmāṃsāists themselves, there is no reason to doubt that a Manu, the author of the present Sūtras, was as much a real personage as Baudhāyana and the other Sūtrakāras who were never raised to a superhuman dignity. I can no more see a valid argument for doubting the existence of this Manu, because his name would mean, etymologically, "a thinking being, a man," and because mythology has lent this character to the father of the human race, also called Manu, than there would be for doubting the real existence of the Brāhmaṇa caste, merely

because they ascribe their bodily origin to the Creator of the World. And as to the name of Manu (man) itself, it does not seem more striking or even more strange than other proper names in the Vaidik time; than, for instance, the proper names Prâna, *life*; Eka, *one*; Itarâ, or Anyatarâ, *either of two*; Panchan, *six*, Saptan, *seven*; Ashtan, *eight*; Svas, *head*; Loman, *hair*; Vindu, *drop*, etc.

DATE OF THIS WORK

To assign a date to the Mânava-Kalpa Sûtras, even approximately, is a task I am incapable of performing; though, judging from the contents of this work, it may seem plausible to assert that they are more recent than the Sûtras of Baudhâyanî and older than those of Apastamba. But I have not any means of ascertaining when these latter works were composed.

It may not, however, be superfluous to add that they were either younger than Panini or, at least, not so much preceding his time as to be ranked by him amongst the old Kalpa works. For in an important Sûtra of his grammar he states that the names of old Kalpa works are formed with the affix *in*, and it follows therefore that none of the works of this kind, which are likely to be still in existence, and amongst them the Mânava Kalpa Sûtras, are, from Panini's point of view, old Kalpa works'. And when I express the opinion that there is no tenable ground for assigning to Panini so recent a date as that which has been given to him, *viz.*, the middle of the fourth century before Christ, but that there is on the contrary a presumption that he preceded the time of the founder of the Buddhistic creed,—I have advanced as much, or as little, as, I believe, can be safely advanced on the date of the present Kalpa work.

LITERARY AND CHRONOLOGICAL QUESTIONS CONCERNING EVERY WORK OF THE VAIDIK LITERATURE AND THEREFORE BEARING ON THE PRESENT RITUAL BOOK

Prof. Max Muller holds that the art of writing was not yet known in India when Panini lived.

After the foregoing lines were written I received Professor Max Müller's "History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature, so far as it illustrates the primitive religion of the Brahmins (1859)." To acknowledge the merits of this work, which shows the great importance of the religious development of India, to acknowledge the light it throws on the obscurest parts of Hindu literature, and the comprehensive learning it has brought to bear on many an intricate topic connected with the rise and progress of Hindu grammar, law, and theology, must be the first and not the least, gratifying feeling of every one interested in Sanskrit, and more especially in Vaidik philology. The

¹ Panini, iv 3, 105. This Sûtra is composed under the head rule iv 3, 101, which extends as far as 111. In the gloss on some of these Sûtras the hâsika the Siddhâ-k, and the Calcutta Panjits who composed or compiled the printed commentary, have introduced the word अपि॒ in addition to अपि॑. I hold arbitrarily,—since it is neither indicated by the head rule, nor met with in the Mahâbhâshya.

greater, however, this new claim" of the editor of the Rigveda to our gratitude, the more does his work impose on us the duty of examining, among the topics of which it treats, those which seem to require additional evidence before they can be considered as having attained a definite settlement. I take advantage of this opportunity, therefore, to re-open the discussion on two points, which seem to me to fall under this predicament, especially as they concern every work of the Vaidik literature, and equally bear on the present ritual book. I mean the question of the introduction of writing into India,⁹ and the general question of the chronology of Vaidik works.¹⁰

Muller's view on the first of these questions is contained in the following words (p. 524). "If writing came in towards the latter half of the Sûtra period,¹¹ it would no doubt be applied at the same time to reducing the hymns and Brâhmanas to a written form. Previously to that time, however, we are bound to maintain that the collection of the hymns, and the immense mass of the Brâhmana literature, were preserved by means of oral tradition only;" and (p. 507). "But there are stronger arguments than these (*viz.*, the arguments alleged by him, pp. 497 507), to prove that, before the time of Pânini, and before the first spreading of Buddhism in India, writing for literary purposes was absolutely unknown. If writing had been known to Panini, some of his grammatical terms would surely point to the graphical appearance of words. I maintain that there is not a single word in Panini's terminology which presupposes the existence of writing etc."

Muller maintains, therefore, that not merely *before* the time of Panini, but to Panini himself, writing was unknown, and as according to his view, 'Pânini lived in the middle of the fourth century B C' (pp 245, 301 ff.),¹² it would follow that, according to him, India was not yet in possession of the most useful of arts at the time when Plato died and Aristotle flourished.

I must confess that I could not, and cannot, look upon this assertion otherwise than as a splendid paradox, which, it is true, makes up for its want of power of convincing by the ingenuity of the defence with which it is supported, and the interest which may be derived from the extraneous matter it has brought to its aid; and, had I happened to read this chapter before the rest, I should probably have thought that the idea of conceiving India without reed and ink until, or after, Pânini's death, did not originate with Muller before the close of his learned work, and then only that he might crown, as it were, its merits by some extraordinary feat. But though justice requires me to admit that such is not the case,—that, on the contrary, the same opinion pervades

⁹ Muller's History, p. 497 &c. This chapter is reprinted in the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal (No. II 1859) with the following note which became my first inducement to treat the matter on this occasion. "This paper is an extract from a work now in the press on the history of ancient Sanskrit literature. Professor Müller has sent it for the Society's Journal in the hope of eliciting some fresh information from European or native scholars in India on the interesting questions which it discusses."

¹⁰ The same pp 244 313 475 572

¹¹ This period extends according to his views from 600 to 200 B C. (p. 244)

¹² This date will be the subject of ulterior remarks.

which tell us that amongst the nations subdued by him were the Gadara and Hidhu or the Gandharas, and the peoples living on the banks of the Indus¹⁶ Could Panini, therefore, who was a native of Gandhāra, had he lived after Darius, as Müller supposes to be the case, have remained ignorant of the fact that writing was known in Persia? And if not, would he not, in composing his work, have profited by this knowledge, provided, of course, that he was not acquainted previously with this art, independently of his acquaintance with the Persian alphabet? This question is answered, however, I believe, by a word which is the subject of one of his special¹⁷ rules (IV 1, 49), the word *yavanānī*, explained by Kātyāyana and Patañjali as meaning the "writing of the Yavanas" Both Weber and Müller mention this word, the former as meaning 'the writing of the Greeks or Semites (Ind St I p 144), or, as he later opines, of the Greeks alone (IV 89); the latter (p 521) "a variety of the Semitic alphabet, which, previous to Alexander, and previous to Panini, became the type of the Indian alphabet. It would seem to me, that it denotes the writing of the Persians, and probably the cuneiform writing which was known already, before the time of Darius, and is peculiar enough in its appearance, and different enough from the alphabet of the Hindus, to explain the fact that its name called for the formation of a separate word

PANINI MENTION'S THE WORD *LIPIKĀRA* A WRITER

While I intend to address myself now to the special arguments offered by Müller, for the theory that writing was unknown to Panini, I find myself, as it were, arrested by his own words, for, after having proposed his reasons in support of this theory (from page 407 to page 520) he makes the following remark on the word *lipikāra*, 'a writer or engraver,' which I quote in full — "This last word *lipikāra* is an important word for it is the only word in the Sūtras of Panini which can be legitimately adduced to prove that Panini was acquainted with the art of writing. He teaches the formation of this word, iii 2 21." Whether it is the only word which can be legitimately adduced for such a proof I shall have to examine. But even on the supposition that it is, I must really question the purport of the whole discussion, if Müller himself admits that Panini would have pointed to this word *lipikāra* had it been his task to defend himself against the imputation of being ignorant of the art of writing. For it becomes obviously immaterial whether the word *lipikāra* occurs once or a hundred times in the Sūtras, — whether another similar word be discoverable in his Grammar or not, one word is clearly sufficient to establish the fact, and to remove all doubt. This admission of Müller, which upsets all he has tried to impress upon our minds is doubtless very creditable to his candour, for it shows his wish to elicit the truth, and fully confirms our faith in what he says at the end of his essay — "It is possible I may have overlooked some words in the Brāhmaṇas and Sūtras which would prove the existence of written books previous to Panini. If so, it is not from any wish to suppress them." But

¹⁶ Compare Lassen's Int. Alterth 1 422 II 112 113 and the quotations given there.

since he has not even tried to invalidate by a single word the conclusion which necessarily follows from this admission, it would be like carrying owls to Athens if I endeavoured to prove what is sufficiently proved already by himself.

Nevertheless, I will do so; not only out of respect for his labour, but because the observations I am going to make may tend to show that there is much more evidence in Pāṇini than this solitary word for the assumption that he was not merely conversant with writing, but that his Grammar could not even have been composed as it is now, without the application to it of written letters and signs.

The chief argument of Müller is a negative one—the absence of words which mean book, ink, paper, and the like. Thus he says of the Vaidik hymns (p 497): "Where writing is known, it is almost impossible to compose a thousand hymns without bringing in some such words as, writing, reading, paper, or pen. Yet there is not one single allusion in these hymns to anything connected with writing," or (p 512) "If we take the ordinary modern words for book, paper, ink, writing, etc., not one of them has yet been discovered in any Sanskrit work of genuine antiquity."¹¹ I do not think that such an argument, in its generality, can ever be held to be a conclusive proof. It is not the purpose of the Vaidik hymns to tell us that pen and ink were known to the Aryas; it becomes, therefore, entirely a matter of chance whether so prosaic an object be mentioned in them or not,—whether the poets borrow their figures from paper and book, or from the life of the elements. The very instances Müller has adduced from the Psalms will probably leave in every one's mind the impression that these songs might easily have existed, without any damage to their reputation, even if they had not contained the three verses which bespeak the scholarship of their authors, and the book of Job too, if it had not that literary longing which is contained in Müller's happy quotation: "Oh that my words were now written! oh, that they were printed in a book!" But what applies to poetical songs, avails with still greater force in a grammatical work. Pāṇini's object is to record such phenomena of the language as are of interest from a grammatical point of view. Sometimes the words which belong to his province, will be at the same time also of historical and antiquarian interest; but it does not follow at all, that because a word of the latter category is omitted in his rules, it is absent from the language also, the extreme conclusion would be that it is a word of no grammatical interest, and this conclusion itself, to be correct, would imply that Pāṇini was a perfect author, and did not omit any word or words which ought to have been noticed by him on grammatical grounds.

"There is no word," says Müller, "for book, paper, ink, writing, etc., in any Sanskrit work of genuine antiquity" (p 512). Of *lip*, "to write," I need say no more, since it is the base of *lipī*. I agree with him that the verbs *adhi* or *tañch* (in the *caus*) which are used in the sense "to read," contain no proof of their applying to a written work, since the former means literally "to go over mentally, to acquire," and

¹¹ Not even *lipī?*

the latter "to cause to speak."¹⁴ I am equally willing to admit that the divisions of literary works which are frequently met with, such as *anuvâkas*, *prasnas*, *mandalas*,-*pathas*, *vargas*, *sûktas*, etc., cannot be compared with such words as "volumen, a volume, *liber*, i.e., the inner bark of a tree, or βιβλος, i.e. βιβλος, the inner bark of the papyrus; or book, i.e., 'beech wood' (p 515). But I cannot admit that there is no word of genuine antiquity meaning book, or division of book, which cannot be compared with those latter words of the cognate languages. One word is indeed supplied by Muller himself, at the end of his essay; it undoes, as it were, all that precedes on this subject, in the same way as *lipikara* undid his arguments against Pâṇini's acquaintance with writing.

PATALA, THE NAME OF A DIVISION OF SANSKRIT WORKS, IS A FURTHER PROOF THAT WRITING WAS KNOWN IN ANCIENT INDIA

After the words I have quoted above, "if so, it is not from any wish to suppress them," he continues (523). "I believe, indeed, that the Brâhmaṇas were preserved by oral tradition only, but I should feel inclined to claim an acquaintance with the art of writing for the authors of the Sûtras. And there is one word which seems to strengthen such a supposition. We find that several of the Sûtras are divided into chapters, called *patalas*. This is a word never used for the subdivision of the Brâhmaṇas. Its meaning is a covering, the surrounding skin or membrane, it is also used for a tree. If so, it would seem to be almost synonymous with *liber* and βιβλος, and it would mean book, after meaning originally a sheet of paper made of the surrounding bark of trees." But he seems to have entirely overlooked—no doubt on account of its common occurrence—the word *kânda*, which is the name of a division of the Taittirîya Sâmhitâ and Brâhmaṇas, not to speak of the frequent application it has found at a later period in denoting chapters of ritual books, or ritual books themselves, such as *kâmyeshti-kânda*, *lâmâyapâsu lânda*, *pânu odâsika kânda*, *âgneya kânda*, *hautâ kânda*, *adhukai yu-kânda*, *yajamâna-kânda*, *sattrâ kânda*, etc. And *kânda*, before meaning book, means "the part of the trunk of a tree whence the branches proceed,—a stalk or stem;"—it is, therefore, a fair representative of our word book. But, if such is the original purpose of *patala*, and of the more frequent *kânda*, I cannot conceive on what grounds Muller sounds his doubt (p 513) of *pattira* meaning the leaf of a book, in works of genuine antiquity, since *pattira* means, originally, the leaf of a tree, and since palm-leaves, even now, bespeak the use which has been made of them for literary purposes. For, though Urvâśî writes her amatory letter on a "birch leaf,"—which, then, is called, not merely *pattira*, but *bhûrja-pattira*,—it does not follow that ordinary letters of literary works must also have been engraved on what was probably a rarer material than the leaf of a palm-tree or of a lotus.

A FURTHER PROOF IS DERIVED FROM THE WORDS *KINDA* AND *PITTRA*, *SUTRA* AND *GRINTRA*

Besides *kânda* and *patala*, there are, however, two other important words, in the sense of work, which could not but attract the attention

¹⁴ Thus Pâṇini himself says, V. 2, 84, योग्यिष्यत्यन्दा इति.

of Professor Muller—the words *sūtra* and *grantha*. The former, which means, literally, “string,” has become, according to him (p. 512), the well-known name of an extensive class of works, by assuming the figurative sense, “strings of rules.” The latter, he says (p. 522), “is derived from a root *grath*, which means *nectare*, serere. *Grantha*, therefore, like the later *sandarbha*, would simply mean a composition. It corresponds etymologically with the Latin *textus*. Thus it is used by the commentator to *Nu* 1 20, where he says that former teachers handed down the hymns, *granthato'rthataścha*,¹⁹ ‘according to their text and according to their meaning.’ In the later literature of India, *grantha* was used for a volume, and, in *granthalatī*, a library, we see clearly that it has that meaning. But in the early literature *grantha* does not mean *pustaka*, or book; it means simply a composition, as opposed to a traditional work.”

DEFINITION OF THE WORD SŪTRA

That “*sūtra*” may have assumed the sense of “string of rules,” before it became the name of a book, is possible; but that it must have gone through this metaphorical process, and no other,—as the certainty with which Muller explains the term would imply,—²⁰ is not corroborated by any proof he has given; nor is it even plausible. Before, however, I give my own opinion on this word, it will be necessary, first, to ascertain whether the word *sūtra*,—which is used in the singular both as a name for a whole collection of rules, and as a name for a single *sūta*,—denoted, originally, the latter, and then became the designation of the former, or *vice versā*. Thus, the *Kaśikāvittī* calls Pāṇini’s *Sūtra*, V. 4, 151, *gana-sūtram*, and speaks of the five *Sūtras*, I 3, 72–76, *swaritamita iti panchabhis sūti air ātmanepadam, etc evam panchasūtryām udāhāryam*; and Patanjali says, in the introduction to Pāṇini, *Sutrāṇi chāpyadhiyāna iṣhyate vāyākarana iti*, “he who studies the *sūtras* is termed a grammarian.” But if we examine the use which Pāṇini himself makes of this word, we find that he always uses *sūtra* as a term for the whole collection of rules, and not as an expression for a single *Sūtra*. IV. 2, 65, “*Sūtrāch cha kopadhāt*,” IV 3, 110 “*Parāsaryasilālibhyam bhikshunatasūtrayoh*” (where the dual shows that the analysis requires *bhikshusūtre* and *natasūtre*) In his Rules, IV 2, 60, and V. 1. 58, the number of the word is less clear, since it is part of a compound; yet the instances of Patanjali to the *Varttikas*, and some explanations of the *Kaśikā* (e.g., *Kalpasutram adhīte*, *lalpasutrah*, and *ashtav adhyāyāḥ parinānam asya sūtrasya ashtakam paniniyam*) leave little doubt that it is likewise to be taken there as a singular. In a similar manner it is used in Patanjali’s comment on II 3, 66, v 2, “*Sobhanū khalu panineh sūtrasya kritih*”²¹ It would seem, therefore,

¹⁹ Similarly, e.g. *Kaṭīka* on *Manu* VII 43, निवेदिमर्तो ग्रन्थतश्चाभ्यसेत् See, also, “*Muir’s Original Sanskrit Texts*” vol. II p 175

²⁰ “We meet with *Brahma-sas*, the sayings of Brahmins, with *Sūtras*, i.e., the strings of rules” (p 512)

²¹ In the *Sūtra* VIII 3 90 and the *Gāṇa* to I 4 29 its sense is the literal one, it is mentioned, too, as a male and neuter in the *Gāṇa* to II 4 31.—It is necessary for me to observe, that in the quotations from Pāṇini I always distinguish between the text of the *Sūtras*, the *Varttikas* of Kātyāyana,—and those alone can be held to be

since no higher authority than Pāṇini can be quoted, that *sūtra*,—when used in the sense of a single rule,—is *paris pro toto*, and that its

Kātyāyāni's *Varttikas* which appear in the *Mahibhāṣya*—Patanjali's *Commentary*, the *Varttikas* found in the *Kāśikā* and in the *Siddhāntakāumudi* and these latter works. The importance of this distinction requires no remark, since all conclusions must become unsafe if the observations or instances of one writer are given as evidence for or against another especially before it has been decided whether, for instance, Pāṇini and Kātyāyāna were contemporaries or not. I regret that Professor Müller has paid little attention to this circumstance for he has frequently confounded the *Commentaries*, even the latest, with the text of the *Sūtras* of Pāṇini, and the very circumstance that he has sometimes pointed out the *commentary* as distinct from the text, and vice versa, creates still more confusion where he has omitted to do so. Thus, he quotes correctly (p. 44 note 2), "VIII 9, 05 (text), or, 'IV. 1, 176 (text) or, (p. 45, in the same note), 'IV 8, 08 (text), and I admit that an attentive reader will conclude that the quotations not marked 'text' are taken from the *commentary*, yet, VI 8, 75," is not *commentary* but text. And what does the word 'commentary' mean? *Patanjali*, *Kāśikā*, *Siddhānta*, or the *Calcutta Pāṇitī*? Again, when he says (p. 63, n. 1), "It is remarkable that, in Pāṇini also, the word *stoka* is always used in opposition to *Vedic literature*," not one of his quotations given to prove this important point, viz., IV 2, 66, 'IV 8, 102, 1, IV 3, 107, "II 4, 21,' belongs to Pāṇini, but the two former to *Patanjali*, and the two latter to the *Kāśikā*. On p. 347, n. 1, the *Śulbhāṇi* *Brāhmaṇāṇi* are attributed by him to Pāṇini himself, but Pāṇini says nothing about them. The instances to the quotations, of page 361, n. 3, ("IV 8, 101, IV 2, 64"), and those to n. 4 (IV 8, 108), belong to the *Kāśikā*,—none to Pāṇini. Nearly all the instances referred to, p. 361, n. 3, belong to *Patanjali*, and p. 369, nn., where "com" and "text" are contradistinguished, "VI 2 10 is not Pāṇini. P 370, n. 10, 'IV 8, 104' ought to have been marked 'com,' and a similar confusion exists, pp. 362, 371, 521, 522, etc., while on the other hand the *commentary* is correctly quoted in most of the instances of p. 181, 185, 193, 2, 2, 330, 339, 353, 357, though without any mention whether the *commentary* of *Patanjali* or of the *Kāśikā*, etc., be meant. The text is marked correctly, pp. 125, n. 2, 340, 368, n. 1 (IV 3, 128), 5, 369, n. 1, 3, 371, n. 2 & 372, n. 2, 8; 373, n. 3, and the *gāṇas* correctly, p. 369, n. 6, 370, n. 7, 8, 9, 10, 372, n. 8, 373, n. 8—*I* do not altogether think that this want of accuracy, in a writer like Professor Müller is entirely the result of oversight. It seems to me, on the contrary that the reason for it lies in the words of his note to p. 46—"It was impossible to teach or to use Pāṇini's *Sūtras* without examples which necessarily formed part of the traditional grammatical literature long before the great *Commentary* was written and are therefore of a much higher historical value than is commonly supposed. The coincidences between the examples used in the *Prātiśākhya*s and in Pāṇini show that these examples were by no means selected at random, but that they had long formed part of the traditional teaching. This coincidence to be of that value which is described in the words quoted, would require first the proof that the *Prātiśākhya*s, *sic* the existing ones of *haunaka* and Kātyāyāna are older than Pāṇini; otherwise it ceases to be of any consequence, as regards Pāṇini. As to his statement in general however, I must observe, that it can surely not be received as authoritative in the absence of all proof. I must myself, on the contrary, quite demur to its admissibility. The coincidences, in the first place between the instances of the existing *Prātiśākhya*s and those in the *Commentaries* of *Pāṇini*, considering the great bulk of the latter are perfectly trifling. Again, as to the other instances, about 200 *sūtras* of Pāṇini are not critiqued by Kātyāyāna nor commented upon by *Patanjali*, with regard to the instances, therefore, in this considerable number of rules, one oldest authority is nearly always the *Kāśikā*, the infallibility of which *Commentary* I have had sometimes reason to doubt. scarcely any instances of this category can be traced to the *Prātiśākhya*, and, unless it can be proved by Müller that these instances belong to antiquity, I do not consider it at all safe to draw any conclusions on them, as regards antiquity.

original sense is that of a whole collection of rules^{**} If such be the case the question arises, whether it is the figure implied by Muller's rendering "strings of rules" that has led to the word sūtra being used in the sense of "book," or not. As, I believe, I am able to show that Pāṇini was perfectly well acquainted with the art of writing, and that written books had even existed long before his time, my own opinion is, that the name for book was, as in the case of pāṭala and kānda, borrowed rather from a material fact than from the metaphorical idea of the logical connection of rules. And here I appeal to evidence, and to the admission which will be made to me that there are peculiarities and habits in the life of nations, which may be supposed to have existed at the earliest times such as we see them now. Everyone who has studied Sanskrit MSS in the libraries of London and Paris, will have found that the oldest specimens of these MSS are written on palm leaves, which are pierced in the middle, and kept together by means of a "string." The naturalness of the material of these MSS and the primitive manner in which they are bound,—if we can use the term "binding," for a parcel of leaves covered on both sides with oblong pieces of wood, and kept together by a string which runs through the middle,—bespeak, in my opinion, the habits of high antiquity, religiously preserved, up to a recent date by a nation which, beyond all other nations, is wont to cherish its antiquity, and to defend it, even in practical life, against the intrusions of modern arts. The MSS I have seen are certainly not more than a few centuries old, as may be easily inferred from the fragility of the material of which they are composed; but I hold them to be genuine specimens of the manner in which books were formed at the earliest periods of the civilization of India. No one, however, ought, I should conceive, to be less surprised at seeing

Bit on no account can it be consistent with critical research to use even the instances of Patañjali as evidence for or against the Vārtikas and much less for or against the Sūtras of Pāṇini since Kātyayana never gives instances but like Pāṇini himself, either lays down a general rule or specifies the words which are the subject of his rule

^{**} Compare also the following passage of the Mahābhāṣya (ed. Ballantyne, p. 68) Patañjali अथ व्याकरणमित्यस्य शब्दस्य क. पदार्थ । सूत्रम् ॥ Kātyayana सूत्रे पष्ठयर्थे उनुपपत्त ॥ Patañjali सूत्रे व्याकरणे पष्ठयर्थे नोपपद्यते व्याकरणस्य सूत्रमिति । कं तदन्यत्सूत्राद्याकरणम् । यस्याद् सूत्रं सात्, Kātyayataपष्ठयर्थे इति । द्वाभ्यामपि शब्दाभ्यामप्याध्याय्या प्रतिपादनाद्यतिरेकाभाव । सामान्यविशेषशब्दतया हु इयो प्रयोगो न विस्तृते । यदा त्वदाध्यायेकदेश सूत्रशब्देनोच्यते तदा पष्ठयर्थे उनुपपद्यते, Nagojibh. ननु सूत्रसमुदायस्य व्याकरणस्येदं सूत्रमित्युपपद्यते इति आह । द्वाभ्यामिति । सूत्रपदेनाप्याध्यायेव यदेच्यते तदापीच्यते इयं प्रयोग स न सिद्धेदित्यर्थ । ननु किमुच्यते पष्ठयर्थे उनुपपत्त इति पर्यायतया सहप्रयोगो उपि न स्यादत आह । सामान्यविशेषेति । सूत्रं सामान्य व्याकरणं विरोपः । सूत्रशब्देनाधार्या र्येव । तदेकदेशे हु योगव्यवहार एव येऽगे येऽगे उपतिष्ठत इत्यादै । यदाविति । सूत्राणि चाप्यतीयान इति भाष्ये वैश्यमाणवादिति भाव । वसुत पृक्देशस्य सूत्रन्वे उपि तस्यापि सादारपरम्परया वा व्याकरणत्वात्पृष्ठपृष्ठानुपपत्तिरेवेति तत्त्वम्

the word “string” becoming the name of “book,” than a German who would call his own book “Band,” translating, as it were, literally, the Sūskrit sūtra, and having recourse to the same figure of speech.

PROBABLE ORIGIN OF THE SŪTRA LITERATURE

Since I contrast, in these remarks, opinion with opinion,—not claiming any greater value for mine than that which may be permitted to the impressions and views of the individual mind,—I will not conceal that I hold the very nature of the works called “Sūtra,” to have arisen from, and depended on, the material which was kept together by the “string” I cannot consider it plausible that these works,—“written, as they are, in the most artificial, elaborate, and enigmatical form,”—which have been so well defined and described in Müller’s work (p 71, ff),—in which, to use his words, “shortness is the great object of this style of composition,”—should have been composed merely for the sake of being easily committed to memory “To introduce and to maintain such a species of literature,” argues Müller (p 74), “was only possible with the Indian system of education, which consisted in little else except implanting these Sūtras and other works into the tender memory of children, and afterwards explaining them by commentaries and glosses” But, though I do not dispute that these Sūtras were learnt, and are learnt, by heart up to this day, this circumstance alone does not explain why the matter thus to be inculcated must have been written in such a manner “that an author rejoiceth in the economizing of half a short vowel as much as in the birth of a son,” why, “every doctrine thus propounded, whether grammar, metre, law, or philosophy,” must have become “reduced to a mere skeleton” Müller himself says (p. 501),—and I fully concur with him,—that “we can form no opinion of the powers of memory in a state of society so different from ours as the Indian Parishes are from our universities Feats of memory, such as we hear of now and then, show that our notions of the limits of that faculty are quite arbitrary.” And, as he himself produces proof that the three Vedas and their Brāhmaṇas were learnt by heart, it does not appear at all likely that the peculiar enigmatical form of this Sūtra literature was invented simply to suit the convenience of a memory the capacities of which must have been extraordinary.

The reason which accounts for this form is, in my opinion, of a far more prosaic kind I hold that it is the awkwardness, the fragility, and, in some parts of India, perhaps the scarcity of proper natural leaves, which imposed upon an author the happy restraint of “economizing half a short vowel,” that the scantiness of the writing material compelled authors to be very concise and betrayed them, as a consequence, into becoming obscure.

Vaidik hymns and sacrificial Brāhmaṇas stand clearly, under a different predicament to works on grammar or philosophy A god cannot be invited with anūpanas to partake of the sacrificial meal, nor the religious feelings of a nation be roused with hard and unintelligible phraseology; but the purpose of a grammar may be attained, if there be need to give spirit, by an artificial method; and a philosophical doctrine may

be propounded in riddles, as we can testify in our own days. I draw here, of course, a line between genuine and artificial Sūtras,—the former, in my opinion, a creation of material necessity, the latter, a mere imitation when this necessity had ceased. The Sūtras of Pāṇini, in their dignified brevity, and the Sūtras of the Buddhists, in their tedious prolixity, are, probably, the two opposite poles;¹³ but it requires, I conceive, no great effort to see that there is a gap, even between Pāṇini and the Yogi Sūtras, nay, between him and the Mīmāṃsa and Veda-Inta-Sūtras as well as the Nyāya Sūtras and the Sāṅkhya-Pravachana.

OSCILLATIONS OF PROFESSOR WEBER CAUSED BY THE WORD GRANTHA
DOUBTS OF PROFESSOR MULLER CONCERNING THE
OCCURRENCE OF THIS WORD IN PĀṇINI
MEANING OF THIS WORD

Turning now to the second word, I have mentioned above, with the word Sūtra, I will say at once, that *grantha* likewise appears to me to have become the name of a book, not on account of the connection which exists between the different parts of a literary composition, but on account of the connection of the leaves which form its bulk. Professor Weber, who makes Pāṇini live about 110 years after Christ,¹⁴ but who, nevertheless, is favourable to the view I take of Pāṇini's acquaintance with writing, says, in the "Indische Studien," vol. iv, p. 89, that "the word *grantha*, which is several times used by Pāṇini, refers, according to its etymology, decidedly to written texts;" yet he informs us (p. 430), that "the word *grantha* is referred by Bohtlingk-Roth to the composition." Whether the latter remark is made 'pūjārtham,' or whether this author,—according to his habit of leaving the reader to make his own choice amongst a variety of conflicting opinions,—intended to establish a *tibhishā*,¹⁵ or whether he has altered his original view, is more than I can decide, since he has neither supported his first opinion with any explanatory remark, nor expressed adhesion or dissent when he concluded his fourth volume of the "Indische Studien."¹⁶

That *grantha*, according to its etymology, may mean "a literary composition," and that it has been used in that sense, is undeniable; yet I contend that it did not bear this metaphorical sense before it was used in the literal meaning of "a series of leaves," or, in other words,

¹³ The lamented Burnouf has given a description of these Sūtras in his invaluable work on the 'Buddhisme Indien' p. 38 ff. He particularly points out—and the fact is important—that amongst these caricatures of the Brāhmaṇic Sūtras there are several which have the enigmatical brevity of the latter; he distinguishes therefore, between Sūtras which may be attributed to Sakyamuni and Sūtras which belong to subsequent periods. See *Introduction à l'Histoire du Buddhisme Indien* p. 104 ff.

¹⁴ "Akademisches Vorlesungen über Indische Litteraturgeschichte" p. 200, 202

¹⁵ Such is really the case in the "Indische Litteraturgeschichte," p. 183 note

¹⁶ Should I have overlooked any observation of his on this word it would be quite unintentional since I have been guided in my quotations by the excellent index he has appended to his volumes. All I mean to convey is that the only justification he gives for the sense 'written work' of *grantha* viz. the etymology of the word does not appear to be a sufficient one since Muller is certainly right when he remarks (p. 522) that *granthā* nectere serere, might be taken also in a figurative sense

before it designated a written book. Previously to supporting this opinion with other arguments than those which are implied in my remarks on *sîtra*, I consider it necessary to remove the suspicion which has been thrown by Muller on this legitimate word. He quotes the four Sûtras in Pânini where it occurs,¹¹ but remarks in the note of p. 45, "The word *grantha*, used in the Sûtra (IV. 3, 87), is always somewhat suspicious." The reason for this sweeping doubt is contained, I suppose, in the words which immediately follow: "That some of the Sûtras which now form part of Pânini's grammar, did not proceed from him, is ac-

¹¹ Compare also IV. 3, 101, v. 2, 105, V. 2, the Kasikâ on V. 1, 10, v. 1 पौरुषेयो ग्रन्थः; on IV. 2, 62 व्राह्मणसदशो ग्रन्थो उन्माहाणम्, on IV. 2, 63 वसन्तसहचरितो ग्रन्थो वसन्त हस्युर्यते on III. 1, 89, v. 1 (a *vartikâ* of the Bhâradwâjîyis according to Patanjali) ग्रन्थये ग्रन्थ, on VII. 3, 4 स्वरमधिकृत्य कृतो ग्रन्थं सौवरो ग्रन्थ — Of one of the Sûtras he quotes *viz.* I. 3, 75 Muller observes (p. 522) that it is used there "so as to apply to the *Veda*." This remark concerns the commentator but not Pânini who, as he correctly states a few lines afterwards uses *grantha* as 'opposed to traditional work.' I do not believe that the commentator is absolutely wrong as will appear from my subsequent remarks but I think that he might have chosen a better instance. By commentary however I do not understand Patanjali's *Bhashya* which has no remark on this Sûtra nor the *Kasikâ* which has the counter instance, उद्यन्धति चिकित्सावेद्, the first trace of this instance I find in the *siddhîkâ* (fol. 167 1) — uncorrected in the *Praudhamanorama* — whence it has crept into more recent books *e.g.*, the abridged *Commentary* of Nâgoji on Pânini's Sûtras. This instance, one of many will corroborate my statement in note 21, that the compilation of the Calcutta Pandits — however meritorious and superior to its mutilated and unauthorised reprint — so far from admitting of being identified with Pânini himself ought not to be used as evidence for or against Pânini without a knowledge of the source whence it has derived its instances.

I feel grieved that I cannot leave this note without destroying one of the most poetical illusions of Professor Weber connected with this word *grantha*. From the stream of imaginary narrative which meanders through the desert of his *Literaturgeschichte* emerges *a propos* of the *Ramayana* (p. 182) the remark that this masterpiece of Hindu poetry was probably preceded by some other epic works. To prove that which cannot be proved without a knowledge of the date of the *Ramayana* which we have not — and without a knowledge of those epic poems which likewise we have not — but which is plausible enough without any proof he quotes Pânini's Sûtra IV. 3, 88 which treats on the titles of some *granthas*. Among these *granthas* (which are to his imagination epic poems) is one called *sisukrandiyâ*, which therefore is to him a forerunner of the *Ramayana*. The same ingenious conjecture occurs in his 'Indische Studien' vol. 1 p. 155 where he grows somewhat indignant at Wilson, who in his *Dictionary* renders this term a work treating of infantine or juvenile grievances for he adorns Wilson, for this rendering with a query and note of admiration (Wilson dict. 21!) Now, whether *sisukrandiyâ* ought to have been by right the title of an epic poem (in the same manner as we learn from another work what the words in the *Vedas* ought to have meant, if they had profited by the last results of Sanskrit and comparative philology), I am unable to say. Nevertheless I believe that Wilson is right, for the *Kasikâ* explains this word, शिशूना कन्दनं शिशुमद्दन तमधिकृत्य कृतो ग्रन्थं शिशुप्रन्दीय and the *Ganarâtau mahodadhi* has even an additional remark शिशो वालास्तेपा मन्दनमधिकृत्य कृतो ग्रन्थं शिशुप्रन्दीय। वालपुस्तक. — It is, in other terms, a book for children, written with reference to their cries, — a kind of nursery book for naughty babies.

knowledged by Kaiyyata (cf. IV. 3. 131, 132);" and in the first note of p 361, where he writes, "Pan, IV 3, 116, कृते यते ॥ Kaiyyata says that this Sūtra does not belong to Panini" That there are *three*, perhaps *four* Sūtras in Pānini's Gramma, which probably did not belong to his work originally, I will concede;** but amongst these three or four

**Dr Otto Boehltingk was the first who drew attention to this fact, in the volume which he has annexed to his garbled and unauthorized reprint of the meritorious labour of the Calcutta editors of Pānini. In a note of p xx of his Preface, he enumerates *seven* Sūtras, which, according to him, "were originally Vārttikas, and only at a later time became embodied into the text of Pānini, *viz.*, "IV I, 166, 167, IV 3, 132, V I 36, VI I, 62, 100, 136." It certainly raises a strong doubt as to the authenticity of a Sūtra, if it occurs also as a Vārttika of Katyāyana, but I hold the indispensable conditions for confirming such a doubt to be—1 that the Vārttika must really belong to Katyāyana, 2 that the wording of the Vārttika must be identical with that of the doubted Sūtra, and 3 that both must have the same tendency. In the first place, however, we are entitled to consider as Vārttikas of Katyāyana only such as occur in, and,—what is invariably then the case,—are commented upon by, the Bhāshya of Patanjali. Vārttikas found in the Kāsika or Siddhantalaumudi, but not in the Bhāshya, may be, and evidently are in many instances, the critical additions of later times. They afford no basis for doubting the genuineness of a Sūtra in Pānini, nor is a mere remark of Kaiyyata, the commentator of Patanjali, that "some consider a Sūtra as having been a Vārttika, sufficient to cancel the Sūtra from amongst the original rules. Secondly, if a Vārttika is not worded in the same manner as the Sūtra—excepting, of course, the usual addition of Katyāyana, दूर्ति वक्तव्यम्—*the mere similarity of both is no sufficient ground for doubting the originality of the Sūtra*, for the difference in the wording of the Vārttika may have, as it very frequently has the mere object of criticizing the manner in which Pānini delivered his rule. Lastly, if the Vārttika and Sūtra are identical in words but not in tendency, there is not the slightest ground for doubting the authenticity of the Sūtra though Kaiyyata may historically record that "some have preferred to "throw it among the Vārttikas. In applying these tests to the enumeration given by Dr Boehltingk, we find, that IV I, 166 does not occur literally in the Vārttika 3 of IV I 163, for, though the Calcutta editors write वृद्धस्य च पूजायामि, and append their mark, that it occurs in the Siddhīkā (the printed edition of this work contains on p 66a line 1, the words वृद्धस्य च पूजायामिति याच्यम्),—*the wording of this Vārttika, in the Bhāshya is (MS., E III, 330) वृद्धस्य च पूजाया युवसंज्ञा वक्तव्यम् (probably युवसंज्ञेति याच्यम्)*—but even if the additional words belong as is possible, not to the Vārttika, but to the Bhāshya it is clear that the tendency of the Vārttika and that of the Sūtra are not identical for in the Vārttika the rule is absolute, while in the Sūtra, IV I, 166 it is optional through the anuritti of the preceding Sūtra of IV I, 165. Therefore, Patanjali comments on the Vārttika in question, तत्रभवन्तो गार्यायणा । तत्रभवन्तो वाच्यायना without the option recorded by the Kāsika on IV I, 166 in the instances तत्रभवन्नागर्यमयो गार्यो वा । वाच्यायनो वास्त्वो वा । दाचायणो दाचिर्वा—A similar negative conclusion applies to IV I 167. The Vārttika mentioned by the Calcutta editors to IV I 162 does not occur in the Bhāshya. It is not identical, even in the Siddhīkā, with the Sūtra IV I, 167, it has not the same tendency as the Sūtra the latter being optional, the former absolute. There is no ground consequently, for doubting that the "some" of Kaiyyata, who maintain the antiquity of the Sūtra, are correct—IV. 3, 132 is suspicious, for it occurs as a Vārttika in the Bhāshya to IV 3, 131 and fulfills the three above-named conditions equally so V I, 36 which is a Vārttika to V. I, 35, and VI I, 62, which occurs as a Vārttika to VI I, 61. On the other hand,

Sūtras out of 3096, there is no Sūtra containing the word *grantha*; for I believe Muller was mistaken when he says that Kātyāyata acknowledges that the Sūtra IV 3, 116 did not belong to Pāṇini. I have not been able to discover anywhere, in the Mahābhāṣya, either by the aid of my memory or my indices, that Kātyāyata expresses any opinion whatever on this Sūtra; but even should the mistake be mine, there would be little importance in the mere doubt of Kātyāyata, since Patañjali, when commenting on the Vārtikas to IV. 3, 105, distinctly quotes twice the Sūtra IV 3, 116, which is a positive proof that it existed at his time, and was genuine enough ^{**}.

THE MEANING OF GRANTHA IN A PASSAGE FROM THE MAHĀBHĀRATA

I will now give an instance from the Mahābhārata, which, in my belief, would be perfectly unintelligible, if *grantha* were taken only in the sense of "composition," and not also in that of "written book," or "volume." I am met here, however, with an objection; viz., that I ought first to show that the Mahābhārata possesses the qualification which Muller has appended to his quoted remark, or, in other words,

VI I, 100, need not be rejected absolutely, for its wording is not identical with that of the Vārtika of VI I 99, nor is it clear that both coincide in tendency. VI I, 99, restricts the rule to the condition of the word इति following a combination like पटपट्ट; VI I, 100 exempts a similar combination if ending in आच् from this condition (comp. V 4, 57) it would seem, therefore, that the Vārtika to VI I, 99 maintains the condition, but corrects the option वा, by the word नित्यम्. I must admit however, that Patañjali gives the instance पटपट्टयति, which would countenance the probability of this Sūtra, also, not being an original one. Lastly, the Sūtra VI I 136, अङ्गस्यासव्यवाये एषि neither occurs as a Vārtika in the Bhāṣya, nor even as a Vārtika in the Kāśika or the Siddhākāśika, nor has its original existence, in fact, been doubted by anybody except Dr. Boehtlingk, who writes in his so called Commentary (p 266) 'This Sūtra has been interpolated at a later time, it owes its origin to the following two Vārtikas to the preceding Sūtra, अङ्गस्यासव्यवाय उपस्थ्यानम् ॥ १ ॥ अङ्गस्यासव्यवाये च ॥ २ ॥ Compare Siddhākāśika p 144a;' where, however, the reader will not find anything relating to the subject, while, on p 145a he will discover the Sūtra IV I 136, such as it is in the Calcutta edition of Pāṇini. That both Vārtikas are a criticism of Kātyāyana, who clearly disapproved of the condensed wording of the Sūtra 136 did not even occur to the mind of Dr. Boehtlingk but considering the condition of his knowledge of Pāṇini, as displayed in this "Commentary," and even in his very last work, I cannot but express the belief that his *avrogāvya* to strike out a Sūtra of Pāṇini, goes for very little indeed,—especially as it touches upon the sphere of reasoning.

"There is no Bhāṣya on IV 3, 116, and, therefore, no commentary of Kātyāyata on this Sūtra. On the Vārtika 2, to IV 3, 105, कृते ग्रन्थे मणिकादिभ्यो इति which is a criticism on Pāṇini IV 3, 116, on account of the addition, मणिकादिभ्यो इति, and, therefore, a proof that the latter Sūtra was originally existing, Patañjali says कृते ग्रन्थे इत्यत्र (i.e., IV 3, 116) मणिकादिभ्यो इति वक्तव्यः मणिकाभिः कृते मणिकम्; and on a third Vārtika योगविभागात्सिद्धं which is not printed in the Calcutta edition, he observes, योगविभाग करिष्यते। कृते ग्रन्थे (IV 3, 116) तत् संज्ञायां (IV 3, 117) न कृत इत्येतसिद्धं यथाविहितं प्रत्ययो भवति

that it is a work of "the early literature," since he says that "grantha does not mean *pustaka*, or book, in 'the early literature,' while he admits that it has that sense in the later literature. Both Muller and Weber agree that there was a *Mahābhārata* at the time of *Āśvalāyana*, since they quote a passage from his *Gṛhya-Sūtra*, where the name occurs (Muller, p 42, Weber, "Literaturgeschichte" p 56), and neither denies that a work prior to *Āśvalāyana* would have a claim to be called a work of the earlier literature. Both scholars however question,—and very rightly too,—the claim of the *present* *Mahābhārata*, to having been *that* *Mahābhārata* which is quoted by *Āśvalāyana*. It is, of course, impossible for me to treat here, as it were incidentally, not merely of the question concerning the age of the *Mahābhārata*, but the relative ages of the various portions of this work, since it must be evident to everyone who has read it, that it is, in its present shape, a collection of literary products belonging to widely distant periods of Hindu literature. To do justice to a subject of this kind, I should have not merely to enter into details which would be here out of place, but to discuss the prior important question, as to how far the printed text in which this colossal epos is generally known to us, may be relied upon, and I should feel all the more bound to do so, as my collations of considerable portions of this text with the best MSS., in this country and abroad, fully convince me that it is neither advisable to make a translation of the *Mahābhārata*,—a labour which, if done once, should be done once for all,—nor to found a detailed criticism of the several portions of this work, on the printed text, however much I admire the industry, patience, and scholarship, of those who have accomplished the task of laying before us a first edition of this enormous work. Without their labours, it would have been still more difficult than it now is, to perceive the defects of the MSS.; but this tribute, which I gladly pay to their merits does not dispense with my expressing the conviction, derived from my own labours, that no conclusion founded on special passages of the present text, is safe, before the differences of the MSS.—sometimes great—are thoroughly sifted and discussed with the help of the Commentaries.²⁰

On the names of the leading characters in this poem, as occurring
in the Sūtras of and the commentaries on Pāṇini

²⁰ Weber (Indische Studien I p 148) and Muller (pp 44-45 note) give a valuable synopsis of the leading characters of the *Mahābhārata* as they occur in the text and the commentaries of Pāṇini. This synopsis I conceive must convince even the most sceptic, that Pāṇini cannot have ignored the renown of these personages nor consequently, it is probable the real or poetical events on which this renown was founded. It forms the subject-matter of the *Mahābhārata*. Some stress has been laid by both scholars on the circumstance that the name *Pāṇini* or *Pāṇavaya* does not occur in the Grammar of Pāṇini (Weber, Indische Studien" p 148, Muller, p 46) but since both have constructed their list as well from the *Gītās* and commentaries as from the Sūtras it will not be amiss to add that *Pāṇava* occurs in *Kāliyata's* gloss on *Patañjali* IV 1 169 v 4 and in the *Kātiśā* on IV. 1 171, when the observation of the former implies what I pointed out in a former remark that the word *Pāṇi* does not occur in the *Vārtikā*, as the name of *Yaduśīthīra*.

In proceeding now to give an instance which I hold to belong to the early (though not the earliest) portions of the Mahâbhârata, I must submit, therefore, to having its validity acknowledged or rejected, according to the value the reader may attach to my opinion. Not to be misunderstood, however, I will add that I consider it as posterior to Pânnî. But, as the date I shall assign hereinafter to this grammarian will be older than the date originated by Dr Boehthung, the passage in question will still be entitled to rank among the earlier literature. In the *Santiparvan* of the Mahâbhârata we read : " "Vasistha spoke (to Janaka) "The doctrines of the Vedas and the (philosophical) Sâtras which thou hast uttered, are rightly uttered by thee, but thou understandest them not ; for the text (*grantha*) of the Vedas and Sâtras is possessed by thee, yet, king, thou dost not know the real sense of the text (*grantha*) according to its truth ; for he who is merely bent upon possessing the text (*grantha*) of the Veda and Sâstra, but does not understand the real sense of the text, his possession of them is an idle one ; he carries the weight of the book (*grantha*) who does not know the sense of it, but he who knows the real sense of the text (*grantha*), his is not an idle acquisition of the text" In this instance, *grantha* is used in its double sense, composition or text, and book ; for there can be no doubt that in the passage, " *Bharam sañjate tasya granthasya*," "he carries the weight of the *grantha*," the last word can only refer to the material bulk of the book.

THE PHRASE GRANTHATO RTHATASCHA, COMPARED WITH
KĀNDĀ AND PADARTHA

I will conclude my observations on this word with a remark on the phrase, "gīāntha to'thatascha," which must undoubtedly be rendered in the sense proposed by Muller, "according to the text and according to the meaning." An analogous contrast, exactly in the same sense, is that of *kānda* and *padārtha*, which is of frequent occurrence in Mīmāṃsā writers.¹¹ That, in the latter case, the meaning "text" is a secondary one of *kānda*, no one will dispute, since there is nothing in this

father, because the word *Pitālaka* is too common a derivation to require a grammatical rule. Vārtikā पाण्डोप्रयृष्ट वक्तव्य — *Patinjali पाण्डयः*—Kalyāya, पाण्डारिति । वाहूदिप्रमृतिपु (IV 1, 96 etc.) येषां दशर्णे लौकिके गोवधार इति (words of *Patanjali* on a previous Vārtikā) व्यवाद्युपिष्टिरदिपितु पाण्डोप्रयृष्टाद्वचिन । पाण्डय इत्येव भवति — *Kāskā* on the same Vārtikā (differently worded quoted in the Calcutta edition under the Sūtra IV 1, 103 in the MSS under IV 1, 171) पाण्डय । अन्यमापाण्डय पृष्ठ The word *पाण्डरेय* occurs in the *Kāskā* on the Gāṇa IV 1, 123

११३३०-११३४२ (the corrections are founded on the com and MSS.) यदेतदुन्न
भवता वेदशास्त्रनिदर्शनम् । पूर्वमेतदथा चात्म गृह्णति (for चेतप्रियू) तथा भगान् ॥ धारांते हि
द्वया प्रन्य उभयोर्वेदशास्त्रयो । न च प्रन्यस्य तत्त्वाणि यथादर्शं (for यथा च त्वं) परेषाः ॥ यो
हि येदे च शास्त्रे च प्रन्यथारणतापरः । न च प्रन्यापैतत्त्वाद्वान्य गद्वरणं वृषा ॥ भारं स यद्गे
तस्य प्रन्यस्यायै न येति य । यस्तु प्रन्यापैतत्त्वाणो नास्य प्रन्यथामां वृषा ॥

" *E. g., In मालिखाना Jaiminiya nyāya māla-ritata, where वार्षिकानुयाय, is contrasted with पद्मानाथानुयाय for instance, १ २ ३ ४ ५ ६ ७, etc, etc etc*

word which points to "composition." It must be allowable therefore to conceive, that its synonyme *grantha* may, through the same mental process as *lāṅda* have assumed the secondary meaning of "text."

PROFESSOR MULLER AND WEBER ASSUME THAT
THE WORD VARNA DOES NOT MEAN
A WRITTEN LETTER.

REFUTATION OF THIS VIEW

There is another important word which Müller will not admit as evidence of Pāṇini's having had a knowledge of writing,—for it is used by this grammarian,—the word *tarna*. But the only reason he gives for invalidating its testimony is, that this word which, etymologically and otherwise, really means "colour,"—when having the sense of letter "does not mean colour in the sense of a painted letter, but the colouring or modulation of the voice" (p. 507). In the absence of any proof for this assertion he adds, in a note—"Aristotle, Probl. v. 39 τὰ δὲ γραμμata παθη τοιτῆς φωνῆς." In this respect he coincides, for once, with Weber, not merely in the point at issue, but also in the remarkable brevity of his argument. For all that Weber says on the subject ("In dische Studien," iv. 109) is "The name *tarna* is probably (wohl) to be understood of the 'colouring' specializing (specialisirung) of the sound, compare *ralta*, which is employed in the Rikpratisakhyā in the sense of 'nasalised', (nasalirt). With writing it has nothing to do." Now, I confess, that I always become somewhat suspicious when I meet with a definition which prefers the language of similes to plain prose. How, I must ask, for instance, does the figure of colouring apply to the notion of specializing? It is striking, moreover, that Weber, who starts with a probability, in two lines reaches a positive certainty, founded only on the analogy of *ralta*. And, in turning again to Müller's words, I must, in the first place, ask, what does an analogy taken from Aristotle prove for the Sanskrit word? But, supposing it could prove anything, would it not be more plausible to make use of it in favour of the contrary conclusion to that which Müller has drawn? Aristotle speaks of *γραμμata* which word applies originally to none but written signs, and if he may apply *γραμμa* to the voice, might not the same liberty be claimed for a Sanskrit word meaning a written letter? Again, the notion of "colouring," itself supposes necessarily a condition which may be called indifferent or colourless green, blue, red, are colours, because there is an indifferent condition, called white. A coloured sound is not intelligible, except on the supposition that there is also an indifferent, or uncoloured sound. Hence we speak, for instance, in modern terminology, of *i*, *u*, *ɛ*, *e*, *o*, etc., as coloured vowels, because we contrast them with the fundamental uncoloured vowel *a*. But I shall show that *tarna* is applied indifferently to all vowels, inclusive of *a*. *

VARNA AND KARA MEAN A LETTER OF THE ALPHABET

I do not dispute that *tarna* is used like *γραμμa*, 'letter,' also for the spoken letter,³³ but I hold that there is strong evidence to prove

³³ Thus Nagajibhatta explains in the commencement of the *Vivaraṇa* नादो वर्णः, or Kātyāyana says धात्रवन्तो वे वर्णः etc.

that its *original* sense is that of *written* letter, is arising naturally from its primitive sense "colour, and that the appearance of this word in Pāṇini or other authors, may serve as one of many arguments that they practised the art of writing. To make good this statement I must advert to another word which may also mean letter, and in this sense is always the latter part of a compound, the former of which is the letter itself designated by it *i.e.*, the word *lāṭa*, *e.g.* *a lāṭa*, the letter *a*, *i kāṭa*, the letter *i*, etc. It corresponds with *tarṇa*, in the synonymous expressions, *a tarṇa*, *i tarṇa*, etc. Katyayana looks upon it in the light of an affix, probably on account of its being always compounded with the letter itself, and Kṛiṣṇa enlarges upon the expression *varṇa*, in saying that this word means, in the Vāttika quoted, "that which expresses a *tarṇa* or inadequately realizes a *tarṇa* (*i.e.*, is the adequate value of a *varṇa*). He, therefore, like Katyayana, contrasts the purport of *lāṭa* and *tarṇa* though *a lāṭa* and *a tarṇa*, *i kāṭa* and *i-tarṇa*, may appear to be,—and we shall see from what reason—convertible terms". To understand, however, this contrast, and the use of two other terms which I shall have to name I will first give instances from Pāṇini, the Vāttikas of Katyayana, and the Bhāṣya, which will illustrate the manner in which these grammarians have used both terms.

USE OF THE TWO WORDS IN THE WORKS OF PĀṇINI KATYAYANA AND PATANJALI

We find *a lāṭa*, Śivas 1, v 1 (omitted in the Cilecttrī edition of Pāṇini), II 4, 30, v 4, IV 4, 128, v 2, III 3, 108 v 3, P, —*ā lāṭa* Śivas 1, v 1 (om Cilec ed), I 1, v 4 I 1 56, v 11, III 1, 8, P, VI 1 87, kar 2 P, —*i lāṭa* III 3, 108 v 3 P IV 4 128 v 2, —*i lāṭa*, VII 1, 39, v 3, VIII 2, 15 v 1 P, —*u kāṭa* VI 1, 183 pri 1 P, —*ii lāṭa* P on Śivas 2 and Vātt (om in the Cilec ed), I 1, 9 v 2, VI 1, 101, v 1 P, VIII 4, 1, v 1 *ii kāṭa*, VI 1 87 v 1 (om Cilec ed), —*hi lāṭa*, P on Śivas 2, Śivas 4, v 5 (om Cilec ed), I 1 9, v 2, VI 1, 101, v 2 P, —*e lāṭa*, P on a Vātt to Śivas 3 (om Cilec ed), IV 3, 23, v 6, —*o lāṭa*, P on a Vātt to Śivas 3 (om Cilec ed), V 3, 72 v 1, VII 2, 1 v 1, 2, 3 III 3, 20 v 1, *au lāṭa* VIII 2 89, P, —*la lāṭa*, P on a Vātt to Śivas 4 5 (om Cilec ed) VII 3 41 v 1 P, —*ṅga kāṭa*, I 3, 12, v 1 P, —*cha lāṭa* P on III 1, 8, —*jha lāṭa* and *ūn lāṭa*, P on a Vātt to Śivas 8 (om Cilec ed) —*na lāṭa*, P on *u* Vātt to

" Vāttika 3 III 3 108 धर्णीकार । नियाजि—वर्णात्कारमत्ययो वत्तस्य । अकार हकार Kātyāyata—वर्णादिति वर्णावचिनो वर्णानुकरणादित्यर्थे । यहुत्प्रहृण्यावचिना भवति । अस्य व्याख्याति (VII 4 39) यथा तथा वचिद्वर्णसमुदयानुकरणादिति पृष्ठार हति To remove the apparent strangeness of the manner in which I have rendered अनुकरण which usually meansimitating doing in conformity with I subjoin to other instances from Kātyāyata where the same word is also used by him in the sense of adequate or real value Kātyāyana having given this derivation of अकार, ' अभोतेर्यस्मी अतिक मत्प्रत्यये ' Kātyāyana observes अभोतेर्यति । सरन्प्रत्ययस्यानुकरणलोपे कृतेऽनुकरण सर इति etc. or मर्त्यापाताराणि धमामान्य तदनुकरणमत्राकार

śivas. 6 (om. Calc. ed.) ; VI. 1, 1, v. 10 ; VI. 4, 120, v. 1 ; VIII. 3, 55, v. 1 P.—*ta-lāra*, P. on a Vārtt. to Śivas 4 (om. Calc. ed.) ; VII. 2, 48, v. 1 ; *tha-kāra*, P. on VII. 4 46—*da-kāra* and *pa-kāra*, P. on a Vārtt. to Śivas. 4 ;—*dha-kara*, VIII. 3, 78, v. 1, P. and v. 3 ;—*na-lāra*, P. on a Vārtt. to Śivas. 2 ;—*bha-lāra*, P. on a Vārtt. to Śivas 8 (om. Calc. ed.) ; V. 3, 72, v. 1 ;—*ma-kāra*, P. on a Vārtt. to Śivas 7 ;—*ya-kāra*, P. on a Vārtt. to Śivas 6 ;—*la-kāra*, I. 3, 3, v. 2 ;—*va-kāra*, P. on a Vārtt. to Śivas. 5 ;—*śa-kāra*, P. on a Vārtt. to Śivas. 5 ;—*sha-kāra*, VI. 1, 1, v. 10 ;—*sa-lāra*, V. 3, 72, v. 1 ;—*ha-kāra*, P. on a Vārtt. to Śivas. 5 (all these Vārtt. to the Śivas. om. in the Calc. ed.).

On the other hand : *a-tarṇa*, P. on a Vārtt. to Śivas. 1 (om. Calc. ed.) ; IV. 1, 1, v. 3 ; VI. 3, 97, v. (not of K, but mentioned in P) ; VIII. 3, 64, v. 3 ; VII. 1, 82, v. 2 ; and in the *Sūtras* : VI. 1, 182 ; VI. 2, 90 ; VI. 3, 112 ;—*i-tarṇa*, P. on a Vārtt. to the Śivas. 1 and 3 (om. Calc. ed.) ; VII. 2, 10 P. ; VIII. 2, 106, v. 1 P. ; *Sūtra* VII. 4, 53 ; *u-vaiṇa*, P. on a Vārtt. to Śivas. 1 (om. Calc. ed.) ; V. 3, 83, v. 5, and Kār. 1 ; VII. 2, 10 P. ; VIII. 2, 106, v. 1. P. ;—*tarṇa y* (or *y-vaiṇa*) *Sūtra* VII. 4, 53 “

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO WORDS

— The foregoing combinations of a letter of the alphabet with *kāra* and *tarṇa* are, I believe, all that occur in the grammarians named, and they show at once, that *kāra* enters into composition with all vowels and all consonants, provided the latter are *followed by the letter a*—(for it may be assumed without risk that the absence of some combinations, such as *lha-lāra*, *gha-kāra*, etc., is merely a matter of chance, not of necessity ; compare the additional instances of the note 33)—while *tarṇa* is joined merely to vowels and to such consonants as are *without a vowel sound*” (cf. *Sūtra*, VII. 1, 53)

And in the *Kāsikī*, etc

“The instances quoted are restricted as I have stated to the *Sūtras* of Panini, the Vārttikas of Kātyāyana, as they occur in the Bhāṣya of Patañjali, and to the latter, (marked P) some of the above-named Vārttikas are marked in the Calcutta edition, ‘Kāsī, or ‘Siddh-k’, but they occur too in the Bhāṣya. These instances might have been multiplied and had it been necessary to add quotations from the *Kāsikī*, *Siddh-k* or the words of the Calcutta editors f. 1 by *ta-lāra* VIII. 1, 91, *Kāsikī* ; *Kātyāyana* on Śivas. 9.—*tha-lāra* VIII. 3, 7 *Kāsikī* VIII. 3, 51, *Kāsikī*, VIII. 4, 51 *Kāsikī*—*da-lāra* VIII. 3, 55 *Kāsikī*,—*tha-kāra* I. 2, 23 *Kāsikī* VIII. 3, 7, *Kāsikī*, VIII. 3, 34 *Kāsikī*,—*na-kāra* VIII. 2, 16 *Kāsikī*—*ha-kāra* I. 2, 23, *Kāsikī* VIII. 4, 51 *Kāsikī*—*sa-kāra* I. 4, 8, *Kāsikī*—or *ri-vaiṇa* I. 1, 9, v. 1 *Siddh-k*, V. 7, 83, v. 5 *Kāsikī* (thus quoted in the Calcutta edition, but not met with in the MSS. 2441 of the I. I. II.) VIII. 4, 1 v. 1 *Kāsikī* and *Siddh-k*—*tri-vaiṇa* I. 1, 9 v. 1, *Siddh-k*. The very unusual *ra-kāra* in the Commentary to VIII. 2, 15, (it occurs chiefly in mystical not in grammatical works e.g. in the dialogue between Lālita and Kārtikeya of the Rudrayāmaṭaṭītra) I must leave to the responsibility of the Calcutta editors, for the Bhāṣya on the Vārttika does not speak of the letter *ra*, and the *Kāsikī* and *Siddh-k* have instead of *ra-kāra* the usual *ra-pūṇāṭī*. I have omitted of course to quote passages of the *Sūtras* etc. where *vaiṇa* or *kāra* have other meanings than letter.

“Panini never uses *tarṇa* of a consonant followed by the vowel *a*—but the late *Kāsikī* writes अम् दृष्टेनावर्णी, or अम् दृष्टेनावर्णी, or अम् दृष्टेनावर्णी, if the MSS. are to be trusted.

Since an uttered sound may comprise more than one letter, we find *lāta*, as Kaiyata already remarks (compare note 31), equally applied to complicated sounds, e.g., *ela lāta* (III 4, 67, v 3 and 6; I. 4, 8, Kāś; VI. 2, 80 P.); and Pāṇini, who never uses it for expressing a simple letter-sound (because his terms are such as apply to a written book), applies it to the sound *tashat* in *vashat-lāra* (I. 2. 35). *Varna* is never used in a similar manner.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN VARNA AND KARANA

In this respect *kāra* coincides with the term *karana*, which occurs in combinations quite analogous, e.g., *iti-karana*, I. 1, 41, v. 1, P.; IV. 2, 21, v. 2, P.; *dul-karana*, VII. 1, 25, v. 3; *dit-karana*, VII. 1, 25, v. 4; 3, 118, v. 6; *chit-karana*, III. 1, 8, v. 4, P.; or even combined with *lāra* as *etakāra-larana*, VI. 2, 80, Kīś, etc. *Varna*, on the contrary, is used by Kātyāyana and Patanjali in the same manner as in Pāṇini: Sūtra which speaks of the *varna y*, *viz.*, of *unutterable consonantal sounds*, which therefore must have been written signs. Thus, a discussion is raised by Kātyāyana on the Sūtra VI. 4, 49, which treats of the elision of *ya*, in reference to the question whether *ya* is to be dropped or merely *η*; and on this occasion, he calls the former *sāṅghata*, "combination," (*viz.*, of *y* and *a*), and the latter *tarma*. In a *Vṛtti* to VII. 3, 50, a similar discussion is started on *tha*; again, *tha* is called there *sāṅghāta* and the unpronounceable *th tarma*. The same term *sāṅghāta* is applied to *la* in a *Vṛtti* to VII. 3, 44, and *tarma* to the vowelless *h*.

THE MEANING OF UPADESA

The same sense of *vaiśiṇa* is conveyed by a definition of Patanjali concerning the term *upadeśa*, which literally means demonstration, and then assumes the special sense of grammatical mode of denoting, or of grammatical appearance, and of the book in which such grammatical denotations occur. " it means, for instance, the

तुराद्, VI 2, 50, Ka.lik. (तु being affix अच्छन्ते, VII 1, 20, v 4 P (अद् being the ending of pronouns in the neuter) अयम् तुराद् VII 1 50, v 1 P (अयम् being the de cension ending)

²² Patanjali on the Sâtra I 3 2 कि पुनरपदेशनम् । शास्त्रम् । Vârttika on 1 3, 3 सिद्ध तु व्यवसितान्त्यवान्, on which Patanjali comments मिद्दमेतत् । कथम् । व्यवसितान्त्यवान् । व्यवसितान्त्यवान् हुलिसंही भगवत्तिव वक्ष्यम् (Kittiyana, says Patanjali, ought rather to have said इयम्.. भगवति, these latter words of Patanjali have been mistaken by the Calcutta editors for the Vârttika itself and they of course again make their appearance in the reprint of Dr. Boeckhlingk, who besides and for the sake of greater clearness adds 'Fin Vârttika' and prints ^{२३४} इयम्. If he had looked into the Mahâbhâshya and amended the 'Vârttika' from the original work — Patanjali then continues) के पुनर्व्यवसिता । धातुप्रातिपदिकप्रयशनिवालगामादेशा — In account of the double sense of *पुनर्व्यवसिता* 'book etc. and 'grammatical appearance,' Patanjali raises this question when speaking of the Sâtra VI 1 45 कथमिद विज्ञाने । पृष्ठ उपदेशा इति । आहोस्तिवेजन्त यदुपदेशा इति, when Kârttika is still more explicit कथमिति । यदोपदेशशब्देन वरणमापनेन शास्त्रमुच्यते तदा मिगेष्यम्यानुपादानादेश मानि

grammatical appearance of the radicals in the Dhritupitha, or the Dīptupitha itself; and, in like manner, the grammatical appearance of the letters in the Sivasūtras, "the root of Pāṇini's Grammat," as Nagoyibhūta calls them. For, when Kātyāyana, in several introductory Vṛttikas, enlarges on the purpose of the letters, as they occur in the Sivasūtras, Patanjali asks :¹⁶ "Now, what is *upadeśa*, or technical denotation? Pronunciation. How is that? The radical *dis*, 'to show,' (whence *upi-deśa* is derived) implies the act of pronouncing; for, after having pronounced the *tarnas*, one may say, 'these *tarnas* are *upadishta*, or technically denoted.' " Patanjali distinguishes, therefore, between *tarnas* and *upadishta-tarnas*; only the latter are, according to him, the pronounceable *tarnas*; and it would have been useless for him to draw this distinction, if *tarna* itself originally signified the spoken letter.

What the simple consonantal sound is to the pronounceable consonant, the simple vowel is, in some measure, to the diphthong or combined vowel sound. It is, perhaps, on this ground that, while we find a general name for vowel-letters, *etc.*, *śvara-tarṣa* (IV, 1, 3, v. 7), the compounds, *e-tarna*, *o-tarna*, *ai-tarna*, *au-tarna*, neither occur in Pāṇini nor Kātyāyana, for *e* is *a* and *i*, *o*—*u* and *u*, *ai*—*o* and *e*, *au*—*u* and *o*. Their general name is, in "older grammars," *samāhāra-pāṭha*; and in Kātyāyana and Patanjali, for *e* and *o*, *pradishta-tarna*, for *ai* and *au*, *samāhāra-pāṭha*.¹⁷ The Kāśikī, it is true, speaks of these vowels simply as *tarnas*;¹⁸ but, in the first place, it does not form a compound *e-tarna*, *etc.*, like *i-tarna*, *etc.*; and, secondly, however great the value of this commentary, it cannot always be considered as fulfilling the conditions of critical accuracy, and cannot therefore be quoted as evidence against Pāṇini or Kātyāyana. But even if there were in Pāṇini's Grammat such compounds as *e-tarṣa*, *o-tarṣa*, their occurrence would not invalidate the conclusion that *tarna* represents the written sign, since it is the combination of *tarna* with a consonant that alone can enable us to decide the question at issue. At least there are other values in Pāṇini which could not have been *upadeśa*, though they are an essential portion of his Grammat, will be seen afterwards.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN VARNA, KARA, KARANA AND AKSHARA

How far *vara* coincides, and is synonymous with *al shāra*, "syllable," or not, is obvious: it coincides with the latter term when it means vowel, otherwise not.¹³ The distinction between these terms may therefore be comprised in the following definition. *lāra* denotes the pronounceable sound, which must always be one syllable, but may also consist of more than one syllable; if denoting one syllable, it may mean a simple vowel (*a, ā, i, ī, u, ī, i, ī, lāra*), or a complex vowel (*e, o, ai, au*), or a simple consonant made pronounceable by a vowel (usually the vowel *a*); *Karana* denotes more especially the pronounceable sound represented either by more than one syllable or by one syllable containing more than one consonant. *Varna*, on the contrary, implies merely the simple letter,—among vowels, especially the simple vowels, among consonants, merely the single consonant, not accompanied with a vowel sign. Lastly, *al shāra* means "syllable" in our sense of the word, and may sometimes therefore coincide in value with *lāra*, or *vara*, in the same way that *lāra* and *vara* are apparently convertible terms when they are the latter parts of compounds, the former of which are *a, ā, i, ī, u, ī, i, ī, lāra*.

I have, in the foregoing observations, purposely abstained from alluding to the use which has been made of these terms in the existing Prātisikhyas of Saunaka and Kātyāyana; in the first place, because it was my object to show their meaning in Pāṇini's work, as well as in those old Commentaries which have strictly adhered to his terminology, and because it would have been an uncritical proceeding to confound the meaning or bearing of these terms in works belonging to a different class of Hindu literature;¹⁴ secondly, because the date of these works, themselves,—or, at least, their relative position towards Pāṇini,—will have to be ascertained, before any conclusion can be drawn from a difference which may have existed between them in the use of these terms. Though I shall recur to this point, I may now state my belief, that even if grammatical works older than Pāṇini had used *vara* in the general sense of *al shāra*, such a circumstance would not disprove the fact that *vara* might have meant a written sign even before Pāṇini's time. There

is, for instance, in introductory Vārttika of Kātyāyana which countenances the assumption that *taīna* had such a sense in some older grammar, but the very manner in which it is brought before the reader shows that Kātyāyana contrasts the use of this word in Pāṇini with that in his predecessor, and confirms, therefore, the definition I have given before. At the same time, it leaves the question undecided whether *taīna* was, or was not, a written letter in this older work. The Vārttika I am alluding to occurs at the end of the general introduction, and refers to the following Vāedic passage mentioned in the beginning of the introduction: "Whoever establishes this speech according to its words, its accent, and its syllables, he is fit to institute or to perform sacrificial work, and that it is a duty to study grammar, follows from the words 'let us be fit to institute, or to perform sacrificial work'".⁴⁵ The Vārttika then says "akṣara, you must know, means *alshara* i.e., not perishable, and continues, 'or *akṣara* comes from *as*, 'to pervade,' with the affix *sara* (Kātyāyana 'because it pervades the sense'),' and concludes, 'or they call *varna* so in the Sūtra of a former (grammarian) [Patañjali] i.e., 'or in the Sūtra of a former (grammarian) *taīna* has the name *alshara*' Kātyāyana 'For it is said in another grammar, that the *taīnas* are *alsharas*' Nagojibhatta 'In a similar manner the term *alsharasamīkhyā* means a multitude of *taīnas*, as seen in the Vedas'".⁴⁶

THE WORD UDAYI IS A FURTHER PROOF THAT PĀṇINI WAS ACQUAINTED WITH WRITING

Before I proceed to give other evidence as to Pāṇini's knowledge of writing, I will draw attention to two words which have here a claim to notice, and first to the word *śidhūna*. It is used adverbially in the sense of 'after', for instance, in Manu ix 77, *śidhūnam samatsarāt*, "after a year, or, Chhindogya-Upanishad *tataśidhūnam tālasyāmīt*, 'after that I shall see'. But *śidhūna* means, originally, "upwards, above, high, or (in combination with an ablative) higher". It is possible to conceive progress as an act of rising, when the sense "after" would follow from this latter interpretation. But it is more probable that the metaphorical sense of the word was first applied to passages in books — where it is frequently used in this way, — before it became a more general one, and, if so, the figure would naturally follow from the description I have given of a Hindu book for the beginning of a Sanskrit

MS.—as may still be seen in some of the oldest specimens,—was at the bottom of the pile of leaves which constitute its bulk. What is "above," in a Hindu book, is, therefore, "after;" while, with us, the term "above" denotes the opposite sense, from the circumstance of the progress of our books being a descending one. And this assumption is corroborated by a second synonymous word, *viz.* : *udaya*, which also means, originally, "going upwards," and then, "after, following," and which, moreover, is never used in this sense, except of passages in books. It occurs frequently thus in the *Pratisâkhya*s; but, for the reasons stated before, I content myself with quoting, for its occurrence in Pânini, the Sûtra VIII. 4, 67."⁴⁴

"If writing," says Müller, "had been known to Pânini, some of his grammatical terms would surely point to the graphical appearance of words. I maintain that there is not a single word in Pânini's terminology which presupposes the existence of writing" (p. 507).

A FURTHER PROOF RESULTS FROM HIS TECHNICAL TERMS SWARITET AND ANUDATTET, AND FROM THE WORD SWARITA IN PÂYINI'S RULE I. 3, 11

As Weber, in his "Indische Studien" (vol. iv. p. 89), had already mentioned two grammatical terms of "Pânini," *viz.*, "swaritet" and "udattet," which he considers as "founded on graphical appearance," I cannot suppose that Müller has overlooked the remark of this scholar, but must assume that he has silently rejected it, either on account of its incorrectness or its inconclusiveness. It is true, that the latter term does not occur at all in the Sûtras of Pânini, nor the former, such as it is given by Weber; but, in the first place, there can be no doubt that, in the Sûtra I. 3, 72, *swaritañitas* must be analysed *swaritetas* and *ñitas* (comp. the commentaries), and on the other hand, Müller can neither have ignored that Pânini's expression, *anudâttanigitas* (I. 3, 12), is equivalent to *anudâttetas* and *ngitas*, nor that the term *anudattet* distinctly occurs in the rules III. 2, 119 and VI. 1, 186. His absolute silence on this point was probably, therefore, not caused by Weber's partial inaccuracy, but by the reference the latter gives when naming these terms,—the reference to Dr. Boehthlingk's "Comment" on the Sûtra I. 3, 11. For it must be readily admitted that the gloss of this writer is quite enough to raise the strongest apprehensions as to the sanity of Pânini, provided that it does not induce the reader to arrive at a peculiar view of the fitness of Pânini's "editor" himself to compose a comment on the great grammarian.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ For the same reason I do not avail myself of the word अधिक "above," though it occurs in the same sense, *after* e.g., in Katyâyanî's *Pratisâkhya*, I. 33 (The word अधस्त् is used in the sense *before* e.g., in Urata's com. on this *Pratisâkhya*, I. 85, अपरिष्टात्, in the sense *after* e.g. in the introduction of the *Jumivâva mâla vistâra*).

An insight into the character of Dr. Boehthlingk's "edition" of Pânini
In extraordinary explanations given by him, of the Sûtra I. 3, 11

⁴⁵ I subjoin a literal copy of this gloss which but poorly illustrates the character

quotation of the Sutras with the assistance of Katyayani and Patanjali. Panini says (I. 3, 11). "An *adhilāla*, or heading rule (will be recognized in my Grammar) by the accent *swarita*"¹¹ Upon this Patanjali

the Kasika, as quoted in its comment on this Sūtra, and apply to them his comment on the first Vārttika. According to the Kasikā, the Sūtras VI. 4. 129, III. 1, 91, VI. 4. 1, IV. 1. 1, III. 1. 1, are among those marked with a *swarita*, to indicate that they are *adhilālas*, the first of these *adhilālas* extends over 47, the second over 511, the third over 613, the fourth over 1190 and the fifth over 1821 Sūtras. If we credit therefore the explanation of Dr Bochting, a letter of the alphabet (he does not say which, probably therefore any one) was added perhaps as he says in the parenthesis 'as the bearer of this *swarita*' that is to say, as often as the *adhilāla* had to be supplied in the sequel. In other words in the five instances quoted such a letter was added to the Sūtra VI. 4. 129 17 times and so on to the other Sūtras severally 511, 613, 1190 and 1821 times!¹² And this method he conceives had been devised in a kind of literature where shortness is the chief object and where 'an author rejoices in the economizing of half a short vowel as much as in the birth of a son'. Surely, it requires neither knowledge nor scholarship but merely some thing else, to deter a rational writer from eliciting such a sense from a single book.

"Panini I. 3. 11 स्वरितेनाधिकारः—Patanjali किमर्थमित्तमुच्यते—Vārttika omitted in the Calcutta ed. of this Sūtra but mentioned VI. 1, 158 where it occurs as a quotation) अधिकारः प्रतियोग तस्यानिर्देशार्थः—Patanjali अधिकारं क्रियते प्रतियोगं तस्यानिर्देशार्थं इति । शिरित्तं पूतियोगमिति । योगं योगं पूति पूतियोगं योगं योगं तस्य ग्रहणं मार्कारपमिति—Kātyayana स्वरितेनाधिकारंभूतलक्षणे तृतीया । स्वरितेनाधिकारो लक्ष्यते इत्यर्थं । स्वरितवं सूक्ष्मस्थानां येवलमधिकारज्ञानार्थं प्रतिज्ञायते न तु पूयोगसमवायि अधिकारशब्दे भावसाधनं कर्मसाधनो वा । विनियोगो लोके अधिकार उच्यते स पूवेह गृह्णते । किमर्थमिति । आकाशाद्विवशात्पूर्वं कृतस्य संबन्धो लोक द्वय भवित्यर्थतिं पूर्व— . . . Vārttika omitted in the Calcutta ed.) अधिकारपरिमाणाज्ञानं तु—Patanjali अधिकारपरिमाणाज्ञानं तु भवति । न ज्ञायेत क्रियन्तम् वधिमधिकारो ज्ञुवर्तते इति—Vārttika (omitted in the Calcutta ed.) अधिकारपरिमाणं ज्ञानार्थं तु—Patanjali अधिकारपरिमाणाज्ञानार्थमेव तर्द्य यं योगो वक्तव्य । अधिकारपरिमाणं ज्ञायामीति कथं पुनः स्वरितेनाधिकार द्वयनेनाधिकारपरिमाणं शक्यं विज्ञातुम् । पूर्वं वक्ष्यामि स्वरितेनाधिकार इति Kātyayana अधिकारपरिमाणाज्ञानं वित्ति । यथा धातोरिति किं पूर्णलादेश्य । अध्यावापरिसमाप्ते । अङ्गाधिकारं पूर्णम्भ्यासविकारेभ्य । अथासप्तमपरिसमाप्तेरिति—Patanjali स्वरितं द्वष्टाधिकारो न भवतीति केनदानीमधिकारो भवित्यति । लोकिको अधिकार । नाधिकार इति चेदुत्तम् । किमुक्तम् । अन्यनिर्देशस्तु निवर्तकस्तस्मापरिभायेति । अधिकारार्थमेव तर्द्य यं योगो वक्तव्य—Kātyayana स्वरितद्वष्टेति । पूर्वतस्याधिकार निवृत्य शब्दान्तरस्य स्वरितव्यं पूतिज्ञायते । तेन विशतिकान्तरं इत्यत्र स्वरितवदर्शनात् । द्विप्रिपूर्वादित्यत्य निवृत्तिरनुमीयते—Patanjali ननु चोक्तम् । अधिकारपरिमाणाज्ञानं वित्ति ।—Vārttika यावतियोऽलनुवृत्य तावतो योगा निति उच्चनासिद्धम्—Patanjali यावतियोऽलनुवृत्यते तापतो योगानधिकारो ज्ञुवर्तते इति वक्तव्यम्—Kātyayana यावतियिति । द्विप्रिपूर्वांश्चिकादित्यतेऽनेकारो ज्ञुवर्त्य कर्तव्य । तेन द्वयोर्योगयोगसमवृत्तिर्भवति । एवमन्यत्रापि वेदितव्यम्—Patanjali अथेदानी यज्ञालीयासोऽल भूयसश्च योगानधिकारो ज्ञुवर्तते कथं तत्र कर्तव्यम्—Kātyayana अलीयांस इति । कथं पुनर्भिज्ञातीयापेक्षया पूर्कर्पूर्त्यय । परमतापेक्षया । अल्पे योगा इति चेन्मन्यसे तपालीयासोऽल । तथा वहवो ऽल इति

remarks. "Why does he say that?"—*Vāttika* "An adhikāra to every rule belonging to it; its object is to avoid a (repeated) designation"—*Patanjali* "An adhikāra (says Kātyāyana) is made (so as to apply to every rule belonging to it, its object is to avoid a (repeated) designation' What does that mean, 'to every rule belonging to it?' 'To every rule belonging to it' means in reference to each such rule, and he wants to imply that I must not make special mention (of the adhikāra) in each such rule."—*Kaṇṇyaṭa* "The words, 'by the accent swarita' [in Sanskrit it is only one word], are the third case in the sense of 'such and such a mark' (as ruled by Pāṇini, II. 3, 21), i.e., an adhikāra is marked with the accent swarita. The plan to mark words which are in the Sūtra with the swarita, is merely devised in order that the adhikāra may become recognizable, but it has nothing to do with practical application [i.e., the swarita is not pronounced] The word adhikāra either expresses a condition or it expresses an act, in common language, adhikāra is the same as *anuyoga*, or appointment to an office, and this is understood here. Patanjali asks 'Why does Pāṇini say that?' This question means Will there be (in his grammar) as in common language, a connection of the matter treated under the same head, because the subjects refer necessarily to one another, and the like?" [Then follows in the Bhashya a discussion of Patanjali, the purpose of which is to show that the word *adhikāra*, which literally means *superintendence, government*, has, in grammar, an analogous sense to that which it has in common life]—*Vāttika* "But (there is) no knowing how far an adhikāra goes"—Patanjali (repeating these words in the manner we have seen before, adding the ellipsis 'there is,' as he usually repeats the words of a Vuttika which he explains, in order to ensure its proper text, and then continues) "These words mean 'It might not be known to what limit in adhikāra is applicable'—*Vāttika*. "However, that the extent of an adhikāra might be known"—Patanjali "Just that the extent of an adhikāra might be known, on that account this rule (I. 3, 11) had to be uttered, in other words, that I may know how far an adhikāra goes. But again, how can the extent of an adhikāra be known through the Sūtra, which says 'an adhikāra (will be recognized in my grammar) by the accent swarita,' so that I could say, 'the adhikāra (is recognized) by the accent swarita'?"—*Kaṇṇyaṭa* "But, there

चेद्भूयासो योगा— *Vāttika* भूयसि पूर्वचनम्—*Patañjali* भूयसि पूर्वचनं कर्तव्यम् । पूर्वानुत इति यक्षम्यम् । तत्तद्द्वयम् । न वक्ष्यम् । संदेहमात्रमेतद्भवति । सर्वसंदेहेषु चेद्मुपतिष्ठने व्याख्यानातो विशेषपूर्तिपत्तिर्न हि संदेहादलक्षणमिति—*Kaṇṇyaṭa* भूयसीति । अद्वयं पूर्वद्वेरित्यादि यक्षम्यम् । तत्तद्वयति । यापतियो इतिति भूयसि पूर्वचनं चेत्यर्थ—*Patañjali* किं पूर्योगनम्—*Vāttika* (omitted in the Cole ed.) म्वरितेनाधिकारातिरित्यथा ग्रिष्यते—*Patañjali* अधिकारागति । अधिक कार । अधिक फार्यम् । गोदियोपर्यमर्जनस्येतत्र गोदाप्रहृण्य चोदितं न कर्तव्यं भवति । ग्रीष्मद्वय स्वरित्यन्ते । म्वरितेनाधिकारातिरित्यर्थतीति न दोषो भवति, etc.

is no knowing how far an adhikara goes, says the *Varttika*, for instance does adhikara III 1, 91, stop before the Sutra III 1 78 or does it go to the end of the (third) book? Does the adhikara VI 1, 1, stop before the Sutra VI 1, 78, or does it go to the end of the seventh book? — *Patanjali* ‘Since, as soon as (another) swarita is seen, there is an end of the adhikara (indicated by the previous swarita), by what means, then, can there be now an adhikara? Adhikara is (as we have seen) a term of common life. Now, if you say there is no such adhikara (meant in this grammar), why was it said before [in a previous discussion] ‘that a new injunction stopping (the applicability of the adhikara) a paribhasha (had to be given)? Therefore on account of an adhikara this rule had to be uttered — *Kaavyata* (When *Patanjali* says) As soon as (another) swarita is seen, etc (his words mean) to stop the (applicability of an) adhikara on a subject matter, the plan is devised to mark another word with the swarita thus because the swarita mark is seen in the Sutra V 1 32, it must be inferred that the applicability of the adhikara V 1 30 (which also was marked with the swarita) has ceased — *Patanjali* Now, has not *Katyayana* said, ‘But there is no knowing how far an adhikara goes?’ (Quite so hence the) *Varttika* (continues) This results from what is said elsewhere whatever the numerical value of the letter which is joined (to an adhikara rule) to as many rules

Patanjali These words would have been better quoted thus ‘With whatever numerical value a letter is joined (is numberless to an adhikara rule to as many (following) rules the adhikara applies — *Kaavyata* ‘For instance to the Sutra V 1, 30, the mute letter *t* (the second in the Sivasutras) is to be joined therefore it applies to two subsequent rules, and similarly in other adhikara rules — *Patanjali* Now, what is to be done when an adhikara applies to more rules, while there are fewer letters of the alphabet? — *Kaavyata* (When *Patanjali* says) ‘Fewer (and more)’ is this comparative (literally, is the affix of the higher degree, i.e. the affix of the comparative) used in reference to different species (of the same class)? (No,) it is used in an absolute sense (For he means) If you think the rules belonging to the same adhikara are few, then (you would have to take his words as implying that) the letters of the alphabet may be (still) fewer on the other hand if you think the letters are many then (his words would imply that) there may be still more rules belonging to the same adhikara — *Varttika*

If there are more (rules for the same adhikara than letters) the expression *प्रति विभागे* before — *Patanjali* — If there are (more rules for the same adhikara than letters) *Purnini* (says the *Varttika*) ought always to have made use of the expression *प्रति विभागे* before or the *Varttika* ought to have rather said before with a word following in the ablative [The *Varttika* means that the adhikara then should have been always indicated in the Sutra by the expression that such and such an adhikara is valid before i.e., goes no further than such and such a rule or word as is the case e.g. I 4 36 II 1 3, IV 1 1 and 73, V 1 1 and 18 & 1 and 70 etc] Ought *Purnini* indeed (in such a case) to have expressed himself thus? No he ought not. This is a mere question of a doubtful case in that in all such cases there would be the *Paribhasha* which says that the solution of the special (difficulty) results

from explanation,⁵⁰ for it does not follow that because there is a doubt there is no criterion (to solve it).”—*Kaṭṭiyata*. “The foregoing words, ‘if there are more, etc.’ mean that Pāṇini (instead of giving, e.g., his rule, VI 1, 1, as he does in the word *angasya i.e.*, ‘this is the *adhihāra* on base’), ought to have said, ‘*angasya piāt dvach*, i.e., ‘this is the *adhihāra* on base which avails before (i.e., does not go further than) VIII. 1, 1 (exclusively).’ The words of Patañjali, ‘ought Pāṇini, indeed, etc.,’ mean: ought Pāṇini to have given the contents of the two preceding Vāttikas?” [Then follows, in the *Bhīṣhya*, an observation of Patañjali on a doubtful passage, which is the subject of his comment in its appropriate place. He continues]. “What is the purpose of the Sūtra?”—*Vāttika*: “That the proper way of applying an *adhihāra* might be known by means of the *swarita*.”—*Patañjali*: “‘Proper way of applying an *adhihāra*’ (Just so) (*Adhi-hāra* means) an agent placed over, or an act to be done, placed over. Now, at the Sūtra I 2, 48, the expression *golāng* (used in the Vāttika to this rule) must not be considered as the subject of the *adhihāra*, for the expression *stīl* will have the *swarita*. Therefore, according to the words of the Vāttika (‘that the proper way,’ etc.) those affixes alone will have to be understood in that Sūtra (I 2, 18) which fall under the head *stīl*, and, according to the Vāttika’s own words, there is no defect in the Sūtra I. 2, 18.” [To understand this latter illustration of our rule, it is necessary to know that Kātyāyana, in giving the Vāttika *gotāṅgrahanam kāṇvītīgatham*, to the Sūtra I 2, 48, intends to point out an omission in the rule of Pāṇini. Patañjali, however, shows that the *swarita* over *stīl* in this rule obviates the punctiliousness of the Vāttika, and he therefore trumps Kātyāyana, as well on this occasion as when he comments on I. 2, 18, for not having understood ‘the proper way of applying the *adhihāra*’ by repeating to him his own criticisms on the Sūtra of the present discussion. Then follow other illustrations of Patañjali as to the proper way of applying an *adhihāra*, which it is not necessary for our immediate purpose to add to the foregoing translation]

THE COMMENTARY OF THESE GRAMMARIANS PROVES THAT PANINI'S MANNER OF DEFINING AN ADHIHĀRA WOULD HAVE BEEN IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT WRITING.

The passage I have given here from the “Great Commentary” on Pāṇini,—and which may serve too as a specimen of the manner in which the two grammatical saints, Kātyāyana and Patañjali, scrutinized every doubtful word of the Sūtras,—will have shown that the rule of Pāṇini, which teaches the manner of defining an *adhihāra*, or *binding rule*, is interpreted by them as being based on the *application of writing* to his terminology. There are three modes, as we learn from them (and the fact is, of course, fully borne out by the Sūtras themselves), by which

— “*स्पालयान्*” The word *स्पालयान्* “explanation” is defined in the Introduction of Patañjali वदारत्य प्रत्युदारत्य वाक्याव्याप्तिर इष्टवायमुद्दितं स्पालयान् भवति; explanation is giving an instance, giving a counter instance, or I suppose the elliptical expression of a sentence; all these three together

Pânnî indicates a heading-rule in his grammar. The one consists in his using the word *prâh*, "before," with a word following in the ablative, by which expression he implies that the heading continues up to that word, which will occur in a later Sûtra. Another mode of his is merely to indicate the heading, the extent of which is then, as the Bhîshîya says, matter of "explanation." His third and last mode consists in putting the sign of a *swarita*,—*which was not intended for pronunciation*,—not over any word of the Sûtra, arbitrarily, as Dr. Boehltingk imagines, but, as common sense would suggest, over that word which is the heading, as over the word *stri*, in the Sûtra I. 2, 48 Kîtyâvana, moreover, indicates (by the expression *bhûshyasi*), and Patanjali expressly states, that in those cases in which the number of Sûtras composed under an *adhiâkâra* did not exceed the number of the letters of the alphabet, a letter representing a numerical value (without, of course, being "the bearer of a *swarita*"), was added to indicate the extent of the *adhiâkâra*; and from the example given by Kâtyâyana we must infer that the numerical value of the letter was determined by the position it has in the Sîvasûtras, since 1 is to him an equivalent of the figure 2. And this representation of figures by letters of the alphabet derives an additional interest from the circumstance that it is quite different from the method we meet with at a late period of Hindu progress in mathematics and astronomy.⁴¹ In short, we see that Patanjali and Kâtyâyana not merely presuppose a knowledge of writing in Pânnî, but consider the use he has made of writing as one of the chief means by which he has built up the technical structure of his work.

I will obviate, at once, an objection which may be raised,—though it could scarcely be raised by those who treat Kâtyâyana as a contemporary of Pânnî, or use the Commentaries as direct evidence for or against Pânnî,—I mean the objection that the comments of Kâtyâyana and Patanjali would only testify to their own knowledge and use of written accents; but that neither necessitates the conclusion that Pânnî knew and employed, as they suppose him to have done, written accents, nor that he was acquainted with the use of written letters for the purpose of denoting numerical values. And should there be any who attach more faith to Kâtyâyana the late commentator on Patanjali, than to Patanjali himself and Kîtyâvana, they might, perhaps, adduce an observation of this grammarian, "that the Sûtras of Pânnî were read in one breath, (without any regard to accent)," in order to infer that the *swarita* might have been sounded over the word which it intended to mark as *adhiâkâra*.⁴² Such a conclusion, however, would be invalidated, not only by the natural sense of the passage quoted, but by the remark of the same grammarian, which is contained in the translation I have given before, and which states that the *swarita* was not

⁴¹ Compare the system of Arybhatta, who uses vowels and nasals = 0, ka, ga, pa, ja = 1, tha, tha, pha, ra = 2, ga, da, ba, la = 3, etc. See Lassen's Zeitschrift, II 423 ff., "Journal Asiatique" (1875) vol. XVI, p. 116, etc.

⁴² Kâtyâyana towards the end of the Introduction पृथग् द्यामुद्वाणे पादाम्बर्योपाद्य दात्तादीनामुपदेश—Another discussion on *adhiâkâra* occurs incidentally in Patanjali's comment on I 1 49.

intended, in our present case, for "practical application." It remains, therefore, to be seen whether this remnant of *Kaiyāyī* is confirmed by analogous facts in Panini's *Gīmī*.

WRITTEN ACCENTS WHICH INDISPENSABLE FOR PĀMINI'S TERMINOLOGY

Pāni frequently refers, in his *Sūtras*, not only to grammarians who have preceded him, but to lists of affixes, and to arrangements of the verbal roots, which must have coincided with his own terminology. The personal relation of Panini to these collections of books will be the subject of future remark, it will suffice, at present, to show that Panini's work, and these works, were based on the same grammatical system. Pāni refers, for instance, to a list of affixes which begin with *un*;⁶³ where the mute letter *u*—which has exactly the same technical value in the affix *un* as it would have in Panini's affixes *an*, *na*, or in other terms containing this *anubandha*—proves that these affixes rested on the terminology which governs the *Sūtras* of Pāni. He speaks of *blūdādi*, *adādi*, *tudādi*,—in short, of the ten classes of radicals, just as they are given in the *Dhātupath*, and even of subdivisions of this work, e.g., *dūtādi*, *pushādi*, *blūdādi*, *muñchādi*, *yañādi*, *adhādi*, etc.;⁶⁴ and if there existed a doubt that the expressions quoted, which contain the first word of a list, necessarily imply the whole list, and in the order in which the words of such a list appear in this work,⁶⁵ the doubt

*On the incorrect spelling of the word *u* : *u*di*

"उण्णादि", compare Panini III 3 1, 4 75—This word is sometimes written उण्णादि, but wrongly, for the Sindhū rules apply not only to real words but equally to the technical language of the *Sūtras*. Since उण्ण in उण्णादि, is a *pāda* (*pūrvapāda*) it has to follow the Sandhi rule given VIII 3 82. Real padas ending in ण, it is true are rare and perhaps still rarer in first parts of a compound but a word उण्णादि becomes on that very ground the subject of an exceptional rule, its first part is said to be not एव but अ (I 4 18 v 3). As the phonetic rules of the grammarians bespeak the necessities and predilections of the Hindu organ of speech technical names could not but follow the general rules of pronunciation, and there is no cause therefore to establish an exception for the term उण्णादि.

"Compare e.g. Pāni I 3 1 II 4 72 and 79, III 1, 69 73 77, 78 79 81, 25 III 1 5, 3 101 VII 1 59 VI 1 15 VII 2 45 and other instances which are quoted in the excellent *Radices Linguæ Sanscritæ* of Hestergaard.

"It is barely possible however to admit such a doubt for Panini does not restrict himself to generally mentioning radicals by giving the first word of the order such as *blūdādi* etc. he refers also to distinct numbers. Thus, VII 2 59 he speaks of the four radicals beginning with उण्ण, and the rule he gives applies to no other four radicals than उण्ण and the three radicals which follow it in the *Dhātup* (§ 18, 19—2^o) he speaks VII 2 75 of the five radicals beginning with ए, and his rule applies only for ए and the five radicals which follow it in the *Dhātup* (§ 23 116—1^o) or VII 1, 98 of the six radicals beginning with अ (≡*Dhātup* § 24 59—6^o) or VI 1 6 of the six radicals beginning with अ (≡*Dhātup* § 23 63—69) or VI 4 12^o of the seven radicals beginning with ए (≡*Dhātup* § 10, 73—79) etc. In all these instances therefore the order of the radicals in the *Dhātupath* as referred to by Panini is the absolute condition of his rule.

would have at least to admit that the anubandhas or technical letters which accompany each radical in the Dhātupātha, possess the grammatical value which is expressly defined as inhering in them by special rules of Pāṇini.⁶⁶ He refers to the Upadeśa, which is, according to Patanjali, a list, not only of the radicals, but of nominal bases, affixes, particles, increases of the base and grammatical substitutes, all of which are "settled," as Kātyāyana says.⁶⁷

THIS RESULTS FROM THE DHĀTUPĀTHA

Now, if we consult the Sūtras which treat of the verbal roots, we find, for instance, that, as a rule, a root is *udātta* on the last syllable (VI 1, 162) Yet (VII. 2, 10 Pāṇini states that a radical has not the connecting vowel *i*, if in the Upadeśa it is a *monosyllable* and *anudātta*. As the former rule concerns a radical, which is part of, and embodied in, a real word, while the latter describes the theoretical existence of the radical in the Dhātupātha, we may imagine, it is true that for the purpose of grammatical teaching a pronunciation of the radical was devised in the Upadeśa different to that which it has in real language. But, even on the supposition that a radical could be pronounced *anudātta*, is it probable that Pāṇini or the authors of the Dhātupātha could have recourse to so clumsy a method for conveying the rule implied by the term *anudātta*? Would they gratuitously have created the confusion that must necessarily arise from a twofold pronunciation of the same radical, when any other technical *anubandha* would have enabled them to attain the same end? Let us suppose, on the contrary, that *anudātta*, in the Upadeśa, does not mean the spoken, but the *written* accent, and the difficulty is solved without the necessity of impugning the ability or the common sense of the grammarians.

This inference is strengthened, moreover, by another analogous fact, which may be recalled before I give further proof from a synopsis of Pāṇini's rules and the appearance of the radicals in the Upadeśa. This fact is contained in the last Sūtra of Pāṇini's grammar, where he teaches that the short vowel *a*, which in his rules is treated as *vivṛita*, or pronounced with the expansion of the throat, is, in reality *saṃvṛita*, or pronounced with the contraction of the throat. This Sūtra did certainly not intend to impose upon the pupil the task of pronouncing, during his grammar lessons, the short vowel *a* in such a manner as no Hindu can pronounce it, or of sounding, when learning the properties of this vowel, instead of it, some nondescript deputi vowel sound. It can only mean that, for the sake of technical purposes defined by the commentators, Pāṇini made a fiction in his grammar, which, of course, he had to remove when terminating his book. This fiction, however, being based on

⁶⁶ Compare the quotations in Westergaard's Radices, p. 342-343.

⁶⁷ Compare Pāṇini I 3 2 VI 1 45, 186, 4 27, VIII 4, 14 18 (the term occurs frequently, too, in the Vṛttikās and Kārikās) and see note 39.

a *phonetic impossibility*, would be a very awkward one if it applied to oral teaching only; it becomes quite unobjectionable if it is supported by a *written text*.⁵⁵

If a radical in the *Upadesa*, says Pāṇini (I. 3, 12) has the *anudātta* (or *ñig*) as *anubandha*, it is, in general, inflected in the *ātmaneṣpada*; if its *anubandha* is the *swarita* (or *ñi*) it is, under certain conditions, inflected in the *ātmaneṣpada*; under others, in the *parasmaipada* (I. 3, 72); if it has neither of these *anubandhās* (nor is subject to any of the rules (I. 3, 12–77), it is inflected in the *parasmaipada* only (I. 3, 78). Again, from the *Dhātupāṭha* we learn that, for instance, the radicals *jyā*, *it*, *li*, *vri*, *bhi*, *lsh* (*sh*), *jñā*, are *anudātta* (*i.e.*, do not assume the connecting vowel *i*), but have neither the *anudātta* nor the *swarita* as *anubandha*.⁵⁶ The latter term implies that the sign which bears this denomination is added *after* the significant element. Since, however, the roots named are monosyllables in the *Upadeśa*, and since it is impossible to pronounce an accent without a vowel-sound supporting it, the assumption that the *anudātta* and other accent-*anubandhās* were spoken sounds, would lead to the conclusion that the same verbal root was simultaneously *anudātta* and not *anudātta*.⁵⁷

If I had adhered to the terminology of the *Dhātupāṭha*, as it is met with in the best MSS of Mādhyava's commentary, the foregoing illus-

On the pronunciation of the vowel ā

⁵⁸ I call it a *phonetic impossibility* since आ, if it were pronounced विवृत्, would assume the properties of आ, but as Pāṇini does not allow such न आ to occupy the same portion of time which is required for the pronunciation of आ, a short आ pronounced with the expansion of the throat, becomes to a Hindu organ of speech and from Pāṇini's point of view, impossible. For this reason, Pāṇḍyā, too, who on a previous occasion had defined the letters which occur in the *Upadesa*, *i.e.*, the *upadishta-vai* as pronounced or pronounceable letters [see note 40] looks upon this last Sūtra of Pāṇini as merely given to counteract the effect of the *Upadesa*, he thus implies that this is the only case in which न *upadishta-vai* was not pronounceable आ आ (VIII. 4. 68)। किमर्थमिदमुच्यते । अकारोऽयमचरसमाज्ञाये विवृत् उपदिष्टस्तस्य संवृततापत्त्यापत्ति कियते—Kaiyyata किमर्थमिति । अकारस्याकारवचने प्रयोजनाभावात्प्रभः । अकारोऽयमिति । सवर्णार्थमिह शास्त्रे विवृतदोपयुक्तोऽकार उपदिष्टः । तस्य प्रयोगे संवृत्तस्यैगे धारणार्थमिदं प्रत्यापत्तिवचनम् । अहरसमाज्ञायमहर्षं सकलशास्त्रोपलक्षणम्.

⁵⁹ Westergaard's Radices § 31, 29–46

⁶⁰ Other instances may be gathered from Westergaard's Radices. I must exclude, however, some which are not countenanced by the best MSS. I have consulted, those especially which are met with in the Radices under the term स्वरितेत्. For when we read in the latter work (e.g. § 22 and § 31, 1 etc.) that भूत्, हृत्, दृत्, etc., दुक्षीत्, श्रीत्, श्रीप्, etc., are अनुदात्ता and स्वरितेत् or (§ 31, 10 etc.) that दूत्, दृत्, दृप्, etc., are ददात्ता and स्वरितेत्, I could not adduce these and similar instances in support of my conclusions, since Mādhyava is certainly right in giving instead of the term स्वरितेत्, the word उभयपद्धिन् or उभयतेभाषा, as the *anubandha* आ would become meaningless, if these roots had, besides the *anubandha* स्वरित्. The term स्वरितेत् is correctly indicated by Westergaard and the MSS. for instance, of the roots हित् भन्त्, etc. (§ 21) यितिर, वितिर, विष्टु (§ 20) मृष, इश्चित्, यह, रभ, etc. (§ 26) मुद्,

tion would have become still more striking ; for, according to them, the roots *jyā*, *rī*, etc., are *anudātta*, and have the *udātta* as their anubandha. In general it may be observed, that the Sūtra I. 3, 78 is apparently understood by Mādhrava and other commentators as referring to roots which have *udātta* as anubandha. for a root which is neither *anudāttet* nor *swaritett*, is described by them as *udātett*. There is some reason, however, to doubt whether the latter term really occurred in the Upadeśa referred to by Pāṇini ; and as the solution of this doubt, in an affirmative sense, would add another fact to those already obtained, it will not be superfluous to advert to it here.

The misgiving I entertain is based on Pāṇini's own terminology. He speaks of roots which, in the Upadeśa are *udātta* (VII. 3, 34) and *anudātta* (VI. 4, 37; VII. 2, 10), which are *anudāttet* and *swaritett* (see the preceding quotations, p 33) ; but there is no trace in his grammar of radicals which are *udātett*. And this omission is the more striking, as the number of roots which are marked *udātett* in the present MSS. of the Dhātupātha is considerable. Nor it is satisfactorily explained by the negative tenor of the Sūtra I 3, 78, since there is no other instance in Pāṇini's work of a technical and important term being given vaguely and inferentially.

If, however, we apply to the present case the conclusions we have been already compelled to draw as to Pāṇini's having used accents as written signs, we may surmise the reason why *udātett* is not amongst the terms employed by this grammarian. Of the three accents, *udātta*, *swarita* and *anudātta*, the two latter only are marked in the principal Vaidik writings, the *swarita* being indicated by a perpendicular line over the syllable, the *anudātta* by a horizontal line under it. The syllable not marked is *udātta*. It is possible, therefore, to say that a radical or syllable which is not marked is *udātta*, and that one with a horizontal stroke under it is *anudātta* ; it is possible, too, to speak of a line added under or over the last letter of the radical ; but it is surely impossible to call that 'addition' (*anubandha*) which, not being visible, could not be added at all. This explanation of the absence of the term *udātett* is founded, of course, on the supposition that the system of marking the accents was the same at Panini's time, as it occurs in our MSS. of the principal Veda Sāhitas, but it can hardly be doubted that this system is as deeply rooted in Hindu tradition as everything else connected with the preservation of the sacred books. If then, it becomes certain that Pāṇini knew written accent signs which were not pronounced, it will not be hazardous to put faith in the statement of Kātyāyana, that the *swarita* which was intended as a mark of an adhikāra, was also a written sign, a perpendicular stroke, " but had nothing to do with practical application "

गुद्, etc (§ 28) स्थिर्, भिद्, etc (§ 29), etc for all these radicals have not the anubandha अ. A proof of the accuracy of the commentators in this respect, is afforded by the instance of the root चृ॒ (§ 24, 7) which is described in the Dhātupātha as अनुदात्तेत्, and represented at the same time as चृ॒ित् for they explain on this occasion that the anubandha अ does not indicate the ātmānepada inflection, marked by the term अनुदात्तेत्, but refers to the effect of the Sūtra III. 2, 119

EVEN THE HABIT OF MARKING HINDU CATTLE AFFORDS PROOF OF THE
ACQUAINTANCE OF THE HINDUS, IN THE TIME OF PĀNINI,
WITH THE ART OF WRITING

That Pānini, as Patanjali tells us, and Kātyāyana gives us to understand, used letters in his adhikāra rules for the notation of numeral values, does not follow, we must admit, from his own words in the quoted Sūtra (I. 3, 11), but there is a rule of his (VI. 3, 115) in which he informs us that the owners of cattle were, at his time, in the habit of marking their beasts on the ears, in order to make them recognizable. Such signs, he says, were, for instance, a swastika, a ladle, a pearl, etc.; yet he mentions besides, *eight* and *five*. Now, either the graziers used letters of the alphabet to denote these numerals, or they employed special figures, as we do. In either case, it is obvious that they must have been acquainted with writing; in the latter, moreover, that the age to which they belonged had already overcome the primitive mode of denoting numerals by letters, and that writing must have been, therefore, already a matter of the commonest kind. At all events, and whichever alternative be taken—if even the Hindu cattle paraded the acquaintance of the Hindus with the art of writing and of marking numerals,—one may surely believe that Panini was as proficient in writing as the cowherds of his time, and that, like them, he resorted to the marking of numerals whenever it was convenient to him to do so.

THE WORDS LOPA AND DRIS, IN THE SŪTRAS, ARE A FURTHER PROOF
THAT PĀNINI HAD A KNOWLEDGE OF WRITING

The absence of a letter or grammatical element, or even of a word, the presence of which would have been required by a previous rule, is called by Pānini *lopa*. The literal sense of this word, which is derived from *lup*, "to cut off," is "cutting off." It will be conceded that it is not possible to "cut off" any but a visible sign, and that a metaphorical expression of this kind could not have arisen, unless the reality existed. Indeed the very definition which Pānini gives of this term must remove every doubt, if there existed any. He says, "*lopa* (‘cutting off’) is the not being *seen*" (*scil.*, of a letter, etc.)⁶¹ For, whatever scope may be given to the figurative meaning of the radical "to see," it is plainly impossible that an author could speak of a thing visible, literally or metaphorically, unless it were referable to his sense of sight. A letter or word, which is no more *seen*, or has undergone the effect of *lopa*, must, therefore, previously to its *lopa*, have been a visible or written letter to him. And the same remark applies to an expression which occurs several times in the Sūtras; for Pānini speaks more than once of affixes which are *seen*, or of a vowel which is *seen* in words.⁶²

" 1. 1, 60 अदर्शने लोप

1 passage relating to the mystical powers of the alphabet, from
a Chapter of a Dialogue between Kāra and Pāṇini

61 अन्येष्योऽपि दर्यते III 2, 178, 3, 120—अन्येष्योऽपि दर्यते III 2, 75—अन्ये

THE VEDAS WERE PRESERVED IN WRITING AT PĀNNI'S TIME

If it becomes evident from the foregoing arguments that Pāṇini not only *wrote*, but that *writing* was a main element in the technical arrangement of his rules, it may not be superfluous to ask, whether the sacred texts had been committed to writing at the time at which he lived, or whether they were preserved then by memory only? That the mere fact of learning the Veda does not disprove the possibility of its having been preserved by written letters also, is clear enough, and is indirectly acknowledged by Müller himself.⁶⁷ He quotes, it is true, a passage from the *Mahābhārata*, and one from Kumārītā's *Vārtikas*, which condemn, the one the writing of the Veda,

पासपि दृश्यते VI 3, 137—अन्येष्वपि दृश्यते III 2, 101—हृतरास्योऽपि दृश्यन्ते V 3, 14—Though in the foregoing observations no conclusion of mine is founded on statements of the later grammarians alone, it may not be without some interest to mention now that these grammarians do not seem to have conceived as much as the idea of Panini's grammar ever having existed except in writing. For Kaiyyata amongst others, refers to a written text of this grammar, even when there is no necessity whatever of making allusion to such a circumstance. We must infer, therefore, that it was a matter of course to him to look upon Panini's rules as having been at all times written rules. Thus in commenting on the vowel अ of the *pratyahādra* अक्, and in adverting to its last letter, he might have simply spoken of a letter क्, but he speaks of a *letter-sign* क् “अत्र हि ककारेण चिन्हेन प्रत्याहारस्यो विवृतो निर्दिष्ट् एते” — And when Professor Müller as we shall presently see, avails himself of so late an authority as the *Mimamsa-Vārtikas* of Kumārītā to prove or to make plausible facts concerning the highest antiquity I will quote, as a counterpart another late work which introduces to us the god Siva himself as recommending the writing and wearing of grammatical texts as a means for the attainment of boons and the prevention of evils. I need not add that I look upon neither work as a sufficient authority to settle the points of the present discussion. The passage alluded to occurs in the chapter of a mystical dialogue between Siva and his wife, called *Janāmalindāreshvarādhasya*, where Siva after having explained to Pārvati the letters of the alphabet concludes his instruction with the following words पृतद्याकरणं देवि लिपिन्वा भूजंपत्रके । गोरोचनाकुमुमेन तथा शललचन्तुना । कण्ठे वा यदि वा वाहौ मस्तके वा वरानने । सरेच्याधिविनिर्मुक्तो दिनानां दिनवे भवेत् । संतानार्थं पठेद्विद्वान्वारयिन्वा समाप्तिः । अवश्यं लभते पुत्रं वन्ध्याया सम तुल्यरूपम् । रथे साम्भुते घोरे अपि व्याघ्रभयादिके । स्मरणादेव नश्यन्ति किमन्यक्षयथामिते, i.e. if a man writes this grammatical explanation on a steel leaf with a mixture of the yellow pigment *Gorochana* and saffron or if he has it written by a scribe with the quill of a porcupine on his neck or his arm or his head he becomes after three days free from all disease and if a wise man, wishing for progeny reads and retains it attentively he is sure to obtain a son, who will be like me, from his (previously) barren wife. If a battle (rages), or the royal family spreads terror or if a tiger causes alarm or on similar occasions, all danger vanishes in merely remembering (this grammatical explanation). What further shall I tell thee? etc.

⁶⁷ History etc p 216 “The ancient literature of India was continually learnt by heart and even at the present day, when MSS have become so common, some of its more sacred portions must still be acquired by the pupil from the mouth of a teacher, and not from MSS”

and the other the learning it from a written text; ⁶¹ but I hold that neither quotation proves anything against the practice of writing the Veda at or before Pāṇini's time. Both passages might, on the contrary, be alleged to confirm the fact that the offence of writing the Vedas had already been committed when these verses were composed. They betray, it is true, as we should expect, the apprehension of their authors lest oral teaching might become superfluous, and the services of the Brāhmaṇa caste be altogether dispensed with; but they convey nothing else—not even the prohibition that the teacher or Guru himself might not have recourse to a written text of the Veda if he wanted to refresh his memory or to support his meditation. Nay, we may go further, and assert that by an authority certainly much older than both the authors of this passage of the Mahābhārata and the Mīmāṃsā-Vārttikas, all the first three castes were distinctly recommended to possess written Vaidik texts. For, let us hear what the lawgiver Yājñavalkya says: "All the religious orders must certainly have the desire of knowing the Veda: therefore the first three classes—the twice-born—should see it, think on it, and hear it." But how could Yājñavalkya order them to see the Veda, unless it could be obtained in writing? ⁶² And that Pāṇini, too,

⁶¹ P 502 "In the Mahābhārata we read 'Those who sell the Vedas and even those who write them, those also who defile them, they shall go to hell. Kumārila says 'that knowledge of the truth is worthless which has been acquired from the Veda, if the Veda has not been rightly comprehended, if it has been learnt from writing, or been received from a Sūdra;'"—The passage of the Mahābhārata quoted by Müller, occurs in the Anuśāsana p. verse 1645. I doubt, however, whether his rendering of वेदानां चैव दूषका "those also who defile the Vedas, is quite correct. It seems to me that it means "those who corrupt the text of the Vedas, and that it is synonymous with the expression वेदविष्टुवका which occurs in the second act of the Prabodha chandrodaya (ed. Brockhaus, p. 20 1 14, ed. Cale p. 12a, 1 5). The expression समयाना च दूषका which precedes by a few verses (Anuśāsana p. 1 1639): i.e., 'those who vitiate agreements is analogous. There is, unhappily, no comment of Tilakantha on either of these passages.

1 passage from Yājñavalkya, which shows that Manuscripts of the Vedas existed in his time

" याज्ञवल्ल III 151 स द्याश्रमैविजिज्ञास्य समस्तैरेवमेव तु । द्रष्टव्यस्तव्य मन्तव्य

श्रोतव्यश द्विजातिभि विज्ञानेश्वर, the modern commentator of Yājñavalkya, who like Kumārila is evidently not pleased with the recommendation of "seeing" the Veda twists the construction of the latter passage into the following sense—the twice-born should first hear (the expounding of) the Veda, then reflect on it and thus (by reflection) keep it present (to their mind). In order to impart to the word "to see" the figurative sense, he reverses the entire and, it would seem, natural order of the injunction which recommends the twice-born first to look into the Veda, then to reflect on it, and ultimately to ask the teacher to give his own explanation of it, the latter becoming of course, more effectual, if the pupil is at ready somewhat familiar with his subject—This is the comment of the Mīdakshāra यमाद्वितीयामप्रमाणभूतो वेदस्तस्माद्सादुक्तमार्गेण सकलाश्मिभिन्नाप्रकारं विज्ञासितम्यन्मेव प्रकारं दर्शयति । द्विजातिभिन्नदृष्टयो इपरोक्षीकरत्वमपेक्षं दर्शयति । श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्य इति । प्रथमतो येदान्तश्रवणेन निर्देशप्रमाणदनन्तरं मन्तव्यो युक्तिभिन्विचारयितायस्तो इमां इत्यानेनाप-रोक्षीमवति

must have seen written Vaidik texts follows clearly, in my opinion, from two Sûtras, in which he says, "(the augment *â*) is seen also in the Veda (viz., in other instances than those mentioned in a former rule)," and "(the *âdesa an*) is seen also in the Veda (viz., in other cases of *asthi*, *dadhi*, etc., than those mentioned previously)"⁶⁵ It is on this ground that—while disapproving the loose manner in which the Siddhânta kaumudi imparts to the word *grantha* in Pânini's Sûtra, I 3, 75, the meaning *Veda*,—I cannot altogether reject the identity which is established by this commentary between the two "words, though it would have been better, in a gloss on Pânini, to have retained the distinction which he himself established for facilitating a clearer understanding of those Sûtras which refer to revealed books, and of others which speak of unrevealed ones⁶⁶

There is but one other question which can be raised in connection with the present inquiry. Was writing known *before* Pânini?

WRITING WAS KNOWN BEFORE PÂMINI—RISHI A SEER OF VAIDIK HYMNS

One word, of frequent occurrence in the Vaidik hymns, or rather the sense which is imparted to it, may enable us, perhaps, to form an opinion on this difficult problem. I mean the word *Rishi*. It is explained by old and modern commentators as 'a seer of hymns,' a saint to whom those Vaidik hymns referred to his authorship, were revealed by a divinity. Thus it is said in the Satipathâ Brâhmana that the *Rishi* Vamadeva obtained *seeing* the Rigvedâ hymn, IV. 26, 1, or in the Aitareya Brâhmana that the *Rishi* *seeing* the hymn II 41, 2, spoke it⁶⁷ For reason which will appear from the statement I shall have to make on the chronological relation of these works to Pânini, I cannot appeal to these Brâhmaṇas as evidence for the present purpose, it is safer to quote Pânini himself, who also speaks of hymns which are *seen* (IV 2, 7), and

" VI 4, 73, and VII 1 70 इन्द्रस्यपि दद्यते

" Compare note 27. I alluded above to the analogy which exists between the contrasted words *granti-a-arthâ* and *ka-ka-pa-arthâ*. After having shown that the text was a written book of Pânini's time I may now quote a passage from the Parâsikâ of the Nîruktâ (I. 12) अथ मन्त्रार्थेचिन्तनम्युहोऽम्युदोऽपि श्रुतिसोऽपि तर्हतो न तु पृथक्क्वनेन मन्त्रा निरेत्तत्त्वा प्रकरणेत् पृथ तु निरेत्तत्त्वा, which is thus rendered by Mr. Muir in his valuable work *Original Sanskrit Texts* (vol. II p. 184). "This reflective deduction of the sense of the hymns is effected by the help of oral tradition and reasoning. The hymns are not to be interpreted as isolated texts, but according to their context. In this passage the words श्रुतिसोऽपि तर्हते are equivalent of मन्त्रार्थेऽप्तंथा

" *dati*, XIV 4 2 22 तदैतपरयन्तृपिर्गमदेय प्रतिपेदे । अहमनुभव मूर्यश्वेति—*litar* Br 9 1 सदेतपि परयन्तृन्वाच नियुक्तौ इन्द्रसारपिरिति. Compare also Müller's "Ancient History" p. 237 शीनद्वे . . द्वितीय मण्डलं दद्या, etc. or listen on the first verse of the *Ukt pratisikya* (in the valuable edition of Mr. Regnier "Journal Asiatique" tom. VII 1856 p. 181) श्रूपदो मन्त्रदद्यात्, or *Aug. publication* of Pâniini I 1 1 पञ्चाण्डदद्यात् श्रूपद, reflecting on IV 1 70 श्रूपिरादेनाय मन्त्रदद्यात् etc.

this term, we may surely admit, on account of his using the word *śrotrīya*,¹⁰ that he was acquainted with it, and that the same mode of studying the Vedas was already usual in his time. Now the contrast is marked between 'seeing' the Veda and 'hearing' it. In metaphorical language both terms would be equivalent, they would express comprehension of the revealed truth. But there is no metaphor in the term 'sruti'. 'Hearing' the Veda rests on a material fact. Why should 'seeing' the hymns be considered to rest on a less solid ground?¹¹

To extend this view from Yāska and the predecessors he quotes, to the authors of the hymns themselves, would, no doubt, be very hazardous. For even on the supposition that the etymology proposed by the son of Upamanyu is correct,¹² no proof exists that Rishi is conceived in the hymns as implying the seer of words or sentences. He may be there the real representative of the Roeh who sees the general idea of his prayer or praise, but fashions it with his own—uninspired—words. There are, we may add in proof of this assertion, various instances in the poetry of the Rigveda, where the poet is spoken of as having "composed" (literally *fabricated* or *generated*), not as having "seen," a hymn, and they belong undoubtedly to real antiquity,

¹⁰ II 1, 65 and V 2, 84. Compare also the Ganas to V 1, 130 133 श्रुति in the Gana to V 2 88, and श्रौति in the Gana to IV 2 138

On the title Rishi

¹¹ The title of Rishi was, at a later period given to renowned authors, though they were not considered as inspired by a divinity. The Kalpa works for instance, are admitted on all hands to be human and uninspired compositions, yet Kumarila writes in one of his Vārtikas (I 3 10) न तापदनृपि. कथित्यस्यते कल्पसूत्रकृत् । कर्तुत्वं यत्पीया तु तस्य मन्त्रहृसमम् and again आर्पेयवचनं नित्यर्थापन्वेन गम्यते । आर्पेयवचनसिद्धिश्च कल्पसूत्रेष्वस्थिता । and आचार्यवचनाना च प्रामाण्यं श्रूयते भ्रुतौ अहानां च प्रणेतार आचार्या श्रूपयो मता, i.e., No mention occurs of an author of a Kalpa work who was not a Rishi, but all that Rishis compose is like that which the authors of Mantras compose. The word *arsheya* is a synonym of eternal, and the quality of *arsheya* is vested in the Kalpa-Sutras, moreover, the Veda says that the words of Ācharyas have authority, and the Āchāryas who have composed the Vedas are deemed Rishis. And though these words of his make part of a Pūrvapaksha, and the proposition that the Kalpa works have the same claim to divine origin as the Mantras, is refuted by him in the Siddhānta his refutation merely concerns this latter part of the discussion but does not invalidate the title of Rishi given by him to the authors of the kalpas. For as he said on a previous occasion न द्युत्यन्तानुत वक्तु रास्यते पूर्वपरिणा, the propounder even of a Pūrvapaksha should not say that which is too much at variance with truth (if his Pūrvapaksha is to be worthy of being part of a discussion). The title Rishi had therefore already lost its primitive worth in the days of Kumarila and had undergone the same fate which is common to titles in general.

¹² That in रूप, the रू way be a prefix is countenanced by the following analogies रू (॒=रूप॑) and श्रूप॑, रूप and श्रूप॑ रू (रूपेति) and श्रू (श्रूपेति), रूत (respected) and श्रूत (respected) रूप॑ and श्रू (whence श्रहन) दिव् (to be glad) and श्रूप॑, दूर॑ and श्रूप॑.

as they show greater common sense. Thus it is said in the Rigveda (I. 171, 2) "this praise accompanied with offerings, Maruts is made (lit. *fabricated*) for you by the heart;" or (VI 16, 47): "we offer to thee, Agni, the clarified butter in the shape of a hymn made (lit. *fabricated*) by the heart." or (I. 109, 1, 2) : "my clear understanding has been given to me by no one else than by you, Indra, and Agni; with it I have made (lit. *fabricated*) to you this hymn, the product of intelligence which intimates my desire for sustenance. For I have heard that you are more munificent givers than an unworthy bridegroom or the brother of a bride; therefore, in offering you the Soma, I produce (lit. *generate*) for you a new hymn;" or (VII. 7, 6): "these men who have cleverly made (lit. *fabricated*) the hymn, have increased the prosperity of all (living beings) with food."¹¹ And when the poet says in a Vâlakhilya hymn: "India and Varuna, I have seen through devotion that which, after it was heard in the beginning, you gave to the poets—wisdom, understanding of speech;" *seeing* is obviously used by him in none but a metaphorical sense¹².

¹¹ Compare, for other instances, Muir's "Original Sanskrit Texts, vol II p 208, note 163, and p 220

¹² Compare *ibid* p 220 इन्द्रवरुणा यदपिम्यो मनीषा प्राचो मति श्रुतमदत्तमप्य ।..... तपससायपरम्. In the same sense *Yâshu* says (I 20) सादात्कृतधर्माण वायप्यो यम्बु , 'the Rishis had an intuitive insight into duty' (Muir, vol II p 174), and *Sayâna*, e.g., in his gloss on Rigv I 102, 7 कृपयोऽतीनिदियद्रष्टार, or on IV 36 6 कृपिरतीनिदिय- ज्ञानी.

PROFESSOR MULLER HOLDS THAT THERE ARE FOUR DISTINCT PERIODS OF ANCIENT SANSKRIT LITERATURE,—THE CHHANDAS MANTRA, BRAHMANA AND SUTRA PERIODS HIS DISTRIBUTION OF THE ANCIENT LITERATURE OVER THESE PERIODS

REFUTATION OF HIS VIEWS AND OF HIS DISTRIBUTION OF THE ANCIENT LITERATURE

There are in the Vaidik age, says Professor Muller (p 70), "four distinct periods which can be established with sufficient evidence. They may be called the *Chandas period*, *Mantra period*, *Brahmana period*, and *Sutra period*, according to the general form of the literary productions which give to each of them its peculiar historical character." In the continuation of his work he then defines the Chandas period as embracing the earliest hymns of the Rigveda, such as he conceives them to be according to the instances he has selected from the bulk of this Veda (p 525 ff.). The Mantra period is, in his opinion, represented by the remaining part of the Rigveda (p 456 ff.), and the Brahmana period by the Sama-veda samhitâ, "or the prayer book of the Udgatri priests," which is entirely collected from the Rigveda, "the Samhitâs of the Yajurveda (p 457), the Brahmana portion of the Vedas, properly so called, and "on the frontier between the Brahmana and Sutra literature," the oldest theological treatises of Âranyakas and Upanishads (p 313 ff.). Lastly, the Sutra period contains, according to him (p 71 ff.), the Vaidik words written in the Sutra style, viz., the six Vedângas or the works on "Sîl shâ (pronunciation), Chhandas (meter), Vyakarana (grammar), Nirukta (explanation of words), Jyotishâ (astronomy), and Kalpa (ceremonial)" (p 113 ff.).

An author has, in general, the right of choosing his terms, nor should I consider it necessary to add a remark on the names by which Muller designates these four periods of his Ancient History, were it not to obviate a misunderstanding which he has not guarded against, though it may be of consequence to do so. Two terms which have served him for the marking of two periods of the ancient literature, viz., *Sutra* and *Brahmana*, have been used by him nearly in the same sense in which they occur in the ancient writers; and if he embraces more works under these heads than those writers would have comprised, it may be fairly admitted that no misconception will result from this enlargement of the original acceptation of the words *Sutra* and *Brahmana*. But if he designates the two first epochs by the names of *Chandas* and *Mantra*, with

¹ Professor Benfey has pointed out in his valuable edition of this Veda the few verses which cannot be found in the Rigveda (Pref p xix). This redundancy which is apparently at variance with the general doctrine of the Hindu commentators that the Sama-veda is extracted from the Rigveda, proves in reality, that there must have been at one time another recension of the Rigveda than that which we possess now, a fact clearly proved also by Müller's "Ancient History."

the explicit remark that he has made this division of four periods "according to the general form of the literary productions which give to each of them its peculiar historical character" (p 70), it may be inferred that, as in the case of Sūtra and Brāhmaṇa, he has chosen those names in conformity with the bearing they have in the ancient literature itself, that the Hindus when using the words Chhandas and Mantra, meant by them the older and the more recent hymns of the Rigveda. Such, however, is not the case.

MEANING OF THE WORD MANTRA

Mantra means, as Colebrooke has already defined the word—in conformity with the Mīmānsā writers—"a prayer, invocation, or declaration. It is expressed in the first person or is addressed in the second, it declares the purpose of a pious act, or lauds or invokes the object, it asks a question or returns an answer, directs, inquires, or deliberates, blesses or imprecates, exults or laments, counts or narrates," etc. "Mantras are distinguished under three designations. Those which are in metre are termed *metre*, those chanted are *sāman*, and the rest are *yajus*, sacrificial prayers in prose," etc.¹⁶

MEANING OF THE WORD CHHANDAS USE OF BOTH THESE WORDS IN THE SŪTRAS OF YĀMINI

The first meaning of Chhandas, in the ancient writers, is metre, the second is verse in general, and in this sense it is contrasted with the prosaic passages of the Yajurveda. Thus the Purushasūta of the Rigveda—the late origin of which hymn is proved by its contents—says "¹⁷ From this sacrifice which was offered to the universal

¹⁶ Translations of the Royal Asiatic Society, I p 448 449—Compare also Jaimitriya yajuravatāli vistira I 4 1 (principally a) तथा धोत्तम् । उत्तमामन्त्रणात्य न्तवान्तस्पादभावत् । मन्त्रप्रसिद्धयभावात्त्वं मन्त्रतैर्पां न युज्यत इति । अस्ये जुर्दं निर्व पामीत्युत्तमपुरुप् । अग्ने यस्त्विन्यश्च समर्पयेत्यामन्त्रणम् । उर्वा धासि पस्ती धासीत्यन्तस्पम् । हये श्वेते त्वेति त्वान्तस्पम् । आदिशादेनाशीर्देवत्यग्रतिष्ठादनादय एति II 17 तत्त्व समाध्यानमनुष्टानसाराकार्त्तिना मन्त्रव्यं गमयति । उद्य प्रथस्वेतादयो उनुष्टानसारका । अग्निमीत्ये पुरोहितमित्यादयः स्तुतिस्पा । हये त्वेत्यादयस्वान्ता । अग्ना अग्ना यादि वीतय इत्यादय आमन्त्रणो पेता । अग्नीश्चनियद्वित्यादय प्रवृप्त्या । अग्न च्विदाग्नीदुपरिच्विदामीदित्यादयो विचारस्पा । अस्ये अग्निके अग्नालिके न मा नयति कथनेत्यादयः परिदेवनस्पा । पृष्ठामि त्वा परमसा वृथिणा इत्यादय प्रभस्पा । येदिमादु परमन्ते वृथिणा इत्यादय उत्तरस्पा । पृथमन्यद्व्युदाहार्यम् एति II 1 10 12 पादव्यष्टेनार्थेन्द्रेन षोपेणा पृथमदा मन्त्रा ग्राच । गीतिस्पा मन्त्रा मामानि । शृणिगीतियज्जन्त्येन पृथिष्ठिता मन्त्रा यत्प्राण्युक्ते न व्यापि गीतकर II 1 13 . . . तता मन्त्राणो ग्रन्थिष्यं सुस्थितम्

Rigveda (V 10 9) तमादग्नासर्वदुग्ध श्रव्य सामानि जग्निरे । पृथमि जग्निरे तमादग्नुमादग्नापत् त्वया a it is true rulers पृथमि with ग्राण्याशीनि, but in the word would simply mean "metre," but it does not seem natural that the enunciation of the other Vedas shall be interrupted by a word meaning "metre" while on the other hand the word यज्ञम alone might have left a doubt as to whether the metrical contents of this Veda are included in it or not.

spirit sprang the Richas (Rig-verses), the Sūmans (Sāmaveda-verses), the metrical passages (Chhandas) and the Yajus;" which latter words seem to be referable only to the two characteristic portions of the Yajurveda, since Yajus in general designates its prosaic part. In a verse of the Atharvaveda it is contrasted, in a similar manner, with the Yajurveda, and seems to imply there the verses of the Atharvaveda: "From the remainder of the sacrifice sprang the Richas, Sāmanas, the verses (Chhandas), the old legendary lore, together with the Yajus"** In the Sūtras of Pāṇini the word *Chhandas* occurs, in rules which concern Vaidik words, one hundred and ten times, and its sense extends over two hundred and thirty-three Sūtras; in rules of this category it means Veda in general, comprising thus the Mantras as well as the Brāhmaṇa-portion of the Veda. Whenever, therefore, such a general rule concerning a Vaidik word is restricted or modified in the Mantra portion, Chhandas then becomes contrasted with Mantra, and thus assumes the sense of Brāhmaṇa; or whenever such a general rule is restricted or modified in the Brāhmaṇa portion, Chhandas then becomes contrasted with Brāhmaṇa, and therefore assumes the sense of Mantra.***

From no passage, however, in the ancient literature, can we infer that Mantra conveyed or implied the idea of a later portion, and Chhandas that of an earlier portion of the Rigveda hymns.

“Atharv XI 7 21 कहच सामानि च्छन्दासि पुराणं यतुपा सह । उच्छिष्टाज्ञज्ञिरे etc—in this sentence *Chhandas* is separated from the word *Yajus* by the word *Purāna*, which here probably implies the legends of the Brāhmaṇas

“Thus it is used by Pāṇini in the general sense of *Veda* I 2 61, 4, 9 20 81, II 3, 3, 4, 28 39 73 76, III 1, 42 50 59 84 123, 2, 63 88 10, 137 170, 3, 129, 4 6 88 117, IV 1, 29 46 59, 3 19 150 4 103 110, etc. It is contrasted with *Mantra*, for instance, I 2 66 (comp 34 35 37), III 2, 73 (comp 71 72), with *Brāhmaṇa*, for instance IV, 2, 66, IV 3, 106 (comp 10).—The meaning ‘desire’ of the word *chhandas* has not been mentioned above as being irrelevant for the present purpose, nor was it necessary to give passages from Pāṇini where the word has the general sense ‘metre,’ such as III 3 34, etc., or as base becomes the subject of rules respecting its derivatives—Professor Weber has adverted in his ‘Indische Studien’ (vol 1 p 29 note) to the manner in which Pāṇini has used *chhandas*—he defines it however as meaning first, ‘desire’, then ‘a prayer of desire, prayer *mant* a contrasted with *brahmaṇa*, IV 2, 66, then in a more extended sense, even *brahmaṇirāham* III 2 73 [or shall this mean ‘asks he *brahmaṇirāsartham*’? Certainly not, for the word is contrasted in III 2, 73 with the word *mantra* of III 2 71 (72), and implies therefore in this Sūtra the sense *brahmaṇa*] and then ‘in the widest sense generally, *veda*, as contrasted with *loke*, *bhashu* *gum* and its *slokis* (IV 3 102n).’ [The latter instance is not happy since it belongs to a *Varttika* of the *hāsikā* and since there are more than a hundred Sūtras of Pāṇini which might have been referred to for the corroboration of the sense *Veda*.] Lastly he says it means ‘metre’. But this reversal of the meanings of *chhandas* is not only objectionable etymologically—it prevents our understanding how *chhandas* could mean both a poetical and a prosaic passage of the *Vedas*. Hence, the incidental question of Weber and his conjecture—which could not have arisen if he had started from the general sense *Veda* which if contrasted (but only then) with *mantra*, would in play the sense *Brāhmaṇa*, and vice versa. It seems moreover, that the sense ‘desire’ marks the last stage of its development. In short, that *chhandas* means 1 metre, 2 a verse, 3 a verse as a prayer 4 *Veda* in general, which may become modified to *Mantra* or *Brahmaṇa* 4 desire.

PROFESSOR MULLER ASSIGNS DATES TO HIS FOUR PERIODS
 OF ANCIENT SANSKRIT LITERATURE. HIS OLDEST
 DATE IS 1200 B.C.

Some very questionable points in the detail of this distribution of the Vaidik literature will be noticed by me hereafter as touching the ground on which I have raised this inquiry into the chronological result of professor Müller's work. There is, however, one general question which must be dealt with previously. If Müller had contented himself with simply arranging his subject-matter as he has done, we could readily assent to the logical or esthetical point of view which, we might have inferred, had guided him in planning his work. But he does not allow us to take this view, when he assigns dates to these periods severally. The "Chandas period," he says, comprises the space of time from 1200 to 1000 B.C. (p. 572), the "Mantra period" from 1000 to 800 B.C. (pp. 497, 572), the Brâhma period" from 800 to 600 n.c. (p. 435), and the "Sûtra period" from 600 to 200 B.C. (pp. 210, 313). In other words, his arrangement is meant to be an historical one. He does not classify ancient Sanskrit literature into a scientific, a ritual, a theological, and poetical literature, each of which might have had its coeval representatives, but he implies by these dates that when the poetical epoch, his Chandas-and Mantra-epoch, had terminated its verses, the theological time, that of the Brâhmaṇas and Upanishads etc., set to work; and when this had done with theology, the ritual and scientific period displayed its activity, until it paused about 200 n.c. I need scarcely observe that such an assumption is highly improbable, unless we suppose that India which, from the time of Herodotus, has always enjoyed the privilege of being deemed the land of supernatural facts, has also in this matter set at defiance the ordinary law of human development. But this doubt seems to derive some support from Müller's own arguments. In the course of his researches he has confirmed the general opinion, that a Sûtra work presupposes, of necessity, the existence of a Brâhmaṇa, and that a Brâhmaṇa cannot be conceived without a collection of hymns, the Samitî. Thus the ritual Sûtras of Âśvalâyana would have been impossible unless a Brâhmaṇa of the Rigveda—for instance, the Altareya-Brâhmaṇa,—had been known to him; for he founds his precepts on it; and such a Brâhmaṇa, in quoting the hymns of the Rigveda, implies, as a matter of course, a previous collection of hymns, a Rigveda itself. Yet, though this argument is unexceptionable, and may be used, perhaps—not without objections of some weight—so as to presuppose in Âśvalâyana a knowledge of, and therefore as prior to him, a Sîmaveda and a Taittirîya Samitî—where is the logical necessity that the Vâjasaneyi-Samitî and the Satapatha-Brâhmaṇa (belonging to Müller's third period, 800—600 B.C.) existed before Âśvalâyana who lived, according to him, between 600 and 200 before Christ? His Sûtras would be perfectly intelligible if neither of the two last-named works had been composed at all. And, again, where is the logical necessity that the Upanishads should have been written before the authors of the Knâpa Sûtras, the Grammar, etc., since all these works are quite independent in spirit and in substance from the theo-

sophy of Upanishads or Āranyakas. On what ground does Professor Muller separate Pāṇini from these latter writings by at least 250 years, when there is no trace of any description in this Sūtras, either that he knew this kind of literature or that his grammar would not have been exactly the same as it is now if he had lived much before the time of these theological works? I shall recur to this latter question; but I cannot conclude the expression of my misgivings as to this historical division without questioning, too, the usefulness of these dates in general. They are not founded, as Muller himself repeatedly admits, on any basis whatever.⁵⁰ Neither is their a single reason to account for his allotting 200 years to the three first of his periods, nor for his doubling this amount of time in the case of the Sūtra period. He records, it is true, his personal impression alone in speaking of 1200, 1000 years, and so on; but the expediency of giving vent to feelings which deal with hundreds and thousands of years, as if such abstract calculations were suitable to the conditions of human life, appears very doubtful, if we consider that there are many who will not read his learned work with the special interest and criticism which it inspires in a Sanskrit philologer, but will attach a much higher import to his feelings than he himself does. One omission, moreover, I cannot leave unnoticed in these general dates, since it has a bearing, not merely on the intervals of his periods, but on their starting points.

BUT A QUOTATION, BY COLEBROOKE, FROM THE JYOTISHA,
PROVES THAT AN ARRANGEMENT OF VAIDIK HYMNS
WAS COMPLETED IN THE 14TH CENTURY BC

Colebrooke, in his essay on the Vedas, speaks of the Jyotisha, the ancient Vaidik calendar; and after having quoted a "remarkable" passage of this Vedāṅga, in which the then place of the colours is stated,

to "Ancient Sanskrit Literature, p 244 "It will readily be seen, how entirely hypothetical all these arguments are As an experiment, therefore, though as no more than an experiment, we propose to fix the years 600 and 200 B C as the limits of that age during which the Brāhmaṇic literature was carried on in the strange style of Sūtras" p 435 'Considering, therefore, that the Brāhmaṇa period must comprehend the first establishment of the threefold ceremonial, the composition of separate Brāhmaṇas, the formation of Brāhmaṇa charanas and the schism between old and new charanas, and their various collections, it would seem impossible to bring the whole within a shorter space than 200 years Of course this is merely conjectural but it would require a greater stretch of imagination to account for the production in a smaller number of years of that mass of Brāhmaṇic literature which still exists, or is known to have existed' P 497 I therefore fix the probable chronological limits of the mantra period between 800 and 1000 B C [Where is the least probability of this date?] P 572 "The chronological limits assigned to the Sūtra and Brāhmaṇa periods will seem to most Sanskrit scholars too narrow rather than too wide, and if we assign but 200 years to the Mantra period, from 800 to 1000 B C, and an equal number to the Chandas period, from 1000 to 1200 B C, we can do so only under the supposition that during the early periods of history the growth of the human mind was more luxuriant than in later times, and that the layers of thought were formed less slowly in the primary than in the tertiary ages of the world —But is 1200 B C a primary age of the world, except in biblical geology?

continues (M. E. vol. 1 p 109, or As. Res. viii, p. 493): "Hence it is clear that Dhanishthā and Aslesha are the constellations meant; and that when this Hindu calendar was regulated, the solstitial points were reckoned to be at the beginning of the one, and in the middle of the other: and such was the situation of those cardinal points, in the *fourteenth century before the Christian era*. I formerly (As. Res. vii p 283, or Essays, 1 p 201) had occasion to show from another passage of the Vedas, that the correspondence of seasons with months, as there stated, and as also suggested in the passage now quoted from the *Jyotisha*, agrees with such a situation of the cardinal points."

We have evidence, therefore, from this passage of the *Jyotisha*, that an arrangement of Vaidik hymns must have been completed in the fourteenth century before Christ; and as such an arrangement cannot have preceded the origin of the hymns comprised by it, we have evidence that these hymns do not belong to a more recent date. Nor is there any ground for doubting the genuineness of this calendar, or for assuming that the Hindu astronomers, when it was written, had knowledge enough to forge a combination, or if they had, that, in the habit of dealing with millions of years, they would have used this knowledge for the sake of forging an antiquity of a few hundred years. Yet the oldest hymns of the *Rigveda* are, according to Muller's opinion, not older than 1200 before Christ.

He has not only not invalidated the passage I have quoted, but he has not even made mention of it. Yet a scholar like Colebrooke, laid, as I have shown, greatest stress on it: it is he who calls it "remarkable;" and scholars like Wilson and Lassen have based their conclusions on Colebrooke's words.⁵¹ Should we, therefore, be satisfied with the absolute silence of Muller on the statements and opinions of these distinguished scholars, or account for it by the words of his preface?⁵²

PROFESSOR WEBER'S SLUR ON COLEBROOKE'S ACCURACY

No one, indeed, to the best of my knowledge, has ever doubted the accuracy of Colebrooke's calculation, but Professor Weber, who, in his "Indische Studien," vol. 1 p. 85, thus expresses himself:—"I avail myself of this opportunity to observe that before Colebrooke's astronomical calculation (M. E. 1. p 110, 201) has been examined once more, astronomically, and found correct, I cannot make up my mind, to assign to the present *Jyotih-çāstras*, the composition of which betrays—in language and style—a very recent period, any historical importance whatever for the fixing of the time when the *Vedas* were composed." Thus it seems that Professor Weber would make up his mind to that effect if some one would comply with his desire, and confirm the result of Colebrooke's calculation. But, we must ask, on what ground rests

⁵¹ See Lassen's "Indische Alterthumskunde," I p 747. Wilson's Introduction to his Translation of the *Rigveda*, vol I p xlvi.

⁵² Page vi. "Believing, as I do, that literary controversy is more apt to impede than to advance the cause of truth, I have throughout carefully abstained from it. Where it seemed necessary to controvert unfounded statements, or hasty conclusions, I have endeavoured to do so by stating the true facts of the case, and the legitimate conclusions that may be drawn from these facts."

this desire, which, in other words, is nothing but a very off hand slur' aimed at Colebrooke's scholarship or accuracy? Is Colebrooke a third-rate writer, to deserve this supercilious treatment? Has he, in his editions or translations of texts, taken such liberties as to forfeit our confidence? Has he falsified antiquity by substituting for its traditions his own foregone conclusions or ignorance? Has he appropriated to himself the labour of others, or meddled with subjects he did not thoroughly understand? His writings, one would think, prove that he is a type of accuracy and conscientiousness, - an author in whom even ungirded expressions are of the rarest kind, much more so errors or hasty conclusions drawn from erroneous facts. But Colebrooke was not only a distinguished Sanskritist, he was an excellent astronomer. Lassen calls him the profoundest judge in matters of Hindu astronomy, ⁵³ and he is looked upon as such by common consent. Yet, to invalidate the testimony of a scholar of his learning and character, Professor Weber, simply because a certain date does not suit his taste, and because his feelings, unsupported by any evidence, make him suppose that the Jyotisha 'betrays in language and style a very recent period,' has nothing to say but that he "will not make up his mind" to take that date for any good until somebody shall have examined that which Colebrooke had already examined, and, by referring to it, had relied upon as an established fact!

PROFESSOR WEBER'S SILENCE ON LASSEN'S RESEARCHES

It is but just to add, that three or seven years after he had admitted this singular lesson to Colebrooke, Weber once more is haunted by the asterisms Dhanisthā and Aslesha, and once more rejects their evidence as to Hindu antiquity ⁵⁴. This time, however, it is no longer the accuracy of Colebrooke's statement which inspues his doubt—he passes it over in silence altogether—but the origin of the arrangement of the Hindu Nakshatras. "Since," he says "the latter was not made by the Hindus themselves, but borrowed from the Chaldeans, it is obvious that no conclusion whatever can be drawn from it respecting Hindu antiquity" ⁵⁵. But he does not mention that Lassen, whose opinion will have, I assume, as much claim to notice as his own, had adduced weighty reasons for assigning the Hindu Nakshatras to Chinese origin, and had likewise, referring to the Veda calendar, observed—"As it is certain now that there existed in ancient times an intercourse, not thought of hitherto, between the Hindus and the Chinese, and that, with the latter, the use of the *sīra* ascends to a far higher antiquity, no objection can be founded on the Chinese origin of the Nakshatras, against their having been used by the Hindus at a time which is adverted to in their oldest astronomical observations on record. These observations belong to the fourteenth century B.C., and it results from them that the Hindus at that period dwelt in the northern part of India" ⁵⁶.

⁵³ Indische Alterth. vol I p 824 Ueber die Fortschritte der India in der Astronomie in der ältesten Zeit drückt sich der g. undlichste Kenner des Gegenstandes (Colebrooke a. 1 O II p 447) auf folgende Weise aus etc

⁵⁴ In an essay on Die Verbindungen Indiens mit den Ländern im Westen, written in April 1853 and printed in the Indische Skizzen 1857

Indische Skizzen p 73 note

⁵⁵ Indische Alterthumskunde vol I p 747

PROFESSOR WEBER AS A PERSONAL WITNESS OF THE PROGRESS
OF THE ĀRYAS IN INDIA UP TO 1500 B C

But, strange to remark, a year after having expressed his repeated doubt, Professor Weber records his poetical views on the earliest period of Hindu civilisation in the following manner :—“ From the Kābul river to the Sādānirā, from the remotest point of the western to that of the eastern border of India, there are twenty degrees, three hundred geographical miles, which had to be conquered (by the Āryas) one after the other. Thus we are able to claim, without any further remark, 1000 years as a minimum time for the period of occupying, subjecting to complete cultivation, and brahmanizing this immense tract of land; and thus we are brought back to about 1500 B C. as the time when the Indian Āryas still dwelt on the Kabul, and after which they commenced to extend themselves over India ”.¹

In short, with fantastical certainty he scruples about astronomical facts, and presents fantastical facts with astronomical certainty. I doubt whether this critical method will strengthen the faith of the general public in certain results of Sanskrit philology.

PROFESSOR MULLER HOLDS THAT THE UNIFORM EMPLOYMENT
OF THE ANUSHTUBH ŚLOKA MARKS A NEW PERIOD, VIZ.,
THE CLASSICAL PERIOD OF SANSKRIT LITERATURE

“ If we succeed,” says Professor Muller (p. 215), “ in fixing the relative age of any one of these Sūtrakāras, or writers of Sūtras, we shall have fixed the age of a period of literature which forms a transition between the Vedic and the classical literature of India ”. This inference does not seem conclusive; for neither can the age of one individual author be held sufficient to fix the extent of a period which, according to Muller’s own views, may embrace, at least, 400 years, and probably more; nor has Muller shown that the older portions of the Māhabhārata and, perhaps, the Rāmāyaṇa, might not have co-existed with some, at least, of the authors of his Sūtra period. He says, it is true, in the commencement of his work (p. 68) :—“ Now it seems that the regular and continuous Anushtubh śloka is a metre unknown during the Vedic age, and every work written in it may at once be put down as post-Vedic. It is no valid objection that this epic śloka occurs also in Vedic hymns, that Anushtubh verses are frequently quoted in the Brāhmaṇas, and that, in some of the Sūtras, the Anushtubh śloka occurs intermixed with Trishtubhs, and is used for the purpose of recapitulating what had been explained before in prose. For it is only the uniform employment of that metre which constitutes the characteristic mark of a new period of literature.” But this very important assertion, even with its last restriction, is left by him without any

¹ “ Die neueren Forschungen über das alte Indien. Ein Vortrag, im berliner wissenschaftlichen Verein gehalten am 4. März, 1854 printed in the *Indische Skizzen*, 1857, p. 14

proof. For, when he adds, in a note (p. 69), "It is remarkable that in Pāṇini also, the word *Stolā* is always used in opposition to Vedic literature (Pan IV 2, 66, IV 3, 102, v 1, IV. 3, 107)," I must observe, in the first place, that in none of these quotations does the word *Stolā* belong to Pāṇini." The first of these instances, where *Stolā* occurs, cannot be traced to a higher antiquity than that of Patīnyali, the second, which coincides with it, occurs in the commentary of the late Kasikā on a Varttikā, the antiquity of which rests on the authority of this work, and, in the last quoted rule, the word *Stolā* likewise belongs to no other authority than that of the same late commentary. But, in the second place, it seems to me that these very instances may be used to prove exactly the reverse of Muller's views.

PROOF THAT THIS VIEW CANNOT BE ASSIMILATED TO —TITTIRI
AND CHARAKA WERE AUTHORS OF SLOKAS

I should quite admit the expediency of his observation if its object had been to lay down a criterion by which a class of works might become recognisable. There is, however, clearly, a vast difference between an external mark, concerning the contents of certain writings and the making of such a mark a basis for computing periods of literature. For when Patīnyali or the Kasikā, in illustrating the rules IV 2, 66, or IV 3, 102, says that a Vaidik composition of *Tittiri* is called *Taittiriya*, but that such a derivative would not apply to the Slokas composed by *Tittiri*, they distinctly contrast the two kinds of composition, but they also distinctly state that the same personage was the author of both. And the same author, of course, cannot belong to two different periods of literature, separated, as Muller suggests, from one another by at least several centuries. The same remark applies to the instance by which the Kasikā exemplifies the import of the rule IV 3, 107, it contrasts here the Vaidik work with the Slokas of the same author, *Charaka*.

KATYAYANA COMPOSED SLOKAS CALLED BHRAJAS

KATYAYANA AS KARMAPRADIPA IS WRITTEN IN SLOKAS — VIADI
WROTE A WORK SANGRAHA IN 100 000 SLOKAS — ALL THESE
AUTHORS WOULD BELONG TO PROFESSOR MULLER'S
VAAIDIK PERIOD

But I will give some other instances, which, in my opinion corroborate the doubt I have expressed as to the chronological bearing of this word. Kātyayana, who is assigned by Muller to the Sūtra period, and rightly so far as the character of some of his works is concerned is the author of *Stolās* which are called *Bhrajas* the Splendid. This

^{**} The quotations of Muller's note to his p. 69 are IV 1 66 instead of IV 2 66 and IV 3 103 1 instead of IV 3 107 v 1 but as the word *Stolā* neither occurs in the Sūtra nor in the Varttikā nor in the commentaries on the former quotations I was probably right in assuming that they were errors of the press and in substituting for them the figures given which are the nearest approach to them. There is indeed one Sūtra of Pāṇini where *Stolā* and *mo* it are mentioned together viz. the Sūtra III 2 23 but I am not aware that any conclusion similar to that mentioned above could be drawn from it.

fact is drawn from Patanjali's commentary on Pāṇini and Kātyāyana's gloss on Patanjali (p. 23 and 24 of Dr Ballantyne's valuable edition)⁹⁹ Now, the word *Sloka*, if used in reference to whole works, always implies the Anushtubh-sloka : thus Muller himself properly calls the laws of Manu Yājnavalkya, and Parāśara, "Sloka-works" (p 86) It would seem, therefore, that the *Bhrāja-slokas* of Kātyāyana were such a work in continuous Anushtubhs. A second instance is the *Karmapradīpa*, which is a work of the same Kātyāyana, and is mentioned as such by Muller himself (p. 235) on the authority of Shadguruśishya ; it is written in the "regular and continuous Anushtubh-sloka," as every one may ascertain from the existing MS. copies of this work. *Vyādi*, or *Vyāli*, who is an earlier authority than Kātyāyana (see Müller's History, p. 241), composed a work called *Saṅgha*, or "Compendium" in one hundred thousand *Slokas* ; and there can be little doubt that this information, which is given by Nāgojibhātta, applies to a work in the *continuous* Anushtubh verse¹⁰⁰ And this very *Vyādi*, I may here state, will hereafter become of peculiar interest to us on account of his near relationship to Pāṇini. It is evident, therefore, that the "uniform employment of that metre" is not a criterion necessitating the relegation of a work written in it to a period more recent than 200 before Christ.

PROFESSOR MULLER ASSIGNS TO KĀTYĀYANA THE DATE
850 B C, AND CONSIDERS PĀṇINI TO BE HIS
CONTEMPORARY.

The "writer of a Sūtra" which, in Muller's opinion, may help us to fix the whole period of the Sūtra literature, is KĀTYĀYANA ; and if I do not mistake his meaning, PĀṇINI too. For Muller arrives at the conclusion that Kātyāyana lived about 350 B C, and, if I am right, that Pāṇini was his contemporary.¹⁰¹ The reason for assigning this date to Kātyāyana

" Patanjali (p 23) वस्तु पुनरिदं पठितम् । आजा नाम शोकाः ।—Kātyāyana (p 24) कात्यायनेष्वनिवद्वाजात्यथ्वेकमध्यपठितस्य त्वस्य श्रुतिरसुप्राहिकामिति । एकं शब्दः सुश्रातं सुपूरुक्तं स्वर्गं लोके कामात्मभवतीति—Nāgojibhātta (p 23) आजा नाम कात्यायनपूर्णता शोका इत्याहुः.

" Patanjali (ed Ballantyne, p 48) संग्रह एतत्पूर्वाधान्येन परीक्षितम्—Kātyāyana संग्रह इति । ग्रन्थविशेषे—Nāgojibhātta संग्रहो व्याडिकृतो लक्ष्मोक्तसंस्तयो ग्रन्थ इति पूर्सिद्धिः—This remark concerns the use which is made of the word *Sloka* in reference to whole, especially extensive, works. Single *verses* not of the Anushtubh class, are sometimes also called *Slokas*, thus Kātyāyana calls so the *Ārṣī* verse of the Kārīkā to II 4 85, or IV 4 9, etc., or the *Dodhaka* verses of the Kārīkās to VI 4, 12, or VIII 2 108, and Nāgojibhātta gives the name of *Sloka* to the *Indravajra* and *Upendravajra* of the Kārīkā to I 1, 38, but I know of no instance in which a whole work written in such *verses* is simply spoken of as having been written in *Slokas*.

¹⁰¹ I regret that I am not able to refer with greater certainty to Müller's views

is contained in the following passage of the "Ancient Sanskrit Literature":—"Let us consider," says Muller, after having established the identity of Kātyāyana and Kātyāyana Vararuchi (p 210 ff), "the information which we receive about Kātyāyana Vararuchi from Brahmanic sources. Somadevabhatta of Kashmir collected the popular stories current in his time, and published them towards the beginning of the twelfth century under the title of Kathā-saritsāgara, the Ocean of the Rivers of Stories. Here we read that Kātyāyana Vararuchi, being cursed by the wife of Śiva, was born at Kauśambi, the capital of Vatsa. He was a boy of great talent, and extraordinary powers of memory. He was able to repeat to his mother an entire play, after hearing it once at the theatre; and before he was even initiated he was able to repeat the Prātiśākhya which he had heard from Vyālti. He was afterwards the pupil of Varsha, became proficient in all sacred knowledge, and actually defeated Pāṇini in a grammatical controversy. By the intercession of Śiva, however, the final victory fell to Pāṇini. Kātyāyana had to appease the anger of Śiva, became himself a student of Pāṇini's Grammar, and completed and corrected it. He after-

on their contemporaneousness. In page 138 he writes "Kātyāyana, the contemporary and critic of Pāṇini, p 215 'Now, if Pāṇini lived in the middle of the fourth century B.C., etc [this is the date which Müller assigns to Kātyāyana], p 303 'the old Kātyāyana Vararuchi, the contemporary of Pāṇini, but at p 184 he says "at the time of Kātyāyana, if not at the time of Pāṇini"—which clearly implies that he here considers Pāṇini's time as prior to Kātyāyana's, since Kātyāyana wrote a critical work on Pāṇini, the Vartikas, and on p 44, 45 he observes, "If then, Āśvalāyana can be shown to have been a contemporary, or at least an immediate successor of Pāṇini etc," but p 239 "we should have to admit at least five generations of teachers and pupils first, Saunaka after him, Āśvalāyana, in whose favour Saunaka is said to have destroyed one of his works, thirdly, Kātyāyana who studied the works both of Saunaka and Āśvalāyana, fourthly, Patañjali, who wrote a commentary on one of Kātyāyana's works and lastly, Vyāsa, who commented on a work of Patañjali. It does not follow that Kātyāyana was a pupil of Āśvalāyana, or that Patañjali lived immediately after Kātyāyana but the smallest interval which we can admit between every two of these names is that between teacher and pupil, an interval as large as that between father and son, or rather larger." Now, if according to the first alternative of p 49, Āśvalāyana was a contemporary of Pāṇini, the latter becomes a doubtful contemporary of Kātyāyana according to the quotation from p 239 and if according to the other alternative of p 45 Āśvalāyana was a successor of Pāṇini, there is, according to p 239, still a greater probability that Pāṇini and Kātyāyana were not contemporaries. Again at p 230 he says "from all these indications we should naturally be led to expect that the relation between Saunaka and Kātyāyana was very intimate, that both belonged to the same Sākha and that Saunaka is anterior to Kātyāyana. But if Āśvalāyana is an immediate successor of Pāṇini (p 49), and an immediate successor of Saunaka (p 239) Pāṇini and Saunaka must be contemporaries, and if Saunaka is anterior to Kātyāyana (p 230 and comp p 242), Pāṇini, too, must have preceded Kātyāyana. Acting therefore on the rule of probabilities, and perceiving that Müller three times distinctly calls Pāṇini a contemporary of Kātyāyana and allows by inference only this date to be subverted two-and-a-half times it is fair to assume that he believed rather in the contemporaneousness of both than otherwise. The correctness of this belief I shall have to make the subject of further discussion; but when I find myself compelled to infer from Müller's expressions that Pāṇini is to him a contemporary of Saunaka I must, in passing observe that Pāṇini himself repudiates this conclusion for in the Sūtra IV 3 106 which is intimately connected with IV 3 105, Pāṇini speaks of Saunaka as of an ancient authority.

REFUTATION OF THIS VIEW

Thus, the whole foundation of Muller's date rests on the authority of Somadeva, the author of "an Ocean of [or rather, for] the Rivers of Stories," who narrated his tales in the twelfth century after Christ. Somadeva, I am satisfied, would not be a little surprised to learn that "a European point of view" raises a "ghost story" of his to the dignity of an historical document. Muller himself, as we see, says that it would be "wrong to expect in a work of this kind 'historical or chronological facts,' he is doubtful as to the date which might have been in Somadeva's mind when he speaks of King Nanda, he will 'disregard' the fact that Kātyāyāna becomes, in the tale quoted, a minister of Nanda, he admits that a story current in the middle of the 12th century about Kātyāyāna and Pāṇini is but a 'slender fact,'—in short, he pulls down every stone of this historical fabric, and yet, because Nanda is mentioned in this amusing tale, he "must place Kātyāyāna's life about 350 B.C.

I have but one word to add. however correct the criticisms of Muller on the value of this tale may be, the strength of his conclusion would have become still more apparent than it is now, if instead of the abstract of the story, which he has given, a literal translation of it had preceded his premises, for the very form of the tale, and its incidental absurdities, would have illustrated much better than his sober account of it, its value as a source of chronology. I subjoin, therefore, a portion of it, from the fourth chapter of this work. Kātyāyāna, the grammatical sūnt and author of the Kūḍī sūtras after having told Kanabhūti how once upon a time he became enamoured of a beautiful damsel, by what feelings he was moved, and that he at last married the fair Upakosī, continues as follows: "Some time after, Varsha (who in another tale is said to have lived at Pataliputra during the reign of Nanda) had a great number of pupils. One of them was a great blockhead, by the name of Pāṇini, he, tired of the service, was sent away by the wife of Varsha. To do penance, he went grieved yet desirous of knowledge, to the Himalaya, there he obtained from Siva, who was pleased with his fierce austerities, a new grammar which was the introduction to all science. Now he came back and challenged me to a disputation; and seven days passed on while our disputation proceeded. When on the eighth day, however, he was defeated by me instantly Siva (appeared) in a cloud (and) raised a tremendous uproar. Thus my grammar which had been given to me by Indra, was destroyed on earth, and we all, vanquished by Pāṇini, became fools again."

DR. BOEHTLINGK ALSO PLACES PĀṇINI ABOUT 300 B.C.

It is almost needless for me to state, that the profound researches of Dr Otto Boehltingk in his "commentary" on Pāṇini, are based on the same interesting "Ocean for the Rivers of Stories" and have duly advocated the same date of Pāṇini's life. But as we have become already acquainted with the reasoning of the "editor" of Pāṇini it will not appear devoid of interest to recall his arguments, which differ in several respects from those of Professor Muller. In the Rājatarangini,

the Chronicle of Kashmir, he says (p. vii), we read that Abhimanu ordered Chandra and other grammarians to introduce the great commentary of Patanjali into Kashmir. Now, continues he (p. viii), "the age of King Abhimanu, under whose reign Chandra lived can be ascertained by various ways, which all lead to the same result," viz., to the date 100 B.C.; and (p. viii) "since we have found that Patanjali's Mahābhāṣya came into general use in Kashmir through Chandra, about 100 B.C., we are probably justified in pushing the composition of this great commentary to the Sūtras of Pāṇini, into the year 150. Between Patanjali and Pāṇini there are still three grammarians known to us, as we have observed before (p. xiv; viz., Kātyāyana, the author of the Paribhāṣā, and the author of the Kārikās) who made contributions to the Grammar of Pāṇini. We need therefore only make a space of fifty years between each couple of them, in order to arrive at the year 350, into the neighbourhood of which date our grammarian is to be placed, according to the Kathā-sarit-sāgara."

PROOF THAT THE PREMISES WHICH HAVE LED TO HIS CONCLUSION
ARE IMAGINARY.

"Every way," says the French proverb "leads to Rome"—but not every way leads to truth even in chronology. There is one way for instance, and it was the proper way, which led Professor Lassen⁴⁴ to the correct result that Abhimanu did not live about 100 B.C., but between 40 and 65 after Christ. As to the triad of grammarians which is "known" to Dr. Boehtlingk between Pāṇini and Patanjali, and represented to his mind by Kātyāyana, and what he calls the author of the Paribhāṣās and the author of the Kārikās, I must refer to my subsequent statements, which will show the worth of this specious enumeration. But, when Dr. Boehtlingk required 200 years between Patanjali and Pāṇini, simply to square his account with the "Ocean for the Rivers of Stories," it would be wrong to deny that he has rightly divided 200 by 4; nor should I doubt that he would have managed with less ability the more difficult task of dividing 2000 or 20000 years by 4, if such an arithmetical feat had been required of him by that source of historical chronology, the Kathā-sarit-sāgara.

Professor Müller must have had some misgivings like my own as to the critical acumen and accuracy of Dr. Boehtlingk's investigations. For, in the first instance, he does not start from the Kathā-sarit-sāgara in order to arrive at the conclusion that Kātyāyana lived fifty years after Pāṇini; on the contrary, he makes, as we have seen, both grammarians contemporaries; judging, no doubt, that two men who enjoyed a very substantial flight cannot have lived at different times, even in a story book. Then he adverts likewise (p. 213) to the little mistake of Dr. Boehtlingk concerning Abhimanu's date; in short, he denies the validity of all the arguments alleged by Dr. Boehtlingk, save those which are founded on the Kathā-sarit-sāgara. When therefore he, nevertheless, says (p. 301) that the researches of Professor Boehtlingk "with regard to the age of Pāṇini deserve the highest credit," I am at a loss to understand this handsome compliment, even though it strengthen

⁴⁴ "Indische Alterthumskunde," vol. II, p. 412.

his assurance (p. 310) "that Kātyāyana's date is as safe as any date is likely to be in ancient Oriental chronology."⁹⁴

An extraordinary view taken by Dr. Boehtlingk of the moral and intellectual condition of ancient India —The whole of the ancient scientific literature of this country would prove, according to his view, a gigantic swindle and imbecility

"In reply to this compliment, Dr. Boehtlingk makes the following bow. Alles was zur Entscheidung dieser Frage beitragen konnte finden wir auf das sorgfältigste zusammengestellt und erwogen in einem so eben erschienenen Werke von Max Müller, einem Werke, in welchem überraschende Belesenheit, Scharfsinn und geistreiche Behandlung des Stoffes den Leser in beständiger Spannung erhalten, i.e., 'All that can contribute to the solution of this question—(viz., that of the introduction of writing into India) we find put together and examined in the most careful manner, in a work by Max Müller, just published, a work in which surprising acquaintance with the literature, acuteness and ingenious treatment of the subject-matter, never suffer the reader's attention to flag.' The testimonial he thus gratuitously gives to his own knowledge of "all that can contribute to the solution of that question," reached me too late to be noticed in the previous pages as they were already in the press, it is contained in a paper of his, having the title 'Ein paar Worte Zur Frage über das Alter der Schrift in Indien.' These "few words" do not contain, indeed a particle of fact bearing on the question, but much reasoning of which the following concluding passage is the summary: "Nach meinem Daft erhalten also wurde die Schrift zur Verbreitung der Literaturen in den älteren Zeiten nicht verwandt wohl aber wurde sie zum Schaffen neuer Werke zu Hülfe genommen. Der Verfasser schrieb sein Werk nieder lernte es aber dann auswendig oder liess es durch Andere memoriren. Niedergeschriebene Werke wurden in der älteren Zeit wohl selten von Neuem abgeschrieben, mögen aber im Original in der Familie als Heiligtümer aufbewahrt und geheim gehalten worden sein. Möglicher Weise vernichtete aber auch der Autor sein Schriftwerk, sobald er dasselbe memorirt hatte, um nicht durch sein Beispiel Andere zu verleiten um sich nicht des Vorwurfs einer Verrätheit an der Priesterkaste schuldig zu machen vielleicht auch um nicht als gewöhnlicher Autor, dem das Werk allmäthlich unter den Händen entsteht, zu erscheinen, sondern als ein inspirirter Seher, der ohne alle Mühe und Anstrengung von seiner Seite beim Schaffen, ein Werk in abgeschlossener Gestalt im Geiste erschaut und als ein solcher von den Göttern bevorzugter weiter verkündet" i.e., "In my opinion, therefore, writing was not used in the olden times for the propagation of literature but was resorted to for the production of new works. The author wrote down his work, but then learnt it by heart, or made others commit it to memory. Probably, works once written down, were not copied anew in the olden time with rare exceptions, but the original manuscripts were perhaps preserved as sacred reliques in the family, and kept secret. But it is possible too, that the author destroyed his written work, after he had committed it to memory in order not to seduce others by his example, nor to make himself guilty of the reproach of treason towards the caste of priests; perhaps too, not to appear as an ordinary author whose work grew gradually under his hands but as an inspired seer who without any labour and exertion in producing had seen in his mind a work in a finished form, and as a person thus favoured by the gods had proclaimed it abroad. —This reasoning will not surprise us in the author of a "commentary on Pāṇini" (compare note 48, etc.) let I must ask, whence he derived his information that it was treason towards the Brāhmaṇa caste to write or to produce a manuscript? or whence he has learnt that an author could, in olden times pass himself off as an inspired seer who was favoured by the gods, without, of course being chastised by his countrymen, as an impostor?" Manu XI. 55, treats false writing—पूर्ण लिप्त्वा—as a crime equal to that of killing a Brāhmaṇa and 15ṇarākṣa III. 229 places it on the same level with the drinking of a certain liquor which crime is expiated only after the sinner has drunk either

UNSATISFACTORY RESULTS CONCERNING THE DATE OF PĀṇINI

That Sausskrit philology should not yet possess the means of ascertaining the date of Pāṇini's life, is, no doubt, a serious impediment to any research concerning the chronology of ancient Hindu works. For Pāṇini's Grammar is the centre of a vast and important branch of the ancient literature. No work has struck deeper roots than his in the soil of the scientific development of India. It is the standard of accuracy in speech—the grammatical basis of the Vaidik commentaries. It is appealed to by every scientific writer whenever he meets with a linguistic difficulty. Besides the inspired seers of the works which are the root of Hindu belief, Pāṇini is the only one, among those authors of scientific works who may be looked upon as real personages, who is a Rishi in the proper sense of the word,—an author supposed to have had the foundation of his work revealed to him by a divinity¹⁶. Yet, however we may regret the necessity of leaving this important personage in the chaos which envelopes the

boiling spirits or boiling butter, cow's urine, or milk, until he dies (III 253) Veri city, moreover, is known to be one of the principal features of the character of the ancient Hindus, as, in the epic legends a word spoken or a promise made, is always deemed irrevocable and binding. It is notorious that the Hindu authorities did not look upon any one as an inspired seer, except the author of a Mantra and probably, at a more recent period, of a Brahmana. The Kalpa works were never considered to be anything but human productions and I know only of one instance, viz., that of Pāṇini, where the author of a scientific work was supposed to have received it from a divinity—in other words, to the mind of Dr Bochtlingk the whole of the ancient scientific literature of India presents a lecture of a gigantic swindle and impudence, on the one side are the charlatans who write works learn them by heart, and burn the manuscripts in order to appear in direct communication with a divinity, on the other is the idiotic nation which believes that the learned quacks are inspired seers favoured by the gods! It is not a little characteristic, but at the same time very intelligible that this should be the view of the "editor" of Pāṇini.

Pāṇini looked upon by the Hindus as a Rishi, in the proper sense
of this word

"Patanjali frequently, therefore, makes use of the expression "Pāṇini sees" when an ordinary author is quoted by him as saying or the like, e.g., p. 145 (in Dr. Ballantyne's edition) परयति त्वाचार्ये भावारम्भस्यातो लोपो भर्तीति; or p. 210, परयति त्वाचार्ये न प्यञ्जनस्य गुणो भर्तीति; p. 281 परयति त्वाचार्ये न सिध्यन्तार्थं भर्तीति, p. 615, परयति त्वाचार्यं स्थानिद्वाद्वरो भर्तीति; p. 787, परयति त्वाचार्यं द्वाद्वरामूर्त्तद्वप्रहणेन गृह्णा दृति etc. but p. 608, परयति त्वाचार्यं (viz., Kātyāyana, in his Mātikas to VI 4, 104) चिष्ठो तुकि तद्वप्त्यानपेत्य त्यातस्याप्यव्याप्तात्तोपम्य चानिद्वच्चादिति etc.—For the same reason, when Kātyāyana, for instance, speaks of 'the author of the Sūtras, viz., Pāṇini, Vāḡ-jibhūtta' etc., he uses this expression with "hi a. who revealed to Pāṇini the first fourteen Sūtras e.g., p. 86 गृह्णारो महेष्ठ । येद्वप्त्यो पा or when Kātyāyana calls Pāṇini, Āchārya Nāgajīhaṭṭa says (p. 122) त्रिष्ठो येद्वप्त्यो पाचाचार्यः; or p. 107, त्वाचार्यः चिष्ठ. Of the first fourteen or the first Sūtras Nāgajīhaṭṭa says that they existed from eternity, while Pāṇini made the rest (p. 773 ed. Ballantyne) तेषामनादिःयादेव पाचित्विनिरूपादात् etc.

historical existence of all ancient Hindu celebrities, it is better to acknowledge this necessity than attach faith to a date devoid of real substance and resting on no trustworthy testimony. For, in doing so, we may feel induced to direct our efforts towards an investigation more likely to lead to a solid result,—I mean the investigation of the *internal evidence* afforded by the ancient literature as to the position of Pāṇini relatively to the works which are its chief representatives. If we could succeed in establishing this position, or, at least, in determining the critical means by which this end could be obtained, future research into the chronology of Sanskrit literature would have, at least, some ground to build upon, as well as a test by which to recognise the place that may be allotted to many important works within the structure raised.

ON THE CHRONOLOGICAL RELATION BETWEEN PĀNINI AND KĀTYĀYANA, THE AUTHOR OF THE VÄRTTIKAS.

In making an attempt in this direction, we feel our immediate interest naturally engaged by the question whether Pāṇini and Kātyāyana (the author of the Värttikas), were in reality contemporaries or not, whatever be the age at which they lived. As a substantial record of these Värttikas is met with in no other work than the "Great Commentary" of Patañjali, it will first be necessary for us to examine the literature embodied or alluded to, in the Mahābhāṣya, so far as it bears on this inquiry, in order to ascertain what portion of this literature is anterior to Kātyāyana, and what portion belongs to his own authorship. We may consult for this purpose, Kaiyata, the principal commentator on Patañjali; but we need not descend to the recent period of the Kāśikā, the Siddhānta kaumudi, the commentaries of Nāgeśa, Purushottama, or other Vrittis and Tikas, for all these works are at too great a distance from the period of Patañjali to assist us in the solution of our problem.

THE LITERATURE MENTIONED IN THE MAHĀBHĀSHYA— GRAMMARIANS PRIOR TO PĀNINI'S GRAMMAR— AUTHORS OF VÄRTTIKAS LATER THAN KĀTYĀYANA.

Of the grammatical writers named by the author of the Mahābhāṣya, we pass over those which are quoted by Pāṇini himself, as by his testimony we are enabled at once to assign to them an existence prior to his Grammar.⁸⁷ We may pass over, too, those authorities to whom Patañjali adverts when he speaks of a "Sūtra of the former grammarians", for such an expression on his part invariably refers to Pāṇini's Sūtras, and the substance of the opinions or rules of these

⁸⁷ These authors are Apisali, Kāsyapa, Gārgya, Gālava, Chikravarmana, Bhāradvāja, Śākātāyana, Śākalya, Senaka, Śipotāyana and those designated by the collective appellation of eastern and northern grammarians. These names have been correctly mentioned by Dr Boehtlingk vol II p 311—1

"Kaiyata calls them पूर्वाचार्य or the "former teachers," e.g., in his comment on

"former" grammarians must equally, therefore, have preceded Pāṇini's work, and, consequently, the Värttikas of Kātyāyana.

The first category of writings deserving our notice here will therefore be those Värttikas and grammatical dicta which are quoted by Patanjali in relation to Kātyāyana's own Värttikas. As authors of such writings we meet, for instance, with the grammarians of the school of the Bhāradhvājīyas and Saunāgas, with Kunāracādāra, Vādava, who is perhaps the same as this grammarian, with Sauryabhagavat, with Kumi, who is spoken of by Kātyāyana as a predecessor of Patanjali, and an indefinite number of grammarians who are introduced to us under the general designation of "some" or "others"¹⁰⁰. Whether the latter term comprise the grammarians just named, or other authorities, we cannot infer from the words of Patanjali; probably, however, we are justified in deciding for the latter alternative, since Patanjali is a writer who chooses his words deliberately, and would scarcely have quoted his authority at one time by name, and at another by a general term which does not imply that great respect entertained for a high authority. But, whatever view we take of the matter,—setting aside those grammarians quoted by Patanjali, who will require some additional remark before we can establish their relation to Kātyāyana—we may see that all that are named must have lived before Patanjali, and after Kātyāyana, since all their Värttikas or remarks, recorded by Patanjali are criticisms on, and emendations of, the Värttikas of Kātyāyana¹⁰⁰.

the third ēivasūtra, on I 1, 4, V 2, 39, VI 1, 6, etc. The word पूर्णसूत्र which in the sense given is a Tatpurusha, the former part of which is to be understood in the sense of a genitive, occurs, e.g., in the Bhāshya to VII 1, 18, compare also note 40.—And the authorities quoted by Patanjali, under the name of आचार्य, are probably also meant as "older grammarians," e.g., in his gloss on the fifth ēivasūtra on I 1, 1 and 2, 18, etc.

"The Bhāradhvājīyas are quoted several times in the Bhāshya, and in the Cited four times, viz., III 1, 89, v 1 IV 1, 79, v 1, VI 4, 47, v 1, and 165 v 1.—The Saunāgas are mentioned there to II 2, 18 v 1—4, VI 3, 41, v 1, and VII 2, 17, the latter quotation, however, does not occur in the Bhāshya.—Kumi (and his teacher) is mentioned in the Bhāshya to VII 2, 1, v 6, Vādava and Sauryabhagavat to VIII 2, 106 v 3. Kumi in Kātyāyana's gloss on I 1, 76 where he says that Patanjali follows in the words referred to the opinion of Kumi (Kātyāyana कुमिना पूर्णग्रहणमाचार्येनित्यरप्यम् ।

..... भात्रकारस्तु कुमिदर्शनमरित्यित् ।) Some of these quotations are given by Dr. Boecklingk, vol II pp 4v II. The phrase "भात्र चाहु" is of frequent occurrence in the Bhāshya e.g., to the second ēivasūtra to I 1, 10, 2, 50 51, II 2 21, 3, 66, III 1 27 112 123, 2 103 127, etc. or क्षिद्धैयाकरण भाह e.g. II 4, 56, धन्यैयाकरण e.g. I 1, 27 क्षेत्रिष् e.g. VIII 2, 80 (क्षेत्रिष् . . . क्षेत्रे); धरे e.g. I 1, 1 and 2, III 2 123 and four sets of grammarians are contrasted by Patanjali in his comment on III 2 11" कथं जातीयकं तु न . परोऽनाम । क्षेत्रिकाशक्तुः परोशाशक्तुः परोशमिति । धरर चाहुः । परंसद्याशृतं परोशमिति । धरर चाहुः । कुट्टक टान्तरिणं परोशमिति । धरर चाहुः । द्वादशाः श्वाशृतं येति

In extraordinary syllable of Dr. Boecklingk refers to some authors of ēivasūtra

¹⁰⁰ A few instances will bear out this conclusion. Kātyāyana's third Värttika

THE ISHTIS OF PATANJALI

Of Patanjali's *Istis* or "desiderata," which are his own additions to Kātyāyana's *Vartikas*, I need not speak, since they are an essential portion of his own Great Commentary.¹⁰¹

to II 2, 18 runs thus **सिद्धं तु क्वाङ्म्बतिदुर्गतिवचनात्**; and his fourth प्रादय. क्तार्य (omitted in the Calc ed.) After having explained both, Patanjali adds एतदेव च सौनागौर्विम्बरतरकेण पठितम् and quotes the four *Vartikas* of the Saunāgas as given in the Calc edition. Kātyāyata is even more explicit on this occasion for he says एतदेवेति । कात्यायनाभिपूयमेव पूर्वमिति॑ सौनागौरतिविस्तरेण पठितमित्य॑.—The *Vartika* of Kātyāyana to I 1, 20 reads शुसंज्ञायां पूरुतिग्रहणं शिदर्थम्; but says Patanjali, the Bhāradwājīyas read it otherwise भारद्वाजीयाः पठन्ति॑ । शुसंज्ञाया पूरुतिग्रहणं शिद्वृत्तार्थम्, which last compound contains an important improvement on the rule of Kātyāyana.—The latter enlarges Pāṇini's rule III 1, 89, by this *Vartika* यस्त्रिष्णो॑ पूतिपेषे हेतुमणिच्छ्रिन् यामुपसंख्यानम्; but, says Patanjali after his explanation of it, भारद्वाजीया॑ पठन्ति॑ । यकृचिष्णो॑ पूतिपेषे णिन्ननियप्रनियद्यूमामामनेपदाकर्मकाण्मुपसंख्यानम् which version of the Bhāradwājīyas is a distinct criticism on Kātyāyana.—His two *Vartikas* on VI 4, 15a are the following णविष्टव्यातिपदिकस्य and पुवद्भावरभावितोपयणादिपरार्थम्, but the Bhāradwājīyas improved them in this way (Patanjali भारद्वाजीया॑ पठन्ति॑ ।) णविष्टत्प्रतिपदिकस्य तुवद्भावरभावोत्तोपयणादिपरपूदिविन्मतोलुँकन्विष्यर्थम् The same Bhāradwājīyas have criticised Pāṇini also, independently of Kātyāyana, for Patanjali mentions at the Sutra 31 4 47 अस्त्वोरोपययो रमन्यतरस्याम् their *Vartika* अस्त्वोरोपययोलोप आगमो रग्विदीयते The mere comparison of their *Vartikas* and the passages quoted, will clearly show that these grammarians not only lived after Pāṇini, but also after Kātyāyana and that they were engaged on the same task which was the object of Kātyāyana, viz., that of criticising Pāṇini. Dr Boecklingk, however, (vol II p 11)—when speaking of the *Vartikas* of the Bhāradwājīyas and one *Vartika* of the Apisalas, which improves Pāṇini's Sutra VII 3, 05, तुरस्तुराम्यम् सार्वेयातुके in this manner तुरस्तुराम्यम् सार्वेयातुके अन्दसि (quoted by the Kāsikī not by Patanjali)—draws from them the twofold conclusion, "first that the grammatical terminology of both predecessors of our grammarians (Pāṇini) was the same, partly at least (dass die grammatische Terminologie bei den beiden Vorgängern unserer Grammatikers zum Theil einigstens dieselbe gelesen ist) and then, that their original works in time, received similar emendations and additions as the grammar of Pāṇini. I know not by what logical process either of these conclusions could be extracted from these *Vartikas*. The passages quoted are obvious criticisms on Pāṇini and Kātyāyana—and so are the other *Vartikas* of the Bhāradwājīyas named by Patanjali. There is not the slightest evidence afforded by these *Vartikas* that they are in any connection whatever with works of Bhāradwāja and Apisala and any reasoning concerning the latter becomes therefore without foundation. Or do we find that in India all pupils and descendants are compelled to confine their writings or remarks to the works of their teachers and ancestors? and will their criticisms on these latter works turn out by some marvellous process to fit exactly the productions of other authors also?"

*Another extraordinary syllagm of this writer by which ishti
is metamorphosed into kārikā*

¹⁰¹ It will probably be thought desirable that an editor should at least under-

THE KÂRIKÂS BELONGING TO DIFFERENT AUTHORS

Another category of literary compositions, which are either entirely or partly embodied in the Mahâbhâshya, are the Kârikâs.¹⁰⁴ To assign these verses to one author, would be as erroneous as to speak of one author of the Vârtikas.¹⁰⁵ For, even the Calcutta

stand the title page of the work which he is committing to the press, even when editing is merely tantamount to reprinting the labours of others, faults and all, but I fear that this much cannot be said of Dr Boehtlingk's edition of Pâṇini, for, in translating the title page of the Calcutta edition, he renders 空爲 "Kârikâ" and justifies this version in the following note (vol II p xxvii) "I take परिकायेदिति as a dwandwa, and 空爲 as synonymous with Karika, because I should not like to miss these (the Kârikâs) on the title. Thus, because the Calcutta Pandits rightly or wrongly, did not say on the title page of their edition that their compilation will comprise the Karikas, but merely stated that it will give Vârtikas, Ganas, Paribhâshas and Ishtis, Dr Boehtlingk reasons, that "since he does not like the omission of the Kârikâs Ishtî is the same as Karikâ. There is, indeed, nothing strange in this reasoning of Dr Boehtlingk, we have seen already some specimens of it, and if any one would take upon himself the ungrateful task of reviewing the second volume which he has annexed to his "edition" of Pâṇini, he would have to add a good many more of the same quality. But if Dr Boehtlingk had chosen to consult, by letter or otherwise, the editors of his edition of Pâṇini, they would in all probability have told him that ishtî means a "desideratum, and that ishtis emphatically so called, and not qualified otherwise (as Ishtis of the Kârikâ etc), designate the Vârtikas of Patanjali. They might, too, have referred him to the Pada-chandrikâvitti, which in the introduction plainly says 空爲 भाष्यकारस्य, or to Mâgabhrutta, who when referring to the word 空爲 applied by Kâlyânta to the Vârtikâs (of Patanjali to I 1, 1, omitted in the edition) अन्दोवसूत्राणि भवन्ति comments 空爲रिति । तथा च भाष्यकारीयतिदेशात्सूत्रेषु अन्दःकार्यपूर्वतिरिति भाव. But, for ought I know they might have simply requested him to read their own edition, before sending it to the printer, since they have themselves written the word भाष्यकारेऽपि; for instance, after a Vârtika to I 1, 9, or भाष्येऽपि; after a Vârtika to I 1, 68 or the words अन्दान्दान्दान्दा when a Vârtika to II 2, 28, which is quite enough. That in none of these instances can 空爲 be synonymous with कारिका.

¹⁰⁴ It is almost superfluous to state that I merely speak of the Kârikâs which are recorded by Patanjali. Those belonging to Bhartrihari, who wrote a gloss on Patanjali (con e.g. Gaṇarâthamahodadhi भर्तृहरियज्ञियपदीयकर्ता महाभाष्यालयान् च, and my subsequent observations on the Tâkyapadîya), as well as the Kârikâs met with exclusively in the Kârikâ or Siddhânta Lankârûpa, can have no bearing on the present investigation.

A further insight into the value of the statements of Dr Boehtlingk

¹⁰⁵ These assertions have nevertheless been made by Dr Boehtlingk, vol II, p xiv, where he states that "between Pâṇini and Amara-Sinâ there are still four grammarians Kâtyâyana the author of the Paribhâshâ, the author of the Kârikâs, and Patanjali, and p xxviii xix, where he states that each couple of these grammarians may be separated from one another by a space of fifty years. He repeats, "as we have observed above (p xiv), there are between Patanjali and Pâṇini still three grammarians known to us, who made contributions to the grammar

edition of Pāṇini enables us to see, *at first sight*, in four instances, that they cannot be the work of the same author; and, besides these, two other instances of the same kind may be found in the "Great Commentary."¹⁰⁴ But, to define the relation of these verses to Kātyāyana, it will not be sufficient simply to state that some of them embody the rules of Kātyāyana, while others deviate from them, and others again enlarge and criticise the Vārttikas:¹⁰⁵ it will be necessary to describe the characteristic features of these Kārikās such as we find them in Patanjali's work.

VARIOUS CATFGORIES OF KĀRIKĀS

An external, but very important mark, is afforded by the circumstance that one portion of the Kārikās is left by Patanjali entirely

of Pāṇini." On page xlvi, it is true, he says, "no doubt the Kārikās do not all belong to the same author, since the same subject is treated sometimes in two different Kārikās in a perfectly different manner, but is he observed before that the Kārikās are "scattered in various grammars (sic), viz., in the Mahābhāṣya, the Kāśikā, the Pāṇimāṇḍū and the Kṛiṇvudī" and as two quotations which he adds in corroboration of his statement viz., VI 3, 109 and VII 2, 10, have reference to the Kāśikā and Siddhānta Kaumudi only, we should be in fairness bound to conclude that, in his opinion, it was the literary period after Patanjali which produced this variety of authors of the Kārikās. Yet when he presents us with a third quotation, viz., "Cal ed p. 274," which clearly points to the fact that there were different authors of Kārikās *at or before* Patanjali's time, it would be curious to learn how he reconciles this latter quotation with his previous statements at pages xiv and xix, according to which there is but *one* author of the Kārikās between Pāṇini and Patanjali and a personage, too, who lived 50 years after the author of the Paribhāṣhās and 50 years before Patanjali! Compare also the following note.

¹⁰⁴ The Kārikās not met with in the Bhashya are, usually, correctly marked in the Calcutta edition with the name of the work whence they have been taken, those not marked, are therefore, nearly always, recognizable in this edition as belonging to the Mahābhāṣya. That such Kārikās of the latter kind, to the same Sūtra of Pāṇini belong to different authors, is indicated in the Calcutta ed., at. I 4, 51 III 2, 123 (p. 274), IV 1, 44 and 63. From the Bhashya we learn it, *at first sight*, besides, in the two instances, I 2 50,—where the words गौण्या दृत्यं, etc. are preceded by अपर आह— and VIII 2 58 where the latter words precede the Kārika वेत्तेस्तु etc. Compare the notes 107 108 111.

¹⁰⁵ Three striking instances of the latter kind are the Kārikās to IV 2 60, VIII 1 69, and III 2 118. The first occurs at the end of Patanjali's commentary on the Vārttikas of this Sūtra is without comment and contains, for the greater part new matter which is given in the shape of Vārttikas in the Siddhānta kaumudi. It is omitted in the Calcutta ed., and runs thus अनुसूलं क्ष्यलच्छणे सर्वसादेद्विं गोश क. । इकम्पदोत्तरपदाच्छतपटे पिकन्पथः The Kārika to VIII 1 69 embodies the Vārttikas I, 2, 3 to the same Sūtra and Vārttika 2 to VIII 1, 67 but in the latter Kātyāyana says मलोपवचनं च, and the Kārika enlarges this rule to मकारलोपो श्विदि (Magojibhatta मलोपश्वेति वाति कोक्तो मलोपस्तिङ्गडन्तेनेषा) The Kārika to III 2 118 is thus introduced by Patanjali कि चात सादि० । न स पुराद्यतन इति (second Vārttika) वृक्ता कालायनेनेह सादि०; and by Kaiyyata पुक्तरमिन्वातिंके सपुराशन्दावुपलक्षणेनाश्रयणीयै । तत्र पूर्वसिन्परस्तिन्वा विशेषप्रस्त्रन्वृच्छति । इतरो वार्तिकपूलाल्यानाय मया विकल्पितमेतदित्याह । सादि००

without comment, while he comments on another portion in the same manner as he does on the Vāttikas; and we may add, too, that there are a few Vāttikas which are not altogether without a gloss, but the gloss on which is so scanty and so different from the kind of comment bestowed on the Vāttikas, that they might seem to constitute a third category of Kārikās.¹⁰⁶

AUTHORS OF THE KĀRIKĀS NOT COMMENTED UPON BY PATANJALI

If we first examine the Kārikās without comment, we meet twice with the remark of Patanjali that "another" or "others," have composed the verse in question, when the Kārikā is contrasted by him with the preceding Vāttika; and the same remark occurs four times, when the Kārikā thus introduced to our notice is contrasted with a preceding Kārikā.¹⁰⁷ More definite statements, I believe, are not volunteered by Patanjali; but Kātyāyana once tells us, that such an uncommented Kārikā was composed by the Śloka-vāttīlālāka, or the "author of the versified Vāttikas;" and though this information is not more distinct or more satisfactory than that of Patanjali, it has, at least, the merit of having on another occasion elicited the remark of Nāgoji, that this author is not Kātyāyana.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁶ Without any comment of Patanjali we find the Kārikās to I 1, 10 14 20 98 70, 2, 64 ; 4, 51 (Kār. 5-7) — II 1, 10 60 , 4, 36 85 — III 1, 7 (=V 2, 94 Kār 1) 22 27 79-122, 127 , 2, 3 123 (Kar. 1, 2 4 5 6) , 3, 1 (Kār 3) 156 (=VII 4, 41) , 4, 79 — IV. 1, 44 63 161 , 2, 0 60 (comp the preceding note) , 4, 9 — V 1, 115 , 2, 48 ; 3, 55 — VI 1, 1 77 (Kar 2) 87 ; 1, 109 ; 4, 114 — VII 1, 18 73 (Kar 2) , 4 46 (Kār 2) 92 — VIII 1, 70 , 2 58 (Kār 3) 59 62 80 108 , 3, 43 — There are Kārikās commented upon by Patanjali in his usual manner, to I 1, 19 57 , 2, 9 17 18 50 51 , 4 21 (=III 3, 161) 51 (Kār 1 2 1-4) — III 1 112 , 2, 57, 109 115 130 , 3 1 (Kār. 1 2) — IV 1, 3 10 18 32 54 78 92 93 120 105 , 2, 8 45 3, 60 84 134 — V 1, 19 , 2, 39 45 94 (Kar. 2) , 3, 83 — VI 1, 77 (Kār 1) 103 158 , 2, 1 3, 48 , 4, 3 12 22 40 62 74 128 — VII 1 9 21, 40 73 (Kār 1) 96 , 2, 102 107 3, 3 86 , 4, 46 (Kār 1) — VIII 1, 60 (comp the preceding note) , 2, 25 55 58 (Kar 1 2) , 3, 88 4 68 — To the third category belong the Kārikās to I 1, 38 (om Cale ed) — III 1, 123 2 118 123 (Kār 3) — IV 2 19 — VI 4, 120 149 — VIII 3, 45 — Other Kārikās quoted in the Calcutta edition do not occur in the Bhashya.

¹⁰⁷ Patanjali to III 1, 27 अपर आहु । भास्तु ॥ (contrasted with the preceding Vāttika) , III 2 123 Kār 1 अपर आहु । नास्ति वर्तमानःकाल इति । अपि चात्र श्लोकानुदाहरन्ति । न वर्तेते ॥.....सो उद्यनन्य इति (contrasted with the preceding Vāttika etc , but the last Kārikā, which is introduced by the words अपर आह । आस्ति वर्तमान काल इति । आदित्यगतिवशोपलभ्यते । अपि चात्र श्लोकानुदाहरन्ति । विस्तय० ०, १९ contrasted with the preceding Kārikās , at IV 1 44, after गुणः he says, अपर आह । उपैय इति etc , at IV. 1, 63, after चरणै सह, he adds, अपर आह । प्रादुर्भाव० ०, at VIII 2, 58, after इत्यते, his words are, अपर आह । वेत्से स्तु इति

¹⁰⁸ Patanjali on IV. 4. ० अग्र किं न्यायम् । परिगणने कर्तव्यम् । आकर्षण्यम् इति — Kātyāyana श्लोकवाचिकाकार संदिग्धानसंदिग्धांश भावितनिरासाय पर्यज्जिग्यत् — Kātyāyana on the Kārikās to VI 4, 22 वाचिककरोक्तेषु प्रयोगेनेषु प्राप्यातेषु श्लोकवाचिककरोक्तप्रयोजनाप्येषु — Nāgojibhāṣita वाचिककार वाचायन । श्लोकवाचिककारस्यम् पूर्वेति भावः । See also page 75

Being here merely concerned with the question of the relation of these Kārikās to Kātyāvāna, we should not feel under the necessity of examining the contents of the six verses just mentioned, even if they differed in character from the rest—which is not the case,—for the statements alleged enable us, as it is, to conclude that they are later than his Vārtikas. Still, as the remaining portion of these uncommented Kārikās does not admit of a similar inference without an inquiry into the evidence which they yield, it will be necessary to observe that they fall into two distinct divisions.

One class of them merely records the substance of the preceding Vārtikas. These, for the most part, stand at the end of Patanjali's commentary on the Sūtra to which they belong, but some of them are also met with in the midst of the discussion of the Bhāshya, but only when they comprise the contents of a portion, not of the whole of the Vārtikas to the Sūtra of Pāṇini.¹⁰¹

¹⁰¹ Such uncommented Kārikās standing at the end of the commentary occur at the Sūtras II 1 10, 4 85 (Kār 2 3)—III 1, 70 2 9—IV 2 48 3 55 (Kār 3 5)—VI 1 77 (Kār 2) 87—VII 1 73 (Kār 2)—VIII 2 62 108 : 43—In the middle of the discussion they occur at the Sūtras II 1 60, before the fourth Vārtika and summing up the Vārtikas 1, 2 3 II 4 80 (Kār 1 being a summary of the Vārtikas preceding the third Vārtika in the Cale ed)—The summary character of these Kārikās is sometimes expressly adverted to by the commentators. Thus at II 1 60 kātyāya observes भवत्यारणं तजा चेदिति पूर्वे पूर्वार्थं आर्यया संगृहीत , II 4 80 (Kār 1) पूर्वे पूर्वार्थं (of what precedes) आर्यया दर्शित II 4 80 (Kār 2 3) पूर्वोक्ते पूर्वार्थं श्लोकेन संगृहीत , III 2 8 उत्तार्थसंग्रहाय श्लोका । नित्य प्रसारणमिति । 2 48 प्रवृत्त्यर्थोदिति पूर्वोक्तार्थसंग्रहश्लोका etc etc I may here observe that the word इति which is usually added by authors after quotations they make from other authors is scarcely ever met with after the last word of these or any other Kārikā. There is the following instance which clearly proves that no inference can be drawn from the presence or absence of this word इति after the Kārikās viz the Kārikā to III 1 7 is identical with the first Kārikā to IV 2 94 इति occurs after the former not after the latter. Only one of the Kārikās introduced by अपर आदृ—a clear instance of a quotation—is followed by this word viz III 2 123 (Kār 1) none of the un-commented Kārikās except the one mentioned (III 1 7) has this word after it and among the Kārikās with comment it occurs only at III 2 139. It is not necessary on the present occasion to make any further statement concerning the use of इति in Patanjali's commentary but compare also note 130.—The Cale ita edtors who unfortunately have cons dered themselves justified in giving us Extracts from the Vārtikas of Kātyāvāna do not enable their readers fully to recognize the summary character of these Kārikās and in placing the Kārikās either at the end or at the beginning they have in this class of the Kārikās and still more so in the following classes entirely destroyed all possibility of perceiving how these Kārikās are sometimes summaries of a part or only of Vārtikas sometimes the summary of Patanjali's discussion and sometimes an essential portion of his arguments. When in the MSS. of the Bhāshya to judge from the one at my command a Kārikā which occurs in the middle of the discussion is sometimes—not always repeated at the end such a device on the part of Patanjali or as it seems more probable on the part of the copyists is intelligible and deserves approval as it is calculated to draw our attention to the occurrence, in the middle of the discussion of such a verse which usually contains important information. But when such a verse is always taken from its original and proper place and always put either at the beginning or at the end for no other reason than that it is a verse such a

The second class has not the character of summaries of the Vārttikas. It is an essential part of the discussion of the Bhāshya itself, now introducing the point at issue with some general remark, then connecting or strengthening the links of the debate by an important definition or a new argument, then again summing up the substance of the discussion itself, and throwing, as it were, some additional light on it¹¹⁰

SUCH KARIKAS ARE LATER THAN KATYĀYANĀ'S VARTTIKAS.

A comparison of these two classes of *uncommented* Kārikās shows, therefore, that while the former might have been omitted in the Great Commentary, without any detriment to the contents of this work, the

method in a book, moreover of that equivocal class which gives dribbled extracts of an important literature makes the same impression on my mind at all events, as if an editor of a garbled Shakespeare were to present us first with all the prosaic and then with all the poetical parts of the play or *vice versa*!

Uncommented verses of this kind are met with in the Bhāshya at or near the beginning of the discussion on IV 1 44 (वोतो गुणः । गुणवचनादित्युच्यते । को गुणो नाम । सत्ये निवेशते etc when he contrasts the following Kārikā—अपर आह । उपैत्य ।—with the preceding words) IV 1 63 जातेरस्मी० । जातेरित्युच्यते का जातिनाम० । आकृतिग्रहण००, which words are contrasted with the Kārikā of another अपर आह । प्रादुर्भाव००), IV 1 161 (मनोजातावश्य० । अपत्ये कुसिते etc) V 1 115 (तेन सुर्यं० । इदमयुक्तं वर्तते । किमग्रायुक्तम् । यत्तत्त्वीयासमर्थं किया चेत्सा भवतीत्युच्यते । कर्यं च तृतीयासमर्थं नाम क्रिया स्यात् । नैतदयुक्तं वर्तते । सर्वं एव ते शब्दा, गुणसमुदा येषु वर्तन्ते वाहाणं उत्तियो वैश्य शब्द इति । तप श्रुतं००), VI 2 100 परादिशङ्कन्व-सि वहुलम् । अत्यर्थमिदमुच्यते । परादिश परान्तश्च००), VII 4 46 Kār 2 (रो दद० । अवदृशं विदत्तं च etc)—The foregoing quotations which begin with the Sūtra itself, will show the introductory character of these Kārikās—In the middle of the discussion of the Bhāshya we find such Kārikās at I 1 10 (ed Ballantyne p 201, 202 towards the end of the Introduction) I 1 20 (preceding the fourth Vārttika of the Calc ed) I 1 38 (the first Kārikā of the Calc ed, it stands after the Vārttikas of this ed and is followed by a Kārikā of the third category—see note 106—which is omitted in the Calc ed), I 2 64 (preceding the eighteenth Vārttika of the ed), III 1 22 (after the Vārttika of the ed but before other Vārttikas omitted there) V 3 55 (Kār 1 2 preceding the ninth Vārttika of the Calc ed) Patanjali speaks in the first person), VI 4 114 (before the thirteenth Vārttika of the ed) VIII 2 80 (before the second Vārttika of the ed)—Uncommented Kārikās occur at the end of the discussion of the Bhāshya at I 1, 14 38 (the last Kārikā of the ed, the Calc editors add that this Kārikā is originally a Vaidik passage referring to गृह्य कल्याण and वैगोपिभित्ता have no remark to this effect but even if the editors be right they ought to have proved first that the Vaidik passage in question—a very vague definition—is older than Patanjali's Bhāshya and not taken from it on I 1 70 4 51 (Kār 5-7), II 4 28, III 1, 7 (which occurs once more in the middle of the discussion on V 2 91 as Kār 1) III 1 122 127, 3, 1 Kār 3 (see note 113) 150 (=VII 4 41), 4 79, IV 2 9 60 (omitted in the Calc ed, see note 105 अनुसूल००), V 3, 55 (Kār 3-5), VI 1, 1, VII 1, 18, 4 92 (where Patanjali speaks in the first person), VIII 1, 70; 2, 50

latter was indispensable to it. We may look upon the summary Kārikās as memorial verses, adapted for forming a separate collection for the convenience of teachers and pupils; but the independent existence of the commentator on Kārikās is quite unintelligible, and would be altogether purposeless. In short, though there might be a doubt whether Patanjali, or some other grammarian, poetically inclined, had versified the Vārttikas, it seems impossible to assume that the second class of those Kārikās was composed by any one but Patanjali. It is very probable, however, that the author of the Mahābhāṣya was not the author of the summary or memorial Kārikās. For since there was in "author of versified Kārikās," as we learn from Kaiyata and Nāgojibhatta, and as we shall see that a considerable number of the commented Kārikās do not belong to his authorship, the literary activity of this personage would become restricted to, and his fame would have been founded on, less than half-a-dozen lines, if we did not ascribe to him more Kārikās than those expressly attributed to him by these commentators, or if we farthered these summary Kārikās on Patanjali. Whether the "other" mentioned in the first six instances be the same, or not, as the "author of the versified Kārikās," I have no means of deciding; but, at all events, it becomes certain, after this brief explanation, that all the *uncommented Kārikās are later than the Vārttikas of Kātyāyana*

AUTHORS OF THE KĀRIKĀS COMMENTED UPON BY PATANJALI.

The Kārikās commented upon by Patanjali are in one respect similar to the foregoing class, but in another wholly different from it. As regards an external mark, we again meet here with "another," who has twice composed a Kārikā which is contrasted by Patanjali with a preceding Vārttika, and twice a Kārikā which he contrasts with a preceding Kārikā, the authorship of which is left without a remark.¹¹¹ Another such Kārikā, too, is distinctly ascribed by Kaiyata to the "author of the versified Kārikās."¹¹² And when we examine the contents of this second class of Kārikās, we again find many which form an essential part of the arguments in the discussion of Patanjali.¹¹³ Here, however, the analogy stops, for the remainder have in no way the nature of summaries; they are to all intents and purposes

¹¹¹ III 1 112, Patanjali says अपर आह । संज्ञापां पुसि etc, when he contrasts the Kārikā with the preceding Vārttika, III 2, 109, अपर आह । नोपेयिवान् etc contrasted with preceding Vārttikas omitted in the Calcutta ed., I 2, 50 (Kār 2), अपर आह । गोप्या इति etc., contrasted with the preceding Kārikā, I 4 51, अपर आह । प्रधानकर्मण्यात्पेये etc (commented on up to कवयो विदु, Kār 1-4) contrasted with the preceding Kārikā

¹¹² VI 4 22 Compare note 108

¹¹³ Such Kārikās are met with at or near the beginning of the Bhāṣya on I 4, 51 (the two first Kār of the Calcutta ed.) III 3 1 (Kār 1-2, the last Kārikā is left without comment), IV 1, 3 54 78 (the first four Kārikās stand at the beginning, before the first Vārttika, the following nine after the second Vārttika of the Calcutta edition, which, in the Bhāṣya, however, is the fourth), 92 165, V 2, 45, VI 1, 108. In the middle of the discussion on I 1 57, IV 1 93, V 1, 19, 2 94, Kār 2 (before the seventh Vārttika of the Calcutta ed.), VII 4, 46 (Kār 1)

identical in character with the Varttikas of Kātyayana, and even Patanjali's commentary on them follows the same method that he observes in his comment on the Vārttikas¹¹⁴

THE METHOD OF PATANJALI'S GREAT COMMENTARY

This method is analogous to that which has become familiar through the classical commentaries of Śankara on the Upanishads of Medhātithi and Kullūka on Manu or Sayana on the Vedas, of Vijnāneśvara on Yājñavalkya, and so on. Its character chiefly consists in establishing usually by repetition, the correct reading of the text, in explaining every important or doubtful word, in showing the connection of the principal parts of the sentence, and in adding such observations as may be required for a better understanding of the author. Patanjali even excels, in the latter respect, the commentaries instanced, for he frequently attaches his own critical remarks to the emendations of Kātyāyana often in support of the views of the latter but not seldom, too, in order to refute his criticisms and to defend Pāṇini, while, again, at other times he completes the statement of one of them by his own additional rules.

REPETITION OF KARIKAS.

Now this method Patanjali strictly follows in his comment on the Kārikās I am alluding to. As they nearly always constitute a whole verse and as such a verse is generally too complicated an assemblage of words to be thoroughly intelligible without being interrupted by some explanatory remark it seldom happens that the comment of Patanjali does not begin till he has given the whole verse in its uninterrupted order. Nor is it often that so many words of the Kārikās constitute half a verse remain together in the Bhāṣya though it is obvious that half a verse is more likely to afford undivided matter for comment than a whole one. The rule therefore is that small portions of the Kārikā for the most part of the extent of an ordinary Vārttika are, like so many Vārttikas separately commented upon by Patanjali, and that in all such instances we have to gather the scattered parts of the Kārikā from amongst the commentatorial interruptions of Patanjali in order to see that, put together they form a verse,—a Sloka an Indravajra a Dodhaka, an Aryā or the like¹¹⁵. This trouble we are frequently saved

¹¹⁴ Kārikās of this description occur in the Bhāṣya at or near the beginning of the commentary on I 1 18 2 0 17 18 50 (Kār 1) III 2 11a IV 1 10 (the Vārttika of the Calc ed on this Sūtra is no Vārttika but Bhāṣya) 3 60 84 124 V 3 83 VI 1 77 (Kār 1) 158 2 1 3 40 4 3 48 128 VII 1 21 40 73 Kār 1) 96 2 107 3 8 (Kār 1) 86 VIII 1 60 (?) 2 25 57 58 (Kār 1 2) 8 88 4 68 —In the middle at 1 2 51 4 *1 (=III 3 161) III 2 57 129 IV 1 18 32 (the second Vārttika of the Calc ed is no Vārttika but Bhāṣya on the last part of the Kārikā) 2 8 (the second Vārttika of the Calc ed is misedited. It runs thus एते सामने जाते याप्यविद्युतिष्ठै विद्युतिष्ठै) 40 V 2 39 VI 4 12 6* 74 VII 1 9 2 102 3 3 (Kār 2 and 3) —To end at IV 1 120 —In several of these instances there are no other Vārttikas to the Sūtra besides the Kārikā which is then the subject of the whole commentary e.g. at IV 1 60 84 VI 4 46 128 VII 1 21 3 86

¹¹⁵ The text of the whole verse of Kārikās of this class is given before the

either by the author of the Great Commentary himself, or by the attentive copyists of his work, as he or they usually repeat, at the end of the gloss on the Vārtikas, the whole Kārikā in its metrical integrity. Sometimes, however, they omitted to do this; and if I may judge from the copy of the Mahābhāshya in the possession of the Library of the Home Government for India, the Calcutta Pandits, who published an edition of Pāṇini, have, in some instances, supplied the apparent defect of this manuscript ¹¹⁶

comment of Patanjali at I, 2 51 V 2 91 Kār 2, 31 4 46, VIII 4 68. There occur half-verses of the Kārikās without commentatorial interruptions e.g. at I 4 21 (=III 3, 161) 51 III 2 57 115 IV 1 3 10 32 33 165 2 8 45 V 2 39, VI 4, 3 12 62 123 VII 1 9 96 2 102 107 3, 3 86—Both modes are combined at VIII 3 45 (in Kār of the third category) where Patanjali first comments on the text of the first Kārikā which is given without any interruption then in the first half of the second Kārikā then on the second half of the second and the first half of the third Kārikā, both given together then on the second half of the third, and lastly on the first half of the fourth Kārikā. The comment on 'the second half of the fourth Kārikā follows first after the words सिद्धं च मे समाप्ते, and then after the words प्रतिपेधार्थस्तु यतो द्यम्—The manner in which the great majority of these Kārikās is interrupted in the Mahābhāshya may be guessed from a very few instances which have escaped the garbling process of the Calcutta editors from IV 1, 120, where the four Vārtti kās are the literal text of the Kārikā and from V 3 83 where the first five Vārtti kās constitute the Kārikā. The injudiciousness of giving these Kārikās on all other occasions without indicating the manner in which they have arisen from a number of short Vārtti kās requires no remark after the foregoing explanation but this proceeding becomes still more subject to censure when some portions of the Kārikā are given as Vārtti kās and others are omitted or ascribed to other works than the Bhāshya while the Kārikā nevertheless is printed as belonging to the latter work. For it becomes evident that in all such cases there was not even a principle which guided the so-called selection or quotation of the works whence the Vārtti kās are taken. Thus at IV 1 32 the Calcutta edition gives the Kārikā but only the last portion of it as Vārtti kā—mistaking moreover, the words of the commentator यथा छन्दसि तु ग्रन्थकान्य for the Kārikā Vārtti kā which runs thus या छन्दसि मुम्बवेत्—

A similar misedition of the second Vārtti kā to IV 2 8 and the attributing to the Kārikā of the fifth Vārtti kā make it impossible to see that the Vārtti kās 2-5 form in the Mahābhāshya the text of the printed Kārikā—In ascribing the third and the fifth Vārtti kā of V 3 83 to the Siddhānta-Kaumudi, the editors obscure the origin of the Kārikā to this Sūtra which repeats the text of the first five Vārtti kās such as they occur in the Bhāshya—At VIII 2 25 the same edition does not allow us to perceive more than the first stop of the first Kārikā, while it gives the three Kārikās in full—I may mention too that there is no such Kārikā in the Bhāshya as that printed at VI 4 19. It certainly was very tempting to roll up into a bōla the words of Patanjali तुक्ष्मसङ्गते, which explain the second Vārtti kā तुक्ष्मसङ्गते, together with the three other Vārtti kās which belong to Kātyā yana but there is no evidence to show that Patanjali made this verse nor does it occur in the Kārikā or the Siddhānta kaumudi—For one Kārikā Patanjali seems indeed to be himself answerable for the Vārtti kās to VIII 1 89 merely contain the material for the first fourth and the second half of the Kārikā which occurs at the end of his Bhāshya on this Sūtra. It is possible however under the circumstances, that this Kārikā may be one of the summary class. See note 103

¹¹⁶ Dr Ballantyne's edition of the first Pāda of the first Adhvāya of the Mahābhāshya and the MS of the E I H which have the four Vārtti kās to I 1, 57 नित्य

INSTANCES OF WORKS WHICH ARE WRITTEN IN VERSE AND COMMENTED ON, IN PROSE, BY THEIR OWN AUTHORS

The foregoing remarks sufficiently express my views on these commented Kārikās. Where the authorship of "another," or of the Śloka-vārttila-lāra, is distinctly mentioned by Patanjali or Kaiyyata, I see no reason to doubt that the Kārikās to which this remark applies are neither Patanjali's nor Kātyāyana's. When the Kārikās are part of the arguments of the Bhāshya itself, it seems certain, as in the case of the analogous Kārikās without comment, that their author is Patanjali, but when they have entirely the character of Vārttikas—which will later be defined—they are undoubtedly the composition of Kātyāyana; and such, I hold, is the view of Kaiyyata and Nāgojibhatta also. For though it is no part of their task to specify the authorship of the Kārikās, except when such a remark is essential to their gloss, they, nevertheless, have done so occasionally; and when thus we find that they plainly ascribe some of these commented Kārikās either to the author of the Vārttikas or the author of the Gīcat Commentary, as the case may be, we must be allowed to infer that they entertained a similar opinion on other Kārikās which would fall under either of the heads I have mentioned above.¹¹⁷ Nor need we hesitate at the idea of a poetical

परयादेशः (MS परयादेशो नित्यः) comm । परश्चासो व्यवस्थया comm युग पत्तमवो नास्ति । comm चहिरङ्गे न सिद्धति comm । do not repeat these words without interruptions in order to show their Kārikā nature; and the same remark applies to the MS with regard to the commented Kārikās I, 2, 51, 4, 21, 51, IV 1, 3 32 78 92 98 120 165, 2, 45, 3, 60 124, V 1, 19, 2, 39 45 94 (Kār 2), 3, 83, VI, 1, 158, 4, 40 62 74 128 VII 1, 96, 4, 46, (Kār 1), VIII 2, 25 55 58 (Kār 1, 2), 3, 45, 4, 58. The repetition of some of these Kārikā Vārttikas has no doubt been omitted, because the commentary of Patanjali allowed the whole verse or half a verse of this text to remain uninterrupted (see note 115). In the Calentta edition all these Kārikās are given in their metrical integrity.

¹ Thus, on the first four Kārikās to IV 1, 78, Nāgojibhatta observes पूर्ते श्लोका भाष्यकृत एव न यातिंकृत—which words, moreover, plainly intimate that there exist Kārikās composed by Kātyāyana, or in the latter part of Kaiyyata's comment on the Kārikā to VI 1, 103 we read.इत्यादिना विशिष्टमेव लिहाचार्यं भाष्यकारेणाधितम्—In his comment on the Kārikā to IV 3 60, Nāgojibhatta, in referring to the remark of Patanjali मुख्याभ्युत्तेताम्यां तसन्ताभ्या मीयप्रत्ययो वस्तम्यः, (which words explain the beginning of the second Kārikā) observes भाष्ये तसन्ताभ्यामिति यातिंके भाष्यात्तमास., and on a further remark of Kaiyyata पूर्णतवासिंकृत्योजनमार्ह On the 5th तत्रै in the second Kārikā to VI 1, 158, Nāgojibhatta remarks: यातिंके सपैप्रदृश्यं सूत्रोपलब्धम्, on the first Kārikā to VI 2, 1इति नियमो अस्ति इति यातिंकार्यः, on Kaiyyata to the first Kārikā to VI 3, 46 अन्यपूर्वतिरिति यातिंकस्यमम्ब शब्दं व्याप्ते, on Kaiyyata to the second foarth of Kārikā 1 to VI 4, 12 यातिंके मुट्ठीति etc., on a various reading in the second Kārikā to VII 3, 86 यातिंके ज्ञातोपैति पाठे, etc.—In his gloss on the Kārikā to VIII. 4 88, Kaiyyata says: तस्य पिद्युतोपदेशादन्यप्राप्ति विषुतोपदेशः सब्दंप्रदृश्यार्ये इति यातिंकृता पूर्णमेव पूर्णिपादितम्

author of Vārtikas. Not only were whole grammatical works, ancient and modern, written in verse,¹¹ but it is a common occurrence with scientific commentators in India, that they cannot resist the temptation of running into verse, even at the risk of endangering their prosaic task. We need only remember another celebrated author of Vārtikas, Kumārila, who writes alternately in Śloka and prose. It might seem more remarkable that Patanjali should write in verse and comment upon this himself; but Mādhava affords an analogous instance in his Jaiminiya-nyāya-māla-vistāra; Viśwanātha-Panchānana wrote a commentary in prose, the Siddhāntamuktāvali, on his metrical exposition of the Vaisesika Philosophy, the Bhāskāparīchchheda; Daṇḍanārāma explained in prose his versified Muhūrtachintāmāni; Vardhamāna did the same with his Ganarātnamahodadhi; and many more instances could be adduced to show that there is nothing striking, or even remarkable, in the assumption that Patanjali composed grammatical verses and commented on them in prose.¹¹

AUTHORS OF THE KĀRIKĀS WITH IMPERFECT COMMENT IN THE MAHĀBHĀSHYA OF PATANJALI

After the foregoing observations, the authorship of those Kārikās, which, apparently, form a third category, can create no difficulty so far as Kātyāyana is concerned. They were neither written by him, nor before his time. The manner in which Patanjali comments on them, and their very contents, show that they cannot be assimilated to Kātyāyana's Kārikās, which, as I mentioned before, are dealt with by him in the same manner as the Vārtikas in prose. There is either

¹¹ For instance, the Pāṇiniya Śikṣā and the Rīk Prātiśākhya

A valuable contribution to these instances by Dr Fitz-Edward Hall

¹¹ I owe to the kindness of Dr Fitz-Edward Hall an extract from his "Contribution towards an Index to the Bibliography of the Indian Philosophical system" which mentions besides Viśwanātha Panchānana eleven authors who wrote twelve works in verse and commented on them in prose. As this extract is, on other grounds, of considerable interest I will with Dr Hall's permission forestall the arrival in Europe of his important work, and here subjoin the substance of his communication. He names in it, besides the author of the Bhāskāparīchchheda—1 Jīvarāja-Dīkṣita, who wrote the Tarkākārikā (on the Vaisesikā) in verse, and a commentary on it in prose the Tarkamājari 2 Vidyārūḍhīdīkṣita, the author of the Vedāntādīkṣikārāma māla (in verse) and a prose exposition interspersed, 3 Prakasānanda or Anantanandādīkṣikā (?) the author of the Siddhāntamuktāvali, 4 Vasudeva-Brahma Prasāda the author of the Sāchchidānāndānubhava prādīpikā 5 Lakṣmīdharā Kāvi who wrote the Advaitāmākārānda, 6 Sāṅkarādīkṣita to whom the Atmabodha is inscribed and likewise a comment on it, entitled Tṛyānābodhī, 7 Sāṅkarānanda the author of the Ātmapurāṇa and a comment on it the Ātmapurāṇa dīpikā 8 Īppayya-Dīkṣita the author of the Brahmatarkastava and the Brahmatarkastavavivāraṇa 9 10 Vālabbāchārya the author of the Pushtiprāvāhamāryādībheda and a Vivāraṇa on it, and likewise of the Antahkaranaprabodha and a Vivṛti on it, 11 Gangadharasārasvati, the author of the Siddhāntasūktimājari (an abridgement of the Siddhāntaleśa and a Prākīra of it, and 12 Govindasāstrin, who wrote the Atharvānarāhāsyā and a commentary on it—All these works (except the first) treat on the Vedānta, their text is in verse and their commentary in prose.

scarcely any comment on the Kārikās of this class, or his comment assumes more the nature of a general exposition, which is intended to work out the sense of the Kārikā, but not to give, at the same time, a gloss, in the usual sense of this word.¹²⁰ In short, a comparison of these Kārikās with those of the two other classes, must lead to the conclusion that, in reality, they are no separate class, but belong either to one or the other. They are partly Patanjali's own arguments expressed in verse and amplified in prose, or the composition of that "other" grammarian whom we have encountered before. There are, indeed, two of these Kārikās which are distinctly ascribed by Patanjali to this grammarian, and a third which quotes Kātyāyana, and cannot therefore belong to this author of the Vārttikas.¹²¹

¹²⁰ Thus the two half verses of a Kārikā to I 1, 38 (omitted in the Calcutta ed.), are interrupted and accompanied by a brief remark, as will appear from the following quotation (ed. Billantyne, p. 492) कृत्तद्वितानां प्रहणं तु कार्यं संस्थाविरोधं द्विभिन्निश्चित्ता वे (first half verse) ॥ तेषां पूतिपेषो भवतीति वक्तव्यम् । इहा मा भूत् । एको द्वौ बहव इति ॥ तस्मात्स्वरादिप्रहणं च कार्यं कृत्तद्वितानां प्रहणं च पाठे (second half verse) पाठेनेयमव्ययसंज्ञा कियते सेह न पूर्णोति । परमोच्चेः परमनीचैरिति —The Bhāshya on the first two half verses of the Kārikā to III 1, 123 (which are left uninterrupted), merely consists of the words निष्टक्यं चिन्वीत पशुकामः; on the following portion, एवादेकसाचतुर्भ्यः क्ष्यप्, of the instances देवहृष्टः । पश्यिः । उच्चीयः । इच्छिष्यः ।; on चतुर्भ्यश्च यतो विधिः of the instances मर्यः । स्त्याधिष्यः । खन्यः; and the like on the last half verse —The comment on the Kārikā to IV, 2, 13 runs thus अथवा कुमार्यां भवः कौमाराः । यदेवं कौमारी भार्यांति न सिद्ध्यति पुर्येगादभिधानं भविष्यति । कौमारस्य भार्या कौमारी —The whole Bhāshya on the Kārikās to VI 4, 120, is the following, on the first half verse द्वृन्दस्यमिचोर्त्पीति वक्तव्यम् । किं पूर्योजनम् । अनेता¹²²; and on the rest, which is given without any interruption अनित्यो च विधिरिति —The Kārikā to VI 4, 140, which also is given entire —up to तथा, which is preceded only by the word अनित्यपद— is followed by these words अनित्यं च दूरके सूर्य —The Bhāshya on the whole continuous first Kārikā to VIII 3, 45, consists of these words व्यपेक्षासामर्थ्ये पूर्येगः । न चात्र व्यपेक्षासामर्थ्ये । किं पुनः कारणम् । पूर्यस्मिन्योगे व्यपेक्षासामर्थ्यमाश्रीयते न पुनरेकार्थीभावे यथान्यप्र; on the first half of the second, the Bhāshya runs ऐकार्थं सति वाक्ये पत्वं न स्थात् । संपिद्धकरोति । सप्तिः करोतीति ; on the uninterrupted second half and first half of the third Kārikā ; यदि द्वृन्दस्येतत्ततो ऽधिकस्य पत्वं न पूर्णोति । किं कारणं । पूर्यव्यप्रहणे यस्मात्स तद्वादेप्रहणं भवतीति वाक्ये ऽपि तर्हि न पूर्णोति । परमसप्तिकरोति ; on the second half of the third Kārikā यद्यमनुत्तरपदस्थयेति पूतिपेषं शान्ति तज्ज्ञापयत्वाचार्यः । भवति वाक्ये विभावेति ; fourth Kārikā, etc.

¹²¹ The Kārikās to I 1, 18, VI 4 140; and VIII 3, 45, belong, in all probability, to Patanjali, and those to III 1, 123, 2, 118 123 (Kār 3), IV, 2, 13, and VI 4, 120, to the "other" grammarian. The Kārikā to III 1, 123, is distinctly introduced by Patanjali with the words अपर आह—The third Kārikā to III 2, 123, which has no other comment than the words द्विमरणपि गच्छुति, is thus introduced by him, to

PARIBHĀSHĀS—DEFINITION OF THE WORD ITS DIFFERENCE
FROM SANJĀ

Another and very important class of grammatical writings frequently adverted to in the Mīhabhīṣya is familiar to Hindu grammarians under the name of *Paribhāshās*. They do not amend and criticize, but teach the proper application of, the rules of Pāṇini. While the *Sanjā* rules explain the technical terms of his work, the *Paribhāshās* explain the general principles, according to which the Sūtras are to be applied. Thus, when Pāṇini or other grammarians teach the meaning of the terms *Guna*, *Vṛuddhi*, *Upasarga*, *Gati*, *Dwandwa*, etc., the rules devoted to this purpose are *Sanjā* rules, but when Pāṇini says, "If a grammatical element in the Sūtras has the mute letter *m*, this anuban-dha indicates that such an element has to be added after the last vowel of the radical or base with which it is to be joined," or if he states, "The sixth case in a Sūtra means that, instead of that which is expressed by this case, something else enjoined by the Sūtra is to be substituted,"—such rules are *Paribhāshā*-rules ¹¹¹.

DEFINITION OF PARIBHASHA AS GIVEN BY THE PURUSHOTTAMA
VRITTI TIKA AND VAIDYAVATHA

A *Paribhāsha* contains either a special mark, which enables the reader to recognise at once the Sūtra to which it refers or it is delivered without such a criterion. In the latter case, it is matter of discrimination to see whether it applies unconditionally or conditionally to a given Sūtra. In explaining for instance (I 1 3) that "whenever *Guna* or *Vṛuddhi* is the subject of a rule, these terms are used in reference to the vowels *i*, *i*, *u*, *ū*, *ri*, *ṛi*, and *Irī* only," Pāṇini, by these technical terms, gives us the power of distinguishing at first sight, as it were, the Sūtras affected by this *Paribhāshā*. But when he says (I 1, 54), "If a rule is given in reference to something which follows, it concerns

gether with the two preceding and the two following verses अपर आहु । नात्ति वर्तमान काल इति । अपि चात्र स्तोकानदाहरन्ति । न वर्तते, etc. Compare note 107—The first Kārikā to III ² 118 explicitly refers to Kātyāyana in quoting his second Vārtika to this Sūtra.

¹¹² Compare I 1 1 " etc. and other Sūtras marked in the edition संज्ञापूर्देश, and I 1 47 49 and other Sūtras marked there परिभाषासूत्रम्. But the Calcutta editors have failed in accuracy also in this respect. Thus the rule I 1 21 आयन्तवदेकसिन्, is marked by them as an अतिदेश, but Patanjali calls it distinctly परिभाषा, or I 1 69 अलुदित्सवर्णस्य चापूर्वय, has their mark संज्ञापूर्देश, but is called by Kātyāyana himself a *Paribhāsha* (ed. Ballantyne p 763) or I 1 72 येन विधिस्तु दन्तस्य is marked by them संज्ञापूर्देश, but Patanjali likewise calls it a *Paribhāshā* (ed. Ballantyne p 32) द्वयो परिभाषयो सावकाशयो समवस्थितयोरायन्तवदेकसिन्येन विधिस्तु दन्तस्येति च । हृषमिह परिभाषा भविष्यति आयन्तवदेकसिन्यिति । हृष च न भविष्यति येन विधिस्तु दन्तस्येति, etc.

merely the beginning of such a following element," it is for the reader to judge whether this *Paribhāshā* prevails unconditionally at, and is an essential part of, for instance, rule VII 2, 83, or not. Again, when a *Paribhāshā* (I 4, 2) teaches that "If two rules connected with one another, but of a different purport, apparently apply to the same case, the later rule only is valid," it is left to his judgment to decide whether it may be applicable or not to rule VII. 3, 103, for instance.¹²³

VAIDYANĀTHA'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN PARIBHASHAS FOUNDED ON JNĀPAKA, AND PARIBHĀSHĀS FOUNDED ON NYĀYA.

The *Paribhāshas*, however, which are to be the subject of the following remarks, are not those given by Pāṇini himself—they are the *Paribhāshas* met with in the Great Commentary of Patanjali, and have been defined by *Vaidyanātha*, surnamed *Pāyagunda*, in his gloss on the *Paribhāshendusekhara* of *Nāgojibhatta*, surnamed the *Upādhyāya*, as "axioms (the existence and authority of) which are established by certain Sūtras of Pāṇini, and axioms (the existence and authority of) which are established by the method that governs other works, but is applicable to Pāṇini also." Each of these categories has been taught, as they state, by 'older grammarians, in the shape of Sūtras'; the former, however, *Vaidyanātha* observes, prevail in number and authority over the latter. In other words, these *Paribhāshas* are, according to the grammarians quoted, special axioms referring to Pāṇini exclusively, and general axioms which avail for his Grammar as well as for other works. The 'certain' Sūtras of Pāṇini which indicate that such *Paribhāshas* are in existence and are required for a proper application of the rules, are called *Jñāpaka*, and the method of other authors which indicates that those *Paribhāshas* are applicable as well to them as to Pāṇini, bear the name of *Nyāya*.¹²⁴ We shall see, however, that this

¹²³ *Purushottama vritti* t̄̄ku on Iānini, I 1, 3 परि सर्वेणात्म उपयुक्ता याणी भाषा सा परिभाषा सा च लिङ्गवती विध्यहरेषभूता च । या लिङ्गद्वारामात्रे (M4 L1H no 221, भाषा) नापयुज्यते सा लिङ्गवती । या सर्वेष विधिवाक्य उपयुज्यते सापरा । सापि काचिदधिरेषभूता या विना विधिर्विद्यान्नैष पूर्वते । यथा । यादे परस्येति (I 1, 84) । म (M4 म) हि तद्विना ईद्वास ईति (VII 2 83) पूर्वते । काचिद विधिरेषभूता । विषेतिरेषे परमिति (I 4 2) अविरोधे वृषेष्विद्याद्वा भल्योवम्याहतमेव (comp. VII 3 101) विरोधपिष्ये तु पूर्वात्परं (M8 खत्यापरं) कारयतीति The explanation of the *Adhikā*—which in general is much more lucid and on the whole not more extensive than the compiled gloss of the Calcutta edition—runs thus on the word विधिरेष (I 4 2) विषेषो विषेषिष्ये । यत्र द्वा पूर्वात्पर्याप्तेष्वकिमन्युगपापूनुतः स विषेषिष्येः । तु वृषेष्विषेषो विषेषिष्ये ।

¹²⁴ *Paribhāshendusekhara*, in the introduction पूर्वानीर्थाकारणान्ते धारणिकान्तप्र पालिष्येत्य हन्ते शास्त्रन्यायविद्वानि भाष्यार्त्तिक्षेत्रिवद्वानि याति परिभाषानामात्रे ताति व्याख्यायन्ते *Paribhāshendusekhara* *Adhikā* of *Vaidyanātha* on these words पूर्वोक्तेति । ईद्वाद्विष्येः । पारिभाषानि । वृषेष्विष्ये विद्वानि । यथा । अभिनृ । पूर्वमेऽपि शास्त्रव्याख्या वृषेष्विष्याद्वा । तथा च धारणिकानामवि तात्त्वाद्विष्येतानि गैरह्यः । व्याख्याद्विष्यान्युगपापूनुतः । व्याख्याद्विष्यान्युगपापूनुतः ।

definition, to be correct, will have to be modified; and I may mention, besides, that older commentators, Kalyāya, for instance, merely speak of Paribhāshās and Nyāyas, not of Paribhāshās founded on Nyāyas; while the author of the Paribhāshenduśekhara himself frequently gives the name of Nyāya to those Paribhāshās which, according to his introductory words, are such as are founded on Nyāya.¹²²

(MS. E.I.II. No. 480: न्यायसिद्धा ज्ञातो) पूर्वलेनाम्बहिर्तवाज्ञापकशब्दस्य द्वन्द्वे पूर्वनिपातः (comp. II. 2, 34, v. 3) । सत्यैतच्छाखीयलिङ्गं ज्ञापकम् । एतच्छाख्यलोकतन्नान्तरपूर्सिद्वयुक्त्यायः । सूत्रपाठस्थपरिभाषणामत्रान्याख्यानाय प्राचीनोत्तानो कासांचिद्पूर्माण्याय चाद भाव्येति etc.

On the difficulty which these terms have caused to the native grammarians.

Uncritical state of the Calcutta edition of Pāṇini on this point.

¹²² The Laghuparibhāshāvivṛitti is therefore divided into a gloss on what we may call the Paribhāshās proper and a gloss on the न्यायमूलाः परिभाषाः which comprise twenty-eight axioms. This distinction is somewhat obscured in the Paribhāshenduśekhara, where both categories are mentioned in the Introduction (comp. the preceding note), but afterwards treated promiscuously. The Calcutta edition has, in most instances, correctly appended the Paribhāshā to the Sūtra which is its Jñāpaka: thus the P. निर्दिश्यमानस्थादेश भवन्ति which is required for the proper application of, e.g., the Sūtra VI. 4, 130; VII 2, 101, etc., is correctly appended in this edition to the Jñāpaka-Sūtra I. 1, 40; the P. नानुवृन्धकृतमनेकालत्वम् which applies e.g. to VI. 4, 127, to the Jñāpaka I. 1, 55; the P. समुद्रते विपूतिपेषे यद्वाधितं तद्वाधितमेव which applies e.g. to VI. 4, 105 combined with VII. 1, 25, to the Jñāpaka I. 4, 2, and so on. Sometimes, however, the editors have appended the Paribhāshā to the Sūtra for the interpretation of which it is required, but not to the Jñāpaka rule where it ought to have been placed; e.g. the P. विकरणेभ्यो नियमो वलीयान् applies to I. 3, 12, but its Jñāpaka is I. 3, 43, or the P. नानुवृन्धकृतमेजन्तवम् is required for the proper interpretation of I. 120; VI. 1, 45, etc., but its Jñāpaka is III. 4, 19 etc. In some instances the authorities named differ as to the Jñāpaka of a Paribhāshā; thus the P. अर्थवद्ग्रहणेनानर्थकस्य प्रहणम् is indicated according to the Paribhāshenduśekhara which invokes the authority of Patanjali by the Jñāpaka I. 1, 72, according to the Laghuparibhāshāvivṛitti, by the Jñāpaka I. 1, 34; the Calcutta editors have placed it under I. 1, 68 — The P. पूरुतिवदनुकरणं भवति is indicated, according to the first named work, by the Jñāpaka VI. 4, 58, according to the second, by the Jñāpaka I. 3, 18, the editors have appended it to VIII. 2, 46, which Sūtra, however, merely illustrates its applicability. Many other instances of this kind might be alleged in order to show that the matter is one of great difficulty to the Hindu grammarians themselves and that in this respect, also, much scope is left for a future conscientious editor of Pāṇini. That the Paribhāshās are not met with at the end of Patanjali's Bhāṣya to a Sūtra, requires no further observation after the statement of note 109, for they are an essential portion of the arguments of his discussion — The term न्याय is applied six times to Paribhāshās by the Calcutta editors (viz., at the Sūtras I. 1, 23 42 47, twice II. 1 1, III 1, 12), but if they followed the Paribhāshā collections quoted, they ought to have marked in a similar manner several axioms which are given by them simply as Paribhāshās. At all events, they ought not to have called the same axiom नविवयुक्तम्¹²³ Nyāya at III. 1, 12, and Paribhāshā, at VI. 1, 71; and since they repeated it in order to show its application, they might have mentioned it also at VI. 1, 135, where it likewise occurs in the commentary of Patanjali.

PARIBHASHĀS WHICH ARE ANTERIOR TO THE VĀRTTIKAS OF KĀTYAYANA

In now adverting to the chronological relation in which these axioms stand to Pānini and Kātyāyana, we are, in the first place, enabled to decide that Paribhāshās of this kind must have existed before the Vārttikas of Kātyāyana, for the latter quotes such Paribhāshās in his Vārttikas ¹¹⁶. Another question, however, is, whether those Paribhāshās which existed before Kātyāyana existed also before Pānini, and whether we should be justified in looking upon the Paribhāshās collected in the Paribhāshenduśekhāra, the Paribhāshāsangraha, and similar works, as the original Paribhāshās to the Sūtras of Pānini. If we believed Vaidyanātha's definition of the two categories of Paribhāshās, and of the distinction he establishes between Jñāpaka and Nyāya, as just mentioned, it would become very probable that the Paribhāshās were composed *after* the Grammar of Pānini, and by another grammarian than Pānini, since there is no evidence to show that he wrote other Paribhāshās than those which are embodied in his own Sūtras; and if we assumed that the collections of Paribhāshās made and commented upon by Nāgojibhatta, Śiradeva, and others, are the original collections, there would be a certainty that the "older grammarians," whom the former quotes as his authority, did not precede Pānini, for one, or perhaps two, of these axioms, mentioned in each of these collections, distinctly refer to him ¹¹⁷.

NONE OF THE PARIBHĀSHĀ COLLECTIONS IN EXISTENCE IS THE ORIGINAL COLLECTION OF PARIBHĀSHĀS

There are, however, reasons which must induce us to doubt the originality of the Paribhāshās contained in these collections, and to doubt too the strict correctness of Vaidyanātha's definition. In the first place, because these collections, each of which appears to be entitled to equal authority, differ in the number, and even in the wording, of the Paribhāshās which they contain, though they coincide in giving all those

¹¹⁶ A Vārttika to I 1 65 which has disappeared in the Calcutta edition says अन्त्यविज्ञानात्सिद्धमिति वेजानर्थके इलो अन्त्यविधिरनभ्यासविकारे; its last words नानर्थके, etc., are a Paribhāshā as results from the Bhāshya on this Vārttika अन्त्यविज्ञानात्सिद्धमिति चेत् । तत्र । किं कारणम् । नानर्थके इलो अन्त्यविधिरनभ्यासविकारे । अनर्थके इलो अन्त्यविधिरनभ्यासविकारे । नेत्रादृ । अनभ्यासविकारे Compare also a similar instance, in note 187

¹¹⁷ The Paribhāshā to IV 1, 82 अकृतव्यहा पाणिनीयाः and the P to VIII 1 1 पूर्वग्रासिदीयमद्वित्ते, which is perhaps, founded on the Sūtra VIII 2, 1, but as the expression पूर्वग्रासिद्वे need not be a quotation from Pānini it would not be safe to found a conclusion on it with the same certainty as on the word पाणिनीयाः. For this reason I do not lay stress on another Paribhāshā which occurs in the Paribhāshāsangrahaśākyākhaṇḍrikā and the Laghuparibhāshāvṛitti and is founded on VII 4 2 पूर्वग्रासिद्वे न स्पानिवद् (its wording in the Laghup पूर्वग्रासिदीये न स्पानिवद् is erroneous. Compare note 182.)

Paribhāshās which especially concern us here.¹¹⁸ It is not probable, therefore, that the original collection of Paribhāshās was any of those now preserved in manuscript. But there is more ground to confirm this doubt. The *Paribhāshenduśelha* states, in its introduction, that it is going to explain "the axioms explicitly mentioned by the older grammarians and recorded in the *Bhāshya* and the *Vārttī*s;"—whereupon *Vaidyanātha* comments: "The older grammarians' are Indra and so on; 'explicitly mentioned' means read in the shape of Sūtras; . . . in the *Bhāshya*' says the author of the *Paribhāshendusekhara*, because it is not his intention to explain the Paribhāshās which are embodied in Pāṇini's Sūtras, and because some of those mentioned by the older grammarians carry no authority with them"¹¹⁹

PARIBHĀSHĀS COMPOSED BY PATANJALI

Now, if we compare the Paribhāshās collected in the last-named work, and in the other works devoted to the same purpose, with the Great Commentary itself, we find that they frequently call that a Paribhāshā which is not a quotation made by Patanjali from authorities which preceded him, but simply a portion of his own argument. No doubt, when this great critic considered himself justified in laying down general principles, according to which certain Sūtras are to be interpreted or applied, such axioms of his are to all intents and purposes Paribhāshās, but they are Paribhāshās of his, not of the authorities who preceded him.¹²⁰ And this distinction we must draw in order to judge

¹¹⁸ The number of Paribhāshās in the *Paribhāshendusekhara* is 108, it may, however be given as 112, as several P are contracted into one in the *Paribhāshāvṛitti* of *Siradeva* it is 120, in the *Laghuparibhāshāvṛitti* and the *Paribhāshārthasangraha* of *Jyekhachandrikā* there are 108 Paribhāshās proper and 23 *nyāyamūlakā* P, some of the latter being included in the 108 of the first named work. Another collection which does not mention the name of the compiler, but bears the title of *Pāṇinimata nyāyamūlakā* Paribhāshā has 123 Paribhāshās. Each of these collections has some Paribhāshās which are not named in several of the others.

¹¹⁹ See note 124

¹²⁰ I mentioned in note 109 that the absence or presence in the *Bhāshya* of the quotational word *इति* affords no criterion in the case of the metrical *Kārikās*. It is necessary to state now that this word is always met with when a Paribhāshā is quoted by Patanjali, and its absence is therefore a safe mark that a general axiom which occurs in his commentary is one of his own creation. A few instances chosen from the first chapters of the *Mahabhāshya* will make good this assertion. We read in the *Bhāshya* on I 1 20 (p 393 ed Ballantyne) दोष पूर्वतस्याः परिभाषायाः । जड्य-पूर्तिपदोक्तयोः पूर्तिपदोक्तस्यैवेति । गामादाप्रहये प्वविशेषं इति (the former of these P is omitted in the Calc ed) or at I 1 49 (p 565) निर्देशमानस्यादेशा भवन्तीत्येषा परिभाषा etc or at I 1 53 (p 608) अस्त्येषा परिभाषा । नानुबन्धकृतमनेकालच्च भवतीति । or at I 1, 17 (p 877) पूर्वं तहि गौणमुख्येषोमुँहये कार्यसंपूर्त्यय इति ; or at I 2 63 तज्जापयत्याचार्यं सर्वे द्वन्द्वो विभाषयैकवद्भवतीति (not विभाषैकं as in the Calc ed) or at I 4 2 विपूर्तिपेषे परमेव भवतीति तदैतदुपपत्तं भवति । सहजौता विपूर्तिपेषे यद्बाधितं तद्बाधितमेवेति, when in the latter three instances the word इति indicates that the preceding words are a

whether Patanjali originated an axiom merely for the purpose of defending Pāṇini, or whether the Sūtra in question is *bonâ fide* entitled to the benefit of such a general rule, since it is certain that several of these axioms were invented at later periods, either to palliate the shortcomings of Pāṇini, or to make his rules so conveniently elastic as to extend from the time at which he lived down to a period of linguistic development, which could not but find them defective in many respects.¹³¹

There is a material difference, therefore, between the Paribhāshās contained in these collections, when taken as a whole, and the Paribhāshās quoted by Patanjali; and no conclusion becomes safe until we know which Paribhāshās are quotations made by Kātyāyana and Patanjali, and which belong to their authorship, or even to other and later works. It suffices for our present purpose to add, that neither the first Paribhāshā already mentioned, which distinctly refers to Pāṇini, nor the second, is a Paribhāshā quoted by Patanjali or Kātyāyana.¹³²

Paribhāshā, while in the first three instances the term itself is added, and इति afterwards. On the other hand, when we read at I 1 27 (p. 442) नैव दोषः । भवति हि बहुत्रीहौः । तदूरु शास्त्रविज्ञानमपि । तथापि । चित्रवाससमानय एतc or in the Bhāshya on the same Sūtra (p. 448) कर्तव्योऽत्र यत्र । याधकान्येव हि निपातनानि भवन्ति, the words बहुत्रीहौ¹³³ मपि and याधकान्येव¹³⁴ are undoubtedly Patanjali's own, and it may, in passing be observed that the Paribhāshendu-sekhara and the Calc ed have omitted the word हि in giving these words as Paribhāshas. Or when the Bhāshya on the Vārttika शत्रूशानचोश्च निमित्तभावाचित्तिः भावस्थैरपवादत्वात् (omitted in the Calc ed), to II 3, 46 says ...शत्रूशानचौ तिहृष्टपवादौ ती चात्र याधकौ । न चापवादविषयमुत्सर्गोऽभिनिविशते । पूर्वे छपवादा अभिनिविशते पश्चात्तुसर्गां । पूर्वकल्प्य चापवादविषयं तत उत्सर्गोऽभिनिविशते । न तावदप्रकदाचित्तिहृष्टादेशो भवति etc, the word पूर्व¹³⁵ ऽभिनिविशते are clearly a portion of Patanjali's general argument, and do not contain Paribhāshas of older grammarians—These instances will illustrate the uncritical condition of the actual collections of Paribhāshās. Some of these Paribhāshās moreover, are nothing else than Vārttikas of Kātyāyana forming part of the discussion of the latter they, too are therefore not the oldest Paribhāshās since, as we have seen above (note 120), Kātyāyana quotes a Paribhāshā which must have preceded his Vārttikas. Such Paribhāshā Vārttikas which are commented upon by Patanjali in the same manner as the Vārttikas—while he generally contents himself with merely quoting a Paribhāshā rule—are for instance, the P to I 1 60 उभयनिर्देशो विषयिते पैयात्पद्मीनिर्देशो, or to I 1, 72 अपदेशियद्वभावोऽप्युत्पतिपदिकेन, or in पदाकाधिकारे तथा च तदुत्तरपदस्य च; or पूर्वव्याप्तये चायद्वय्या, etc. Other Paribhāshās of the Paribhāshendu-sekhara, etc do not even represent the words of Patanjali, but merely the meaning of his general arguments, e.g. the P given at I 2 9 एजन्यवलुक्यपूर्वति, is the representative of the following words of the Bhāshya एतकारि लक्ष्यपि शास्त्रं पञ्जन्यत् । तथापि । पञ्जन्यो यावद्गृहे पूर्णं च सर्वमभिर्यन्ति, etc., and other Paribhāshās again so far as I was able to ascertain do not occur at all in the Bhāshya, e.g. the P at I 1, 62, II 3 46 (p. 12 2) etc.

¹³¹ Such Paribhāshās are e.g. समासान्तविभिरनित्यः, at VI 2 107, and the nine P mentioned at III 1 79, by the Calcutta editors.

¹³² The Paribhāshā अहृतपूर्वाः पायिनीयाः is mentioned in Kālyāya's gloss on

THE OLDEST PARIBHĀSHĀS ARE ANTERIOR TO THE GRAMMAR
OF PĀṇINI

We are left, then, free to judge of the relative age of these axioms entirely from their contents, to weigh the probabilities which decide whether they could all have been written after Pāṇini or not. These probabilities strongly tend in favour of the latter alternative. For, however, many of these old Paribhāshās may have been additions made after Pāṇini's, though before Patanjali's, time, we still shall have to admit that without a great number of them, a *proper* application of his rules is absolutely impossible. Without them, many rules would become open to equivocations and doubts, nay, to such serious objections, that it is hardly possible to conceive a grammarian of the mould of Pāṇini handing his work to his contemporaries in a condition so needlessly precarious, and so little creditable to his skill ¹³². Nevertheless, if he had delivered his grammar entirely

the Bhashya to IV 1, 82, but not by Patanjali. The P. पूर्वग्रासिद्वयमद्विर्वचने is, in my opinion a portion of Patanjali's own argument when commenting on the 10th Varttika (of the Calcutta edition) to VIII 1 1 as results from the following quotation पैनःपुन्यं पैन पुनिक इति । अपातिपदिकावात्द्वितोपतिर्न स्यात् । यदि तहि॑ स्याते द्विर्वचने राजा वाक्याकपदस्येति (?) नलोपादीनि न सिद्ध्यन्ति । इदमिह संपूर्याय॑ द्विर्वचनं क्रियनां नलोपादीनीति । किमत्र कर्तव्यम् । परवान्नलोपादीति पूर्वग्रासिद्वे नलोपादीनि सिद्वासिद्वयोऽथ नास्ति संपूर्यात्तणा । एवं तहि॑ पूर्वग्रासिद्वयमद्विर्वचन इति वक्ष्यामि etc. The same remark applies to the third Paribhāsha mentioned in note 127, for the passage of the Bhashya to VII 4 2 whence this Paribhāsha is taken, runs thus तज्ज्ञापत्यत्याचार्य॑ । इत उत्तरं स्वानिवद्भावो न भवतीति । किमेतस्य ज्ञापते पूर्येत्तरं पूर्वग्रासिद्वे न स्यानिवद्युक्तम् । तत्र वक्तव्यं भवति etc.

¹³² Two instances will suffice to illustrate this character of what I consider to be the oldest Paribhāshās. In the rule III 1 94 Pāṇini teaches that if, in I 13 chapter on kṛt-affixes, a subsequent rule supersedes a preceding rule either of the kind of affixes enjoined by such rules may be at will employed in the formation of a kṛt derivative except when the affix enjoined is used exclusively in the feminine gender and when the affixes in the preceding and subsequent rules are of the same form. Thus the Sūtra III, 1 133 teaches that nouns denoting the agent are formed with the affixes *rwul* (=āka) and *trich* (=tri). Again Sūtra III 1 134 says that from *kship* and other radicals there named such derivatives are formed with the affix *ka* (=a), hence according to the Paribhāsha rule III 1 94 the nouns of agent formed of *kship* may be *kshipa*, or *kshepa* or *kshpatri* since none of these affixes is used exclusively in the feminine gender and none has the same form as the two remaining ones. But when Pāṇini rules, in III 2 3 that from *da* a derivative may be formed *-da* (as latter part of compounds like *go-da* etc) and in III 3 12 a derivative *daya* (as latter part of such compounds as *go-daya* etc) it would become doubtful whether there be an option also in these instances since the technical affix of the form *da* is *ka*, and of the form *daya* *a*, and since it is not clear whether *ka* and *a* could be considered as affixes of a different form or—on account of their representing the real affix *a* though with a different influence on the radical—as affixes of the same form. This doubt is not solved by Pāṇini himself but by a Paribhāsha quoted by Patanjali which says नात्यन्यकृतमसासूप्यम्, 'dissimilarity (of the affixes) is not produced by the mute *anubandhas*'. And Pāṇini must have supposed that his readers were acquainted with this Paribhāsha for otherwise as an accurate writer he could not—in the Sūtra III 1, 139—have treated, without any further explanation, the affixes

without any Paribhāshā, we might still be free to assume, without inconsistency, that in doing so, he meant to leave to the acumen of his commentators the task of eliciting these general principles from his grammatical rules. But we know that such is not the case; his work bears evidence that he has given Paribhāshā-rules,—axioms which are in no way more important than many of those which are met with in the Mahābhāshya, but not in his work;—axioms which admit of the same arguments for or against their desirability or their dispensableness in a book of this kind. The omission of these rules, then, would not be one made on principle; it would assume the nature of a serious defect, unless we discovered a motive which would reconcile it with the accuracy that characterizes this great grammarian.

We have proof—and some will be afforded in the sequel—that Pāṇini was not the *inventor* of the grammatical system preserved in his work, though he improved the system of his predecessors, and made his own additions to it. We shall see, moreover, that he availed himself of the technical means of the older grammarians, and, in such a case, never gave any explanation of those technicalities which must have been known to his contemporaries, and, therefore, required no remark. If, then, we supposed that he followed the same course with regard to the Paribhāshā rules—and there is no reason why he should not—our inference would, of necessity, be that he was compelled to give such Paribhāshas as did not occur in the works of his predecessors, and were required as special axioms for his own work; but that, without exposing himself to the reproof of carelessness, he could omit all those Paribhāshas which were already in existence, and were available, as well for the grammar of his predecessors as for his own.

DEFINITION OF THE TERM JAĀPAKA

And this conclusion is confirmed by the sense in which the term *Jnāpaka* is used in the older commentaries, especially in the Mahābhāshya itself, where by this name are called such rules of Pāṇini as "indicate" or point to other rules which show how the former rules are to be applied properly. In commenting, for instance, on a Vāttika to the Sūtra I 1, 23, which defines the technical term *sankhyā*, Patīnījali asks, "how will there be in rules on *sankhyā* a correct understanding of this term?" and answers this question in the following manner. "(This understanding) results from the *Jnāpaka* rule. What is such a *Jnāpaka* rule? When Pāṇini, in his Sūtra V 1, 23, teaches that bases formed with the affix *tat*, have an additional vowel *i* before the affix *ta* enjoined in the preceding rule for *sant* *hyās*,—is this Sūtra V. 1, 23, the *Jnāpaka* rule of *sankhyā*? (i.e. does this Sūtra indicate that bases formed with *tat* are comprised under the technical name *sankhyā*?) No

sa (—a) and na (—a) as similar affixes, and exempted them as such from the influence of the rule III 1, 24.—Or when in the Sādṛī VI 1, 48 (and VII 3 36) he says that the radical *i* before the affix of the causal, becomes *ap*, his rule (VI 4 57) on *ap* would be equivocal, since the form *ap* may represent a simple radical too,—unless he relied on the familiarity of his reader with the Paribhāshās, which states जापाकात्प्रतिपदोक्तये. प्रतिपदोक्तस्य, '(If there is a doubt) whether a secondary or a primitive form (is meant), the primitive form (has the precedence).

For the term *Jnāpaka* concerns the application of a rule (*i.e.*, this term is not used of a Sūtra when its application is prohibited; the Sūtras V, 2, 51, and 52, for instance, as Kaiyājī observes, are *Jnāpaka*s of the Sūtra on *santyā*).¹³⁴

Hence, though a rule may stand in relation to another rule, it is not its *Jnāpaka* unless it indicate its real purpose;¹³⁵ and, as Patanjali expressly and repeatedly states, a rule has the character of a *Jnāpaka* only when it is given in reference to a rule already previously established, and when its sense becomes completed by it. Thus the Sūtra III, 2, 07, says Patanjali, is no *Jnāpaka* of the Guna rule I, 1, 3, since the former rule does not become completed through the contents of the latter. Or, the Sūtra VII 2, 103 is not a *Jnāpaka* of the rule VII 2, 102, since its object would not be accomplished by the contents of this latter rule, though the words concerned by both rules are comprised under the term *sarvanāman*.¹³⁶ In consequence, a *Jnāpaka* rule cannot precede, but must come after the rule which is indicated by it.

¹³⁴ Vārttika to I 1, 23 (om in the Calc ed, p 432 ed Ballantyne) यद्यादीनाम-
प्रहणम् Patanjali यद्यादीनां प्रहणं शक्यमकुर्म । केनेदानीं संत्याप्तेशेषु संत्यासंपत्यो
भविष्यति । ज्ञापकात्सद्वितीय । ज्ञापकं किम् । यदयं वतोरिद्वेति (V 1 23) संत्याया विहितस्य
कनो (comp V 1, 22) यद्यन्तादिटं शास्ति । वतोरेव तज्ज्ञापकं स्यात् । नेत्याह । योगापेच्चं ज्ञापकम्
—Kaiyājī ज्ञापकात्सद्वितीय । एकादिविद्विज्ञयतसंत्यायावाचित्य यद्यादीना नास्तीति ज्ञाप
काधय । योगापेच्चमिति । अस्य योगस्य प्रत्याल्यानादेतद्योगापेच्चमिति न योद्व्यम् । किं तु
योगानपेच्चत इति योगापेच्चम् । यदय बहुपूर्णगणसंवस्य तिथुक (V 2 52) पटकतीति (V 2 51)
उत्तिपत आगमं शास्ति तज्ज्ञापयति भवति संत्याकार्यमिति Nagojibhattī explains
योगापेच्चमिति! प्रयोगापेच्चमित्यर्थ—This instance will suffice to illustrate the use of the
word *jnapaka*, which is of constant occurrence in the *Bhāṣya* and is always
employed in a similar manner. In order to obviate an objection which might be
raised by those not familiar with the *Mahābhāṣya* against my rendering वतोरेव
तज्ज्ञापकं स्यात् “is this Sūtra V 1 23 etc—I have to observe that Patanjali when
quoting a Sūtra, often merely mentions its principal word instead of repeating the
words of the Sūtra and adding after them the quotational word इति The word वतोरेव
taken from the Sūtra वतोरिद्वा is therefore here an equivalent of वतोरिद्वेति
Analogous instances will be found in note 136

¹³⁵ Patanjali observes for instance in his comment on the first *Sivasūtra* (p 87 ed Ballantyne) कथं ज्ञायते यदयम आ (VIII 4, 68) इत्यकारस्य विवृतस्य
संवृतताप्रत्यापत्तिं शास्ति । नैतदस्ति ज्ञापकम् । अस्ति हान्यदेतस्य प्रयोगनम् etc or on the
Vārttika to I 1 56 आहिभुवोरीटप्रतिपेदे¹³⁷ he observes (p 633 ed Ballantyne)
आहिभुवोरीटप्रतिपेदो वक्तव्यः । आथ । अभूत् । अस्ति वू प्रहणेन प्रहणादीट् प्राप्तोति । आहेस्ता
वत्र वक्तव्य । आचार्यप्रवृत्तिज्ञापयति । नाहेदीट् भभतीति । यदयमाहस्य इति (VIII 2 35) मलादिप्रकरणे थन्यं शास्ति । नैतदस्ति ज्ञापकम् । अस्ति हान्यदेतस्य वचने प्रयोगनम् । किम् । भूतपूर्व-
गतिर्यणं विज्ञायेत । मलादिर्यो भूतपूर्वं इति । यदयेव थवचनमनर्थक स्यात् etc and the like in
other instances

¹³⁴ Patanjali, e.g., in his gloss on the Vārttikas to I 1 3 (ed. Ballantyne, p 248)

RELATION BETWEEN JNĀPAKA AND PARIBHĀSHĀ

In now considering the relation which exists between the Jnāpaka and the Paribhāshā Sūtras,¹¹¹ we cannot but perceive that it nowise differs from the relation which exists between rules instanced before and ordinary rules indicated by these Jnāpaka. In the same manner as there are Jnāpaka-rules which indicate the purpose of other rules, there are Jnāpaka-rules which indicate the purpose of Paribhāshās, and all the Paribhāshās given by Pāṇini himself, therefore, precede their Jnāpaka-rules. If, then, as we learn from Kātyāyana and Patanjali, there existed Paribhāshās which are not contained in Pāṇini's grammar, but which nevertheless are indicated by Jnāpaka, which are Sūtras of Pāṇini, such Paribhāshās must, at least in Patanjali's opinion, have existed before Pāṇini's work; for otherwise the definition given by the Mahābhāṣya of the term *Jnāpaka* would become inconsistent with itself. And since Paribhāshās or principles of interpretation cannot be conceived without matter to be interpreted according to them, such Paribhāshās must not only have preceded Pāṇini, but they must have been taught in one or more other grammatical works; and Vaidyanātha, therefore, as I suggested above, cannot be correct in biasing his distinction between *Nyāya* and *Jnāpaka* on the circumstance that the latter refers to Pāṇini exclusively, while the former applies also to other works. In all probability the difference is this: that *Jnāpaka* is used especially of grammatical rules, while *Nyāya* is a synonym of Paribhāshā, but applies to writing which are not grammatical.

THE CHARACTER OF THE VĀRTTIKAS OF KĀTYĀYANA

In now summing up the result we have obtained from the previous investigation, so far as it bears on our immediate problem, we find that the oldest author on record who wrote on Pāṇini was Kātyāyana, and that he was not merely the author of the Vārttikas, properly so-called, but also of a certain number of Kārtikas, which, in reality, however, are nothing else than an assemblage of single Vārttikas, forming, combined, a stanza or a verse. We have seen, too, that Vārttikas, which form an essential part of the Mahābhāṣya itself, are of Patanjali's authorship.

यद्यप्युत्त्वते जनेऽव्यचर्ते (III 2 97) ज्ञापकं न च्यञ्चनस्य गुणो भवतीति सिद्धे विधिराभ्यमाणो
ज्ञापकार्थो भवति । न च जनेऽग्नेण सिद्ध्यति, on the last words of the third Kārtika to VII
2 102 पर्यं तद्वाचार्यं पूर्वतिज्ञापयति न सर्वेषां लक्ष्यादीनामस्तं भवतीति । यद्यं किम् क इति
(VII 2 103) कादेशं शालि । इतरपा हि किमो उभयतीतियेव मूलात् । सिद्धे विधिराभ्यमाणो
ज्ञापकार्थो भवति । न च किमो उत्तेज सिद्ध्यति

¹¹¹ A Paribhāshā is on account of this relation also called ज्ञाप्य. In his comment, for instance to 1 4 14 Patanjali says अन्तप्रहृष्टविमर्थम्। सुसिद्धपदमिष्येवीर्यते केनेदानों सदन्तानां भवित्यति । सदन्तविधिना । अत उत्तरं पठति—Vārttika पदसंज्ञायामन्तप्रहृष्टं पदनमन्यथा संज्ञाविधीं पूर्वयप्रहृष्टे तदन्तविधिपूर्विष्येधार्यं—Patanjali पदसंज्ञायामन्तप्रहृष्टं किष्यते । किं ज्ञाप्यम् । पूर्वज्ञापयत्याचार्यं अन्यथा संज्ञाविधीं पूर्वयप्रहृष्टे तदन्तविधिनं भवतीति etc. Compare note 126.

What, then, is the relation of Kätyäyana to Pāṇini, and of Patanjali to Pāṇini and to Kätyäyana? Is it that of commentators, or is it to be defined otherwise?

Professor Müller confers upon Kätyäyana the title of "editor" of Pāṇini, and says that "the Great Commentary of Patanjali embraces both the Värttikas of Kätyäyana and the Sūtras of Pāṇini"¹¹⁸ Professor Weber, on the contrary—who, even in some of his latest writings, candidly confesses that he has never read the Mahābhāshya, but nevertheless, or perhaps for this reason, abounds in conjectures on this work, which not only is in existence but within reach,—goes so far as to throw doubt on the genuineness of those Sūtras which are not explained, because they are not explained, in the Great Commentary.¹¹⁹ I fear that neither scholar will find adherents for his opinion amongst the pupils of Patanjali and Kätyäyana. The mutual relation of these latter grammarians and their relation to Pāṇini is, indeed, implied by the word *Värttika*.

"The characteristic feature of a Värttika," says Nāgojibhatta, "is criticism in regard to that which is omitted or imperfectly expressed in a Sūtra"¹²⁰ A Värttika of Kätyäyana is therefore not a commentary which explains, but an animadversion which completes. In proposing to himself to write Värttikas on Pāṇini, Kätyäyana did not mean to justify and to defend the rules of Pāṇini, but to find fault with them; and whoever has gone through his work must avow that he has done so to his heart's content. He will even have to admit that Kätyäyana has frequently failed in justice to Pāṇini, by twisting the words of the Sūtras into a sense which they need not have, or by upbraiding Pāṇini with failings he was not guilty of. On this score he is not unfrequently rebuked by Patanjali, who on such occasions severely rates him for his ungenerous treatment of Pāṇini, and, as we have seen in an instance above (p. 37), proves to him that he himself is wanting in proficiency, not Pāṇini. Kätyäyana, in short, does not leave the impression of an admirer or friend of Pāṇini but that of an antagonist,—often,

¹¹⁸ Ancient Sanskrit Literature pp 233 and 243

A fantastical conjecture of Professor Weber on the Mahābhāshya, which has not become real by dint of repetition

¹¹⁹ For instance in the *Indische Studien* vol. IV, p. 78 'Die Pläxis kommen in dem tebhol zu Pāṇini (V. 1. 9, 2. 112) vor (ob aus dem Mahābhāshya?),' or in a note to the same vol., p. 169, when referring to the Sūtra VI 2, 142 of Pāṇini, he observes 'Allerdings klaşye tu nī: ej kṣṭu: jatim also unsicher ob ihm gehörig' [Also —, on what basis does this conclusion rest? 'Unsicher' —, for whom?] The same confession and the same conjecture occur indeed so often in Professor Weber's multifarious writings that it becomes a matter of psychological curiosity to see how an author apparently much concerned about a certain subject, instead of acquiring the necessary information—which in the present case could not have caused any great difficulty—or of consulting at least some one who might have allayed his disquietude constantly displays before the public his feelings and theories whereas by dint of a stereotyped repetition of the same words, he must convey to a confiding reader the impression that there may be some foundation, at least, for his would be critical asseveration.

¹²⁰ Nāgojibhatta on Kätyäyana to the first Värttika (of the Calcutta ed.) of I 1 1 (ed. Ballantyne p. 213) पातिकमिति । सूत्रे उक्तुराधिन्ताकर्यं पातिकमिति ।

too, of an unfair antagonist. In consequence, his remarks are attached to those Sūtras alone which are open to the censuro of abstruseness or ambiguity, and the contents of which were liable to being completed or modified. he is silent on those which do not admit of criticism or rebuke

THE CHARACTER OF THE MAHĀBHĀSHYA ITS RELATION TO
KĀTYĀYANA AND TO PANINI

The position of Patanjali is analogous, though not identical. Far from being a commentator on Pāṇini, he also could more properly be called an authoī of Vārtikas. But as he has two predecessors to deal with, instead of one,—and two predecessors, too, one of whom is an adversary of the other,—his Great Commentary undergoes, of necessity, the influence of the double task he has to perform, now of criticising Pāṇini and then of animadverting upon Kātyāyana. Therefore, in order to show where he coincided with, or where he differed from the criticisms of Kātyāyana, he had to write a comment on the Vārtikas of this latter grammarian, and thus the Mahābhāshya became not only a commentary in the ordinary sense of the word, but also, as the case might be, a critical discussion, on the Vārtikas of Kātyāyana, while its *Ishtis*, on the other hand, are original Vārtikas on such Sūtras of Pāṇini as called for his own remarks.

I have already mentioned that Patanjali often refutes the strictures of Kātyayana and takes the part of Pāṇini, I may now add that, in my opinion, and as a few instances hereafter will show, he sometimes overdoes his defence of Pāṇini, and becomes unjust to Kātyāyana. It is easy, however, to understand the cause of this tendency in Patanjali. The spirit of independent thought, combined with the great acumen and consummate scholarship which pervade the work of this admirable grammarian—to whom, as far as my knowledge goes only one author of the later literature bears a comparison, I mean the Mīmānsa philosopher, Kumārila—could not allow him to become a mere paraphraser of another's words. An authoī like Patanjali can only comment on the condition that, in doing so, he develops his own mind, be it as adherent or as antagonist. And since Kātyāyana had left but little chance for a successor to discover many more blemishes in the Grammar of Panini than he had pointed out, an active and critical mind like that of Patanjali would find more scope and more satisfaction in contending with Kātyāyana than in completing Pāṇini, and thus, I hold we may explain his proneness to weaken even those censures of Kātyāyana which we should see reason to approve, did we not discover in favour of Pāṇini arguments which will appear hereafter, but which were foreign to Patanjali.

As little, therefore as it entered into the purpose of Kātyāyana to advert to every Sūtra of Pāṇini, did it come within the aim of Patanjali to write a commentary on Pāṇini, and, according to the requirements of such a commentary, to explain every rule of this grammarian. His object being, like that of Kātyāyana, merely a critical one, Patanjali comments upon the Vārtikas of Kātyāyana because such a comment of his implies, of necessity, criticisms, either

on Pâṇini or on Kâtyâyana; and, in consequence, no Vârttika could be left unnoticed by him. Again, independently of Kâtyâyana, he writes his own Vârttikas to Sûtras not sufficiently or not at all animadverted upon by the latter grammarian, because they, too, are criticisms, *viz.*, on Pâṇini. And, like Kâtyâyana, therefore, he passes over altogether all those Sûtras which are unexceptionable to his mind. It is obvious, therefore, that no doubt whatever concerning the genuineness of a Sûtra of Pâṇini can be justified on the ground alone that it has no Bhâshya of Patanjali, and the unsoundness of such a doubt becomes still more obvious when we consider that a great many Sûtras of Pâṇini, which have no Vârttikas and no Bhâshya of Patanjali, nevertheless make their appearance as quotations and as part of Patanjali's argument in his Commentary on other Sûtras criticized by Kâtyâyana.

A SUMMARY VIEW OF THE CRITICISMS OF KÂTYÂYANA

Now, if we take a summary view of the labours of Kâtyâyana, we find that of the 3993 or 3992 Sûtras of Pâṇini, more than 1500 offered him the opportunity of showing his superior skill, that his criticisms called forth more than 4000 Vârttikas, which, at the lowest estimate, contain 10,000 special cases comprised in his remarks.

Having arrived at this point, let us ask—How could India be sound with the fame of a work which was so imperfect as to contain at least 10,000 inaccuracies, omissions, and mistakes? Suppose that there existed in our days a work of 4000 paragraphs, every second or third of which not merely called for an emendation, an addition, and corrections, in formal respects, but which, on the whole, compelled us to draw the conclusion that there were twice and a half times as many blunders in it as it contained matter to be relied upon,—is it possible to assume that such a work could create a reputation for its author except one which no sensible man would be desirous of? If we assumed such a possibility, it could only be on the supposition that such an author originated the subject he brought before the public, and, as an inventor, had a special claim to indulgence and fame; or, on the supposition of public ignorance and individual immorality.

But there is evidence to show that Panini was not the first Hindu grammarian who wrote, nor even the inventor of the technical system which has caused so much uneasiness to would-be philologists. It is certain, too, that grammar was not, in ancient India, the esoteric study of the few, and there is no proof of any kind that Pâṇini had influenced or hired a number of scribes to puff his Grammar and his fame. We must needs, therefore, resort to another explanation, if we want to reconcile the fact of the Vârttikas with the fact of Pâṇini's reputation, which was so great that supernatural agency was considered as having assisted him in his work.

FOUR ARGUMENTS TO PROVE THAT PÂÑINI MUST HAVE PRECEDED KÂTYÂYANA

This explanation, I hold, can only be derived from the circumstance that Pâṇini and Kâtyâyana belonged to different periods of

Hindu antiquity,—periods separated by such a space of time as was sufficient to allow—

1. Grammatical forms which were current in the time of Pāṇini to become obsolete or even incorrect;
2. Words to assume meanings which they did not possess at the period when he lived;
3. Words and meanings of words used by him to become antiquated; and
4. A literature unknown to him to arise.

It is on this supposition alone that it seems possible to realise Pāṇini's influence and celebrity; or, on the supposition, too, that in his time he gave so accurate, so complete, and so learned a record of the language he spoke, that his contemporaries, and the next ages which succeeded him, could look with admiration on the rules he uttered, as if they were founded on revelations from above. If he had bungled along, as he must appear to have done, had he been a contemporary of Kātyāyana,—not he, but the author of the Vārtikas, would have been the inspired Rishi and the reputed father of the Vyākaranā. It is not necessary to exaggerate this view by assuming that Pāṇini was an infallible author, who committed no mistakes, omitted no linguistic fact, and gave complete perfection to a system already in use: we need take no other view of the causes of his great success than we should take of those which produce the fame of a living man. His work may or may not have been looked upon by his contemporaries as having attained the summit of excellency, but, at all events, it must have ascended far beyond mediocrity. At its own period it cannot have failed so signally, and in so many respects, as it would have done if Pāṇini and Kātyāyana had been contemporaries.

In order fully to substantiate this view, I should have to submit a considerable portion of Pāṇini's Grammar and the Vārtikas connected with it, to an investigation which would exceed by far the limits prescribed by the present inquiry; and such an investigation might, moreover, appear to be superfluous on the present occasion, since I shall adduce hereafter arguments of another kind, which will add materially to the force of these deductions. Yet the importance of this question is so great that I will indicate, at least by a few instances, the direction in which, I believe, the facts may be found that lead to the conclusions named.

1. Pāṇini says (I 2, 6) that the radical *Indh* is fit in *It*, which words mean that, according to rule VI. 1, 24, the preterit of *Indh* is *Idhe*. This radical he treats together with *Indh*; and he does not observe—as he always does if such be the case—that his rule concerns the Vaidik use of the preterit of *Indh*. Yet Kātyāyana corrects the injunction of the Sūtra by adding this restriction; and, for reasons connected with the latter, goes so far as to declare this Sūtra of Pāṇini to be superfluous.¹¹¹

111 १,२,६ इन्दियादित्य च—वार्तिका इन्द्रेष्वद्देविष्यणाद्युपो युपो विष्यातात्य द्विष्यमानपूर्वपम्—भाष्या इन्द्रेष्वद्देविष्यो तित् । ग इत्यात्य व्याप्त इन्द्रेष्वद्यात्य द्विष्य

In rule VII. 1, 25, Pāṇini states that the *sai vanāmāni* (which word is usually but inaccurately rendered "pronouns") which are formed with the affixes *datātā*, and *datamā*,—moreover, *itāra*, *anya*, and *anyatātā* (Gana to I 1, 27) form their neutrals not in *m*, but in *d*, e.g., *katarad*, *katamad*, *anyad*, etc.; but he says in a following special rule, that, in the Veda, *itāra* has *itaram* for its neuter. It is obvious, therefore, that he intended to exhaust his subject by these rules; yet Kātyāyana has to state that "ekatāra forms *elataram* in the Veda as well as in the language of common life" ¹⁴¹.

The letters *k*, *t*, *t*, *p*, at the end of a Pada, says Pāṇini (VIII. 4, 45) may become *g*, *d*, *d*, *b*, before a following nasal, or be changed into the nasal of their class. Kātyāyana adds: "If, however, the following nasal is part of an affix, these letters must always become the nasal of their class, in the language of common life." ¹⁴²

Now I have chosen these instances from the sphere of conjugation, declension, and phonetic laws, simply because they at once suggest the question whether Pāṇini knew as much grammar as we should fairly expect from a beginner, who had studied Sanskrit for a few months. Is it probable or not, that he was proficient enough to form the preterite of the common radical *indh*, "to kindle," the nominative of the neuter of *elatātā*, "one of two,"—a word which, moreover, is the subject of one of his special rules (V 3, 94) ² and was he really so ignorant as not to be able to combine *vāk* or *tvak*, with the common affix *maya* into *vāngmaya* or *twangmaya*, though a phonetic influence of the affix *maya* on the base *hiranya* is adverted to in his rule VI 4, 174? Or is it more plausible to assume that *idhe* and *ekatarad* were forms current in his time, though no longer current and correct when Kātyāyana wrote; and that when Pāṇini lived, *vāgmaya* or *twagmaya* were as legitimate as *vāngmaya* or *tuāngmaya*? That Kātyāyana's stricture may be as much open to censure as the rule of Pāṇini, unless we, in fairness, gave it the benefit of a similar argument, is proved by the words *kal udmat*, *kal udmin* and *garutmat*, which "in the (classical) language of common life" are quite correct, but would have been incorrect according to the *Varttika*, if they had been used in such language at the time when it was composed ¹⁴³.

सम्य. । आमा भाषायां भवित्यम् । सुवो दुको नित्यवादभवतेरपि नित्यो दुकृते गुणे पामौति । अकृतेऽपि पूमौति । ताम्या दिवचनानर्थक्यम् । ताम्यामिनिधमवतिभ्या किंदूचनमनर्थक्यम् (The Calcutta editors have on this occasion mistaken Kātyāyana's *Varttika* for Patanjali's *Bhāṣya*)

¹⁴¹ VII 1, 26 नेतराच्छन्दसि—*Varttika* इतराच्छन्दसि पूतिपेष्य पूतराच्छवीत्र

¹⁴² VIII 4, 45 यरो ज्ञुनासिके ज्ञुनासिके वा—*Varttika* यरो ज्ञुनासिके पूतये भाषायां नित्यवचनन्—*Bhāṣya* यरो ज्ञुनासिके पूतये भाषाया नित्यमिति वन्ध्यम् । वाहमयं व्यहमयम्

¹⁴³ It is not permitted to adduce also याग्मित्, for this word ought to be written—as, for instance, the commentators of the *Amarakosha* do write it—याग्मित्, since its affix is not मित् but ग्मित्, according to Panini, 1, 2, 121 वाचो ग्मिति That in ग्मिति the letter ग् is not an anubandha, results from I. 3 8

2. Pāṇini says (VI. 1, 150), "the bird (nominative) may be *vishkira* or *vikira*" (either of which means any eatable bird but a cock). This rule is thus modified by Kātyāyana : "the form may be *vishkira* or *vikira* if the sense of the word is 'bird'" (locative). Patanjali, it is true, sides with Pāṇini. The *Varttika*, he says, is irrelevant, since it teaches that either form *vishkira* or *vikira*, is correct, if the word means "bird," but that *vishkira* would be the only legitimate form, if the word has any other sense. Pāṇini, however, he adds, did not mean to affect the sense "bird" by his optional "or," but the irregular form of the derivative.¹⁴⁴ Nevertheless, it appears to me that both grammarians are right, and that Patanjali's decision is open to doubt. Whenever Pāṇini binds the application of a rule to the condition of a special sense, he expresses the latter by a word either in the locative or nominative. If he gives the meaning of the word in the locative it does not necessarily follow, though it usually happens to be the case, that such a word has other meanings, too, which are then excluded from the influence of the rule; but if he expresses the sense of the word in the nominative, he seems always to indicate that the word has this sense, and this sense only,—that both sense and word, being expressed in the same case, are, as it were, conguious.¹⁴⁵ His present rule would therefore imply that each form, *vishkira* or *vikira*, has no other sense than that of "bird", but Kātyāyana's corrections would mean that both forms are optional in the sense of "bird," while in any other sense both forms represent separate words. This fact is borne out by the meanings given in Wilson's Dictionary under each form.

The word *āścharyya* is rendered by Pāṇini *anitya* (VI. 1, 147), i.e., "not permanent, rare." Kātyāyana corrects this meaning, in substituting for it *abhluta*, i.e., "that which has not existed before, miraculous, wonderful." On this occasion, too, Patanjali defends Pāṇini, by observing that this remark might have been spared, for the sense, "wonderful, miraculous," is implied by the sense "rare"; and he gives instances to confirm this view, viz., "the height of (this) tree is something 'rare (or wonderful), the blueness of the sky is something 'rare' (or wonderful)"; but I very much doubt whether logicians will assent to this view of Patanjali; for, though all that is wonderful is rare, not all that is rare need be wonderful. And he himself seems to break down under his third instance, which runs thus "That the stars which are not fastened in the atmosphere do not fall down, is"—surely not rare, but wonderful!¹⁴⁶ In other terms, the meaning of *āścharya*, given by Pāṇini,

¹⁴⁴ VI. 1. 150 विकिर शकुनिर्विकिरो या *Varttika* विकिर शकुनी विकिरो पेति यत्क्षयम्—Bhasbya शकुनी खेलुच्यमाने शकुनी या (या ?) स्यादव्यापि नियम्। तत्तद्द्वयं वक्तव्यम्। न वक्तव्यम्। न यात्यनेन शकुनिरभिसंवृत्यते कि तहि' निपातनमभिसंवृत्यते विकिर दूष्येतद्विपातने शकुनी या निपात्यत इति

¹⁴⁵ Compare, e.g., III. 2, 80 81 87 V. 2. 13; VI. 1, 143 (the meanings 2 and 3 of अप्स्वर, in my Dictionary, are of later origin), VI. 1, 155 156, etc.

¹⁴⁶ VI. 1. 147 आश्रयंमनिष्ये—*Varttika* (revised in the Calcutta ed.) आश्रयंमनुसृत इति यत्क्षयम्—Bhasbya इहापि यदा स्यात्। आश्रयमुद्धता वृहस्त। आश्रयं भीषा चीः।

seems to have been only rare; and if so, it preceded that which became more usual at a later time, and is mentioned by Kātyāyana.

Another and, perhaps, more striking instance is afforded by the Sūtra (VII 3, 69) where Pāṇini renders the word *bhojya* by *bhakṣya*, for Kātyāyana corrects him in saying that he ought to have rendered *bhojya* by *abhyavahāya*. Now, if we consult the use of these words in the classical language, there can be no doubt that *bhojya* and *abhyavahārya* mean "what is fit for consumption," and apply to solid as well as to liquid substances, that on the other hand, *bhakṣya* means "what is fit to be eaten," and applies to solid food only. Is it likely, however, that Pāṇini should have blundered in the application of words which, it would seem, the most ignorant would employ properly? Patanjali, who, as I have already observed, is always disposed to stand by Pāṇini, again takes up his defence, and observes, that Pāṇini's using the word *bhakṣya* instead of *abhyavahāya* need not have been criticised by Kātyāyana, for there are expressions like *ab bhalsha*, "one who eats water," or *vāyu bhalsha*, "one who eats air," which show that the radical *bhakṣ* is used also in reference to other than solid food.¹⁴ But both instances alleged by Patanjali are conventional terms, they imply a condition of fasting, and derive their citizenship amongst other classical words from a Vādik expression, as Patanjali himself admits, when in his introduction to Pāṇini, he speaks of *elapadas*, or words, the sense of which can only be established from the context of a Vādik passage to which they originally belong,¹⁴⁹ they do not show, therefore, that *bhakṣ* is applied also to other phrases of the classical language, so as to refer to liquid food. It seems evident, therefore, that in Pāṇini's time, which preceded the classical epoch, *bhalsha* must have been used as a convertible term for *bhojya*, while, at Kātyāyana's period, this rendering became incorrect, and required the substitution of an other word.

3 The words and the meanings of words employed by Kātyāyana are such as we meet with in the scientific writers of the classical literature; his expressions would not invite any special attention nor

आश्र्यमन्तरिक्षे उद्धनानि नहाणि न पतन्तीति । तत्तहि वत्तव्यम् । न वत्तव्यम् । अनित्य हृषेव सिद्धम् । इह तापदाश्र्यमुद्यता वृत्तव्येति । आश्र्यप्रहणेन न दृशो उभिः सप्त्यते किं तर्युषता सा चानित्या । आश्र्य नीना चैरिति नाश्र्यप्रहणेन घोरभिसव्यते किं तहि नीलता सा चानित्या । आश्र्यमन्तरिक्षे उद्धनानि नहाणि न पतन्तीति नाश्र्य प्रहणेन नहाण्यभिसव्यते किं तहि पतनकिया सा चानित्या । तापनित्य हृषेव सिद्धम्.

* VII 3, 69 भोज्यं भृष्टे—वर्तिका भोज्यमध्यप्रहार्यमिति वत्तव्यम् (where the nominative of अध्यप्रहार्य implies an additional criticism against the locative of भृष्ट, see the foregoing remark (ago 120)—भृष्टये हृषापि यथा स्यात् । भोज्यः सुः । भोज्या यत्तागूरिति । किं तुन कारण न सिव्यते । भवित्य यत्तिरादे वर्तते तेन द्रवे न पूज्नोति । नाश्र्यं भवि सरविरादे वर्तते किं तस्यतापि वर्तते । तथापा । धडमशो यातुभद्र इति

* For the quotation from Patanjali's preface to Pāṇini (ed. Ballantyne, n. 481 see my Dictionary, s. v. अध्यप्रहार्य

call forth any special remark. This cannot be said of the language of Pāṇini. In his Sūtras occur a great number of words and meanings of words, which—so far as my own knowledge goes—have become antiquated in the classical literature. I will mention, for instance, *pratyavasāna*, eating (I. 4. 52; III. 4. 76); *upasamvâda*, making a bargain (III. 4. 8); *rishi*, in the sense of Veda, or Vaidik hymn (IV. 4. 96); *utsanjana*, throwing up (I. 3. 36); *vyaya*, application, employment in (I. 3. 36); *upasambhâshâ*, talking over, reconciling (I. 3. 47); *svalarana*, appropriating, especially a wife, marrying (I. 3. 56); *śâlinî* *aranâ*, humbling (I. 3. 70); *mati*, desire (III. 2. 188); *abhi esha*, propriety (III. 3. 37); *avaklîpti*, imagining (III. 3. 145); *abhyâdâna*, commencement (VIII. 2. 87); *hotrâ*, in the sense of *ritvî*, priest (V. 1. 135); *upâjekî* *l* and *anuajekî*, to strengthen (I. 4. 73); *nivachanekî*, to hold one's speech, to be silent (I. 4. 76); *kanchan* and *manohan*, to fulfill one's longing (I. 4. 66), etc., etc.¹¹⁰

4 To prove a negative, is, no doubt, the hardest of all problems. There are circumstances, however, which may lessen the danger of drawing the conclusion that an author cannot have possessed such and such knowledge when he wrote. If we take into account the evidence afforded by the author's character and work, the judgment passed on his writings by his countrymen, and the condition of the latter,—these elements put together into the scale of criticism will show whether the scale of the author's proficiency can spare, or not, a certain amount of weight without disturbing the balance required. That Pāṇini was an eminent writer, is not only manifest from his Grammar, but acknowledged by the common judgment of his countrymen; and the learning and civilization of ancient India was such that we must admit the fullest competence in those who established his celebrity. But we know, too, that Pāṇini was a Brahmanic writer. No amount of scholarship could have ensured to him the position he holds in the ancient literature if he had been a professor of the Buddhistic creed. In forming, then, an opinion on Pāṇini we must always bear in mind his learning and his religious faith, and the consequences which follow from both these premises.

ĀRAÑYAKAS WERE NOT KNOWN TO PĀṇINI, BUT TO KĀTYĀYANA

After these preliminary remarks I will first advert to the Sûtra (IV. 2. 120) in which Pāṇini teaches the formation of the word *Aranyakâ*, and says that it means "a man who lives in a forest." That *Aranyakâ* has this meaning is unquestionable. It means, too, if we consult the lexicographers, "a forest-road, a forest-elephant, a jackal, etc.;" but above all it is the name of those theosophical works which are the precursors of the *Upanishads*, and are held in the greatest awe by the Hindu authorities.¹¹¹ If a learned Hindu were

asked the meaning of *Āranyakā*, he would certainly first point to the sacred works which bear this name, and then refer to the meaning "forester," just as I suppose, a European questioned on the sense of the word 'Bible,' would first say that it means "Testament," and then remember its etymological sense, "book." Yet Panini merely speaks of *Āranyakā*, "the forester." No wonder that Kātyāyāna supposes, in a *Varttika* of his, the defect which must have struck him if and since he was acquainted with this portion of the sacred literature ¹¹¹ But is it possible to assume that Panini could have known this sense of the word *Āranyakā* when he is altogether silent on it, and if he did not know it, that the works so called could have already existed in his time?

THE VAJASANEYI-SAMHITA AND THE SATAPATHA BRĀHMĀNA WERE NOT KNOWN TO PĀṇINI BUT TO KĀTYĀYĀNA

The acquaintance of Panini with a *Yajurveda* is evidenced by several *Sūtras* of his ¹¹² But in speaking of a *Yajurveda*, he does not tell us whether he knew the *Black* as well as the *White* version, or only the *Black* version of it. That the former, which is considered as the literary property of the *Tittiri* school is older in form and contents than the latter, the *Vajasaneyi Samhitā*, requires no observations of mine, after the conclusive proofs which have been given by previous writers. To decide, however, whether Panini had a knowledge of the *Vajasaneyi Samhitā* or not,—in other words whether both versions of this *Veda* are separated in time or not by the Grammar of Panini, is a matter which touches closely on our present inquiry with regard to the chronological relation between Panini and Kātyāyāna.

In mustering the facts which bear on the solution of this question we shall have first to observe that the word *Vajasaneyin* does not occur in a *Sūtra* of, but only as a formation in a *Gana* to Panini (IV 3 106), while the formation of *Taittiriya* from the base *Tittiri*, is taught in a *Sūtra* (IV 3 102). There is consequently, a *prima facie* doubt

of a lecture of an *Aranyaka* as to that of a whole *Veda* सामध्वनादृग्यजुषी नाधीयीत कदाचन । चेदस्याधीत्य वाप्यन्तमारण्यकमधीत्य च

¹¹³ Pāṇini IV 2 1¹⁹ आरण्यान्मनुष्ये —Patanjali आत्मप्रमिदमुच्यते मनुष्य हस्ति — Kātyāyāna पथ्यव्यायन्यायविद्वामनुष्यहस्तिविति वक्तव्यम् —Patanjali आरण्यक पन्था । आरण्यको उच्याय । आरण्यको न्याय । आरण्यको विहार । आरण्यका मनुष्य । आरण्यको हस्ति —Kātyāyāna वा गोमयेतु —Patanjali वा गोमयेविति वक्तव्यम् । आरण्यका गोमया ।

आरण्या गोमया¹¹⁴ (Both *Varttikas* are marked in the Calcutta edition as if they'd only occur in the *Siddhānta kaumudi*). Professor Müller has pointed out that Panini does not mention the principal meaning of *Āranyakā* but expresses himself thus (page 339) Whether Panini knew the *Aranyakas* as a branch of sacred literature is uncertain. Although he mentions the word *Aranyakā* he only uses it in the sense of living in the forest and it is the author of the *Varttikas* who first remarks that the same word is also used in the sense of read in the forest

¹¹³ For instance by the *Sūtras* I 4, 4 (adhvary 5) VI 1 117 VII 4 38 VIII 3 104 etc

against Pāṇini's acquaintance with the Vājasaneyi-Samhitā.¹⁵¹ And this doubt is heightened by the circumstance that the sacred personage, also, who is believed to have collected not only the Samhitā, but the Brāhmaṇa of the White Yajurveda, Yājnavalkya, is also not mentioned in the Sūtras of, but merely in the Ganas to, Pāṇini.¹⁵²

Since the question, however, whether Pāṇini knew the Vājasaneyi-Samhitā, coincides with the question whether he had a knowledge of the Satapatha-Brāhmaṇa, I will first quote a passage from Professor Müller's work, which, in a correct and lucid manner, describes the relation of Yājnavalkya to both these words:—“A comparison,” he says (p. 353), “of the texts of the Taittirīyas and Vājasaneyins shows that it would be a mistake to call Yājnavalkya the author, in our sense of the word, of the Vājasaneyi-samhitā and the Satapatha-brāhmaṇa. But we have no reason to doubt that it was Yājnavalkya who brought the ancient Mantras and Brāhmaṇas into their present form, and, considering the differences between the old and the new text, we must admit that he had a greater right to be called an author than the founders of the Chāraṇas of other Vedas whose texts we possess. In this sense, Kātyāyana says, in his Anukramanī, that Yājnavalkya received the Yajur-veda from the Sun. In the same sense, the Satapatha-brāhmaṇa ends with the assertion that the White Yajur-veda was proclaimed by Yājnavalkya Vājasaneyā.”

If, then, we turn our attention to the word *Satapatha*, we have again to state that it occurs only in a *Gana* to V. 3, 100 (compare also note 105), but is not mentioned authentically in any Sūtra of Pāṇini. Yet Kātyāyana, I hold, has helped us to untie this knot, which has been drawn still tighter than it was by Professors Müller and Weber, in spite of the excellent counsel which the latter gives, “not to increase, by inattention, the darkness, which is great enough already in the history of Sanskrit literature.”¹⁵³

A rule of Pāṇini's, which, literally translated, runs thus, “amongst the Brāhmaṇas and Kalpas which have been proclaimed by an Old one (or by the Old),”¹⁵⁴ teaches, in its connection with preceding rules, that

¹⁵¹ Professor Weber has already drawn attention to the fact that in the *Ganas* to Pāṇini only the first word may safely be ascribed to the knowledge of Pāṇini, since it is mentioned by himself, and I may add, those words of a *Gana*, too, which are impliedly referred to by him; for instance, उत्तर, उत्तम, उत्तर, अन्यतर, of the *Gana* to I. 1, 27, adverted to in the Sūtra VII. 1, 25, which otherwise would be unintelligible. See also note 55. With these exceptions, we have no real certainty of deciding whether the words of a *Gana* were those which Pāṇini had in view when he wrote; for not only are there considerable differences in the readings of the *Gana* collections in existence, but it is certain that these lists have been subject, at various periods, to various interpolations, which materially lessen their critical worth.

¹⁵² In the *Ganas* to IV. 1, 105 and 2, 111

¹⁵³ *Indische Studien*, vol. I, p. 493: “We have already darkness enough in the history of Hindu literature, let us abstain at least from increasing it through our own inattention!”

¹⁵⁴ IV. 3, 105: उत्तरपूर्वोत्तम अन्यतरपूर्वोत्तम, which words are completed by the tētras IV. 3, 101 and 103.

names of Brâhmaṇas and Kâlpas are formed by adding the (technical) affix *nîti* (i.e., the real affix *in* Vriddhi in the base), to the proper name of the personage who proclaimed them, provided that such a personage is an old authority. Kâtyâyana gives as an instance of a Brâhmaṇa so formed, the word *Śâtyâyanîn*, derived from *Śâtyâyana*, the saint who proclaimed this Brâhmaṇa; and other instances are mentioned by Patanjali in his comment on a previous Sûtra. To this rule Kâtyâyana added a Vârttika, which, according to the text in the Calcutta edition, would mean literally—“*In reference to Yâjnavalkya and so on (there is) an exception, on account of the contemporaneity;*”¹⁵⁵ and the comment on this additional rule is afforded by Patanjali, in the instance he gives: *Yâjnavalkâni Brâhmaṇâni*, where the Brâhmaṇa referred to the authorship of Yâjnavalkya, is not formed by means of the (technical) affix *nîti*, but by the (technical affix *an* (i.e., *a*, with Vriddhi in the base)

PROFESSOR WEBER'S FIRST EXPLANATION OF THE VÄRTTIKA
TO SÛTRA IV 3 105

PROFESSOR WEBER'S SECOND EXPLANATION OF THE SAME
VÄRTTIKA, WHICH DESTROYS THE FIRST

The great importance of this additional rule of Kâtyâyana is obvious. It has been made the subject of several remarks in the “*Indische Studien*,” where Professor Weber writes (vol 1 p 57, note).—“By the *Yâjnavalkâni brâhmaṇâni* [*Yâjnavalkyâni*, as the “*Indische Studien*,” writes it, is probably an error of the press] there [i.e., in the commentary of the Calcutta edition to IV. 3, 105] and also in the *Vârttika*, and in IV. 2 66, there can probably be meant none but the *Satapatha-brâhmaṇa*, either the whole of it, or from XI to XIV, which, therefore, Patanjali even did not consider as *puruṇa-proktam* [i.e., proclaimed by an old authority].” Again (vol 1 p 146), “A matter of importance is the distinct separation of Brâhmaṇas composed by the *Old* (*puruṇa*) IV. 3 105, by which [expression] in contradistinction, the existence also of such as belong to a more recent time (*tulyâkâni*, says the *Vârttika*) is necessarily implied, amongst the latter, recent ones the *Yâjnavalkâni* [the repeated error of the press *Yâjnavalkyâni*, becomes suspicious] (comp p 57, note) in the *Sulabhâni* (otherwise unknown) Brâhmaṇâni are mentioned in the *Vârttika*, amongst the old ones, the scholiast there, (is it on Patanjali's authority?) names the *Bhâllavînî* and the *Śityâ-*

“*Vârttika* of the Calcutta edition to IV 3 10, याज्ञवल्क्यादिन्य पुतिषेवसुत्यका लाभात्

“For this query of Professor Weber compare note 139. But I cannot help asking how he reconciles the statement of the note to vol I p 57 just quoted where he speaks of Patanjali. In terms of that assurance which can only proceed from personal knowledge—with his reported avowal of not having read the *Mahâbhîshya* and with the text itself of p 57 t, which this note refers since he is doubtful even there whether the Calcutta editors have taken their instances to IV 3 105 from Patanjali or not? As a guess his attributing the words याज्ञवल्क्यादिनि प्राप्ताद्याति to Patanjali happens to be quite correct, but it would have been certainly much better to give it distinctly as such than leave us doubtful now as to the nature of other statements of his.

yanmāh."¹⁰ And (vol i p 177, note) — "Now we have seen (pp 57 note, and 146) that the Yājanavalkāmī-brāhmaṇāmī [“Yājanavalkāmī” again, which now becomes very suspicious], are considered by the author of Vārtikas as contemporaneous with Pāṇini. The question, therefore, is whether by it { i.e., the Yājanavalkāmī-brāhmaṇāmī} we have really to understand the Sataptha brahmana itself, or, in general, Brāhmaṇas only, which were composed by Yājanavalkya, or such as merely treated of him. In the former case, it would follow, too, from his proved contemporaneity with Uddālaka, and from Uddālaka's preceding Pāṇdu, that the epoch of Pāṇdu is later than that of Pāṇini." But (vol ii p 393) he observes : "By the Yājanavalkāmī brāhmaṇāmī"¹¹ we, probably, have not to understand those [Brāhmaṇas] which have been composed by Yājanavalkya himself, but those which merely treated of him, and a specimen of these is preserved us in the Yājanavalkiyam-kandam of the Vṛishadaranyaka (see my Akad Vorles p. 125 26); therefore, if this [my] second view is correct, the contemporaneity of Yājanavalkya and Uddālaka with Pāṇini, which is the necessary consequence of my first view, would fall to the ground, together with Pāṇini's preceding Pāṇdu, whose priority in time is again the consequence of such a contemporaneity."¹²

AN ANALYSIS OF HIS CRITICAL METHOD

There is nothing novel or remarkable in the circumstance of Professor Weber's recanting on one page what he maintained with the most specious arguments on another, or of his leaving the bewildered reader between a chaos of what are to him established facts; but however interesting it may be thus to obtain from him an autobiography of his mind, and an insight into the state of maturity in which he presents us with his researches, I must, this time, defend him against himself,

¹⁰ Professor Weber again writes *Yājanavalkyanī*. Being compelled, therefore to abandon the hypothesis of an error of the press, the more so as the same 'Yājanavalkyanī-brāhmaṇāmī' make their reappearance in their alphabetical place in his Index to the first two volumes of the *Indische Studien* — I must refer him for the correct form *Yājanavalkāmī* to Pāṇini VI 4 151 — It is needless for me to say that the 'editor' of Pāṇini likewise writes याज्ञवल्क्यानि IV 2,66 and 3 105 interding probably to improve on the Calcutta edition which IV 3 105 writes याज्ञवल्क्यानि, but IV, 2 66 याज्ञवल्क्यानि. *Habent sua fata libelli!*

¹¹ The self quotation of Professor Weber (Akad Vorles p 125 128) need not be repeated here since it merely contains the same conjecture that the *Yājanavalkāmī* correctly written in the *Akad Vorles*, but re-quoted from this work, *Yājanavalkyanī* in the *Ind. Stud.* vol II p 200 brāhmaṇāmī are the same as the *Yājanavalkiyam* kāndam which treats of Yājanavalkya — The text of the quotations given above, it is superfluous for me to mention is in German. To save space I have confined myself to communicating merely a translation of it which I trust no one will find wanting in strictest fairness and literal accuracy. The words between brackets marked [] are my own parenthetical explanations as the reader will easily see for himself. The *Italics* in the quotation are Professor Weber's own.

and show that *within the sphere of his own presumptive facts*, there is not the slightest ground for immolating by his last conjecture the statements contained in the first three quotations from his essays

The exception made by Kātyayana to the rule of Panini (IV 3, 105) is contained in the word *Yājnavalkya*, as we learn from the authentic comment of Patanjali. There is no proof, whatever, that it can extend to any other derivative of *Yajnavalkya*. Whatever, therefore be the import of the word *Yajnavalkīya* the *Yajnavalliyam kāndam* has nothing to do with the *Yajnavalkāni brāhmaṇāni* mentioned by Patanjali in reference to our *Varttika*. But, in the second instance, the word *pratishedha*, or 'exception,' used by Kātyayana necessarily concerns works of the *same category*. As little as an author could, for instance, call geology an exception to astronomy, as little, I hold, could Kātyayana speak of an "exception" to names of Brāhmaṇas when he had in his mind, as Professor Weber thinks, the name of a particular chapter of an *Aranyaka*. And thirdly, this same word 'exception' in the *Varttika* must likewise concern the *proclaiming* of such a work by the personage who becomes the base of the derivative, for Panini uses the word *prota* 'proclaimed,' distinctly enough in the *Sutra* which is criticized by the *Varttika*. There would be no "exception," if the formation alluded to by Kātyayana, meant a work 'treating of' the personage who is the base of the derivative. But, when Professor Weber, in his 'Akademische Varlesungen' (pp 125-126) crowns his syllogism by the remark that he prefers his last conjecture because it "appears indeed, extremely ticklish (bedenklich) to him 'to consider the whole *Satapatha brīhmaṇa* or as much as its last books, as bearing distinctly the name of *Yajnavalkya*—however much it may contain his system [?—or as contemporaneous with, or is preceding even by little, Panini's time and when he adds in the fulness of his authority, 'but for the *Yajnavalkiyam kāndam* I have not the slightest hesitation in doing the latter'] [Letzteres zu thun —what latter?] I fear I should overstep the limits of scientific criticism if I attached a single remark to a passage like this which treats its readers as if the personal feelings of Professor Weber had all the weight of scientific arguments, and deals with one of the most important problems of *Sanskrit* literature in such a manner as if it were matter for table talk.

PROFESSOR MULLER'S EXPLANATION OF THE SAME VARTTIKA.

Before I proceed in my observations on the point at issue, I will state the views of Professor Muller on this *Varttika*. He writes (p 303) "In the same sense Pīṇini or rather his editor, says in the first *Varttika* to IV 3 105, that there were modern Brāhmaṇas proclaimed by Yājnavalkya, and that their title differed by its formation from the title given to more ancient Brāhmaṇas, and (p 303) 'It is wrong, for instance to speak of the Yājnavalkya in the same sense as we speak of the *Taittirīyas* and the works promulgated by Yājnavalkya although they are Brāhmaṇas are called Yājnavalkyāni [sic] Brāhmaṇīḥ 'And why?' says Kātyayana, 'because they are of too recent an origin that is to say they are almost contemporaneous with ourselves.'

AN ANALYSIS OF HIS EXPLANATION - THE VÄRTTIKA MADE
 THE FOUNDATION OF CHRONOLOGICAL RESULTS, BY
 BOTH PROFESSORS, IS MISPRINTED IN THE
 CALCUTTA EDITION WHICH SUPPLIED
 THEM WITH ITS TEXT

Where, I must now ask, does Kātyāyana speak of Brahmanas "more ancient" than the Brāhmaṇas proclaimed by Yājnavalkya? and where, I must further ask, does he say that the latter are "almost" contemporaneous? Again, what proof has Professor Weber that Kātyāyana meant by contemporaneous, as he says (see above, p 102), *contemporaneous with Pāṇini*? and what proof has Professor Müller that Kātyāyana implied by this word, *contemporaneous with himself*? Assuredly, all these questions ought to have been settled first, and by very substantial proofs, before an edifice of chronology was allowed to be built on them. Not only does Kātyāyana nowhere indicate a *degree*, either in the relative age of the Brāhmaṇas of Yājnavalkya and those subject to the Sūtra of Pāṇini, or in the contemporaneousness of the former with him—but, in my opinion, the word *pratishedha*, "exception," already adverted to, is altogether fatal to the ellipsis supplied by Professors Weber and Müller when they refer to the word *contemporaneous*. This word "exception" clearly proves that Kātyāyana could never have held the dialogue with which Müller enlivens the scene of the Värttika. For if the Brāhmaṇas spoken of in the Värttika, were contemporaneous with Pāṇini or with Kātyāyana, the Värttika would have made an *addition*, not an *exception*, to the rule of Pāṇini, since the latter merely treats of such Brāhmaṇas as are old from his point of view, and in no wise concerned with any Brāhmaṇas of *his time*.

In short, the Värttika can, on account of the word *exception* convey no other sense than that Pāṇini himself was guilty of an inaccuracy, by omitting to state that the Brāhmaṇas which had been proclaimed by Yājnavalkya (and others) were exempt from his Sūtra IV. 3, 105, *these Brāhmaṇas being as old as those which he had in view when he gave this rule*.

THE REAL MEANING OF THIS VÄRTTIKA

Did the words of the Värttika, such as they are printed in the Calcutta edition, admit of the slightest doubt—if interpreted properly, or had the inferences drawn from them been propounded with less consequence, and did not the discussion I have raised concern a principle, viz., the method of examining the relation of Kātyāyana to Pāṇini, the course I should have taken, in refuting the opinion of Professors Weber and Müller would have been a different one. I should have at once stated the fact, that the inadvertence of the Calcutta editors of Pāṇini—(need I repeat that Dr. Boeckhlugl's reprint is as conscientious in this case as in all analogous instances?)—has skipped two words which belong to the Värttika,—words, which, indeed, are not absolutely required for a correct understanding of the Värttika, but the presence of which would have prevented as much as the possibility of a misconception.

ception, however inattentive the reader of the Vārttika might be. These words are no other than the words of Pānini's Sūtra itself, which Kātyāyana, no doubt with the distinct purpose of obviating the very possibility of a misunderstanding, has embodied again in his Vārttika in placing them before his own critical remark. In short, the Vārttika runs thus. "Among the Brāhmaṇas and Kalpas, which are proclaimed by an old one (or by the old), there is an exception in reference to Yājñavalkya, on account of the contemporaneousness," viz., of these latter Brāhmaṇas with the old Brāhmaṇas spoken of by Pānini. In this sense, then, Patanjali remarks, after having named the Brāhmaṇas of Yājñavalkya and Sulabha, "Why (is there an exception to these) 'On account of the contemporaneousness,' that is to say, because they, too, are of the same time;" and Kātyyata adds. 'because they belong to the same time as the Brāhmaṇas proclaimed by Sātyāyana and so on'"¹⁶²

IT LEADS TO THE CONCLUSION THAT PĀNINI DID NOT YET
KNOW THE SATAPATHA BRĀHMĀNA

The ground on which we now stand is once more the ground we have occupied before. And when I previously asked whether it is likely that Pānini could have blundered in conjugating or declining a common word, or whether he was not proficient enough to use the expression "enteble," or whether he could have ignored the meaning of Āranyaka,—I must now add the question whether he was likely to give a rule which, by an essential omission, would have vitiated the name of a principal Brāhmaṇa? Could he have ignored that name which stands foremost amongst all the authors of Brāhmaṇas? So much so, that we have heard only by name of the Brāhmaṇas of Bhṛigu, Sātyāyana, and Sulabha; but are full of the Sātipratha Brāhmaṇa, proclaimed by Yājñavalkya?

In my belief there is but this alternative: either Patanjali, who mentions the Brāhmaṇas, together with other Brāhmaṇas, in his comment on the Vārttika 26 to IV. 2, 104, is correct in saying that the Brāhmaṇa

¹⁶² Pānini, IV 3 105 पुराणपूर्केषु वाह्याणकल्पेषु —kātyyana पुराणपूर्केषु वाह्याण-कल्पेषु याज्ञवल्क्यादिभ्यः पूर्तिपेषस्तुल्यकालत्वात् —Patanjali पुराणपूर्केष्विस्यत्र याज्ञवल्क्या द्विभ्य पूर्तिपेषो वक्ष्य । याज्ञवल्क्यानि वाह्याणानि । सौलभानीति । किं कारणम् । तुल्यकालत्वात् । पूर्वान्यपि तुल्यकालानीति —kātyyata तुल्यकालत्वादिति । शाव्यायानादिष्वेष्वैर्वाह्याणेकमासाच्चादिवर्य । For the sake of greater clearness and in order to anticipate any objection, I will mention that the Sūtras of Pānini itself precedes the words of the Vārttika in the MS I 1 II 330 whence this passage is quoted so that there can be no assumption of a meaningless or earless repetition of the words पुराणपूर्केषु वाह्याण-कल्पेषु. Moreover the beginning of Patanjali's commentary on the Vārttika and his method of commenting as explained above is sufficient to remove all doubt—if any still existed—that they belong to the Vārttika.—Professor Benfey, too, is therefore mistaken, when in his learned and valuable "Vollst ndige Grammatik der Sanskritsprache" (§518) he says: "Es ist been explicitly stated [viz., by one Vārttika] that Yājñavalkya and some others do not belong to the old!"

of Yâjnavalkya is coeval with them, in this case all these Brâhmaṇas must have been unknown to Pânini, and other Brâhmaṇas must have been before his mind's eye, when he wrote the Sûtra IV 3, 105; or Pânini did know and meant to imply in his rule the Brâhmaṇa of Bhallu, and of others named by Patanjali,—then the error must be on Patanjali's side, when he asserts that Yâjnavalkya was their contemporary. I say purposely, it must be an error of Patanjali, for there is no evidence to show that Kâtyâyana alluded to Bhallu, for instance, when he speaks of contemporaries of Yâjnavalkya, he may have referred, for aught we know, to proper names belonging to other old authorities—old from Pânini's point of view; and his error would then have consisted in making Yâjnavalkya the contemporary of the personages who were the authors of those old works.

Yet both—the error of Patanjali and the error of Kâtyâyana—become explainable on the assumption that there is such a considerable period of time between Pânini and Kâtyâyana, and much more so between Pânini and Patanjali that Kâtyâyana even could consider as "old" that which was not only not old, but in all probability did not yet exist in Pânini's time.

It is curious, though I lay no stress on this circumstance, that the Kâsilâ vritti should pass over in silence the whole Vârttikâ of Kâtyâyana, but should, in giving the counter instance, "Yâjnavalkâni Brâhmaṇâni," add: "Why does this rule of Pânini (restrict the formation of Brâhmaṇa names with the affix *in*) to those Brâhmaṇas proclaimed by the 'old'? Because the Brâhmaṇas of Yâjnavalkya, etc., are called Yâjnavalkâni Brâhmaṇâni, etc., for, according to legendary reports, these and similar Brâhmaṇas do not belong to a remote time."¹⁸⁵ Thus, on traditional grounds—which we should have thanked Jayâditya if he had designated in more precise terms—the Kâsikâ, too, discards the notion of the Yâjnavalkâni Brâhmaṇâni being an exception to the much-quoted rule of Pânini. On the contrary, it looks, as we see, on the derivative Yâjnavalka as a counter-instance, which confirms the statement of Pânini; but, I hold that this commentary was wanting in judgment when it passed over in silence the Vârttika of Kâtyâyana, since the latter, by his *पुराण विषय* research, affords us a valuable means of judging on the chronological relation between Pânini and Kâtyâyana.

¹⁸⁵ The commentary of the Kâsikâ on this Sûtra which, in general, is much better and more clearly worded than the comment of the Calentta Pandits runs thus (MS. C 1 H 2440) पूर्वार्थविशेषणमेतत् । वृत्तीयासमर्थात्पूर्णके णिनिपूत्ययो भवति । यत्पूर्णं पुराणपूर्णके चेत् । माहात्म्यकल्पस्ते भवन्ति । पुराणेन चिरन्तनेनपि णा पूर्णके पुराणपूर्णम् । माहात्म्ये तावत् । भाष्यविनः । शास्त्रायनिन् (should be शास्त्रायनिन्) । पैतरोयिषः ॥ कल्पेतु । पैती कल्पः । आरण्यपरानी ॥ पुराणपूर्णके विति किम् । याज्ञवल्कानि भाष्यायनि । आधरण कल्प । याज्ञवल्क्याद्यो हि न चित्काला हृत्यायनेतु यात् । I may add, that the Siddhânta kaumudi also makes no mention of the Vârttikâ of Kâtyâyana, but, in reference to our question, merely contains these words (p. 81 b line 1) पुराणेति विम् । याज्ञवल्कानि (mis-edited याज्ञवल्क्यानि) भाष्यायनि

NONE OF THE BRAHMANAS AND KALPA WORKS IN EXISTENCE
 WERE ANCIENT WORKS FROM PĀṇINI'S POINT OF VIEW —
 THE KALPA-WORK OF KĀTYĀYANA WAS NOT KNOWN
 TO PĀṇINI

Before I support with further arguments the conclusions I have drawn with regard to this chronological relation between the two grammarians, it will be expedient to take a cursory view of the principal categories of *known* ancient writings not already mentioned; acquaintance with which, on the one hand, is shown by Pāṇini himself; and the existence of which, on the other, may either be assumed to fall within a period not very distant from the time when Pāṇini wrote, or in his time, to be open to doubt, on account of the reasons previously alleged.

Since Pāṇini teaches, in the rule I have so often referred to, that all ancient Brāhmaṇas and Kalpa works bear names which end in the (technical) affix *ni*, the names of the former, by the common consent of all commentators, ancient and modern, being used in the plural only, we are justified in inferring that none of the works of the category now preserved in manuscript, so far as my knowledge goes, are ancient works from Pāṇini's point of view. That one of them, at least, the Kalpa work of Kātyāyana, cannot have existed in Pāṇini's time, would be the consequence of the foregoing inquiry, but I should not venture to say more than I have said of the other ritual books of the same category.

THE UPANISHADS WERE UNKNOWN TO PĀṇINI

Again, if the conclusion I drew as to Pāṇini's not having been acquainted with the Āranyakas be correct, it would imply, of necessity, that the Upanishads could not have existed when he lived, since they are a further development of this class of works, and this conclusion, again, strengthens the arguments I have adduced for the non-existence, in Pāṇini's time, of the Vajasaneyi Śimhitā, arranged by Yajnavalkya, for an important Upanishad, the Isa Upanishad is the last portion of this version of the Yajurveda.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶⁴ Pāṇini mentions the word *Up. uśhad* once viz. I 4 79 but not in the sense of a sacred work. It occurs twice in the *Ganas* viz. to IV 3 73 and 4 12 in the former it has the sense of such a work but it is doubtful whether it has in the latter also — In a note at page 323 Professor Müller gives a detailed account of the history of *Anquetil du Perron's Oupnekhat* which contains the translation of fifty Upanishads from Persian into Latin. Since his bibliographical sketch cannot fail to be of much interest and use to many of his readers it will not be superfluous to correct a mistake of his when he states that the *French translation* of Anquetil du Perron was "not published. It was not published entirely but in the well known work of Tieffenthaler Anquetil Rennell and Bernoulli *Description historique et géographique de l'Inde* etc. Berli: vol I second edition 1791 vol II 1786, vol III 1788" the second part of the second volume contains his translation "en françois barbare" as the author himself calls it of the *Oupnekhat Varan (tire) de l'Atharban Beid* (p 297 ff) of the *Oupnekhat tadi (tire) du Djedjr Beid* (p 301 ff) of the *Oupnekhat Athbars (tire) de l'Atharban Beid* (p 308 ff) and of the *Oupnekhat Schat Roud (tire) du Djedjr Beid* (p 323 ff) The same volume also contains an interesting paper of his *no nouvelles preuves que l'Oupnekhat ne parle nulle part du Kâlougam*

HE WAS ACQUAINTED WITH THE BLACK YAJUR-VEDA, THE
RIG AND SĀMA VEDA

HE DID NOT KNOW THE ATHARVAVEDA.

That Pāṇini was conversant not only with a *Black Yajur-veda*,¹⁶⁵ but with a *Rig*-and a *Sāma-veda*, is borne out by several Sūtras of his. We may expect, too, that he, like every other Hindu, looked upon the *Rig-veda* as the principal Veda; and this assumption is confirmed by the circumstance of his calling a *Pāda* of the *Rigveda* simply the "Pāda," without the addition of the word *Rik*.¹⁶⁶ But there is no evidence to show that he knew an *Atharvaveda*. The word *atharvan*, it is true, occurs three times, but only in the *Gāṇas* to his rules, and there even only as the name of a priest. We may add, also, that the word *atharvanīla* is found in two Sūtras (IV. 3, 133, and VI. 4, 174), where it is ex-

nt des trois autres Iongams (Table des Articles, p. 548 ff)—There is another work, published anonymously, which comprises besides other interesting matter, translations in German of portions of Oriental works; the first volume of this work—the only one that appeared I believe—bears the title "Sammlung Asiatischer Original Schriften—Indische Schriften—Zürich, 1791," and contains, amongst others, a German translation of the first three *Upanishads* published in the work of Tieffenthaler, Anquetil du Perron, etc. As this volume is curious and of great scarcity, I subjoin a list of its contents, as given by the author himself "Bagavatam Teuelat Dei Talapoeng Reg Putimuk Des Po Buch Upnekhat Mahabarat Ind Raschah Amertkend Bedung Schaster Dum Schaster Aea dirsen Gotter Verzeichnus Schastah-Bade Lords Schaster Tirunamalei Ramesuram Ramesuram Phil Gespräch Sastiram"—A note appended to the translation of the "Upnekhat Athrbsar, at p. 286 of this work, drew my attention to "A prayer recited by the Brahmins to be offered up to the Supreme Being, written originally in the Shanscrit language, and translated by C. W. Boughton Rouse, Esq., from a Persian Version of Dara Shekoo a son of Jah Jehan Emperor of Hindostan—which prayer is appended to the 'Institutes of Timour, by Joseph,' White (Oxford, 1783), for the note in question says that this prayer is a free and abridged version, from the Persian of the same Upnekhat Athrbsar (or *Upanishad Atharvāśras*). But having compared them I cannot convince myself that such is the case, though the ideas expressed in both compositions have much similarity.—In passing I may mention, also, that this same prayer attracted the attention of the "Monthly Review of 1783, and in consequence, that of August Hennings in his interesting work, "Versuch einer Ostindischen Litteratur-Geschichte nebst einer kritischen Beurtheilung der Aechtheit der Zend-Bücher Hamburg und Kiel, 1789. This work which is extremely rare, bears testimony to the extensive scholarship of its author, it gives a critical review more or less detailed—of 114 works and has an Appendix, entitled "Grundlage zu einem vollständigen Verzeichnisse aller Schriften die Ostindien und die damit verbundene Lander betreffen. In alphabeticischer Ordnung also in folio zur Litteratur Geschichte Ostindien Hamburg." This Appendix contains the titles of not less than 1572 works of the 16th, 17th, and 18th century, referring to the history, "antiquities, nations, languages, religions, and the natural history of India, many of which are unknown not only to me, but to several Oriental scholars, librarians, and Bibliographers whom I have consulted about them.

¹⁶⁵ See note 153

¹⁶⁶ For his knowledge of the *Rigveda* compare VI. 3, 55, 153, VII. 4, 23 etc; for the occurrence of *jāda*, VI. 1, 115, VII. 1, 57, VIII. 1, 19 etc for *śimaredi*, I. 2, 34, IV. 2, 7, V. 2, 59, etc

plained by Patanjali as meaning "the office and the sacred record of the Atharvan," - that Patanjali confirms the occurrence of the word *atharvan* in the *Ganâ* to the *Sûtra* IV. 2, 63, where it can only mean a literary work; and, besides, that the word *âtharvana* occurs twice in the *Ganâs*¹⁶¹. Yet even the testimony of Patanjali cannot entirely remove the uncertainty which, as we have seen above, must always adhere to the *Ganâs* as evidence for or against Pâminî, with the exception of their first word, mentioned by himself, or such of their words as are referred to by other rules of his. Nor does the occurrence of the word *âtharvanika* in the two *Sûtras* quoted necessarily confirm the interpretation of Patanjali. It may there only mean the office of an Atharvan priest, who, probably, was employed in the performance of sacrificial acts. In short, there is no valid ground for attributing to Pâminî a knowledge of the fourth and least sacred *Veda*, the *Atharvaveda*; and this doubt derives some additional weight from the fact that, though the word *Angiras*, one of the reputed *Rishis* of the *Atharvaveda*, is mentioned in a *Sûtra* (II. 4. 65), neither the compound *Atharvângirasas*, nor its derivative, *Atharvângirasa*, is met with in the *Sûtras* of Pâminî, though the former is the name, as well of the two seers of the *Atharvaveda*, as especially of the hymns of this *Veda* itself,—while the latter means the observances connected with the *Atharvaveda*, and would have deserved a place amongst grammatical rules.

PROFESSOR MÜLLER'S VIEW OF WHAT ARE THE OLDEST RIGVEDA HYMNS—OBJECTIONS TO HIS VIEW.

In the last chapter of his learned work, Professor Muller gives instances of hymns which he considers as belonging to the oldest portion of *Vaidik* literature. It seems difficult to follow his arguments so as to arrive at a settled conviction on this point; for the reasons he gives in assigning these hymns to the earliest portions of *Hindu* poetry rest on impressions so individual, that assent or dissent of those who read the *Rigveda* hymns will depend much on their own disposition. I should, for instance, for my part, hesitate very much to assign to a hymn which speaks of thirty-three gods¹⁶² a place amongst the most ancient hymns, since it betrays, in my opinion, a very artificial and developed condition of religiousness, and a considerable deviation from what I hold to be the primitive feeling of the human mind. The impression I derive from another hymn, a poetical version of which Professor Muller gives (p. 561), and a prose translation of which we owed already to Colebrooke (*Misc. Ess.* I. p. 33), would be to the same effect,—that it belongs,

¹⁶¹ For *Atharvan* see the *Ganâs* to IV 2, 38 and 63, (it occurs, too, in a *Vârttika* to IV 3, 133) For *âtharvanika* IV 3, 133 VI 4, 174 and the *Ganâs* to IV 2, 63 and (in the *Kâsikâ*) 60 for *âtharvana* the *Ganâs* to IV 2, 38 and 63 and (in the *Kâsikâ*) 60—On IV 3, 133 Patanjali remarks after the words of the *Sûtra* आथर्वेणो धर्मः । आथर्वेण आश्रायः । इदमाथर्वार्थम् । आथर्वेणिकार्यं च चतुर्मुहूरणं क्रियते । वसन्तादिव्यवर्षशब्दं आथर्वेणशब्दश्च (comp. IV 2, 63) यथा से पठेऽन्याये (VI 4, 174) पूरुतिभावार्थं प्रहृष्टं क्रियते etc.

¹⁶² Muller's Ancient Sanskrit Literature, p. 531

not to the earliest, but to the very latest hymns of the Rigveda-Samhitâ; for it seems to me that a song which begins, "There was no entity, nor non-entity... death was not, nor was there immortality;" and concludes: "Then who can know whence it proceeded, or whence this varied world arose, or whether it uphold itself, or not? He who, in the highest heaven, is the ruler of this universe, does indeed know, but not another can possess that knowledge"—it seems to me that such a song must be already the result of the greatest struggles of the human heart: the full-grown fruit of a long experience in thought,—in other words, that it marks the end, and not the beginning, of a phase of religious development.

I agree with Müller in one important point, viz., (p. 560): that "the evidence of language is the most decisive for settling the relative age of Vedic hymns," and I should have agreed with him still more if he had said that it is the only safe criterion with a European of the nineteenth century to settle this point. Therefore, when he adds that "the occurrence of such a word as *tadânum* is more calculated to rouse doubts as to the early date of this [last-named] hymn than the most abstruse metaphysical ideas which may be discovered in it,"—though I do not share the opinion expressed in his latter words,—I hold the adverb he mentions to be quite sufficient authority for removing this hymn from the earliest portion of Hindu songs.

PÂNINI'S VIEW OF WHAT ARE THE OLDEST HYMNS

But setting aside our personal feelings, which, after all, are of no consequence, we cannot be indifferent about learning what Pânni considered to be the older or the more recent Vaidik hymns. A direct opinion on this point we can scarcely expect to obtain from himself; but indirect evidence of his own impressions, or, more probably, of the tradition current in his time, I believe may be collected from his Sûtras; and, however scanty it be, and however much we may think we may be able, without his aid, to arrive at a similar result in regard to the hymns I am going to name, it will not be superfluous to advert to it here. The hymns of the Rigveda and, consequently, those collected from it for the version of the Sîma, and the two other Vedas—were "seen," as I have shown above (p. 16), by the Rishis, who received them from a divinity. This general belief was, as I there proved, shared in by Pânni, who, therefore, was not so unshackled by the inspiration-doctrine as Professor Müller represents him to have been in his discussion on old and new Brâhmaṇas¹⁶⁸. But there is a marked difference in the language he uses when speaking at one time of one category, and, at another, of another category of hymns; and it is this difference which induces me to express a doubt whether he looked upon all Vaidik hymns as immediate revelations from above.

¹⁶⁸ Ancient Sanskrit Literature, p. 261. "Pânni whose views are not shackled by the inspiration-doctrine which blinded and misled all the followers of the orthodox Mimânsâ school, broadly states the fact that there are old and new Brâhmaṇas, etc."

PATANJALI'S THEORY ON THE ORIGIN OF THE VARIOUS
VERSIONS OF THE VAIDIK HYMNS

In his Sûtras IV 2, 7 to 9, he teaches the formation of words expressing the name of Samaveda hymns, and he applies to the latter the word "seen" i.e., received by inspiration from the divinity. In the Sûtra IV 3, 101, on the other hand, he heads a chapter, which comprises the next ten rules, with the words, "proclaimed by him," which words imply that the Vaidik compositions—the names of which he teaches the student to form in these rules—were promulgated by the Rishis, whose names are the bases of the several derivatives¹¹⁰. That these two different expressions were chosen by Pânini deliberately, results from the contents of the last named rules. They contain amongst others (IV 3, 105), names of Kalpa works, which, at no period of the Hindu religion, were "seen" or ascribed to superhuman authorship. This word "proclaimed" has also been noticed especially by Kâtyâyana and Patanjali who judge as follows of its import in these rules—Kâtyâyana: "(It might seem that) this word 'proclaimed' is purposeless since no affix is visible in (certain) derivatives (which imply its sense)"—Patanjali: "Why is it purposeless? 'Because,' says Kâtyâyana 'no affix is visible.' That is to say, if 'proclaimed' means that the Vaidik version of the Kalpas or Kathas is recited village for village, a derivative implying such a sense has no (special) affix"—Kâtyâyana: "(It is purposeless, too) if applied to the sense 'book,' for (in this case) an affix is taught (elsewhere)"—Patanjali: "There is an affix, if the sense 'composed, as a book,' is implied by it, but such an affix is provided for by another rule of Pânini, viz., IV 3, 116. Could we, then, consider this word 'proclaimed' (in our rule) as used in reference to the Veda? But again, the Vedas are not made (like a book); they are permanent (or eternal)"—Kâtyâyana: "If (however, one should assert that this word) concerns the Veda, (he would be correct, provided that he meant to imput to the word 'proclaimed') a figurative sense"—Patanjali (after repeating these latter words): "Is it not said, however, that 'the Vedas are not made, but that they are permanent (i.e., eternal)'? (Quite so), yet, though their sense is permanent, the order of their letters has not always remained the same, and it is through the difference in the latter respect that we may speak of the versions of the Kathas, Kalîpas, Mudikas, Pippalikas and so on." Now whatever opinion we may entertain of

"IV 2 7 दृष्ट साम—IV 3 101 तेन प्रोक्षम्—Praukshamanorami प्रकृपेणोत्त प्रोक्षम् । अस्यायनेनार्थायात्पातन वा प्रकाशितमित्यर्थं । पूर्वपैलिति वचनात्तेह । देवदत्तेनास्यापितम् ।
Compare the following note

Kalîjîta's and Vigñâbhîrtta's gloss on Patanjali

Pânini तेन प्रोक्षम्—Kâtyâyana प्रोक्षप्रहृष्टमनर्थके तद्रादर्शनात्—Patanjali प्रोक्षप्रहृष्टमनर्थकम् । किं कारणम् । तद्रादर्शनात् । ग्रामे ग्रामे कारणपके कारणके च प्राप्यने । न तत्र प्रत्यये दृष्टये Kâtyâyana ग्रन्थे च दर्शनात्—Patanjali यत्र च दृष्टये ग्रन्थे म भवति तथ वृत्ते ग्रन्थे दृष्टये ग्रन्थम् (IV 3 116) । धन्दोऽर्थं तद्दीदं यत्क्षम् । न हि धन्दासि प्रियन्ते । नित्यानि धन्दासि—Kâtyâyana धन्दोऽर्थमिति वैसुत्यम्—Patanjali धन्दोऽर्थमिति

चेतुल्यमेतद् भवति । [The MS contains here a repetition which is evidently a mistake of the copyist] ननु चोकं न हि छन्दासि क्रियते नित्यानि छन्दासीति । यद्यप्यर्थे नित्यः । या त्वसैष वर्णानुपूर्वी सानित्या तद्भेदाचैतद्भवति काठक कानापक मैदक पैपलादकमिति । न तर्हीदानीमिदं वक्तव्यम् । वक्तव्यं च । किं प्रयोजनम् । यत्तेन प्रोक्तं न चतेन वृत्तम् । माधुरी [cf. Kauyayâ १ माधुरी] वृत्तिः । यदि तर्हि तत्य निन्दनमस्ति । इदमेव वक्तव्यम् । तदप्यवश्य वक्तव्यम् । यत्तेन वृत्तं न च प्रोक्तं वारस्व वाच्यम् । जालूका क्षेत्राः । —Kauyayâ प्रपूर्वे वचि प्रकाशने व्यायानहृषे या वतेते करणे वा । तत्राद्ये अर्थे प्रलयो न दृश्यते । द्वितीये तु सूत्रान्तरेण (i.e IV ३ 116) सिद्धमिति भवाह । प्रोक्तग्रहणमिति ग्राम इति । सुरामांदीना प्रतिप्रामं प्रवक्तव्ये इपि सुशमणा प्रोक्तं काठकमसौशमणमिति [probably काठकम् । सै०] प्रयोगो न दृश्यत इत्यर्थः । नित्यानीति । कर्तुरस्मरणात्तेषामिति भाव । या त्वसाधिति । महाप्रलयादिषु वर्णानुपूर्वविनाशे भुन्त्यपद्य (MS भुन्तपद्य) नृपय संस्कारातिशयाद्वैदार्थं सृज्वा शब्दरचना विदधीतर्थं (MS विद्वतीतर्थः) । तद्भेदादिति । आनुपूर्वभेदादितर्थं । ततश्च कठादये वेदानुपूर्वां कर्तारं एव ननु स्थिता एव सुरामांदिवपूवक्तार । ततश्च छन्दस्यपि कृतो ग्रन्थं इत्येव (IV ३ 116) सिद्धं प्रत्ययं इति भाव । माधुरीति । माधुरेण प्रथमत प्रकाशितेर्थं । (IV ३, 108) कलापिनो इण्यित्यग्रहणस्याधिकविधानार्थं छाद्यवृद्धादप्य ग्रामवति (MS ०र्थदाद्यवृद्धा००) । द्विविधं चेह प्रोक्तं गृह्णते परकृतं स्वं (कृतं वा यप्रकाशितं तेन प्रोक्ताधिकारं एव कठादिष्ये वक्त्यमाणप्रत्ययविधानम्—Nagojibhatta तेन प्रोक्तम् । कालापककाठकयोगीत्रचरणाद्युज् (IV ३ 126) धर्मान्नाययोरिति वाच्यम् । पूर्वां वचिरिति । अप्यायतरुपे पूकाशने वा [both MSS of the I. I. H. No 350 and 1209 in the same order] वतेते करणे वेतनव्य । ननु काठकमित्यादो प्रत्ययदर्शनात् प्रत्ययो दृश्यत इत्यनुपग्रहमत आह । सुरामांदीनामिति । भावे ग्रन्थे चेति तेन कृते प्रथं इत्यर्थं (IV ३ 116) । प्रथं स इति तेन कृतो ग्रन्थं स इत्यर्थं । अशेन वेदस्य नित्यव स्वीकृत्याशेनानित्यवमाह । यद्यप्यर्थं इति । अनेन वेदव शब्दार्थाभयवृत्तित्वमित्यम् MS 1209 ०स्तितिष्ठ०, perhaps ०स्तिरितिष्ठ० । ननु धाता यथा पूर्वमकल्पयदित्यादिथुतिप्रलेनानुपूर्व्यपि सैवेति नव्यपूर्वमीमासासिद्धान्तासा नित्येलुप्तमत आह । महाप्रलयादित्यिति । आनुपूर्व्यस्तत्त्वात्प्रत्ययित्वेनानित्यवमिति भाव इति केचिर् । तत्र । यद्यप्यर्थे निय इत्यदिवान्ययोपविरोधात् । अर्थस्यपि उपेतिष्ठोमादेवनित्यवात् । प्रवाहाविद्येदेन नित्यवं तृष्णयोरपि तस्माम्नवन्तरमेदेनानुपूर्वी भिन्नैव । पूतिमन्तरं चैपा भूतिरन्याविधीयत इत्युक्तेरित्यन्ये । परे तु । अर्थां नित्य इत्यत्र वृत्तम् गविरोप्यनित्यवस्थांगम्भुपर्यगम पूर्वप्रचिणा तादृशनियवरदेव छन्दं सुन्ते । एव चार्थशाद्यान्वेश । सुख्यतया तस्यैव सर्ववेदतापर्यविषयवात् । वेदैश सर्वेरहमेव वेद इति गीतोक्तेरित्याहु (४१ १५) वर्णानुपूर्व्यां अनियवे मानमाह तद्भेदाच्यते । अनित्यद्याप्यभेदेन तस्मिन् । भेदोऽन्नानामावद् । इत्थरे तु न नागाव (MS नतव ?) । भद्रे मार्णव्यप्रदारमाह । काठकेत्यादि । अर्थमेऽप्यानुपूर्वभेदादेव काठकालापकादिव्यवहार इति भाव । अनानुपूर्व्यनियत्युक्ते पदानि तान्येति धनिता तशाह । ततश्च कठादय इत्यधिक मञ्जूरायां दृष्ट्यम् । ननु माधुराद्यवृद्धाच्येन भावमत आह (४ ३१ १५ २ 114) । कलापिनो इण्यिति (IV ३ 108) । नन्यवं वृद्धादिभ्य प्रोक्ताधिकरे प्रत्ययविधान व्यर्थम् । तत्र । यप्रोक्तं न च तेन वृत्तमित्यर्थादात् आह । द्विविधं चेति ग्रोक्ताधिकर एवेति । वृत्तप्रदेशेन न्यायकाशितम्बहुतम्बैद महण्यादिति भाव [Of course in the MS 350 in ४१ ३ १५ — especially in MS 350 which here is more like MS 1209 — I mean 1114 १४१, १० is taken have been lost unnoted 1 ३, ms. The text I am giving is in my opinion as correct as the MSS in question will allow to edit it.]

is evident that Pāṇini—who comprises Kalpas under the term "proclaimed"—looked upon the works, the names of which are taught in these rules, not as having been "seen" or received immediately from the divinity. They must, in his mind, therefore, belong to a later period than the Śāma-veda hymns which he treats of in the rules IV. 2 7-9 as having been "seen." Nor would there be anything remarkable in this view, if it merely referred to the Brāhmaṇa works which also are the subject of his rules; for this class of inspired literature is looked upon by all the authorities as being inferior in degree, and, I hold therefore, less immediate, as an emanation, than the hymns of the Sambitā's. But, there occurs in midst of these rules one (IV. 3, 106) which contains the word *Chandas* which, being contradistinguished from the word *Brāhmaṇa* in the preceding rule (IV. 3, 105), cannot have there any other sense than that of *Mantīa*, as I have shown above; or, if it should be thought that it is contrasted there with *Kalpa* as well as with *Brāhmaṇa* in the preceding rule, it would mean *Veda* in general—*Mantīa* and *Brāhmaṇa*. And in connection with this word Pāṇini writes, "Śaunaka" Śaunaka, however, we know, from Sāyana's commentary on the Rigveda and the Anukramani, was the Rishi who is supposed to be the author of the second Mandala, as we now possess it, though in a former version it appears to have belonged to the Rishi Gṛitsamāda ¹¹².

I have quoted the full gloss of the three principal commentators on this important Sutra and its *Varttikas*, because it is of considerable interest in many respects and, at the same time, bears out my statement at page 48. We see Kaīyyata and Nāgojibhatta writhing under the difficulty of reconciling the eternity of the *Veda* with the differences of its various versions, which nevertheless maintain an equal claim to infallibility. Pāṭinjali makes rather short work of this much vexed question, and unless it be allowed here to render his expression *vara* (which means 'letter'),¹¹³ word it is barely possible even to understand how he can save consistently the eternity or permanence of the 'sense' of the *Veda*. That the modern Mimānsists maintain not only the 'eternity of the sense' but also the 'permanence of the text,' which is tantamount to the exclusive right of one single version, we learn amongst others from Nāgojibhatta. But as such a doctrine has its obvious dangers, it is not shared in by the old Mimānsists, nor by Nāgoji, as he tells us himself. He and Kaīyyata inform us therefore that, amongst other theories, there is one, according to which the order of the letters (or rather, words) in the Vaidik texts got lost in the several Pralayas or destructions of the worlds and, since each Manwantara had its own revelation, which differed only in the expression, not in the sense of the Vaidik texts, the various versions known to these commentators represent these successive revelations which were remembered through 'their excessive accomplishments' by the Rishis who in this manner produced or rather reproduced the text current in their time, under the name of the versions of the *Kathīs Kalpas*, and so on. In this way each version had an equal claim to sanctity. There is a very interesting discussion on the same subject by Kumārila in his *Mimānsa-Varttika* (I. 8 10). I forbear, however, quoting it on the present occasion on account of its great length and because I hope to be able to give it in a more appropriate place.

¹¹² Compare Sāyana in the beginning of his commentary on the second Mandala, Professor Wilson's detailed account in his translation, vol. II, p. 207, and Professor Müller's Ancient Literature pp 231-232 as well as the corresponding passage from Bhāskarāśvāra at p. 237.

PĀṇINI CONSIDERS THE SECOND MANDALA OF THE RIGVEDA
 IN ITS PRESENT VERSION, TO BE AMONGST THE LESS
 ANCIENT PORTIONS OF THIS VĒDA

Should, then, my view of Panini's rule be correct, it will follow that Pāṇini considered this second Mandala as of a later date than the other Mandalas; and we cannot but admit that even the first hymn of the second Mandala fully confirms this impression, for, by speaking of Hotu, Potri, Neshtu, Agnidhra, Piaśastu, Adhwaryu, and Bṛahman priests, it certainly betrays a very advanced development of sacrificial and artificial rites.

THE SIX PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS WERE UNKNOWN TO PĀṇINI -
 1. MIMĀNSĀ

Mimānsā is a word of special grammatical interest, not in so far as its affix *ā* is concerned—for the latter belongs to a general category of derivatives dealt with by Pāṇini in his rule III 3, 102—but on account of the irregular formation of its base. It must be admitted that the Sūtra I 3, 62 may be looked upon as including this base also, but whether the instance *mimāns*, given by the commentators, has there the general sense of *considering*, or the special sense of the philosophical reasoning of the *Mimānsā*, cannot be inferred from the general tenor of this rule. This latter sense is emphatically expressed by two words derived from *mimāns*, viz., *Mimānsā*, the name of the philosophy; and *Mimānsala*, a *Mimānsa* philosopher. Neither word occurs in Panini.¹¹² Nor does he mention *Jaimini*, the author of the *Mimānsa* Sūtra, and it is, perhaps worthy of our attention, that not even the *Ganis* to Pāṇini contain the formation of this word, which is of as much interest as any other word of the *Guru Bāhūrādi* (IV. 1, 96).¹¹³

2. VEDĀNTA

The word *Vedānta* having no remarkable grammatical peculiarities, had no claim to the notice of Pāṇini, but had he been aware of the word *Vedāntin*, “one who knows the *Vedānta*,” it would certainly

¹¹²Even Kātyāyana gives no Vārttikā to teach the formation of *mimānsaka* though this word is of some interest from a grammatical point of view. Amongst those words which designate followers of a doctrine or philosophy it is the only one formed with a *kṛit-affix*. It occurs, e.g., as an instance of Patanjali, to I 2 61, v 17, II 2 29 and in a Kārikā of the latter to III 2 123 where it is rendered by Kātyāyana *richāraṣa*, it occurs, too, as an instance, not in the *Mahābhāṣya* but the Kārikā and Siddhāk to II 1, 53, in the compound *मीमांसकद्वृष्ट*, and it is probably the property of the Calcutta Pandits as an instance to IV 3 9.

¹¹³With regard to *Jaimini*, I have only to add that the instance जैमिनिकार or कात्यायनिकार to II 2 28 has not yet found a place in the *Bhāṣya* or in Kātyāyana's commentary. It occurs in the Kārikā and the *Ganarāṭnāmṛitādhadhi*. But on what authority Jayāditya and Vārdhamāna give this handsome epithet to the old *Jaimini* or whether it is levelled against another *Jaimini* I have no means of stating.

have required a special rule of his, since there is no Sūtra in his Grammar by which the sense of this derivative could be made out satisfactorily. And as Pāṇini notices but *one single word* in which the base is not a proper name and the affix *in* (technically *ini*) imparts to the derivative the sense of studying or knowing, *viz.*, *anubrahmanin*, "one who studies or knows a work like a Brahmana" (IV 2, 62), the omission of *Vedāntin* acquires increased significance¹¹⁵.

3 SANKHYA

Sāṅkhyā is a peculiar form. It comes from *sāṅkhyā*, and designates the philosophy which is based on *synthetic* (sām) reasoning (khyā)*. Its very name shows that it is the counterpart, as it were, of *Vyāya* (mīya), or the philosophy founded on "analytical reasoning". For while the former builds up a system of the universe the latter dissects it into categories, and enters into its component parts. Yet a grammatical rule would have had to explain why the name of the former system is not *līlit* formation,—for instance, its very base, *sāṅkhyā*, analogously to the *līlit* formation *nyāya*. It has not been noticed by Pāṇini. Nor does he teach—as he probably would have done had this philosophy existed in his time—that the same word means as a masculine a follower of the Sāṅkhyā philosophy¹¹⁶.

4 YOGA

The word *Yoga* occurs several times in the Sūtras,¹¹⁷ but never in the sense of a system of philosophy, and the only two derivatives of this word which are taught by Pāṇini, *viz.*, *yogya* and *yogulā* (V 1 102) are two words which have no connection whatever with its philosophical meaning. In the sense of "religious austerity," it seems to have been known by Pāṇini, though he has no rule on the formation of this word, apparently because it offers no other grammatical interest than that which would be satisfied by his general rules III 3 18 and VII 3 52, for he has a rule on the formation of *yogu* (III 2 142). But this word means a man who practises religious austerities, it does not mean a follower of the *Yoga* system of philosophy.

In the Sūtra IV 3 111 the affix *in* (technically *ini*) has a similar purport but the also implies a proper name, thus *Karmādī*; *Kṛishṇa* can mean one who studies or knows the works of Kṛishṇa. Kṛishṇa

¹¹⁵ For the various explanations given by native authorities of this term I need now refer to one essay only since it probably comprises all the literary information—and not only on this point which can be obtained in our days on Sāṅkhyā writers and certainly more than any one scholar in Europe would have at his command—I mean the learned and excellent preface of Dr. Hall to his elaborate edition of the *Sāṅkhyā Prā�īlana*. The latter sense of the word *Sāṅkhyī*, "a follower of the Sāṅkhyā philosophy" occurs e.g. in the *Bhāgavata-Gīta* III 3 or together with the word *Kāla* "a follower of the Vaiseshika doctrine" in the commentary of Sankara on the *Vedānta* Sūtra II 7 51 यदुव्यामस्तु सर्वगतेऽपि प्रतिशरीर पादाम्यतराविरोपेण सनिहितेऽपि मगाकाषादैर्यमात्मापर्मलष्टमद्यसुतान्तेऽपि । सामृग्यानो भावतत्त्वं ।

... काण्डाद्वानामपि

¹¹⁶ I 2 4 30—III 4 20—V 1 102, 4 44 47 50 126—VI 4 74 75—VIII 1, 59

5 NYÂYA

That *Nyâya* was known to Pâṇini in the sense of *syllogism* or *logical reasoning*, or perhaps *logical science*, I conclude from the Sûtra III 3, 122,¹¹⁸ where its affix conveys the sense of instrumentality, i.e., that by which analysis (*lit. entering-into*) is effected, for the same form, *nyâya*, is made the subject of another rule (III. 3, 37), where Pâṇini gives as its meaning "propriety, good conduct," which would lead to its later meaning, "policy." Unless we drew this distinction between the two Sûtras named, the first Sûtra would become superfluous. Nor is it probable that a civilization like that which is traceable in Pâṇini's rules could have done without a word for syllogistic thought. But between this sense of the word *nyâya*, and its designating the special system of Gautama there is a vast difference. Nay, had Pâṇini even written the Gâna IV. 2, 60, which implies, in its present version, the formation *nayâyika*, this latter word would not require us to infer that it means there a follower of Gautama's school; it may only signify a man who studies or knows the laws of syllogism.¹¹⁹ To substantiate this conclusion, with all the detail it deserves, would be a matter of great interest; for no philosophical school has dealt more largely with grammatical subjects than the *Nyâya* school, and its branch, the *Vaisesikâ*. The nature of "sound" and "word," the question whether word is "eternal or transitory," the "power" or purpose of words, the

A further insight into Dr. Boeckling's "edition" of Pâṇini

¹¹⁸ I regret that I must again animadvert on an error of the Calcutta editors. In their gloss on the Sûtra III 3, 122, they give the following etymology of न्याय, 'शीर्ष् नीयन्ते ज्ञेनेति । न्याय.' According to them, this word would therefore come from "to lead an etymology which, of course is absolutely impossible. Nor is there any trace of it in any of the commentaries known to me. Patanjali and his commentators have no remark on this easy word. The Kâsikâ, which explains every Sûtra writes नीयते ज्ञेनेति न्याय, but neither allows these words to be preceded by "शीर्ष्," nor, as this quotation shows to contain a third person of the plural (नीयन्ते). Its gloss obviously means "because entering is made (ज्ञि + इयते) by it, the derivative is न्याय." The *Siddhânta kaumudi* (fol. 211 a line 7) has an analogous interpretation "नियन्ति अनेन," etc., which is still more transparent. But what must one think of the proficiency of an "editor" of Pâṇini who has none of the labours work—which always gives a title to indulgence—of comparing MSS and compiling a commentary—who merely reprints the labour of others—and yet, even in a simple case like this does not feel induced to consult the Kâsikâ or *Siddhânta kaumudi*, though he talks a great deal even on this occasion, of the Kâsikâ "A B and C, but without mastering its 'a, b, c' simply repeats the gross blunder of the editors of his edition of Pâṇini!

¹¹⁹ To arrive at the form नैयायिक it is necessary to combine with the *Gâna* quoted, the Sûtra VII 3, 3. The same word न्याय in the philosophical sense occurs in the *Gâna* to IV 2, 73, where a MS. of the Kâsikâ has even the reading न्यायिणी; and probably in the same sense in the *Gâna* to VIII 1, 27, but even if Pâṇini himself had written it there we should not be justified in giving it a more definite sense than the one stated. In the Sûtra IV, 4, 92, and the *Gâna* to IV. 3, 54 it has the sense of "propriety."

relation of base and affix, and such kindred matters are treated of in a vast literature based on the Sūtras of Gautama; and the controversies of the Naiyāyikas with the Vaiyakaranas or etymologists need not blush before those of our modern philosophers. I must, however, confine myself on the present occasion, as heretofore, to giving a small amount of proof, that Pānini could not have known the Sūtras of Gautama.

**GAUTAMA'S DEFINITION OF JĀTI (GENUS), ĀKRITI (SPECIES),
AND VYAKTI (INDIVIDUAL)**

After having refuted the opinion that the sense of a word conveys either the notion of *genus* or that of *species*, or that of *individual*, each taken separately, Gautama continues:—“ 1 The sense of a word conveys (at the same time) as well the notion of *genus* (*jāti*), as that of *species* (*ākṛiti*), as that of an *individual* (*vyakti*) 2 An *individual* (*vyakti*) is a bodily form as a receptacle for the particularization of qualities 3 Species (*ākṛiti*) is called the characteristic mark of *genus* 1 Genus (*jāti*) is that which has the property of (intellectually) producing (species) of the same kind ”¹¹”¹²

**PĀNINI DOES NOT MAKE USE OF THE TERM ĀKRITI
HIS TERM JĀTI IS THE SAME AS GAUTAMA'S ĀKRITI**

Let us now refer to the terminology of Pānini, and see how he dealt with similar notions. In the first place, we find that he does not make use of a term *ākṛiti*. We meet, in his Grammar only with the two terms *jāti* and *vyakti*. In the rule I 2, 52, he speaks of (words which express) “ qualities as far as a *jāti* goes; ” and the instance of the *jāti*, given by Patanjali, is a tree ¹³

¹¹ Nāya Sūtras II 131—131 जायाकृतियक्यस्तु पदार्थः ॥ व्यक्तिर्गणविशेषाश्रयो
मृतिः ॥ आकृतिर्गतिलिङ्गात्पा ॥ समानप्रसवात्मिका जाति ॥—The object of Gautama
is to show that *individual*, *species* and *genus* are notions which cannot be conceived, independently of one another, and that a separation of one from the other produces a fallacy. In translating the term *vyakti* stress must be laid on the word *vishesha* ‘particularization’ otherwise there would be but one *individual*. The same consideration induced me to differ in my translation of *ākṛiti*, from Dr Billantyne who, in his meritorious edition and learned translation of the Nāya Sūtras renders this term ‘form’, which undoubtedly is its usual sense in non philosophical writings. But when Tisunatha in his comment on the Sūtra II 121 writes आकृतिरप्यस्यान-
मिरोप्य एव in II 133 जातिलिङ्गमित्यात्पा यस्या जातेगोचादेहि साक्षादिस्यानविरोपो-
लिङ्गम्,—he intends, in my opinion, to convey the understanding that *ākṛiti* is the
particularization of organisms and the characteristic mark of ‘cowhood’ is the
particularization of the organism of a cow which translated into our philosophical
language would mean that *ākṛiti* is *species*. In my rendering of the fourth Sūtra
(II 131) the parenthetical words are borrowed from Tisunatha who comments on
them thus, समान समानादारक प्रसवो बुद्धिननमामा स्वरूप यस्या सा तथा ए समाना-
काररुद्दितनवयवचमर्पे There can be no doubt therefore, that Gautama meant
our term *genus*.

¹² I 2 52 विशेषानो चामाते —I must observe here that the Kālikā and, on

At I. 2, 58, he treats of the optional use of the singular or plural. "If the word expresses a *jāti*," (e.g. a Brāhmaṇa or the Brāhmaṇas); at V. 2, 133, he applies the term *jāti* to the elephant,—at V. I, 37, to herbs,—at V. 4, 94, to stones and iron, a lake and a cart,—at VI 1, 143, to the fruit Kustumburu,—at VI 3, 103, to grass;—and IV. 1, 63, is a rule on " *jāti*-words, which are not permanently used in the feminine gender." It is not necessary to multiply these instances, in order to show that Pāṇini understands by *jāti* the same thing that Gautama understands by *ākṛiti*, *viz.*, *species*; ¹⁸² and I may add at once, that he has no word at all for the notion of "genus."

its authority, the Calcutta edition, are quite at variance with Pāṇini, in explaining the last words of this Sūtra, as if it had the sense च अजाते. Pāṇini distinctly rejects such an explanation on the ground that it is impossible to speak of qualities which are not *jātis*. He rejects, too, such instances ¹⁸³ पञ्चाला जनपद्, सुभिता संपत्तपानीय. बहुमाल्यफल; which illustrate his *pūrva-apaksha* in instance of his conclusion is बद्री सूक्ष्मकण्टका मधुरा वृत्त—Pāṇini कथमिदं विज्ञायते । जातिर्यद्विशेषणम्-हैस्तिज्जातेर्यानि विशेषणानीति । किं चात । यदि विज्ञायते जातिर्यद्विशेषमिति सिद्धं पञ्चाला जनपद् इति । सुभिता (VI ०३.) संपत्तपानीय । बहुमाल्यफल इति न सिद्धति । अथ विज्ञायते । जातेर्यानिविशेषणानीति । सिद्धं सुभिता (VI ०३) संपत्तपानीय । बहुमाल्यफल इति । पञ्चाला जनपद् इति न सिद्धति । एवं तर्हि नैव विज्ञायते जातिर्यद्विशेषमिति नापि जातेर्यानि विशेषणानीति । कथं तर्हि विशेषणानां युक्तवद्भावो भवति—वृत्तिः आ जाते—Pāṇini आ जाति प्रयोगात् । किमर्थं पुनरिदमुच्यते—वृत्तिका विशेषणानां वचनं जातिनि-युक्तर्थम्—Pāṇini जातिनिवृत्यर्थोऽयमरम्भ । किमुच्यते जातिनिवृत्यर्थ इति न पुनर्विशेषणानामपि युक्तवद्भावो यथा स्यादिति—वृत्तिका समानाधिकरणावात्सिद्धम्—Pāṇini समानाधिकरणत्वाद्विशेषणानां युक्तवद्भावो भविष्यति । यद्येवं नार्यो जेनलुपो न्यग्रापि जातेर्युक्तवद्भावो न भवति । धात्यन् । बद्री सूक्ष्मकण्टका मधुरा वृत्त इति । किं पुनः कारणमन्यथापि जातेर्युक्तवद्भावो न भवति etc—Kātyāyana. अजातेरित्यसर्वमर्थसमाप्तः । भवति नानन् सदैव्यात् । उभयथा चात्यासि प्रतिपेधस्येति प्रक्ष । आ जातिप्रयोगादिति सूत्र आड प्रश्नेष्व. न तु न ते etc

Pāṇini and Kātyāyana knew the system of Gautama:

¹⁸³ There is indeed a *hārīka* of Pāṇini which explicitly corroborates this comparison which I have made between Pāṇini and Gautama, and which moreover, has an additional import in affording evidence that Gautama is prior to Pāṇini. I mean the Kārikā to II 1 63 which says आदृतिप्रद्या जातिर्लिङ्गार्थं च न सर्वभाग । सकृदात्यातनिर्ग्राह्या गोद्रेण च चरणे सङ्, i.e. "जातिर्लिङ्ग (in Pāṇini) the नैव of अकृति" it does not possess all the genders and once determined, is easily recognized (elsewhere), but it is too a family with its schools. The following passages from Kātyāyana will bear out my translation आदृतिप्रद्यं यस्या साकृतिप्रद्यावद्यवसतिर्वेषविशेषपद्यस्येत्य [For these last words compare Visvamitra's comment on the Nyāya Sūtra II 133, in note 180] पूतेन गोद्रादिजातिर्लिङ्गिता आदृतप्रद्यादिसु न संपूर्णता माप्नुण्ड-स्त्रियादीनां संस्थानस्य सदृशावदिति तद्यम्भायां । लिङ्गानामिति, etc.

As to *vyakti*, it occurs but once in the Sūtras, *viz.* I 2, 51, and means there "linga" generic mark, which, in grammatical terminology, is gender.¹⁶³ The notion of individuality is not represented by a special word in the language of Pāṇini, the nearest approach to it is his word *adhibhāra*, as it is used in the rules II 4, 13 15, and V 3, 43, where it is

सहृदति । अय गैरिते सहृदुपदिष्टा जातिर्निवृद्धीतुं निश्चेतुं पिण्डा तरे शक्तेत्यर्थं गोप्रमिति । अपत्यमित्यर्थं । चरणशब्देन शात्राध्यायिनो गृह्णन्ते । गोप्रस्य सर्वलिङ्गत्वात्पृथगुपादानम् । नाडायनं नर्पुसकमिति दर्शनात् And after having explained the Kārikā of "another quoted by Patañjali on the same subject Kāriyātī adds from this quotation by Patañjali it has been inferred that the former Kārikā expresses his own opinion पूर्वोक्तमेव लक्षणं भाष्यकारस्य मतम् । अपर आहेत्यमिधानादित्याहु—On another occasion Patañjali in adapting himself to Pāṇini's use of the term *jati* (*तत्त्वे जटिः*) observes in a somewhat poetical strain (I 2 52 after the last words of the quotation from the Bhāṣya in note 181) आविष्टलिङ्गा जातिर्यक्षिण्मुपादाय प्रवर्तते । उत्पत्तिप्रभृत्या विनाशात्तक्षिण्हं न जहाति [Kāriyātī आविष्टं लिङ्गं यथा साविष्टलिङ्गा नियतलिङ्गेत्यर्थं, etc] : c

If *jati* has a fixed gender—whenever it has taken that gender, from birth to death it does not abandon that gender—I must also call attention to another passage from the Mahābhāṣya which likewise shows that *jati* has in Pāṇini Gautama's sense of *akṛiti* and which at the same time proves that Patañjali not only had a knowledge of the philosophical application of the latter term but when speaking in his own name uses *akṛiti* in the same manner in which it is used by Gautama. In the passage I am alluding to he broaches the same problem which is proposed by the Nyāya-Sūtras but as a grammarian and in reference to Pāṇini who has no term for genus he comprises in his question merely the alternative whether the sense of a word in Pāṇini implies species (*akṛiti*) or 'individuality' (*dvayāt*). His answer is that it comprises both for those who maintain the former alternative are justified. In their opinion by the Sutra I 2 58 and those who incline towards the latter by the Sūtra I 2 64 Patañjali's Introduction (ed. Ballantyne p. 40 42) किं पुनराहृति पदार्थं आहेत्यमिदद्वयम् । उभयमित्याह । कथं ज्ञायते । उभयथा ह्याचार्येण सूत्राणि प्रणीतानि । आकृतिं पदार्थं मवा जात्यारयायामेकस्मिन्द्वुवचनमन्यतरस्यामित्युच्यते । द्वयं पदार्थं मन्वा सरूपायामेकशेषं आरम्भते—Whether *Katyāyana* in using the expression आसर्वलिङ्गा जाति (I 4 1 v. 3 of the Caleutta edition) merely adapted himself to the manner in which Pāṇini uses जाति, or whether he too had not yet a knowledge of Gautama's definition would have remained doubtful had he not availed himself in another of his Varttikas, of the term *akṛiti* exactly in the sense in which it is defined by the Nyāya-Sūtra—i.e., in the Varttika 5 (ed. Cale) to VII 1 74 मवा समानायामाहृतो भाषितपुरुस्कविज्ञानात्, and though Patañjali observes that this Varttika is superfluous since its contents are a matter of course we may nevertheless be thankful for its word आकृति, and the conclusions it enables us to draw in our present case—Patañjali न वा वक्तव्यम् । किं कारणम् । समानायामाहृतो भाषितपुरुस्कविज्ञानात् । समानायामाहृती यद्भाषितपुरुस्कम् । आकृत्यन्तरे चेतद्भाषितपुरुस्कम् । किं वक्तव्यमेतत् । न हि वयमनुच्यमानं गस्यते । एतद्वयर्थनिर्देशास्त्रिद्वम्, and Kāriyātī . . . तत्र पीतुशब्दो गृष्णाहृती सुलिङ्गं पम्भाहृतो नर्पुसकलिङ्गं इति तुवद्यावाप्रसङ्गः.

¹⁶³ *Jakti* is used in the 2nd sense of *kalitvā* in the Varttika 1 (of the Cale ed.) to I 2 52

rendered by the commentators by *dravya* "substance." The term *vīśeshya* may be compared to *adhi karana*, but as it signifies "the object to be qualified," it is not the counterpart of *jāti*, but of *vīśeshana*, "the quality."¹¹⁴

The result of the foregoing comparison between Pāṇini and Gautama must remove, I believe, every doubt as to the chronological position of both. The expressions of Pāṇini show that he had not even conceived so much as the philosophical problem started and solved by Gautama. The very manner in which Patañjali is compelled to answer the question, whether "the sense of a word" in Pāṇini "implies species or individuality"—viz., that at one time it implies the former, and at another, the latter, shows that philosophical investigations into the "sense of the word" had not yet troubled Pāṇini's mind. A mere difference of opinion between the grammarian and the Nyāya philosopher would be no proof for the posteriority of the latter, but the absence of the problem itself, in the Sūtras of Pāṇini, is, I hold, sufficient ground for this inference. A problem of this kind could not have been slighted by Pāṇini if he had been aware of it; it would have entered unconsciously, as it were, into his terminology, and into the mode of delivering his rules. There is abundant evidence in Patañjali's Great Commentary, that his training must have been a philosophical one, and it is Katyāyana's superiority, too, in this respect, which infests on Pāṇini a quantity of Vāttikas finding fault with his empiric and unphilosophical treatment of grammatical facts.

6 VAISESHIKA WAS UNKNOWN TO PĀMINI

After this conclusion, it seems needless to add that the Sūtras ignore the word *vīśeshaka*, which, from a grammatical point of view, would have had as much claim to being noticed by Pāṇini as any word comprised in his rules IV 2, 60 and 63. The formation *vīśeshaka* is taught in the Gāna to V 4, 31, but merely in the sense of *vīśeṣa*.

CHRONOLOGICAL RELATION BETWEEN PĀMINI AND THE UNNĀDI-SŪTRAS

There is an important class of ancient works the chronological relation of which to Pāṇini deserves our peculiar attention here, from the circumstance that their contents are more or less kindred with those of Pāṇini's work,—I mean the grammatical works known under the name of *Unnādi Sūtras*, *Dhātupāṭha*, *Prātiākhyas*, *Phit Sūtras*, as we may add to them the *Nirutta*, the exegetical work of *Ydsla*. Each of these works, with perhaps the exception of one, if I am not mistaken, is unanimously considered by Sanskrit scholars, as prior to the Grammar of Pāṇini.

PROFESSOR MULLER'S ARGUMENT THAT THE UNNĀDI-SŪTRAS ARE ANTERIOR TO PĀMINI

Before I proceed to examine whether this view can be upheld or not, I will quote Professor Muller's opinion on the age of the *Unnādi*

¹¹⁴ Compare II 1,57, also V 1 110 v 5 (ed. Cale.)

Sūtras "We do not know," he says, "by whom these Unādī affixes were first collected, nor by whom the Unādī Sūtras, as we now possess them, were first composed. All we can say is, that, as Panini mentions them, and gives several general rules with regard to them, they must have existed before his time."¹²⁵

DR AUFRECHT'S ARGUMENTS TO THE SAME EFFECT

On the same subject, Dr Aufrecht, to whom we are indebted for a careful edition of the *Unādī Sūtras*, together with a commentary by *Ujjvaladatta*, expresses himself thus¹²⁶—"We have no direct tradition as to the author of the sūtras. They were composed before the time of Pāṇini, as they are referred to by him in two different passages of his Grammar. The fact, however, that both Yāska and the author of the above-quoted Karikā [viz., to III 3, 1] specify *Salatāyana* as the grammarian who derived all nouns from verbs, speaks in favour of Nāgoji's conjecture, that the authorship is to be attributed to *Salatāyana*. Nor is this supposition entirely unsupported by the evidence of the sūtras themselves. In one place (II 38) we are told that the people of the north used the word *tarshaka* for 'a husbandman,' in another (IV 128), that they employed *taṭi* in the meaning of 'an artisan.' This distinction refers to a period of the language of which no mention is made by any grammarian after *Pāṇini*. In another rule (III. 144,) we find the name of *Sākratarmanā* an old grammarian who is only once more quoted, namely, in *Pāṇini*, VI 1, 130. It is of some importance also, that the author of the sūtras considers *asman* (stone) and *bhūtana* (world) as Vedic, whereas they are treated by *Pāṇini* as words of common occurrence. These facts, even when taken collectively, furnish no decisive evidence as to the authorship of the sūtras, but they show, at all events, that they were composed a considerable time before *Pāṇini*."

Refutation of these arguments

I have in the first instance, to demur to the correctness of one of these "facts," which, if it were real, would dispense with any further proof of the *Unādī Sūtras* having preceded—not, indeed, *Pāṇini* for such an inference would always remain hazardous—but his grammatical work. It is true that this grammarian speaks twice of *Unādīs*, but he never speaks of *Unādī Sūtras*.¹²⁷ The former term merely implies a list of *Unādī* affixes, and may imply, according to analogous expressions in *Pāṇini*, a list of words formed with these affixes,¹²⁸ but it can never

¹²⁵ Ancient Sanskrit Literature p 101

¹²⁶ *Ujjvaladatta's Commentary on the Unādī Sūtras* edited from a Manuscript in the Library of the East India House by Theodor Aufrecht Bonn 1899, Prose p viii.—The *Unādī Sūtras* were first published in the *Clelcutti edition* of the *Sādhāraṇa kaumudi* afterwards reprinted—without any further consultation of MSS., but with deteriorations by—Dr Loeckling Comp. see note 53

¹²⁷ III 3 1 उणादयो यहुलम्, and III 4 7० ताम्यामन्यग्रोपादय

¹²⁸ *Ujjvaladatta* on the *Paribhāṣā* उणादयो अयुपस्थानि प्रातिप्रिकानि— उणा

दय । तदन्तानि तदन्तानेनाभिमतानि या

imply a work which treats of these affixes and these formations, like the Unnādi-Sūtras which we are speaking of. Between a list of Unnādis—affixes or words—and Unnādi-Sūtras, there is all the difference which exists between a lexicographical and a grammatical work. All the conclusions, therefore, which are based on the identity of both, vanish at once.

With the conjecture of Nāgojibhatta I shall deal hereafter, but when Dr. Aufrecht quotes the meaning of *kārīshaka*, 'husbandman,' and of *kārī*, 'artisan' as proving his conclusion, I candidly confess that I do not understand how the fact of these words having been used by the people of the north, in the sense given, can have the remotest bearing on the point at issue, even if in the *whole stretch of the voluminous grammatical literature* subsequent to Pānini, all of which, of course, is covered by his assertion, no grammarian had made mention of the distinction he is adverting to.¹⁵⁹ The Unnādi Sūtras profess to give such information as is not contained in Pānini's work, he himself informs us of this character of the Unnādi list in the two rules alleged. It is but natural, therefore, that we should find in these two Unnādi rules, as indeed we find in all the rest, much interesting matter of which no trace occurs in the Sūtras of Pānini.

But even assuming that my inability to understand this premiss of Dr. Aufrecht only proves my own incapacity, I might go further and ask—What proof does there exist that these two Sūtras, which have nothing characteristic or peculiar in them, were not added to the original Sūtras at a later time, since Dr. Aufrecht himself has shown that the genuineness of sixteen Sūtras was suspected by Ujjwaladatta himself? And I may add—are there not, for instance, in a valuable commentary on more than 300 of these Unnādi Sūtras, composed by Nrisinha, who lived Samvat 1577, or 1520 after Christ, at least in the MS I have consulted, not only many readings which differ from the text of Ujjwaladatta, as edited by Dr. Aufrecht, but three Sūtras the substance of which is now in the Commentary, and three Sūtras which are neither met with in the text of Bhattoji nor in that of Ujjwaladatta?¹⁶⁰

"And this is the question—which portion of the grammatical literature is later than Pānini?—been so finally settled that at present, any one is allowed to speak of it as a matter of course."

New Unnādi Sūtras taken from the Commentary of Nrisinha on the Unnādi-Sūtras
this Commentary being a portion of his Bāradvājanī

¹⁵⁹ Between the Sūtras III. 60 and 61 we read in the Gītā MS 98 of Nrisinha *Sūcāramanjari* (on accentuation)—where these Unnādi Sūtras occur—in Sūtra 11 which is neither amongst those of Ujjwaladatta, nor in his commentary, i.e. धारेण्यकं च। Comm. धारयतीति धर्षणं। दिवौ धर्मं धर्षणे। धर्षणं एकविंशति। सम्योदात् Between IV. 2 and 3 it has a Sūtra, the contents—but not the wording—of which are embodied in Ujjwaladatta's Sūtra IV. 2 कृशे. किंच ॥ Comm. कृशेरामुभ्यत्य दिव्य। कृशतीति कृशानु। सम्भादसि कृशानुष्ठ। Between IV. 90 and 91 तमेतुं कृषि (its substance occurs in the commentary on Sūtra IV. 90), Comm. तमेस्त्वप्रत्यय। कुशागमो दीर्घं। (?)। ताम्यति तेनेति तांवृत्तम्, and कृषातेषुं कृद्विद्य (embodied also in the

It seems, therefore, that with the actual doubts we must entertain as to the originality of several Unnādi-Sūtras, it is by no means safe to appeal to them or any such Sūtras for chronological evidence, unless they be able to show cause why they should not be ranked amongst the additions of later times.¹⁹¹

And again, what possible conclusion as to the chronological relation of the Unnādi-Sūtras to Pīnini can be drawn from another quotation made by Dr Aufrecht? *Chālīavaṇamāṇa*, he says, is once quoted by the Unnādi-Sūtras, and "only once more, namely, in Pāṇini." I will make no remark on these latter words. That they are quoted by both is undeniable; but since it happens that both Dr. Aufrecht and I have quoted Pāṇini, does it follow that either of us lived a "considerable time" before the other, or before any other writer who may also have quoted Pāṇini? When, however, Dr Aufrecht points out that the author of the Unnādi-Sūtras "considers *āśman* (stone) and *bhūrana* (world) as Vaidik, whereas they are treated by Pāṇini as words of common occurrence," I, too, lay much stress on the statement contained in this passage of the Unnādi-Sūtras, but by it arrive at the very opposite inference to that which has suggested itself to him. For, if Pāṇini treated these words which occur in the Vedas as words of common life, and, on the other hand, the author of the Sūtras in question had ceased to use them in his conversational speech, and records the fact that they belong, not only to literary language, but to that of the very oldest literature,—I do not conclude that such facts "show, at all events, that they (the Unnādi-Sūtras) were composed a considerable time before Pāṇini," but I conclude that Pāṇini lived in that Vaidik age when *āśman* and *bhūrana* were as well Vaidik as common words, and

Commentary of Ujjvaladatta) Comm शृणुतेरूलप्रत्यय । दुर्घटदिश । शृणुतीति शारूल । गवय शारूलाय राजा ॥ Before V 28, it mentions a Sūtra which is neither amongst those of Ujjvaladatta nor embodied in his Commentary शारा ॥ Comm शारेति निपात्यते । शो तनूकरणे । शाराम्य स्वाहा etc. Before V 52 which precedes V 70, and follows V 69 and the new Sūtra (i.e. V 69—the new Sūtra—52 70) दिवेऽच्चेऽनन्त ॥ Comm दीन्यतीति चौ । दिवै । दिव, this Sūtra, too, is neither amongst the Sūtras nor in the Commentary of Ujjvaladatta

"Dr Aufrecht himself observes (p. ix) with perfect accuracy "the unadisūtras have not been handed down to us in their original form. It was not the intention of the author to give a complete list of all the unādi words, but merely to collect the most important of them. Hence we frequently meet with the sentence नहुलमन्यतापि in various other words too, or अन्येभ्योऽपि दर्शयते the same suffixes are found in other words too. The former of these expressions, quoted by Dr Aufrecht, occurs indeed five times and the latter once. And Patanjali says in his Kārikā to III 3, 1 and in his comment on it याहुलकं प्रस्तुतेनुरुद्धे ॥ तत्वीम्य प्रहृतिभ्य उणाद्यो दर्शयते न सर्वाम्यो दर्शयन्ते ॥ प्रायसमुण्यनादिपि तेपाम् ॥ प्रायेण सल्पिषि समुचिता । न सर्वै समुचिता ॥ कार्यसरोपविपेश तदुक्तम् ॥ कार्याण्यिषि दर्शयिषि सरोपाण्यि दृतानि । न सर्वाण्यिषि सरुद्येन परिसमाप्तानि. Since then the Unnādis are admitted even by Patanjali to be an incomplete list, and if there is evidence to prove that at certain periods writers permitted themselves to supply the deficiencies, it will be admitted that my hesitation is not a hypercritical one."

therefore required no distinctive remark of his; that, on the contrary, the author of the two *Unnādi-Sūtras* in question belonged to a period when these words had become obsolete in common life,—in short, that Pāṇini lived a considerable time before this grammarian.

An inference, however, of such importance as this could not be considered as resting on sufficiently solid ground if there were no other means of establishing it than two Sūtras of a work avowedly open to interpolations at various periods of Sanskrit literature.

ON THE CRITICAL TEST BY WHICH TO JUDGE OF THE CHRONOLOGICAL
RELATION OF PĀṇINI TO THE UNNĀDI SŪTRAS AND OTHER
GRAMMATICAL WORKS

In order to support it with stronger arguments, I must raise a previous question, which does not concern the *Unnādi-Sūtras* alone—the question, whether or not Pāṇini was the originator of all the technical terms he employs in his work? Since he adverts, several times, in his rules, to grammarians who preceded him,¹¹¹ it would probably—not necessarily—be possible to answer this question if we possessed the works of these grammarians. *Saṅkṛtiyāna*'s grammar seems indeed, to have come down to us, but though, in such a case it would be within my reach, it must still remain at present a sealed book to me, and I must treat it like the works of Gārgya, Kāśyapa, and the other predecessors of Pāṇini who merely survive in name and fame¹¹².

There are, in my opinion, two Sūtras of Pāṇini which may serve as a clue through the intricacies of this problem.

FIVE SŪTRAS OF PĀṇINI THE KEY STONE OF HIS WORK

In five important rules of his, Pāṇini states that, on principle, he will exclude from his grammar certain subjects, as they do not fall within his scope. But since he gives reasons for doing so, he at the same time enables us to infer what he considered his duty, as a grammarian, to teach¹¹³. Amongst these rules, one (I 2, 53) referring to a

¹¹¹ See note 97.

¹¹² The knowledge that *Saṅkṛtiyāna*'s Grammar exists and is preserved amongst the treasures of the Library of the Home Government for India, we owe like so much of our knowledge of Sanskrit literature to the lamented Professor Wilson, who speaks of it in his *MacKenzie Collection*, vol I p 100. Many years ago I obtained sight of the precious volume—but as it is written on palm leaves in the *Hārītā* character and as I could not attempt to make it out without a magnifying glass and then only with much difficulty I was compelled to abandon my desire of mastering its contents. It is to be hoped now that a learned, laborious and competent Sanskrit scholar will transcribe and publish this awkward MS., and thus relieve Sanskrit studies from a suspense which no one can feel more keenly than I do in writing these lines. I must add, at the same time that doubts have lately expressed to me whether this MS. contains really the original work of *Saṅkṛtiyāna* or merely a Grammar founded on his.

A further insight into the character of Dr. Bockting's "edition" of Pāṇini

¹¹³ These rules are I 2, 53-57. They contain Pāṇini's grammatical creed, and are the key-stone of his work. But all that the "editor" of Pāṇini has to offer with respect to them is the following attempt at an epigram (vol II p. 47): "Pāṇini makes

subject touched on by him in a previous Sūtra, says. "Such matter will not be taught by me, for it falls under the category of conventional terms, which are settled (and therefore do not require any rule of mine; literally for it has the authority of a *saujanā* or conventional term.)"

an expedition against his predecessors. And thus in taking up that which is merely incidental and compared with the subject itself, quite irrelevant, he completely leads the reader away from the real importance of these rules. The *Kasikā*, it is true, mentions that Pāṇini differs in the principles he lays down in these rules from previous grammarians, but it is far from making a joke or concentrating the essence of its comments on so futile a point. It shows, on the contrary, the full bearing of these rules and, I believe it would have done still better had it embodied in its gloss the remarks of Patañjali on some of these Sūtras. At all events, the commentary of the *Kasikā* on them was deemed important enough even by Dr Boehltingk to be quoted by him on this occasion in its full extent, though his reason for doing so is merely to show the "expedition of Pāṇini against his predecessors. The whole," (viz., this expedition) he writes in introducing the *Kasikā*

*becomes sufficiently clear through an excellent commentary, I mean the *Kasikā* vṛtti which will make any other remark superfluous.* As the quotation he then gives from the *Kasikā* is the only one of any extent in his whole second volume and as he resumes all the appearance of treating it with that minute and critical and conscientious circumstantiarity which even in an incidental quotation must be extremely welcome—I mean by giving the various readings of his MSS ('A'—MS 829, 'B'—MS 2440 of the East India House—*roughly described by him at p. liv.*), by recording the omissions in either of them, even so far as the omission of a "q" is concerned,—in short, as he gives us in his lengthened and highly valuable extract from the *Kasikā* a specimen of his editorial character, I considered it my duty to make a comparison of his edition of this portion of the *Kasikā* with the two MSS named and used by him. For though I was perfectly well acquainted with his so-called Commentary on Pāṇini, and though it has been my thorough conviction for very many years that his curtailed reprint of the Calcutta edition—I will not qualify it now otherwise—by suppressing important texts and by propagating errors which, even in a reprint, are not excusable has been more an impediment to a conscientious study of Sanskrit grammar, and of Pāṇini in particular, than his very imperfect commentator remarks may have done service to beginners,—though my opinion of the literary activity of Dr Boehltingk was the result of a careful study of his works and was by no means founded on occasional errors of his, or formed in disregard of all the difficulties he had to contend with—in short though not all the imperfections of his writings—if they amounted only to such—would ever have induced me to stint the share of indulgence which I hold ought to be always and largely awarded to laborious and honest work whatever be its failings I have considered it my duty to make this comparison since within the chain of the peculiar circumstances which weigh on his edition of Pāṇini and on some of his other editions, too the point I wanted to ascertain once more did not so much concern a question of scholarship as one of scientific reliability. The result of my comparison was this. Dr Boehltingk records at his quotation from the *Kasikā* to I 2 57 the various readings of MS

PATANJALI ON THE TECHNICAL TERMS OF PĀṇINI

KAIYYATA ON PATANJALI'S GLOSS IN QUESTION

To these words *Patanjali* appends the following gloss. "When Pāṇini speaks of conventional terms which he will not teach, because they are settled, does he mean, by this expression, such technical terms as *ti*, *ghu*, *bha*, and the like?" No, for *sanjñā* is here the same as *sanjñāna*, 'understanding' (*i.e.*, a name which has a real meaning, that may be traced etymologically)" And *Kaiyyata* enlarges upon these words in the following strain "The question of *Patanjali* is

meaningless—while both MSS read वृद्धयोगास्त्वगरे—At I 2 55, he mentions that 1 has omitted यदि and तस्य, moreover that B reads चक्रियसवन्धं जनपदे पञ्चालशब्द । ततो, but he does not say that 1 omits also योगाभावे before तस्य, and adds तत्र before the last words प्रवृत्त इति And what is much worse, he not only edits तत्त्वावश्यमभ्यु-पगन्त्यम्, while both MSS read तत्त्वावश्यमेवाभ्युपगन्त्यम्, but नायं निमित्तक.—which is simple nonsense—while both MSS have the intelligible reading नायं योगनिमित्तक—At I 2, 56, he observes that इति is omitted in B and तत् in 1, but he does not mention that instead of B's प्रमाणत्वात् । अन्य, etc., A reads प्रमाणत्वादित्यन्य, etc., nor does he mention that B reads अर्थसिद्धस्त्र कि यत्नेन, while A reads अर्थसिद्धः कि यत्नेन but, again, he edits, without any remark whatever, अर्थन्यप्रमाणत्वात्, which is ungrammatical, in spite of the concurrent and correct reading of both MSS अर्थस्यान्यप्रमाणत्वात् (or A त्वादिति, see before).—His remarks at I 2 67, are that A omits अशिष्य—मवत्, and that B reads हि (for A च) परिभापन्त (for A परिभापन्ते) and मत्वर्ये (for 1 अन्यपदार्थे) Yet he does not record the various inaccuracies of A, which are essential for those not acquainted with this MS in order that they may form an opinion on it and on its relation to the readings of B Thus he omits stating that A reads the commencing words अशिष्यमिति वर्तते, that it omits इद श कर्तव्यं, and reads पुनराहुरह उभम् for B's more correct reading पुनराहु । अहरभम् But Dr Bochtingk likewise does not mention that B has a marginal note to the word न्यायात्, i.e. न्ययो (sic) यम्, that A reads चाशिष्ये ते for B's चाशिष्ये (in the commencement), that B adds तु after अपरे (first line of his page 48), that 1 reads तथा चोपसर्जनं for B तथोपसर्जनं (first line of his page 49) and नैव ध्युत्पादन्ते for B न चैव ध्युत्पादन्ते And to crown the edition of this portion of the 'excellent commentary' I mean the *kasīl i. vritti* which will make all further explanation superfluous Dr Bochtingk prints, without a single remark (p. 49 line 4) तथोपसर्जनमप्यान-मिति गम्यते, when A has the following passage तथोपसर्जनं यथमन गृहे ग्रामे था। उपसर्जनमप्यानमिति गम्ये (sic) whereas B gives the complete sentence in this way तथोपसर्जनं । प्रस्तावाद्यवीचित्यादेशकालविभागत । शर्वदर्था, ग्रामीयंते न शर्वदैव वेयतात् । वयमन गृहे ग्रामे था उपसर्जनमप्यानमिति गम्यते—And such is his edition of even an easy text of a commentary to only five Sūtras of Pāṇini—of a commentator, too so pompously announced by himself, and laid before the public with so much appearance of care and conscientiousness!

suggested by the rule of analogy. His answer is in the negative, because context itself has a greater weight than (mere) analogy. Now, though such terms as *ti*, *ghu*, *bha*, and the like, are settled terms, this circumstance would not have been a sufficient reason in an etymological work (like that of Pāṇini) for leaving them untaught, for they have no etymology. 'Understanding,' (as Patanjali paraphrases *sanjnā*) means mentally entering into, understanding the component parts of a word, [or it means the words which admit of this mental process] ¹¹¹

INFERENCES TO BE DRAWN FROM THIS GLOSS AS TO THE ORIGINALITY OF CERTAIN TERMS OF PĀṇINI

From this rule of Pāṇini and the commentaries alleged we learn therefore—

1 That his Grammar does not treat of those *sanjnās* or conventional names which are known and settled otherwise

2 That this term *sanjnā* must be understood in our rule to concern only such conventional names as have an etymology.

3 That it applies also to grammatical terms which admit of an etymology, but not to those which are merely grammatical symbols

4 That such terms as *ti*, *ghu*, and *bha* were known and settled before Pāṇini's Grammar, but that, nevertheless, they are defined by Pāṇini because they are not etymological terms

Having thus obtained, through the comment of Patanjali on the Sūtra in question, a means by which to judge of the originality of Pāṇini's terms, we must feel induced to test its accuracy before we base our inferences on it; and the opportunity of doing so is afforded not merely by the technical symbols which Patanjali himself names,—we easily ascertain that Pāṇini has given a definition of them,—but also by another of these important five Sūtras. This Sūtra (I 2 56) says “Nor shall I teach the purport of the principal part of a compound (*pradhāna*), or that of an affix (*pratyaya*), because they, too, have been settled by others (*i.e.*, people know already from other authorities, that in a compound the sense of the word gravitates towards its principal part, and in a derivative towards the affix) ¹¹²”

Thus we learn here from Pāṇini himself that the term *pratyaya* (affix) was employed before he wrote his work, and if Patanjali's interpretation be correct, Pāṇini, who also makes use of this term, must have left it undefined, since it has an etymology and was “settled” in his time. And such, indeed, is the case. Pāṇini uses the word *pratyaya* many times (e.g. I 1, 61 62 69, 2, 41 45, 3, 63 etc., etc.), he heads with it a whole chapter which extends over three books of his work, yet he gives no definition whatever of its sense. Finding, then,

¹¹¹ Pāṇini I 2 53 तदग्नियसङ्गामाणवात् । *ta* *anjali* कि या एता कृतिमादितुभादि-
संना तप्रामाण्यादशिष्यन् । नन्याह । सङ्गान संना *Kaikkati* कि या एता इनि । प्रत्य-
मतिन्द्रायाभ्यर्थेण प्रथ । नन्याहेति । प्रायासत्ते सामर्थ्य बतावत् । न हि दिष्टुभादिसंज्ञाना प्रमाणन्व-
युक्तवद्भामरात्मस्याशिष्यवे हेतुरपवधने । संन्यन्धामावात् । अवगम संप्रव्यय इत्यप्य

¹¹² Pāṇini I 2 56 प्रधानप्रत्ययार्थिचनमर्थस्यान्वप्रमाणवात् । There is no *Lhaṣṭra*
on this rule

that Patanjali's comment is confirmed by Pāṇini's own words, we may proceed; and we then obtain the results that the Sūtris employ, but do not explain such terms, for instance, as *piāthamā* (nominative), *dvitīyā* (accusative), *tritīyā* (instrumental), *chaturthī* (dative), *panchamī* (ablative), *shashthī* (genitive), and *saptamī* (locative). And the commentators apprise us that these words were technical names used by the eastern grammarians, which are referred to by Pāṇini in some of his rules¹⁹⁷. We likewise meet in his work with such terms as *saṁāsa* (compound II 1, 3), *tatpūrusha* (II. 1, 22), *atayibhāta* (II 1, 5), *bahuvīhi* (II. 2, 28), *līlit* (III 1, 93), *taddhita* (IV. 1, 76), etc., etc. He enumerates all the special compounds or affixes which fall under these heads, but does not give any definition whatever of the meaning of these names. Again, the commentaries, in advertising to them, tell us that the terms expressing compounds, for instance, belong to "older grammarians".

When, on the other hand, we see that he does give a definition of *lāmadhātaya* (I 2, 42), or of *samyoga* (I 1, 7), or of *anunāśitā* (I 1, 8), terms which are conventional and admit of an etymological analysis, we are at once compelled to infer that he was the first who employed these technical names in the sense stated by him. And this conclusion would apply with equal force to all other terms of a similar kind which do not merely head an enumeration of rules but are clearly defined by him, e.g., to *sataina* (I. 1, 9), *pragīthya* (I 1, 11), *lopa* (I 1, 60), *kraswa*, *dīgha*, *pluta* (I 2, 27), *udatta* (I 2, 29), *anudatta* (I 2, 20), *sivarita* (I. 2, 31), *aprista* (I 2, 41), etc., etc. Nor do I believe that this conclusion becomes invalidated in those instances in which Pāṇini gives a definition, while yet there may be a strong presumption that the term defined was already used in his time, for it seems to me that, in such a case, his definition either imparted an additional sense to the current term, and, in reality, thus created a new term of his own, or had a special bearing on the technical structure of his own work. When, for instance, he defines the term *duāndhā*,¹⁹⁸ though there is a probability that this term was used by previous grammarians,¹⁹⁹ his definition may have corrected the current notion on the subject implied by it, as I infer from the lengthened discussion of Patanjali. Or, when he uses the term *upasajana* in one of those five rules already mentioned, thus allowing us to conclude that it was a current term in his

¹⁹⁷ II 3 46 2 3 13 30 7 etc

¹⁹⁸ II 2 29 चार्ये द्वन्द्वः

¹⁹⁹ Kāśīya (MS. 829 I. I. II) on I 2, 57 तथा च पूर्याचार्यं परिभासते । अन्यपदार्थं पदुमीहिः । पूर्यपदार्थप्रधानोऽस्यीभावः । वत्तपदार्थप्रधानस्म्युपरः । अभ्यपदार्थप्रधानोऽहम् इत्येतमादि । MS. 2440 I. I. II reads मव्ये instead of अन्यपदार्थी, but both readings are objectionable as we may infer from the Mahābhāṣya on II 1, 20: इह कथित्यगतान् पूर्यपदार्थप्रधानः । कथित्युत्तरपदार्थप्रधानः । कथित्यन्यपदार्थप्रधानः । कथित्युभ्यपदार्थप्रधानः etc. and these identical words reoccur in the Mahābhāṣya to II 1, 49. Neither of the terms *bahuvīhi* or *piāthamā* or *tatpūrusha* is explained by Pāṇini—only are also note 48 and my Dicti over ॥ सम्यपदार्थप्रधानः.

time,¹⁰⁰ and still appears to define it in two other rules,¹⁰¹ his definition is in reality no definition at all; it merely instructs the pupil how he may recognize an upasajana rule in his work.¹⁰²

To extend this inference to purely grammatical symbols like those mentioned by Patañjali, e.g., *gha*, *shash*, *luk*, *slu*, *lup*, etc., etc., would be wrong, after the remark of this grammarian, for, as we learn from him, that they are not *sanjñis*, in the sense in which Pāṇini uses this word in his rule I, 2, 53, we cannot decide to what extent he may have invented these names, or whether he even invented any of them, since Patañjali distinctly tells us, as we have seen, that *ti*, *ghu*, *dhā*, were terms already known to Pāṇini.

APPLICATION OF THE TEST THUS OBTAINED TO THE UNNADI-SŪTRAS

If, then, we apply the test we have obtained to the Unnadi Sūtras, we shall have, in the first place, to observe that the technical, and, at the same time, significant names which would fall under the category of Pāṇini's rule (I, 2, 53), and which he not only uses but are indispensable to, the mechanism of these Sūtras, are the following: *abhyāsa*, *avijaya*, *udātta*, *upadhā*, *upasarga*, *dīrgha*, *dhātu pada*, *vṛiddhi*, *lopa*, *saṃprasarana*, *hiāsava*.¹⁰³ Amongst these Pāṇini gives no definition whatever of *dhātu*, for his explanation is merely an enumeration (I, 3, 1), and the same remark applies to *upasarga* (I, 4, 59), and perhaps to *vṛiddhi* (I, 1, 1) and *avijaya* (I, 1, 37, 38, etc.). It is probable, therefore, that Pāṇini did not invent these terms but referred to them as of current use. On the other hand, he distinctly defines *hiāsava*, *dīrgha*, *udātta*, *upadhā*, *lopa*, *saṃprasarana*, and *abhyāsa*.¹⁰⁴ The term *pada* is also defined by him, but it seems that he merely extended its current

¹⁰⁰ I 2 57 कालोपेत्सर्जने च तुल्यम्

¹⁰¹ I 2 43 प्रथमानिदिः प्रसापसर्जनम् — I 2 44 एकविभक्ति वापूर्वनिपाते

¹⁰² In the foregoing remarks I have drawn a distinct line between the definition which Pāṇini gives of a term — as when he says *abhyāsa* are the two syllables constituting a reduplicated base (VI, 1, 5) or *prātipadika* is that which has a sense but is neither a verbal root nor an affix (I, 1, 4), and the enumeration he makes of the matter comprising a term — as when he says *dhātu* is called *dhā* etc. (I, 3, 1) or *pratijaya* (प्रतिज्या) is that which is treated from the beginning of the third book up to the end of the fifth (III, 1, 1). For I hold that Pāṇini could not at one time feel the necessity of defining the linguistic properties of a grammatical category and at another leave unexplained the notion for instance of a verbal root an affix a particle and so on while using these terms extensively unless these notions were sufficiently clear at the time he wrote and his grammatical purposes were attained by stating what application he gave to these terms in his work. An evidence of the unusability of this view is afforded e.g. by the terms *ātmāṇapada* and *parāmāṇapada*. In rules VI, 3, 7 and 8 Pāṇini mentions that these terms are used by 'grammarians' whose expression can only mean that they were in use before he wrote and in rules I, 4, 10 and 100 he enumerates the conjugation endings to be placed under these denominations but gives no definition of the terms themselves.

¹⁰³ F g I 12 1a 27 32 48 — II 16 59 6a — III 114 — IV 5 130 144 — V 10 etc

¹⁰⁴ I 2 7 ऊहानोऽस्मृत्वशीर्यन्तुत । २ १३ उच्चैरुदात्तः — I 6a अलोऽस्म्यात्तर्वूद्यम्या — I 1 60 अद्वर्द्धने लोप — I 1 4a इव्यष्टं संप्रसारणम् — VI 1 1 पूर्वे अस्यास (comp. also note 44)

application for his own purposes, since the commentaries tell us that "the former grammarians" gave a definition of the terms for compounds, and this definition contains the word *pada*. That the Unnadi Sûtras contain no definition of any technical word requires no confirmation from me.

THESE SUTRAS ARE CONSEQUENTLY LATER THAN PÂMINI
THIS IS THE OPINION ALSO OF BHATTOJIDIKSHITA
UJJWALADATTA AND VIMALA

Now, had Pâni not written the five Sûtras (I 2, 53 57) in which he explains the method of his Grammar, or had he explained all the technical terms used by him the absence of a definition of such terms in the Unnadi Sûtras would not justify us in arriving at any conclusion as regards the mutual relation of the two works. But since we know that Pâni does not define all his terms, and, on the other hand that a treatise like the Unnadi Sûtras uses those terms which are defined by him, and exactly in the same sense in which they occur in his work, the only possible conclusion is that this treatise was written later than the Grammar of Pâni. And this also must have been the opinion of Ujjwaladatta and Bhattojidakshita, for both grammarians in their comment on an Unnadi Sûtra, which is an original one, if may be, since it treats of a whole category of Unnadi words, state in the plunest possible language that this Sûtra is given as an exception to a rule of Pâni.¹⁰⁴ Nay, we owe to Dr Aufrecht himself a very interesting passage from Vimala's *Rûpamîlî* which distinctly ascribes the authorship of these Unnadi Sûtras to *Vararuchi*. But as *Vararuchi* is a name of Katyayana also,¹⁰⁵ this work seems to intimate that Katyayana completed the Grammar of Panini, not only in his *Vartikas*, but in the important work which concerns us here.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁴ Unnadi Sûtra IV 226 गतिकारकये पूर्वप्रकृतिस्वरूपम् — Ujjwaladatta

गतिकारकोपपदाकृत् (Pâni VI 2 180) इत्युत्तरप्रकृतिस्वरूपे सति शेषस्यानुदात्तये प्राप्ते वचनमिदमारम्यते — Bhattojidakshita (Siddh. I p 204 b 1 6) गतिकारकोपपदाकृतिस्वरूपे सति शेषस्यानुदात्तये प्राप्ते तदश्यादर्थमिदम्

¹⁰⁵ See also Ancient Sanskrit Literature p 240

¹⁰⁶ I subjoin a literal copy of this extract from the edition of Dr Aufrecht p 14 'उणादये यहुलम् ॥ संज्ञाविषये स्यु ॥ ताभ्यामन्योणादय ॥ संप्रदानापादानाभ्यामन्यस्मिन्नेवार्थं स्युः । लक्षानुसारणोनेया (१५ लक्षानुसारणोनेया) अनुवन्धा उणादिपु । यहुलोक्या प्रसाप्यानि तेषु कार्यातराणि च । उणादिस्फुटीकरणाय वरस्विना वृथगेत्र सूत्राणि प्रणीतानि । सर्वया । कृतापाणिमित्यदिपाप्यगृह्ण्य उण् ॥' No 114 to this quotation the following curt rebuke. This assertion which makes *Vararuchi* older than *Pâni* has no claim to probability." But I must ask—"is there one single word in this passage which justifies in the slightest degree the strictur, passed by Dr Aufrecht on Vimala? The latter says, To illustrate or to make clear the *Unnadi* *Sûtras*, *Vararuchi* composed the (*Unnadi*) *Sûtras* is a separate work. He draws a distinction therefore as I have already done between the *Unnadi* list and the *Sûtras* on them, but where does he say that *Vararuchi* is older than *Pâni*? Dr Aufrecht evidently mistook his own conclusions quoted above which precede this passage

CHRONOLOGICAL RELATION BETWEEN PANINI AND THE UNNADI LIST

Although it follows from all these premises that the treatise on the Unnadi-words, the existing collection of Unnadi Sūtras, is later than the Grammar of Panini, there still remains the question What relation exists between the latter work and a list of Unnadi affixes or words which Panini twice quotes in his rules?

NIRUKTAS AND VAIYAKARANAS

Yāska relates, in an interesting discussion on the derivation of nouns, that there were in India two classes of scholars, the one comprising the Nairuktas, or etymologists (his commentator Durga adds except Gārgya), and the grammarians Śikatāyana, the other consisting of some of the Vaiyakaranas, or grammarians, and the etymologist Gārgya. The former maintained that all nouns are derived from "verbal roots, the latter that only those nouns are so derived in which accent and formation are regular, and the sense of which can be traced to the verbal root, which is held to be their origin. They denied, as Yāska tells us the possibility of assigning an origin to such words as go 'cow, ashwa 'horse, puusha, man'." Now it is this latter description of words which is the subject of the Unnadi list they are the Unnadi words. We must ask, therefore did Panini belong as regards his linguistic notions, to the Nairuktas or to the some of the Vaiyakaranas?

PATANJALI MUST HAVE LOOKED UPON PANINI AS BELONGING
TO YASKA'S SOME OF THE VAIYAKARANAS

Since the former designation is chiefly applied to the exegetes of the Vaidik texts, and the latter is emphatically used by the grammarians, it seems probable that Panini, in this question of the derivability of Unnadi words, would stand on the side of these Vaiyakaranas. And this unquestionably is the opinion of Patañjali as may be judged from the following facts — In the rules VII 1, 2 Panini teaches, amongst other things, that when an affix contains the letters *dh* or *h* or *chh*,

from Yāska's *Rūpa māla* for the opinion of the latter work. Having first established his conclusions in the manner we have seen he seems never to have doubted that any writer can differ from his view. Therefore when meeting with Vimala who reports that Vararuchi is the author of the Unnadi Sūtras he upbraids this poor grammarian with having made Vararuchi older than Panini.

¹⁰⁰ See Roth's *Nirukta* I 12 Muller's Ancient Sanskrit Literature p 161 and Aufrecht's Unnadi Sūtras p vi vii Yāska according to the present edition adds to the three instances given the word हस्तिन् also. He can scarcely have meant the word elephant which is not a *kṛit* but a regular *taddhita* derivative of *hasti* nor does this word occur in the Unnadi-Sūtras. It seems therefore probable that he said or at least meant the real Unnadi word *hasta* hand. But as Durga too at all events in the MS at my command writes हस्तीति I do not venture upon more than a conjecture that the latter words are to be corrected in the text of the *Nirukta* हस्त हस्ति

these letters are merely grammatical symbols, the real values of which are severally *ey*, *in*, *iy*. To this rule *Kātyāyana* appends the remark that the *Unnādi* affixes form an *exception*, when *Patanjali* explains this view of the author of the *Vartikas* by the instances *sau ha*, *sandha*, for though these words are formed with the affixes *kha* and *dha*, the letters *dh* and *kh*, in their affixes, are real, not symbolical. "And," continues *Katyayana*, in two subsequent *Vārtikas*, "though *Pāṇini* speaks himself, in *Sūtra* III 1, 29, of an affix *īyaṅ* (not *chaṅ*, as might be expected according to rule VII 1, 2), this does not invalidate my exception, for the latter is based on the circumstance that *Pāṇini* treats in his rule VII. 1, 2, not of verbal but of nominal bases. 'True,' rejoins *Patanjali*; "but *Kātyāyana* might have spared this discussion, for 'nominal bases formed with *Unnādi* affixes are bases which have no grammatical origin'."¹⁰

In rule VII 3, 50, *Pāṇini* teaches that the letter *th* in the affix *tha* has the value of *ik*, that *tha*, therefore, means in reality *il a²¹⁰* in rule VII 4, 13, that a long vowel *ā*, *ī*, *ū*, becomes short before the affix *ka*, ²¹¹ in VIII 2, 78, that the short vowels *i* and *u* become long before a radical consonant *i* and *v*, if these consonants are followed by another consonant, ²¹² in VIII 3, 59, that the *s* of an affix is changed

¹⁰ VII 1,2 आयतेयीनीयिय फदखल्लधा प्रत्ययार्द्ध नाम् —A *Vārtika* तत्रोणादिप्रतिवेष
—*Patanjali* तत्रोणादीना प्रतिपेषो वक्तव्य शब्द शण्ड. comp Un S I 101 104,—
Vārtika धातोवेयडवनात् —*Patanjali* अथवा यदयसूतेरीयडिति (III 1, 29)
धातोरीयङ्ग शास्त्रि etc —*Vārtika* प्रातिपदिकविज्ञानाच्च पाणिन सिद्धम् —*Patanjali* प्राति
पदिकविज्ञानाच्च भगवत् पाणिनेराचार्यस्य सिद्धम् । उणादयो ऽयुत्पदानि प्रातिपदिकानि

²¹¹ VII 3,50 दस्येक —A *Vārtika* संधातप्रहृण चदुखादिमाधितिकादीना प्रतिवेष —*Pa-*
tanjali उणादीनां ताष्ट्र० कण्ठ पण्ठ शण्ड (comp Un S I 105, IV 104) etc —
Vārtika संस्माद्विशिष्टप्रभ्रणम् —*Patanjali* (after a lengthened discussion asks and ans
wers) एवमप्युणादीना प्रतिपेषो वक्तव्य० । न वक्तव्य० । उणादयो ऽयुत्पदानि प्रातिपदिकानि
। पृष्ठमपि कर्मं इत्यत्र प्राप्नोति (comp 1 2 30 where the affix is not a *krit* but a
tidhita)

²¹² VII 4 13 कैःय —*Vārtika* कै यो हस्तये तद्वितप्रहृणं कृक्षितृत्यर्थम् —*Patanjali*
कै यो हस्तये तद्वितप्रहृण कर्तव्यम् । किं प्रयोजनम् । कृक्षितृत्यर्थम् । कृति मा भूत् । राका
धाक (MS धाका) इति (cf Un S III 40) तत्त्वाहि वक्तव्यम् । न वक्तव्यम् । उणादयो
अयुत्पदानि प्रातिपदिकानि etc

²¹³ VIII 2 78 उपथायां च —A *Vārtika* उपथादीर्घये उभ्यासजित्तिचतुर्णा प्रतिपेष
—*Patanjali* उपथादीर्घये उभ्यासजित्तिचतुर्णा प्रतिपेषो यत्तद्य । रियंतु । रियु । संविद्यतु ।
संविद्यु ॥ अभ्यास ॥ तिप्र (१५ अभ्यासजिति) चतुर्णिता । चतुर्णितुम् —*Vārtika*
उणादीना प्रतिपेषय —*Patanjali* उणादीना च प्रतिपेषो वक्तव्य० । किमें । गियोरिति
। ut after some discussion he concludes तिप्रतिपेषय न यत्तद्य (१५ यत्तद्य) ।
उणादयो ऽयुत्पदानि प्रातिपदिकानि (cf Un S 1 40), and again न सुरो विभक्षिति-
परिष्यामान् । गीर्म्यां गीर्मित्यदेष । उणादिप्रतिपेषो यत्तद्य इति । परित्तमेतत् । उणादयो
अयुत्पदानि प्रानिपदिकान्तिति (cf 1 p 6 IV 112)

under certain conditions to *sh*.²¹³ To all these rules Kātyāyana takes exception by excluding from them the *Unnadi* words. Thus *lantsha*, *pantha*, *śantha*, are formed with the affix *tha* which does not mean *sha*; *śālā* and *dhālā* retain their long *a* before the affix *la*; from *jrī* is derived *jiveri*, not *jiveri*; *kiri* and *giri* form then dual *kiryos* and *giryos*, not *kiryos* and *giryos*; and in the words *krisara*, *dhūsara*, the *s* has not become *sha*; while, on the other hand, this change has taken place in *varsha* and *tarsha*,²¹⁴ though the conditions named by Pāṇini in rule

²¹³ VIII 3, 59 आदेशप्रत्यययोः—Varttika आदेशप्रत्यययोः प ते सरकः प्रतिपेधः—
Patanjali आदेशप्रत्यययोः पते सरकः प्रतिपेधो वक्तव्यः । शुसरः । धूसरः । अत्यल्पमिदमुच्यते सरक इति—Varttika सरगादीनामिति वक्तव्यम्—Patanjali इहापि यथा स्यात् । वर्षम् । तर्षमिति । सतर्हि वक्तव्यम् । न वक्तव्यम् । उणादयोऽव्युत्पन्नानि प्रातिपदिकानि etc (cf. Un S III 73 62)

A further insight into the character of Dr. Boehtlingk's "edition" of Panini

²¹⁴ In the E I H Ms of the *Mahābhāshya* and in the Calcutta edition of Panini the instances to VIII 3, 59, v 2, are वर्ष and तर्ष (instead of वर्ष and तर्ष, but it is evident that this reading is erroneous, for, in his first *Vārttika*, Kātyāyana intends to show that Panini's rule is too wide, and, in the second, that it is too narrow, if applied to certain *Unnadi* words. Compare also the Commentary on the *Unnadi-Sūtra* III 62—It is needless to observe once more that in this, as in all similar instances the reprint of Dr Boehtlingk has simply continued the mistake of the Panitits though it always assumes the air of having taken its information from the MSS. Thus, in this very *Vārttika*, the Calcutta edition has a misprint सरकप्रतिपेधः, and Dr Boehtlingk writes—not "the Calcutta edition," but—'Eur *vārttika* ' सरकप्रतिपेधः (sic)," as if this reading were an original one. But the E I H Ms. of the *Mahābhāshya* reads quite correctly सरकः प्रतिपेधः', and Kātyāyana has even a special remark to the effect that though the *Unnadi-Sūtra* III 73 (comp also 70) teaches the affix सर्न्, the *Vārttika* and *Bhashya* write सरक् (of which सरक् is the genitive), because this affix is किंत् viz श्रो. सरन्नित्यतः सरन्नत्ययः (MS ०यो) कृध्माद्विभ्य किदित्यत्रानुवर्त्तते (Un ८ III 73) कित्वातिदेशाच्च कित्कार्यलाभाद्भाष्यवार्त्तिकयोः सरकपतिः In all these instances and others too (e.g. to VII 2, 8 v 1 of the Calcutta ed), the E I H Ms of the *Mahābhāshya*, and the Calcutta edition—as often as it gives this passage write उणादयोऽव्युत्पन्नानि प्रातिपदिकानि (the MS of the *Mahābhāshya* without the S, the correctness of the reading given however does not only result from the commentaries, but from the *Paribhāṣa* works, MS 778 of the *Paribhāṣhendusekhara*, e.g., writes उणादयो अन्यु०), when the first word though literally meaning "the affixes un etc" has the sense 'the words formed with the affixes un, etc' (comp I 1 72) in conformity with the use which Panini makes of the words कृत् and तद्वित (in the masculine gender) e.g I 1 33 2 46, VI 2, 155. Compare also Vaidyanatha's explanation in note 183. The reading "उणादीन्यव्युत्पन्नानि प्रातिपदिकानि", which is given by Dr Aufrecht, p 11, I have never met with, though I have frequently met with the phrase quoted above, not only in the gram-

VIII 3, 59, would not justify it there. But Patanjali, who supplies us with all these instances, in order to establish, first, the sense of the Vārtikas, always rejects the criticism of Kātyāyana, and defends Pānini with the same argument which he used before, *viz.*, in saying that "nominal bases formed with Unnādi affixes are bases which have no grammatical origin," and therefore do not concern an etymological work like that of Pānini.

**KĀTYĀYANA MUST HAVE LOOKED UPON PĀNINI AS BELONGING
TO THE NAIRUKTAS**

But if Kātyāyana were really wrong in his censure of Pānini, can the argument used by Patanjali in defence of Pānini be right? Let us imagine that there existed amongst us two sets of grammarians, the one contending that the words *red*, *bed*, *shed*, are derived from radicals *re*, *be*, *she*, with an affix *d*; and another refuting these etymologists, and asserting that their derivation is absurd; that *red*, *bed*, *shed* are "bases without a grammatical origin." Is it probable, on the same supposition, that a member of the last named category, in writing a grammar and in dealing with these words, would ascribe to them an affix *d*? Yet, if Patanjali were right, Pānini would belong to this latter category, and he would have committed such an incongruity. He has not only spoken of an Unnādi affix *u*, but he calls it by its technical name *un*, which means that he bore in mind a distinct form of a radical, the vowel of which would become subject to the Vṛiddhi increase if it is joined to this affix *u*. The Unnādi words must, consequently, have been to Pānini words in which he perceived a real affix and a real radical,—words, in short, with a distinct etymology. There is other evidence to the same effect, besides the two rules of his which contain the word *unnādi*. In rule VII. 2, 9, he mentions the affixes *ti*, *tu*, *tin*, *ta*, *tha*, *si*, *su*, *sara*, *ka*, *sa*, all these are Unnādi affixes, and consequently represent to him as many radicals as are capable of being combined with them for the formation of nominal bases¹¹. That there is a flaw in the defence of Patanjali, must have been already perceived by Kātyāyana, for this commentator tries to reconcile the fact I have pointed out with the assertion of Patanjali. I will quote his words, but merely to show that it was a desperate case to save Pānini from the Nairukta school, and to give him the stamp of a pure bred Vaiyakarana. On the occasion of Patanjali's commenting on the Vārtika to VIII 3, 59, and repeating the remark already mentioned, Kātyāyana says "Though the Unnādi words have been derived for the enlightenment of the ignorant, their formation is not subject to the same grammatical influence as it would be if they had an origin;" and, after having endeavoured to prove the correctness of this view through rule VIII 3, 10, he winds up with the following words: "Therefore in the Unnādi formations, *trisara* etc., *sara* etc. do not

matrical commentaries but in all the Paribhāshā works, which give it as Paribhāshā. I, therefore, very much doubt its correctness even if it should really be found in any MS.

fall under the technical category of affixes so that the rule which concerns the change of *an* affixes to *sh* would have to be applied in their case.²¹⁶

That Katyāyana when he found fault with Pāṇini must have taken my view is obvious. He must have looked upon Pāṇini as justing of the Uṇnadi words in the same way as Śikṛtiyāṇi did otherwise his 'pratishekhās' exceptions or even his *allitions* to the rules in question would have been as irrelevant as if he had concerned them with matter taken from medicine or astronomy.

The conclusion however at which I have thus been compelled to arrive viz. that Pāṇini shared in the linguistic principles of Śikṛtiyāṇa is of importance if we now consider the relation in which he is likely to have stood to the original Uṇnadi list and to the criticisms of Katyāyana.

IMPOSSIBILITY THAT NAGOJIBHUTTA'S ATTRIBUTION OF THE UṇNADI TO SĀKĀTAKĀYĀ IS CORRECT

Nagojibhūtta who wrote notes on Kātyāyana's gloss on Pātanjali conjectures from the Kīrikā to III 3 1 that the Uṇnadi Sūtras were the work of Śikṛtiyāṇa.²¹⁷ His conjecture rests on the statement of Yāsiṇi alluded to by Pātanjali that this grammarian contended for the possibility of deriving all nominal bases from verbal roots. Now I have shown before that the opinion of Nagojibhūtta cannot be adopted so far as the *Sūtras* are concerned for they were written after Pāṇini's work and Śikṛtiyāṇi wrote before Pāṇini.²¹⁸ It may at first sight however appear to be consistent with fact

Pātanjali to VIII 3 59 (comp. note 213) उणादयोऽनुपत्तानि प्रातिपदिकानि
Kātyāyana उणादय इति । अनुपत्तेयनाय व्युपाद्यमाना अन्युशादयो व्युपत्तिनिमित्त कार्यं न
लभते । अत कृक्षिक्षेयत्र (VIII 3 46) पृथक्सप्रहणात् । न वा एतदिति पव व्युपत्तिहेतु
कसुणादीनामप्यान्युपेयम् । सर्पिष्य वृत्त इयादिसिद्धयर्थमिलर्थ । एव तर्हीतिक्षसरादिपु पत्वे
कर्त्तय प्रत्यसंज्ञा न भवति । Here subjoin the interesting comment of *śir deva* in his
Paribhāṣāteriti (MS E 1 H 503) on this Pātanjali as it is appealed to by other
authors of Pātanjali works उणादयोऽनुपत्तानि प्रातिपदिकानि ॥ अय चार्ये
अर्थवासूत्रप्रणयनादस्तीत्याहु । अन्यथा सर्वेषामुणादीना धातुत्र वे कृदत्तत्वाप्रातिपदिकसंज्ञासिद्धौ
तत्र कुर्यात् । अन्ये त्वत कृक्षिक्षेयत्र (VIII 3 46) कमिप्रहण वृत्ता कसप्रहणादेतमाहु ।
तेन कृग्रनुटिविद्यमाश्च (c comp. Un 5 IV 14) इ किदृशीकाप्रत्यया तयो किरिगिरिशब्दयो
रोसि यणादेशे कृते धातुत्वाभावाद्विलिचेति (VIII 3 77 दीर्घव न भवति । किर्या । गिर्यारिति ।
एतत्र न सम्यक । अच परस्मिन्निति (I 1 5) स्थानिवस्त्रादीर्घप्रसादात् । न चास्ति दीर्घविधि प्रति
न स्थानिवदिति । स्वरदीर्घयक्षेपेयु लोपान्नदेश एव न स्थानिवदिति वचनात् (comp. I 1 58) । यथा
प्रतिदीनति । एव तर्ह जीर्यतं जीर्यते जीर्यते किन रथ व इति (U 5 1 49) किप्रत्यय इते
रपत्रे च रेफल्य वकार कृते जिविरिति धातुत्वाभावादीर्घो न भवतीति

²¹⁶ See also Dr Aufrecht's Preface to the Un 5 p v where the Commentary of Nagojibhūtta is quoted and translated by him.

²¹⁷ See note 97

If only the Unnāḍi list were meant, for Śikatāyana's views are such as would admit of nominal derivation by means of Unnāḍi affixes. Yet, since Nāgoji's conjecture is purely personal, and is not supported by any evidence, I may be allowed, after the explanation I have given, to assume that the Unnāḍi list is of Pāṇini's authorship. Indeed, how could Kātyāyana take exception to the technical application or to the working of a rule of Pāṇini's, and supply this defect by pointing to the Unnāḍi list, unless he looked upon Pāṇini as being the author of both? Had he thought that the Unnāḍi list was written by Śikatāyana, he would have laid himself open to serious reflections, in censuring the *anubandhas* of Pāṇini for not fitting the system of Śikatāyana. We might make an assumption, it is true, by which we could reconcile Śikatāyana's authorship of the Unnāḍi list with Kātyāyana's strictures on Pāṇini, —the assumption that Pāṇini's work represented, as it were, besides its own property, that of Śikatāyana's too,—that both grammarians owned one set of technical signs, and that perfect unanimity reigned between their works. The *Ganaratnamahodadhi* of Vardhamāna gives numerous quotations from the Grammar of Śikatāyana, but as several of them merely give the substance of his rules, it would scarcely be safe to judge of his system on the authority of this valuable Gāṇi work.¹¹⁸ Unless, therefore, it can be shown that there was no

On the Ganaratnamahodadhi of Vardhamāna—Another insight into the character of Dr Boethlingk's "edition of Pāṇini"

¹¹⁸ Relative to this work, which is of the greatest importance for the study of Sanskrit grammar, Dr Boethlingk gives the following information (vol II, p xxxix—xl) —"A third work which contains the *Gāṇas*, is the *Ganaratnamahodadhi* (the great Ocean of the Gāṇa pearls). In London there exist two MS copies of this work, the one in the Library of the Royal Asiatic Society, the other in that of East India House. [He adds some remarks on the age of the former MS, and continues]

The work consists of eight chapters (अष्ट्यादि) and about 450 double verses. Its author is drī Vardhamāna a pupil of drī Govinda, and as it is stated in the introductory verses it owes its origin to the request of his pupils three of whom he names in the commentary on his work viz Kumārapālī Haripālī and Muṇīchandra. Text and commentary are so corrupt in both Manuscripts that at the very best only a tolerable text could be made up. Besides this collection was not intended for the work of Pāṇini, but for some more modern grammar. There occur *Gāṇas* in it which are neither mentioned in the *Sūtras* nor in the *Vārtikas*. Then, again, we find two *Gāṇas* which are separate in our collection [Dr B means two *Gāṇas* edited by him] combined into one when the *śikṣātāvritis* formed according to the different rules differ from one other only in accent. The various readings of the *Ganaratnamahodadhi* (G R M) I have indicated merely at the *Gāṇa* पूर्णपाली — so this statement I have to append the following remarks —

1. When Dr Boethlingk tells the public that there are but two MS copies of this work in London his readers will no doubt believe if they believe him —Indeed they cannot draw any other inference from his words than — that there are in London only two texts of the *Gāṇas* collected by Vardhamāna in his work the *Ganaratnamahodadhi*. I cannot suppose that there can be any one who would interpret the meaning of his words in the sense that there are only two catalogued nos of this work in the libraries he is speaking of. Yet I am compelled to take this favourable — though very unseasonable — view of his statement. In order not to be compelled to qualify it otherwise. For, the fact is that the bound vol no No 910 of the Library of the E. I. H., which he is speaking of, is, in fact, one volume only, but

difference whatever and, much more so, if it can be shown that there

contains two distinct copies of the work in question written in different handwritings, and constituting, therefore, two separate MSS. These, added to the copy in the R. A. S. form, therefore, at first sight, three MSS, not two, as he says. But I should trifle with my readers if I considered this correction as sufficient to illustrate the character of Dr Boehltingk's statement. The first MS of No 949 contains the text of the Ganaratnamahodadhi only, on 30 leaves. The second MS of the same No 949, which is a commentary, by the same author, on his work, contains, first the text, and afterwards the comment, which repeats every word of the text, either literally or impliedly, by stating the derivatives from the word or words as they occur in the text. The same method is observed in the MS belonging to the Royal Asiatic Society. Hence we possess, in London not two texts, nor yet three, but in reality five texts of this work.

2 The MSS in question are, no doubt, open to correction, as, indeed, probably every Sanskrit MS in existence is, but I hold that at all events the ancient copy of the R. A. S. will in spite of its inaccuracies, be ranked by every one conversant with MSS, amongst the best Sanskrit MSS in existence. And having considered it incumbent on me to study this book carefully, I have no hesitation in maintaining that even a tolerable Sanskrit scholar would be able to make a perfectly good edition of at least the text of this work, with the aid of these five copies of the text, the two copies of the commentary, and, as a matter of course, with the aid that may be got from Pāṇini and his commentaries.

3 As to the nature of this work I must allow the reader to draw his own conclusions with regard to the credit that may be attached to the information given by Dr Boehltingk, when I state that there is not one single Gana in the Ganaratnamahodadhi, the contents of which may not be referred either to Pāṇini's Sūtras or to the Vārttikas of Katyayana the Kāśikā, etc., and the commentaries on them, or to the Ganas connected with these works, though the latter frequently do not contain so much matter as the Ganas of Vardhamana, who is later, and, as we may expect, made his own additions to previous lists. The substance of its Ganas increased sometimes in the manner stated is often contained in several rules of, and in the commentaries on, Pāṇini and Katyayana, which have been brought into Gana shape, while, at other times several of its Ganas also increased, as the case may be, differ from the Ganas to Pāṇini merely in so far as the heading word of the one occurs in the middle of the other and vice versa. Thus the two combined Ganas कुष्ठादिपत्रादी

was a difference between the technical method of both these gram-

to Pāṇini's rules on accentuation — Of other Ganas to Pāṇini and the Varttikas, mentioned in the *kaṇikā*, *Siddhanta Laumudi*, and the Gana lists, which do not fall under any of these categories, there are omitted in the G. R. M. the Ganas to Pāṇini or the Varttikas आवादि (III 3, 94 v 1), इक्षवादि (V 2, 20 v 2), उपकूलादि (?) (IV 2, 58 v 1), कमलादि (IV 2, 51 v 1), गम्यादि (III 3, 2), दूर्वादि (IV 2, 51 v 2), नावादि (II 3, 17 v 2), निष्कादि (V 1, 20), न्यूणवादि (VII 3, 53), पार्श्वादि (III 2, 15 v 1), प्रदृश्यादि (II 3, 18 v 1), प्रतिवेशादि (VI 3, 122 v 3), प्रादि (I 4, 58), धूतादि (IV 3, 104) भवदादि (V 3, 14 v 1), भीमादि (III 4, 74), युवादि (VIII 4, 11 v 1), यैषेयादि (IV 1, 178, v 3, 117), रसादि (V 2, 95), वरणादि (IV 2, 82), विल्वकादि (VI 4, 153), वृपलादि (V 3, 66 v 5), शाकपार्थिवादि (II 1, 69 v 1), संकलादि (IV 2, 75), सप्तल्यादि (IV 1, 33), सवनादि (VIII 3, 110), सुपास्त्वादि (IV 2, 77), स्तोकादि (VI 3, 2), हरीतक्यादि (IV 3, 167), and perhaps बहूदि (IV 1, 45) since only some words of this Gana are included in the Gana of the G. R. M. शोणादि — These omissions will be excused if a report, current at Benares be true, that the author died before he completed his work, but I have no doubt whether this report be true or not, that they will be looked upon with the greatest indulgence by Dr Boehtlingk, as he himself, in his so called *Alphabetical Ganapāṭha* has omitted not less than about 90 Ganas to the Sūtras and Varttikas.

4 That a work so conscientiously described by Dr Boehtlingk can have no value in his eyes is very obvious. Others however, may think differently, when they become acquainted with the real character of the *Ganaratnamahodadhi*. Its Ganas as I mentioned before, are all based on rules of Pāṇini which very frequently are literally quoted for their authority while even when they are not literally quoted, the reference made to their contents plainly shows their close relation to them. The commentary not only enumerates every derivative formed — thus securing in most instances, beyond a doubt, the reading of the text — but often gives instances from other works — grammatical, lexicographical and poetical, several not yet published, as, for instance, those of *Gaya*, *Chandra*, *Jayaditya*, *Jinendrabuddhi*, *Durga*, *Bhoga*, *Sākātyayana*, *Hale yudha*, etc. And, above all, it supplies us with the meanings of a considerable portion of such Gana-words as have been hitherto either not understood at all, or understood imperfectly. Of the 12,000 words and upwards, which I have collected from this work for grammatical and lexicographical purposes, there are at least 3,000 which would fall under the latter category, and they have signally avenged themselves on the detractor of this work, as, in his own *Dictionary*, he is now compelled to leave, in a great many instances, a very telling blank space, which would have been filled up if he had really read the *Ganaratnamahodadhi*, while in other instances he would have obtained additional meanings to those which he assigns to certain words. When I mention moreover, that this *Ganaratnamahodadhi* is the only known work in existence which gives a commentary on the Ganas to or connected with Pāṇini — so obscure in many respects, — coming also as I before observed in my Sūtras to and Varttikas to, Pāṇini, and when, thus it becomes evident that a conscientious editor of Pāṇini ought to have eagerly availed himself of the instruction afforded him by this unique work, it will perhaps be intelligible why a certain Nemesis has induced Dr Boehtlingk to divert the attention of the scientific public from the MSS. of this work, by describing their condition and contents as he has done. As a matter of curiosity, I may, in conclusion add, that the only Gana of the G. R. M. the various readings and meanings of which he has registered in his "Alphabetical Ganapāṭha" — the Gana कण्ठयादि — occurs very near the end of the whole work, viz., at fol 28, in the text of MS. 94 of the I. I. II., which ends on fol 30 and at fol 110 of the combined text and commentary of the same MS., which ends on fol 121. In the palm leaf MS.

marians, common sense would lean in favour of the conclusion that Kâtyâyana, in his Vârtikas, hit at but one of his predecessors, and that this predecessor was the author as well of the eight grammatical books as of the Unnâdi list,—Pânini.

The proof that such a difference existed between Pânini and Sâkattâyana, indeed, between him and all the grammarians who preceded his work, is afforded by a statement of Patanjali, which is so important that it settles definitely, not only the question of the authorship of the Unnâdi list, but of all the other works which follow the *anubandha* terminology of Pânini. In his comment on the Sûtra VII 1, 18 which makes use of the technical declension affix *auñg* (= *au*), he shows that the mute letter *ñg* has none of the properties which inhere in this *anubandha* in the system of Panini. After some discussion on the various modes in which this *anubandha* could be dealt with, so as not to interfere with the consistency of the method of Panini, he concludes with the following words "Or this rule belongs to a Sûtra of a former grammarian; but whatever *anubandhas* occur in a Sûtra of a former grammarian, they have no *anubandha* effect in this work".

PATAÑJALI'S STATEMENT THAT THE ANUBANDHAS OF FORMER
GRAMMARIANS HAVE NO ANUBANDHA EFFECT
IN THE GRAMMAR OF PÂMINI

Hence we learn from Patanjali, who is the very last author that can be suspected of having made such an important assertion without a knowledge of the works anterior to the Grammar of Pânini, that, though Pânini adopted from his predecessors such technical symbols as *ti*, *ghu*, *bha*, and though he availed himself of other terms of theirs which have a meaning and an etymology (see page 127),—he did not adopt their technical *anubandhas*; and if he avails himself of such an *anubandha*, as that in rule VII 1, 18, we must look upon it as a quotation made by him, but not as influencing the rule in which it occurs ¹¹⁰.

PÂMINI IS, CONSEQUENTLY, THE AUTHOR OF THE U'NNÂDI-LIST

Now, all the Unnâdi affixes have *anubandhas*, which are exactly the same, and have the same grammatical effect, as those used by Panini. They cannot be later than his work, for it refers to them. They cannot have preceded it, for Patanjali says that "whatever *anubandhas* occur in a Sûtra of a former grammarian, they have no *anubandha* effect in Pânini's work". Consequently the Unnâdi list must be of Pânini's own authorship.

of the R. A. S. which ends on fol. 178 this Gâna stands at fol. 163. The title of a Sanskrit book I need not mention, is always given at the end of a manuscript.

¹¹⁰ VII 1 18 औऽ आप —Patanjali (towards the end of his discussion) अथवा पूर्वसूत्रनिर्देशो ऽयम् । पूर्वसूत्रे च ये ऽनुवन्या । न तीर्त्तेकार्याण्य क्रियन्ते —Kâlyâgî अथवेति पूर्वाचार्याण्यद्वे अपि द्वियचने हिती पश्चिमे न चेद् कच्चिद्वौङ् प्रतयो दिवसि सामान्यप्रदायार्थं च पूर्वसूत्रनिर्देश एते —For पूर्वसूत्र, compare also note 46.

Having settled this point, we may now ask, whether the criticisms of Kātyāyana do not lead to a further inference? When Kātyāyana finds fault with Pānini for having overlooked the fact that the vowel *ā* remains long in *rāka*, *dhāka*, or for having given an inadequate rule for such derivations as *krisara* and *dhūsara*, *varsha*, and *tarsha*, such criticism applies to omissions which may occur in the case of an author, even a Pānini. But when he reproaches him with having spoiled the consistency of his *anubandhas*—so dear to a Hindu grammarian—this blemish seems to me so important, and would probably appear so much more important to a Hindu Pandit, that it compels my conclusions to take another course. For it was obviously so easy for him to modify his rules VII. 1, 2, and VII. 3, 50, in order to meet the objections raised by Kātyāyana,—to do, in other words, that which he has done in an analogous case;¹³¹ and the matter he is reproached with in the Vārtikas must have been so deeply impressed on his mind that it seems almost impossible not to draw another result from the strictures of Kātyāyana. And this result is no other than that either the words which are alluded to by the author of the Vārtikas in these criticisms did not yet exist when Pānini wrote, or that they had in his time another etymology than that stated by Kātyāyana. And if this view be correct, it would also add another fact to those I have advanced in favour of the argument that Pānini and Kātyāyana cannot have been contemporaries.

CHRONOLOGICAL RELATION BETWEEN PĀNINI AND THE DHĀTUPĀTHA HE IS THE AUTHOR OF THE GROUNDWORK OF THE EXISTING DHĀTUPĀTHA

The passage just now quoted from Patanjali's Great Commentary, and the conclusions which had to be drawn from it, enable us at once to see that Pānini must also have been the author of the Dhātupātha frequently referred to in his rules. This list makes use of the same mute letters which are the *anubandhas* of Pānini's Grammar, and their grammatical value is exactly the same in both works. According to Patanjali's statement, therefore, the Dhātupātha of Pānini cannot have been arranged by any one else than Pānini.¹³² Whether another Dhātupātha existed previously to Pānini does not concern us here, since it is not known to us; nor does it belong to my present purpose to examine whether the Dhātupātha which has reached us has received additions from those who wrote, and commented on, it, and if so, to what extent. There is the same probability for such

¹³¹ Nominal bases derived with the *kṛit* affixes रूप् or रूप् have certain properties of declension which are taught by Pānini. The *Unādi* say (II. 96) that some of the bases नाम्, सेष्, रप्त्, हेत्, पीत्, भाव्, जामात्, सात्, पित्, शुद्धित् are derivatives formed with रूप् and others with रूप्. But since all of them do not share in the declension properties of the रूप् and रूप् bases, Pānini gives a rule, VI. 4, 11, which obviates an objection that might have been made like that brought forward by Kātyāyana in his Vārtikas to VII. 1, 2 and VIII. 3, 50.

¹³² Compare my previous observations at page 89 and the following pages.

additions having been made to the original list as in the case of all other Ganas; and we may fairly, therefore, ascribe the present Dhâtupâthas to various authors, who also, perhaps, added meanings to the list composed by Pânini, since there is no *direct* evidence to show that Panini did more than arrange this list with the *anubandhas* attached to the radicals. All these questions, however, are foreign to the present subject. It is quite enough for the settlement of this question that the groundwork of the only Dhâtupâtha we now possess, is, like the groundwork of the *Unnâdi* list, the work of Pânini.

CHRONOLOGICAL RELATION BETWEEN PÂNINI AND THE PRÂTISÂKHYAS

The problem which concerns the chronological relation between Pânini and the *Prâtisâkhyas*, more especially those of the *Rigreda* and the *Vâjasaneyi Samhitâ*, has a still greater claim to our attention than that discussed in the foregoing remarks ²²³. The immediate connection of these grammatical writings with the collections of Vaidik hymns, gives to them an appearance of importance which some may deny to the *Dhâtupâtha* and the *Unnâdi* list. Besides, the speculations to which they have been subjected by several authors show that, in spite of the seeming unanimity of their results, there is no work of Hindu antiquity which has caused more uncertainty, as respects the question of date, than these *Prâtisâkhya* works.

There are, I conceive, two ways in which the solution of the problem of which I am here speaking, may be attempted, the one *literary*, the other *historical*. But before I offer from the evidence at my disposal such facts as may enable us to arrive at a settled conclusion on this point, it is my duty to state the prevalent opinion as to the relation of these works to Panini, and the reasons with which this opinion has hitherto been supported. I take for this purpose the works of those authors who have dealt more comprehensively than others with subjects which concern the Vaidik literature, and whose conclusions express, I believe, on this point, the creed of actual Sanskrit philologists.

²²³ I can here only speak of those two *Prâtisâkhyas* which have become generally accessible—the *Rik P* through the valuable and learned edition of Mr Regnier and the *Vâjasaneyi P* through that of Professor Weber—because I am not sufficiently acquainted with the two others which are not yet published and are not met with in the libraries of London so as to feel justified in uttering opinions which I could not fully substantiate. But as I have no ground for doubting the *matter of fact* statements concerning these two latter works, for which we are indebted to the industry of Professor Weber in his preface to his edition of the *Vâjasaneyi P*, I should infer from them that the *Atharvaveda P* must be more recent than the *Rik P* and that in all probability the *Taittirîya P* also is posterior to the same *Prâtisâkhya*. So far therefore, as this latter inference—but this latter inference only—is concerned, and with all the reservation which is implied by the source whence my information has been obtained, I shall feel free to speak of all the *Prâtisâkhyas*. Otherwise I shall merely treat of the two former.

PROFESSOR MULLER HOLDS THAT ALL THE PRĀTISĀKHYAS PRECEDED
THE GRAMMAR OF PĀNINI

Professor Muller writes in his History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature (p 120), as follows: "The real object of the Prātisākhya, as shown before was not to teach the grammar of the old sacred language, to lay down the rules of declension and conjugation or the principles of the formation of words. This is a doctrine which, though it could not have been unknown during the Vedic period, has not been embodied, as far as we know, in any ancient work. The Prātisākhya are never called Vyākaranas, grammars, and it is only incidentally that they allude to strictly grammatical questions. The perfect phonetic system on which Pānini's Grammar is built is no doubt taken from the Prātisākhya; but the sources of Pānini's strictly grammatical doctrines must be looked for elsewhere."

Thus, according to this author, all the Prātisākhya "no doubt" preceded Pānini's Grammar; and we must infer, too, from Professor Muller's words, that he meant by Prātisākhya those either edited or preserved in MSS, since his conclusions cannot consistently have been founded on any imaginary Prātisākhya which may or may not have preceded those that we now possess,—which may or may not have dealt with the same subjects in the same manner as the works we are here alluding to. Nor can it have been his object merely to state what is sufficiently known, that there were other grammarians, though not authors of Prātisākhya, before Pānini who gave rules on Vedic words, since Pānini himself makes mention of them.

PROFESSOR ROTH'S VIEW TO THE SAME EFFECT HIS INTERESTING
AND GRAPHIC ACCOUNT OF THE RISE AND PROGRESS
OF GRAMMAR IN INDIA

UNHAPPILY THIS ACCOUNT IS FANTASTICAL

Professor Roth, whom we have to thank for an edition of Yāska's Nirukta, states his view to the same effect in the following words:*** "Grammar, therefore, took the same natural course of development as we find it has taken elsewhere. It did not proceed from the foundation of the living language, but owed its origin to the observation of that difference which exists between certain forms of language in the actual intercourse of life and those of written works; and, at first, it confined itself to pointing out chiefly these differences. Then, again, it comprised not the whole mass of literature, but only single books, especially important to certain classes of society (*einzelne in den betreffenden Kreisen besonders wichtige Bücher*). Thus the path was opened to a general grammar treating as well of written as of spoken language; we meet this first in Pānini, and from this time all those special grammars gradually disappear from general use."

There is but one thing wanting to this very interesting statement of Professor Roth's, viz., that he should inform us whence he obtained

*** In the preface to his edition of the Nirukta, p xlii.—The original text of this quotation it is necessary to mention is in German and in very good German, too.

this invaluable historical account of the rise and progress of Sanskrit grammar. No doubt he has some voucher of high authority for the important fact that grammar began and proceeded in India in the manner he describes; and that these special grammars, the *Pratisākhya*s, which he enumerates immediately afterwards, were the pioneers of Pāṇini's work. But as he has forgotten to give us the name of his authority, we must, for the present at least, be permitted to look upon this graphic narration of his as a contribution to Vaidik poetry.

PROFESSOR WIBER'S VIEW OF THE CHRONOLOGICAL RELATION BETWEEN PĀNNI AND VĀJASNEYI PRĀTISĀKHYA

Professor Weber, with a caution that almost startles one in so bold a writer, who, as we have seen above (p. 58), has witnessed the progress of the Arians in their conquest of India 1500 B.C., does not sweep over all the *Pratisākhya*s with his chronological brush, but merely records his views of the relation of Pāṇini to one of them, the *Pratisākhya* of Kātyāyana, or that of the *Vājasneyi Sūmhitā*.

"We now come to Pāṇini himself," he says in his preface to his edition of this work, "that is to say ("resp."), to the description of the relations which exist between him and the Vāj. Prāt. These relations are, on the one hand, very close, —since a great number of the rules contained in it re occur, individually, either literally or nearly literally in Pāṇini, and since the Vāj. Pr., like Pāṇini, now and then makes use of an algebraic terminology; but, on the other hand, there is again a vast gulf between them, since this algebraic terminology does not entirely correspond, like that of the Ath. Pr., with that of Pāṇini, but, on the contrary, partly thoroughly (*zum Theil ganz*) differs from it. The particulars on this point are the following: —There correspond with Pāṇini —tū I, 27, aū VI, 21 (MS. A, however, reads merely a), luk III, 12, lup I, 114 (J lup — "resp." — lop) occur several times, but already, too, in the Rik. Pr. and Taitt. Pr.); the use of t in et and ot, I, 114, IV, 58, may likewise be added, and, amongst other expressions which are not algebraic, upapadam VI, 14. 23; yadvrittam VI, 14 (compare Pān. VIII. 1, 48, kīmrītta); naudeśa I, 143; dhitu, verbal root, V, 10; anyataratas V, 15 (Pān. anyatarasyām); linga, gender, IV, 170 (only in BE); samjnā IV, 96. —But there belong exclusively to the Vāj. Pr., and there have been nowhere shown to exist the algebraic terms sim I, 11, IV, 50, for the eight simple vowels, jit I, 50 167 III, 12. IV, 118, for the tenues inclusive of the sibilants (except h), mud I, 52 III, 8. 12 IV, 119 for s, sh, s; dhi I, 53 IV, 35 37. 117, for the sonant sounds; and to these may be added bhāvin, I, 46 III 21 55 IV, 33 45 VII, 9, for the designation of all vowels except i, rit=riphitā IV, 33 VI, 9, and simkiama III, 148. IV, 77 165 104, for they, too, are peculiar to the Vāj. Pr. alone.

"If thus, then, the independence of this Pr of Pāṇini be vouched for with a tolerable amount of certainty (*nutzniemlicher Sicherheit*), we shall be able to look upon the numerous literal coincidences between both, either as [the result of their] having drawn [them] from a common source, or of Pāṇini having borrowed [them] from the Vāj. Prāt, just as we have the same choice in the case of the rules which are common

to the Kātiya sīauta sūtra I 8, 19 20, and Pan I 2, 33 34. In the latter case the former conjecture may be preferable (compare also Vaj Pr I 130) but in our present case I should myself indeed, rather (*in der That eher*) prefer deciding for Pānini's having borrowed [them] immediately [from the Vājasaneyi Prātisākhyā] on account of the great speciality of some of these rules. For, a certain posteriority (*eine gewisse Posteriorität*) of the latter—*independently of [his]* having much more developed the algebraic terminology—seems to me to result with a tolerable amount of certainty (*mit ziemlicher Sicherheit*), from the circumstance also, that the pronunciation of the short *a* was in his time already so much (*bereits so sehr*) *samivita*, covered, that he does not make this vowel, but *u*, the type of the remaining vowels, whereas the Vaj Pr (and likewise the Ath Pr), it is true, agree with him in the *samvritītā* of the vowel *a*, but still retain it as the purest vowel, compare the note to I 72. But it is true that local differences might have been the cause of this, since Pānini seems to belong to the North West, but the Vaj Pr to the East of India.

“For the posteriority of the Vaj Pr Pānini (*für eine Posteriorität des Vāj Pr nach Pānini*) it might be alleged at the very utmost (*hochstens*), that the author of the Varttikas to Pānini bears the same name as the author of the Āj Pr. There are indeed, between both some direct points of contact,—comp III 13 41 46,—but then again there are also direct differences, comp (III 85) IV 119. In general, sameness of names, like that of Kātyayana, can never prove the identity of persons [who bore them], there is nothing proved by it, except that both belonged to the same family, or (‘resp.’) were followers of the same school,—the Kātās.

‘Amongst the Sūtrās which are identical in the Vāj Pr and in Pānini, we must now point out, first, some general rules which are of the greatest importance for the economy of the whole arrangement of both texts, and which, indeed are of so special a nature that they seem to claim with a tolerable amount of force (*mit ziemlicher Entscheidendheit*) [the assumption of the one] having borrowed from the other. They are the three following (called *paribhāṣa* by the scholar to Pānini) *tasmān iti uṇḍishto purvasya*, Vāj Pr I 134 Pan I, 66, *trisvād ity uttāṇyādeḥ*, Vaj Pr I 135 Pan I 1, 67 (without ādeḥ, but see 51), *shashthī sthaneyoga*, Vaj Pr I, 136 Pan I 1, 49—There are very remarkable also *samkhyatānām anudeco yathāsamkhyam*, Vāj Pr I, 143, compared with Pan I 3, 10 *yathāsamkhyam anudecū samānām*, and *vipratisedhī uttaram balavād* alone, I, 159, compared with *vipratisedhī pīrūṇ kāriyam*, Pan I 4, 2. But both [passages] do not require [the supposition of] such a special relation (*beide bedingen indess nicht ein so specielles Verhältniss*), for they might be brought home to a common source in the general grammatical tradition (*sondern konnten auf gemein same Quelle in der allgemeinen grammatischen Tradition zurückgeführt werden*) (the *śāmanyam* of the Ath Pr I, 3, evam iheti ca vibhāṣī *praptūm śāmanye*). Likewise, *varṇasvadṛcāṇam lopth* I, 141, Pan I 1, 60 (without *varṇasya*),—*neerū udātāḥ—neerū anudātih—ubhīyavān* *śvaritāḥ*, I, 108 110, Pan I 2 29 31 (where *śāmūlāḥ* stands for *ubhīḥ*),—*tisvādītū udātāḥ* *śvarārdhūmītūm*, I, 126 Pan I 2, 32 (where *ardhahraswam*),—*udātāḥ*

cānudātī svaritam—nodātīsvaritodayam IV, 134 140 udātīd abu-
 dātīsya svaritah—nodātīsvaritodāyam, Pān VIII 4, 66 67,—sāmīn-
 asthānakarānīsāprāvītānī sāvānī, I 43, tulāsāyāprāvītānī sāvā-
 nam, Pān, I 1, 9; Asid iti cottaram viṭṭe, II 53, upātī sād Asid
 iti ca, Pān VIII 2 102 (97),—nuç cāmreditē, IV, 8 kān āmreditē,
 Pān VIII 3, 12—There are besides these a very great number
 (eine sehr grosse Zahl) of coincidences [between them], for instance,
 IV 49 (Pān VI 1, 84), VI 10 23 (Pān VIII 1, 58 63), which, however,
 may be accounted for simply (*ausfach*) by the similarity of their sub-
 ject. In some of these instances the Vāj Pr is decidedly inferior
 (*steht entschieden zurück*) to Pānini (comp the note to II 19 20). Its
 grammatical terminology does not appear to have attained the sur-
 vey and systematic perfection represented in Pānini *** but compare
 also my former general statement on the want of skill or ("resp")
 probably want of practice of the author (*vgl. indess auch das bereits*
*im Eingange—p. 68—über die Ungeschicklichkeit resp. wohl Unge-
 schicklichkeit des Vfs im Allgemeinen Bemerkte*) In most instances, how-
 ever, from being restricted to the one text of the Vājas Samhitā, he
 is in a better position than Pānini, who has to deal with the whole lin-
 guistic stock, and therefore he is enabled to give rules with a certain
 safety and precision, when Pānini either wavers in indecision (bahulam)
 or decides in an erroneous and one sided way (comp the notes to II
 30 55 III 27 95 IV, 58) ***

REASONS FOR GIVING PROFESSOR WEBER A FULL HEARING THE WHIRLPOOL THE CERTAIN POSTERIORITY

Two distinct reasons have induced me to give a full hearing to Professor Weber on this important question. I do so, in the first place, because the lengthened passage I have quoted from his Preface to the Vājasaneyi Prātisākhya—in my opinion, his most important literary work—is a thorough specimen of the manner and of the critical method—of the scholarship also, as I shall show hereafter—in which he deals with, and which he brings to bear on, all his learned investigations, in the second place, because to give him a hearing at all—and his great

*** The words of the text are Die grammatische Fixirung scheint eben
 Iaselbst noch nicht zu der in Pānini repräsentirten Übersicht und systematischen
 Vollkommenheit gelangt gewesen zu sein. I confess my utter inability to guarantee
 the correctness of the translation of this passage. What is the grammatical
 fixing? and of what? I have assumed that these words may have been intended for
 terminology but for aught I know they may mean anything else. And what
 "survey" is represented in Pānini?

**** Indische Studien vol IV pp 83–86 Once more and considering the
 possibility of a representation which may be made to my translation of his words I must
 express the conviction that I have not only brought the original before the English
 reader literally and faithfully but even favourably. Professor Webers mode
 of composition in all his writings is not only grammatically incorrect and illogically
 elliptical but devoid of the very smallest amount of that care which every
 reader is entitled to expect in his author. I could have wished that he not I had
 been compelled to undergo the agony of rendering his original into English with
 a view of combining the consideration due to my readers with a scrupulous faith-
 fulness in the version of his words and thoughts. The words between [] have
 been added by me in order to make something like sense of some of his sentences

industry and his merit of having touched, with no inconsiderable damage to himself, upon all the burning questions of ancient Sanskrit literature, entitles him to one— was to give him a full hearing, in the fullness of all his words. For, though it be possible to perceive the qualities of a clear spring by taking a draught from it, however small, a whirlpool can only be appreciated by seeing it entire and in the condition in which it happens to exist.

PROFESSOR WEBER'S FANTASTICAL STORY OF THE LETTER Ā

If I had attempted, for instance, to maintain that Professor Weber looks upon the algebraic terminology of Kātyāyana's Prātisākhya and Pāṇini's Grammar, "on the one hand as very close to, and on the other hand as thoroughly differing from, one another" (p. 143, lines 19-23), he would have justly upbraided me with not representing him faithfully, for he really says the one differs "partly thoroughly" from the other. Again, should I have ventured upon the statement that he considers Pāṇini's work as later than this Prātisākhya, because he says that it has borrowed a good deal from it; he would have pointed at p. 144, line 6, where he speaks of a "certain posteriority" of Pāṇini, which kind of posteriority is just as intelligible to my mind as the answer which some one, whom I asked about his travels, gave me, *viz.*, that he had been, but not exactly, on the Continent. Or, if I had said that his chief argument for this "certain posteriority" is the difference in the pronunciation of the short ā, between Pāṇini and Kātyāyana, since this difference led to his conclusion with "a tolerable amount of certainty" (p. 187, line 20), he would reply: "You are mistaken. I stated that this difference may have been caused by local reasons (line 15); it has, therefore, not the slightest conclusiveness." Or, if I gave his opinion on the relative proficiency of both authors to this effect, that he considers the Vājśaneyi Prātisākhya as being "decidedly inferior" (p. 115, line 10) in this regard to Pāṇini's work, he would have pointed to line 2, in showing me how much erred in attributing to him the idea of such "a decided inferiority;" for it is the Prātisākhya, on the contrary, which, "in most instances, gives the rules with a certain amount of safety and precision when Pāṇini either wavers in indecision, or decides in an erroneous and one-sided way."

We must, therefore, leave the whirlpool, such as it is; and in doing so we cannot but appreciate the immense advantage which an author enjoys, when he is impartial enough to arrive at his conclusions unbiassed by a knowledge of the subject of which he is speaking. Professor Weber has made up his mind that the Vājśaneyi-Prātisākhya must be anterior to Pāṇini, probably because it "appears extremely ticklish" to him to decide otherwise, hence he is not troubled with any of those cares which are likely to distract the minds of scholars who would first endeavour to study both works before they drew their inferences from them. He meets with an overwhelming amount of identical passages in the two works: he finds that their terminology is likewise identical to a certain degree,—hence he concludes: either Pāṇini has borrowed these passages and this terminology from Kātyāyana, or both authors have borrowed them from a common source. For, as to a third alter-

native,—that Kātyāyana may have borrowed such passages from Pāṇini, it is dispatched by him "with a tolerable amount of certainty," as taunting amongst things impossible, because Pāṇini is later than the Vājasaneyi-Prātisākhya; and this posteriority, again, he chiefly bases on the argument that the pronunciation of the short ā was, in the time of Pāṇini, 'already so much covered' that he had to take the vowel ū for his type of a vowel sound, whereas Kātyāyana could still make use of the vowel ā as the typical vowel in his Vaidik rules. Now, though I have already mentioned that this great argument is strangled by him as soon as it is born, I must nevertheless take the liberty of asking for the authority which supplied him with the circumstantial account of this phonetic history of the vowel ā? Pāṇini and Kātyāyana both state and imply, as he himself admits, that the vowel ā is pronounced *samvṛita*, or with the constriction of the throat; they do not say one single word more on the pronunciation of this sound; nor is there any grammarian known to me who does so much as allude to the fantastical story narrated by Professor Weber relative to this vowel ā. An ordinary critic, then, would content himself with the authentic information supplied him by both grammarians; and if he perceived that Pāṇini, in his rule I 2, 27, gives the vowel ū as a *specimen* vowel, and not as a type, while Kātyāyana chooses the vowel ā for such a *specimen*, he would conclude that, even should there be a real scientific motive for this difference, it cannot be founded on a different pronunciation of the vowel ā, since it is repudiated by both grammarians. But a critic like Professor Weber, who looks upon facts as worsted if they do not agree with his theories, concludes that this vowel ā was "already so much *samvṛita*" in the time of Pāṇini, that he must needs throw it overboard, and receive ū into the ark of his grammatical terminology.

DANGEROUS ADVERBS

And here I may, in passing, advert once more to a practice sometimes met with in literary arguments. It consists in quietly introducing into the premises some such innocent words as "more," or "almost," or "already," or "so much," or similar adverbs of small size, which have not the slightest claim to any such hospitality, and then, suddenly these little interlopers grow into mastership, and sway the discussion into which they had stealthily crept. Thus, Pāṇini and Kātyāyana, as I have just said, speak of the vowel ā simply as *samvṛita*; and upon these words Professor Weber reports that "ā in the time of Pāṇini was already so much *samvṛita*"—that important secrets may be extracted from this grand discovery.

PROFESSOR MULLER DOES NOT AGREE WITH PROFESSOR WEBER'S SPLITTING KĀTYĀYANA INTO TWO

The foregoing illustration of Professor Weber's critical remarks does not embrace the arguments in which he splits into two, Kātyāyana, the author of our Prātisākhya, and Kātyāyana who wrote the Vārtikas

to Pānini; for I shall first quote the observations of Professor Muller on this treatment of Kātyāyana. In speaking of the Vājasaneyi-Prātisākhya he expresses himself thus: ¹¹¹ "It was composed by Kātyāyana, and shows a considerable advance in grammatical technicalities [viz., in comparison with the Prātisākhya of the Black Yajurveda]. There is nothing in its style that could be used as a tenable argument why Kātyāyana, the author of the Prātisākhya, should not be the same as Kātyāyana, the contemporary and critic of Pānini. It is true that Pānini's rules are intended for a language which was no longer the pure Sanskrit of the Vedas. The Vedic idiom is treated by him as an exception, whereas Kātyāyana's Prātisākhya seems to belong to a period when there existed but one recognised literature, that of the Rishis. This, however, is not quite the case. Kātyāyana himself alludes to the fact that there were at least two languages. 'There are two words,' he says (I. 17), 'om and atha, both used in the beginning of a chapter; but om is used in the Vedas, atha in the Bhāsyas.' As Kātyāyana himself writes in the Bhāṣya, or the common language, there is no reason why he should not have composed rules on the grammar of the profane Sanskrit, as well as on the pronunciation of the Vedic idiom."

In other words, Professor Muller sees that in no grammatical work known to him—and I may safely add to anyone else—mention is made of two Kātyāyanas; he sees, no doubt, too—though he does not state the fact adverted to by Professor Weber himself—that several Vārttikas to Pānini correspond in substance with the Sūtras of the Vājasaneyi-Prātisākhyā; he deduces, moreover, from very correct and plausible premises, that there is nothing in either work to discountenance the possibility of the author of the Vārttikas having also written a work on the pronunciation of Vaidik words; and since he doubtless coincides with me in the opinion that even Sanskrit philology can neither gain in strength nor in esteem by fleeing itself from the fetters of common sense,—he arrives at the result that the hypercritical splitting of the one Kātyāyana into two, as proposed by Professor Weber, is utterly *fantastical*. I shall support his view with stronger proof than may be gathered from the quotations I have made; but in leaving for a while the whirlpool of the *Indische Studien*, I must now take up Professor Muller's own theory.

PROFESSOR MULLER'S OWN THEORY ON THE RELATION OF THE VAJASANEYI-PRĀTISĀKHYA TO PĀNINI'S GRAMMAR

After the words just given, he continues as follows: "Some of Kātyāyana's Sūtras are now found repeated *ipsissimis verbis* in Pānini's Grammar. This might seem strange; but we know that not all the Sūtras now incorporated in his grammar came from Pānini himself, and it is most likely that Kātyāyana, in writing his supplementary notes to Pānini, simply repeated some of his Prātisākhyā-sūtras, and that, at a later time, some of these so-called Vārttikas became part of the text of Pānini."

¹¹¹ *Ancient Sanskrit Literature*, p. 188.

Thus, in order to establish the theory that Pāṇini's work is later than the Prātisākhyā of Kātyāyana, whom Müller, as we know, conceives to be a contemporary of Pāṇini, he presents us with this very plausible sequence and chain of works :—1. The Prātisākha of Kātyāyana. 2. The Grammar of Pāṇini 3. The Varttikas of Kātyāyana. And since some rules of the second work are identical with some of the first, he assumes that such rules marched from the first into the third, and they then gradually invaded the second work. Now even supposing that such a migration of rules could be supported by a particle of evidence, what becomes of those stubborn Prātisākhyā-Sūtras and Varttikas of Kātyāyana which are identical in their contents—as I shall hereafter show—and which have not ventured to walk into the Sūtras of Pāṇini ? They become the stumbling block of the whole theory ; for since Pāṇini, and especially Pāṇini the contemporary of Kātyāyana, could not have written rules of which the defects must have been apparent to him, if he had seen rules so much better in a work written before his own, the substance of these Sūtras of Kātyāyana could not have simultaneously preceded and followed the Grammar of Pāṇini. But I need not go further in showing the weakness of this theory, for I have already explained (p. 21, etc.) that out of the 3996 Sūtras which form the present bulk of Pāṇini's Grammar, only three, or perhaps four, may be ascribed to Kātyāyana, on critical and tenable grounds. A mere supposition, unsupported by any proof, that the Vājasaneyi-Prātisākhyā is older than Pāṇini's work, can certainly not justify the sweeping doubt which is levelled by Professor Müller against the whole work of Pāṇini, and which is not even substantiated—as we might have expected it to have been—by a distinct enumeration of all or any of those Sūtras which he would propose to restore to their rightful owner, Kātyāyana.

Rebuttal of all these theories

FALLACY IN THE ARGUMENT THAT THE PRĀTISĀKHYAS ARE ANTERIOR TO PĀṇINI

In now proceeding to state the reasons which induce me to look upon all Prātisākhyā Sūtras, not only as posterior to Pāṇini's Grammar, but to Pāṇini himself, and separated from him by at least several generations, I must, in the first place, point out the general fallacy which has led to the assumption that these works are anterior to Pāṇini. It consists in applying the standard of the notion of grammar to both categories of works, and having done this, in translating the result obtained, which is less favourable to the Prātisākhyas than to Pāṇini's work, into categories of time—priority and posteriority. An analogous fallacy would be too apparent to require any remark, if it premised conclusions concerning the chronological relation of works of a totally different nature and character. It may assume, however, as it has done, a certain degree of plausibility if it be applied to works of a similar category.

THE PRĀTISĀKHYAS ARE NO GRAMMARS

I must observe therefore, in adverting to Professor Müller's own words, as before quoted, that the term *vyākaraṇa*, grammar, though constantly and emphatically given to Pānini's work, has not been applied by any author within my knowledge to a *Prātisākhyā* work **. This circumstance, however, implies an important fact which must not be overlooked. Tradition, from immemorial times, as every one knows, connects with the *Veda* a class of works which stand in the most intimate relation to it—the *Vedāṅga* works. One of them is the *Vyākaraṇa*. The *Prātisākhyas* do not belong to them. Thus, tradition even in India,—and on this kind of tradition probably the most squeamish critic will permit me to lay some stress,—does not rank amongst the most immediate offsprings of the Vaidik literature, those works which apparently stand in the closest relation to it,—which have no other object than that of treating of the Vaidik texts of the *Samhitās* ;—but it has canonized Pānini's *Vyākaraṇa*, which, on the contrary, would seem to be more concerned with the language of common life than with that of the sacred hymns. Is it probable, let me ask, even at this early stage, that tradition would have taken this course if it had looked upon these *Prātisākhyas* as prior to the work of Pānini ?

VYĀKARAÑA IS A VEDĀṄGA, NOT THE PRĀTI-ĀKHYAS

But this question will receive a more direct answer if we compare the aim and the contents of both these classes of works. *Vyākaraṇa* means "in doing," i.e., analysis, and Pānini's Grammar is intended to be a linguistic analysis: it *in* does words and *in*-does sentences which consist of words; it examines the component parts of a word, and therefore teaches us the properties of base and affix, and all the linguistic phenomena connected with both; it examines the relation, in sentences of one word to another, and likewise unfolds all the linguistic phenomena which are inseparable from the meeting of words.

DIFFERENTIAL BETWEEN THE CHARACTER OF THE VYĀKARAÑA
AND THE PRĀTI-ĀKHYAS

The *Prātisākhyas* have no such aim, and their contents consequently differ materially from those of the *Vyākaraṇa*. Their object is merely the ready-made word, or base, in the condition in which it is fit to enter into a sentence, or into composition with another base, and more especially the ready-made word or base as part of a Vaidik hymn. These works are in no wise concerned in analyzing or explaining the nature of a word or base, they take them, such as they occur in the *Pādā* text, and teach the changes which they undergo when they become part of the spoken sentence, i.e., of the spoken hymn. And

** I may here observe that the full title of Patanjali's Great Commentary is not simply *Mahābhāṣya*, but *vyākaraṇa Mahābhāṣya*. The end for instance, of a chapter in the sixth book of the Great Commentary runs thus: श्री भीमसूभाषणपत्रम् जिविरचिते व्याकरणमदामात्मे पष्टप्यादम्य श्रुतिपादे प्रथमादिकम्

the consequence implied by these latter words entails, moreover, on the Pratiśākhyaś the duty of paying especial attention to all the phenomena which accompany the *spoken* words, hence they deal largely with the facts of pronunciation, accent, and the particular mode of sounding a syllable or word in connection with ritual acts.

POINT OF CONTACT BETWEEN BOTH HOW FAR A COMPARISON
BETWEEN BOTH IS ADMISSIBLE

This brief comparison will already have hinted at the point of contact which exists between Pāṇini and the authors of these Pratiśākhya works. Leaving aside the wider range of the domain of the former, and the narrower field of the Vaidic pursuits of the latter, we may at once infer that both will meet on the ground of phonetic rules, of accentuation, and of the properties of sound, but we shall likewise infer that any other comparison between both would be as irrelevant as if we compared Pāṇini with Suśruti, or the Pratiśākhyaś with the Jyotiṣha.

The aim of both categories of works being entirely different, there is neither a logical nor an historical necessity, nor does there exist a fact or a circumstance which would enable us to conclude, from the absence in these Pratiśākhyaś of certain grammatical matter that their authors were not as much conversant with it as Pāṇini, who treats of it, because it is his object, and therefore his duty, to treat of it.

ANOTHER *A PRIORI* ARGUMENT FOR THE PRECEDENCE
OF PĀṇINI'S WORK

These facts being beyond the reach of doubt, we may again raise the *a priori* question whether it is more probable that the *plan* of Pāṇini's work preceded in time the *plan* of a Pratiśākhya work, or the reverse?

Throughout a great portion of his admirable Introduction to Pāṇini, Patañjali endeavours to impress on the reader the great importance of grammatical study for promoting the objects of religion and holiness. He shows that a knowledge of language is necessary to a proper understanding of the sacred text that no priest is safe in the practice of rites without a thorough comprehension of the grammatical laws which define the nature of sounds and words—in short that nothing less than eternal bliss depends very much on the proper and correct use made of words and is a consequence on the study of Pāṇini.

Here then we have a distinct definition of the relation of Pāṇini to the Vedic texts—a distinct statement of the causes which have produced the *Vyākaraṇa*. And what do they show else than that Pāṇini must have stood in the midst of a living religion, of a creed which understood itself, or at least had still the vigour to try to understand itself?

In Pāṇini there is organism and life. In the Pratiśākhyaś there is mechanism and death. They do not care for the sense of a word. A word *antah* for instance, is to them merely a combination of five

sounds, nothing else; for whether it represent the nominative of *anta*, 'end,' or the adverb *antar*, 'between,' is perfectly indifferent to them. The rule of Kâtyâyana's Prâtiśâkhyâ on this word (II. 26), is, therefore, as dreary as a grammatical rule could ever be imagined to be, and the critical remarks which Professor Weber has attached to this rule merely prove that, on this occasion, also he beats the air.

It does not follow, as I have before observed, that, because linguistic death reigns in these Sûtras, Kâtyâyâna or other other authors must have been as ignorant of grammar as it would seem if these works made any claim to be grammars at all. It merely follows that, in the period in which they were written, there existed a class of priests who had to be drilled into a proper recital of the sacred texts; and it may follow, too, that this set of men had none of the spirit, learning, and intelligence, which Patanjali would wish to find in a man who practises religious rites.

In other words, it seems to me that between Pânini's living grammar and these dead Prâtiśâkhyas, there lies a space of time sufficient to create a want, of which a very insignificant trace is perhaps perceptible in some of Pânini's Vaidik rules, but which must have been irresistible at the period of the Prâtiśâkhyâ works.

In substantiating with material proofs the priority of Pânini's work, I may dispense with giving evidence that Pânini meant, in his eight grammatical books, to concern himself with Vaidik language as well as the language of common life. For I should have simply to quote hundreds of his rules which are entirely devoted to Vaidik texts, and I should have to carry the reader through the whole Introduction of Patanjali, which proves, as I have already mentioned, that one of the chief objects of grammar is the correct apprehension of the hymns. I will merely therefore compare, first, some matter treated by Pânini with some matter treated by the Rik-Prâtiśâkhyâ,—such matter, of course, as admits of a point of contact between both, and therefore of a comparison at all.

THE RIK PRATISÂKHYA IS MORE COMPLETE THAN PÂMINI'S GRAMMAR SO FAR AS BOTH WORKS CAN BE COMPARED AT ALL

The fifth chapter of the latter work treats of the cases in which the consonant *s* becomes *sh*, the same subject is comprised in the latter part of the third chapter of Panini's eighth book, but this book does not contain the smallest number of the cases mentioned in the Rik-Prâtiśâkhyâ. The same work enumerates in the same chapter the words and classes of words in which *n* becomes *ñ*, and very few only of these instances are taught by Pânini in the last chapter of his work. A similar remark applies with still greater force to a comparison of Pânini's rules on the prolongation of vowels with those given by the Rik-Prâtiśâkhyâ in its seventh, eighth, and ninth chapters. In short, there is not a single chapter in this work which, whenever it allows of a comparison between its contents and the contents of analogous chapters of Pânini's Grammar, must not at once be declared to be infinitely more complete than the rules on them delivered by Pânini.

RELATION OF THE VĀJASANEYI PRĀTIŚĀKHYA TO PĀṇINI'S WORK

In addressing myself for a like purpose to the Vājasaneyi-Prātiśākhya, I might seem to do that which is superfluous. For, as I have shown before that Pāṇini was not acquainted with a Vājasaneyi Sambitā, it would require no further proof that he must have preceded a work which is entirely devoted to this collection of hymns. But as such a comparison, being extended also to the Vārttikas, would involve at the same time the question whether the author of the Vārttikas and the author of the Prātiśākhya is the same person or not, and as it would, too, bear on the very appreciation of the character of this Vaidik work, I will enter into it with greater detail than was required for the conclusions which follow from a comparison between the Rik Prātiśākhya and Pāṇini.

PROFESSOR WEBER SCHOOLS KĀTYĀYANA FOR WANT OF PRACTICE
AND SKILL—KĀTYĀYANA APPLIES THIS REPROACH TO PROFESSOR
WEBER BY SHOWING HIM THAT HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND
HIS PRĀTIŚĀKHYA.

It is a remarkable feature in the explanatory gloss which Professor Weber has attached to his edition of the Vājasaneyi Prātiśākhya, that he evinces much pleasure in schooling Kātyāyana for introducing irrelevant matter into his work, now upbraiding him for his remarks on the common dialect, which ought not to have concerned him in a Sūtra of this kind, then finding fault with him for treating of words which do not occur in the Vājasaneyi Sambitā, and which, likewise, ought not to have troubled him. Professor Weber has given us too in the beginning of his preface, a valuable collection of instances which in his opinion prove either that Kātyāyana must have had before him a different version of the White Yajurveda than the one known to us or that he has botched on to his Prātiśākhya a number of rules which, for his purpose, were out of place, or, to sum up in the words of the *Indische Studien*, already referred to that Kātyāyana shows neither skill nor practice in his treatment of the matter edited and commented upon by Professor Weber. But what would the latter think if Kātyāyana applied this very reproach to him? if he told Professor Weber that he did not even understand the character of the Prātiśākhya which he was editing and subjecting to all this learned criticism?

Let me then, take the place of Kātyāyana and maintain for him, that he is not only the very same Kātyāyana who wrote the Vārttikas to Pāṇini, but that his Vājasaneyi Prātiśākhya has the double aim of being a Vaidik treatise as well as of containing *criticisms on Pāṇini*. And let me, therefore, tell Professor Weber that since there is abundant proof of this view in Kātyāyana's Vaidik work all his handsome epithets are put out of court. And this, I hold will also settle the question why we meet with so many Sutras in Kātyāyana which are identical with those of Pāṇini, for we shall presently see that this identity is merely an apparent, one, and, in reality, no identity at all.

KĀTYĀYANA SOMETIMES REPEATS THE WORDS OF PĀNINI MERELY IN ORDER TO MAKE HIS CRITICISMS MORE PROMINENT.

I will take this point up first, and show that Kātyāyana merely repeated the words of Pānini in order to attach his critical notes to them, just as I sometimes literally repeated the words of Professor Weber himself, merely for the purpose of improving on him.

Pānini says (I. 1, 60) *adarsanam lopah* "This is not distinct enough," I hear Kātyāyana say; hence he writes (I. 141) *varnasyādarśanam lopah*—Pānini gives the definition: (I. 2, 29, 30) *uchchair udāttah* and *nīchair anudāttah* "So far so good," I suppose Kātyāyana to say; "but you give the necessary complement of these two rules in the words (I. 2, 31) 'samākhārah swaītah'; I object to this definition, for the *swarita* would better have been defined thus," *ubhayavān swaritah* (K. I. 108—110).—P. I. 2, 32: *tasyādīta udāttam ardhahrasivam*; but K. I. 126: *tasyādīta udāttam swarārdhīmātram*.—P. VIII. 4, 67, 66: *nodāttaswaritodayam* (with the quotation of a dissent on the part of Gārgya, Kāśyapa, and Gālava); *udāttād adnudāttasya swaritah*. The former rule is approved of by Kātyāyana, who repeats it literally, but the latter he words thus: *udāttāch chānudāttam swaritam* (IV. 140, 134)—P. I. 1, 8: *mukhanāsikavachano 'nunāsikah*; but K. I. 75: *mukhānunāsikākārano 'nunāsikah*.—P. I. 1, 9: *tulyāsyapi ayatnam saśānam* "Would it not be clearer," we hear Kātyāyana say, "to give this definition thus: (K. I. 43) *saṁnāsthānakaranasyaprayatnah savaīnah*"—P. VI. 1, 81: *ekah pūrvaparayok*; but K. IV. 49: *athākam uttarāch eka*.—P. I. 1, 66: *tasmīn iti nirdishtē pūrvasya*. "This rule I adopt," Kātyāyana probably thought, (I. 134) "but for your next rule (I. 1, 67), *tasmād ity uttarasya*, I prefer the clearer wording" (I. 135) *tasmād ity uttarasyādeh*, "and your *shashthī sthāneyogā* (I. 1, 49), evidently a rule which you ought to have put with those two preceding *Paribhāshā* rules which are its complement, instead of separating it from them by seventeen other rules, I place it, therefore, immediately after these" (I. 136).

I will not add more instances of the same kind: they have all been carefully collected by Professor Weber; but he is far from perceiving that the identity between the language of both authors is merely an apparent one, and that the additional words of Kātyāyana, either in the same Sūtra or in one immediately following, but intimately connected with it, are so many criticisms on Pānini, which are even made more prominent by the repetition of a certain amount of Pānini's words. For to assume, even without any of the further proofs which I shall adduce, that Kātyāyana first delivered his clearer and better Sūtras, and that Pānini hobbled after him with his imperfect ones, is not very probable.

FURTHER INSTANCES OF CRITICISMS OF HIS PRĀTISĀKHYA
ON THE GRAMMAR OF PĀNINI THE VALUE OF THE CENSURE
WHICH PROFESSOR WEBER ASSIDUOUSLY PASSES ON KĀTYĀYANA

The following synopsis of rules is an extract from those I have collected for the purpose of determining whether it could be a matter of accident that the Prātiśākhyā Sūtras of Kātyāyana are, to a considerable extent, nothing but Vārtikas to Pānini.

Pānini writes (VIII. 2, 87), "om abhyādāne," which rule proves that in his time *om* was not confined to Vaidik use only; but Kātyāyana writes (I. 18 and 19), "omkāram vedeshu" and "athakāram bhāshyeshu" No doubt if Kātyāyana had not written with a direct glance at Pānini, this latter rule would be out of place, but in this combination its origin becomes intelligible P. says (VIII. 1, 46), "ehi manye prahāse lrit." Though this rule does not treat of the accent of *manye*, it nevertheless would follow from other rules of Pānini, that *manye* is ādyudātta in its combination with *ehi*. This inference is emphatically corrected by K 2, 15 : *manye padapūriam sariatra* Professor Weber, it is true, says that this word *sarvatra*—which embodies the emphasis of the censure of Kātyāyana—is meaningless. Once more, no doubt, Kātyāyana has bungled through "want of practice and skill" How much Pānini's rules VIII. 1, 19 and 72, āmantūtasya cha, and āmantritam pūrvam avidyamānavat, are the torment of commentators, may be seen from many instances in Sāyana's Commentary on the Rigveda K. improves them considerably by II 17 and 18. *padapūriam āmantritam anānārthe'pādādau* and *tenānantarā shashty el apadādau*—K. writes II 22: *bhūtūr ādyudāttam*: this rule again rouses the critical indignation of Professor Weber. "Why," he exclaims, "is this word singled out (by Kātyāyana)? Assuredly, it is not the single *klin* formation in the V. S" My answer is, because Kātyāyana had studied Pānini, and Professor Weber, it is clear, has not; for Pānini says, III 3, 96, that *bhūti* is *antodātta* in the Veda; Kātyāyana therefore singled this word out with the decided intention of stating that in the Vajasaneyi-Samhitā Pānini's rule would be erroneous This instance, I hold, moreover, is one of those which add some weight to the proof I have already given, that Pānini did not know, and therefore preceded, the Vajasaneyi-Samhitā.—K. says, II. 48, *devatātwandwām chānāmantritāni*; and his words are a distinct criticism on P VI 2, 141, *devatādiwandive cha*—In rule VIII. 3, 36, Pānini teaches that *Visarjaniya* may remain such (or, as the Sūtra expresses itself, on account of previous Sūtras, may become *Visarjaniya*), before sibilants, or may become assimilated to the following sibilant But he committed the venial offence of not stating that this latter alternative rests on the authority of Śākatāyana, and the former on that of Śākalya Could Kātyāyana, therefore, forego the opportunity of writing (III. 8) "pratyayasavarnam mudi Śatkatāyanah," and (III. 9), "avikāram Śākalyah sashaseshu"?—In VI 1, 134, Pānini gives a comprehensive rule on the elision of the final *s* in regard to the Vaidik use of the nominative of *tad* "No," says Kātyāyana (III. 14), "in the V. S this elision occurs before vowels only in two instances" *sa oshadhimayoh*—K (III. 22) says *āvir nir ida idāyā vasatir varivah*, and thus criticises the imperfection of P's rule VIII. 3, 54, *idāyā vā*.—In III. 27, *adhvano rajaso rishah sprisas pātau*, he shows the clumsiness of P's rule VIII. 3, 52 *pātau cha bahulam*; in III. 30, *pārāv avasāne*, the imperfection of P's VIII. 3, 51, *panchamyāh parāv adharthe*; in III. 55, *bhāvibhyah sah sham samānapade*, that of P's VIII. 3, 59, *ādeśapratyayayoh*—In the Sūtras III. 56 and 57, Kātyāyana teaches that the intervention of *anusvāra*, *k* and *r* do not prevent *s* from becoming *sh*, if this change would have to take place otherwise. "These rules," says Professor Weber, "have no business here, for Samhitā and

Pada-text agree in this respect, and these rules are quite general grammatical rules," and in support of this argument he quotes Uvata, who also points out the superfluity. The latter consoles us for it, it is true, by the remark that a man should not complain if he found honey though he intended only to fetch fuel, or a fish though his object were to fetch water, or fruits though he went out merely to pluck flowers. But as Professor Weber is not so easily consoled, and not so leniently disposed towards Kātyāyana as Uvata is, I may tell him that these rules are levelled against Pānini's rules VIII. 3, 57 and 58, which omit to include *r*. At II. 55, *dwandwam ḡendrasomapūrvam pūshāyinivāyushu*, Professor Weber discharges a witticism. "None of the compounds" (referred to in the Sūtā), he says, "occur in the V. S. or the Sat. Br. How is that to be explained? Did our Homer nod when he composed this rule? or did he have before him passages of the V. S. which it no longer contains [Professor Weber probably meant to say, 'which was not the V. S. we now possess']? or is the text of our Sūtra corrupt, and have we to read another word for *soma*?" I will try to relieve his anxiety by expressing the belief that this Sūtra and the next, II. 56, are criticisms on Pānini's general rule VI. 2, 141, and on his special rule VI. 2, 142.—The rule of Pānini VIII. 3, 107, *sunah*, is criticised in three Sūtras of Kātyāyana III. 59, 60, 61, *okārāt su*; *och chāpi iktāt*, and *abheś cha*.

COINCIDENCES BETWEEN THE PRĀTISĀKHYA, AND THE VĀRTTIKAS OF KĀTYĀYANA.

The Vārttika 3 to III. 3, 108 says *varṇāt kāśah*; K. I. 37, *kārenā cha*; both are identical in their contents, and complete Pānini's rule III. 3, 108. The same remark applies to the Vārttika 4 to P. III. 3, 108, *rād iphah*, and to K. I. 40, *ra ephena cha*, in reference to the same rule of Pānini.—K. III. 38, *aharpatau repah*, points out an omission in P. VIII. 2, 70. the same criticism is conveyed by the Vārttika 2 to this Sūtra of Pānini, *aharādinām patyādīshu*—K. III. 12, *luṅg mudi jītpare* fills up a blank in P. VIII. 3, 36, *vā sari*, and likewise a Vārttika on this Sūtra to the same effect, *vā śāprakarane kharpare lopah*—P.'s rule VI. 3, 109, *prishodarādīnī yathopadishtam*, is criticised by K. III. 41 and 42, *ukāram dur de* and *nāśe cha*, as well as by a Vārttika to the former rule, which has the same contents: *duro dāsanāśadabhadhyeshūtvam vaktavyam* *uttarapadādēs cha shtutiam*.—A Vārttika to the same rule of P., *shasha*, *utvam datṛidaśasāttarapadādch shtutiam cha*, is identical in contents, with K. III. 46, *shad dāśadantayoh samkhyāvayorthayos cha* both are criticisms on P. VI. 3, 109.—The first Vārttika to III. 2, 49, (improperly marked, like the two others, in the Calcutta edition, as if these Vārttikas did not occur in the *Mahābhāṣya*), *dārāv āhano 'nnantyasya cha tah sanjnāyām*, is similar in contents with K. III. 47, *ta āghād anādambārāt*: both complete P. III. 2, 49, *āśīśi hanah*.—The important omission in P.'s Sūtra VIII. 4, 1, *rashābhyān no nah samānapade*, is, with almost a literal reference to these words, criticised by K.'s III. 83, *risharebhyo nahārō nahāram samānapade*, and by his Vārttika to the former rule, *rashābhyām natra ḡikāragrahanam*.

I need not increase the foregoing quotations by a comparison of the contents of whole chapters of the Vajasaneyi-Pratisakhyā with the analogous contents of whole chapters in Panini. For, though the result would be exactly the same as it has been in the case of our comparison between the *Rik Pratisākhya* and Panini's work, even the isolated Sūtras which I have contrasted in these quotations sufficiently show that Panini could never have laid his Grammar open to such numerous criticisms as he has done, if the work of Kātyāyana had been composed before his own. My synopsis, moreover, shows that many rules of Kātyāyana become utterly inexplicable in his Pratisākhya work unless they be judged in their intimate connection with the Grammar of Pāṇini. And, as it is simply ridiculous to assume that "Homer constantly nodded" in writing an elaborate work, which evidences considerable skill and practice in the art of arranging the matter of which he treats, there is no other conclusion left than that the Pratisākhya of Kātyāyana had the twofold aim which I have indicated above.

HIS PRĀTISĀKHYA WAS WRITTEN BEFORE HIS VĀRTTIKAS.

There might, however, remain a doubt as to whether Kātyayana first wrote his Pratisākhyas or his Vārttikas to Panini. Two reasons induce me to think that his Pratisākhya preceded his Vārttikas. In the first place, because the contrary assumption would lead to the very improbable inference that a scholar like Kātyayana, who has given such abundant proof of his thorough knowledge of Sanskrit grammar, left a considerable number of Panini's rules without those emendations which, as we must now admit, are embodied in his Pratisākhya work. If we made a supposition of this kind we should imply by it that he belongs to that class of authors who present their writings in a hurried and immature state, and upon an after thought, make their apology in an appendix or an additional book. If we assume, on the other hand, that he first wrote his Pratisākhya Sūtras, which neither imposed upon him the task, nor gave him an opportunity, of making a thorough review of Pāṇini, we can understand that they might have seduced him now and then into allowing himself to be carried away by the critical tendency which he afterwards fully developed in his Vārttikas; and we can then, too, understand why these Vārttikas treat merely of those Sūtras of Pāṇini which were not included in his former work.

FURTHER PROOF FOR THE PRIORITY OF THE GRAMMAR OF PANINI TO THE VĀJASANEYI PRATISĀKHYA

The historical argument

My second reason for this view is derived from a comparison between such of his Sūtras and such of his Vārttikas as are closely related to one another. For if we examine the contents and the wording of either, we cannot fail to perceive that some of Kātyayana's Vārttikas show an improvement on some of his Sūtras, and we may infer that they were given on account of this very improvement. Thus the Vārttika to VIII 3, 36, quoted before, contains the word *rā*, which is not in the Sūtras III. 12; the Vārttika *duro*, &c., to VI 3, 109 embraces

more formations than the Sūtras III. 41 and 42; the Vārttikas 1-3 to III. 2, 49 do not contain, it is true, the word *ādambara* alluded to in III. 47—perhaps because it was already contained in this Sūtra—but increase considerably the contents of this rule; the Vārttika 2 to VIII. 2, 70 treats of a whole Gana, while the Sūtra III. 38 merely names its heading word; and so on. Nor could we forego such a comparison on the ground that there is a difference of purpose in the Sūtras which are attached to the Vājasaneyi Samhitā, and in the Vārttikas, which are connected with Pāṇini,—that, consequently, an improvement of the Vārttikas on the Prātisākhyā need not tell on the chronological relation between both. For we have seen that Katyāyanī's Prātisākhyā does not strictly confine itself to the language of his Samhitā or even to that of the Vedas in general. Already the instances given before would suffice to bear out this fact, in the appreciation of which I so entirely differ from Professor Weber's views; and a striking instance of this kind is afforded by Katyāyanī's Sūtra III. 42, quoted before. It treats of a case entirely irrelevant for the Vājasaneyi Samhitā; this case is taken up again and enlarged upon in a Vārttika to VI. 3, 109, and there is no reason why the additions made in this Vārttika might not have been entitled with equal right to a place amongst Katyāyanī's Sūtras, as Sūtra III. 42 itself. Their not standing there shows to my mind that this Vārttika is later than this rule of the Prātisākhyā work.

It will readily be seen that I have arrived at the result of the priority of Panini's work to the Prātisākhyā of Katyāyanī, in entire independence of all the assistance which I might have derived from my previous arguments. I have hitherto abstained from availing myself of their aid, because an inference must gain in strength if it be able to show that two entirely distinct lines of argument necessarily lead to the same goal. Such is the case with the question before us. For if we now appeal, once more, to the important information which Patañjali supplied *viz.*, that the *anubandhas* of former grammarians have no grammatical effect in the work of Pāṇini¹¹ in other words, that if a grammarian uses *anubandhas* employed by Pāṇini in the same manner as he did, his work must have been written after Pāṇini's work,—we need only point to the *pratyhāra* *ting*, in Katyāyanī's Sūtra I. 27, in order to be relieved from any doubt that Pāṇini's grammar is prior to the Sūtra of Katyāyanī. That Katyāyanī added in his Sūtras other technical terms to those of Pāṇini, cannot be a matter of surprise, indeed, it is even less remarkable than it would be under ordinary circumstances if we consider that he made—either as Inventor or as borrowing from older grammarians—such additions to the terminology of Panini, in his very Vārttikas, where one would think there was the least necessity for them,—where, for instance, he might have easily done without such new terms as *sit*, *pit*, *jlt*, *jhit*, *ghu*, in the sense in which he uses them ***

¹¹ Vārttika 1 to Pāṇini I. 1.63 मित्तद्विरोपाणी युषात्पर्यम्; Vārttika 2 यित्पर्य-युषात्पर्य च म्यात्पर्यम्; Vārttika 3 तित्पर्यायद्वस्त्रैय राजात्पर्यम्; Vārttika 4 मित्तात्पर्य च तद्विरोपाणी च म्यात्पर्यम्—In his Vārttika to VII. 1.21 (compare note 114) Katyāyanī uses the term युष in the sense of उपात्पर, as results from the commentary of Patañjali.—

Thus far my literary argument on the chronological relation between Pāṇini and the Prātiśākhya works. The historical proof, that not only the work of Panini, but Pāṇini himself, preceded, by at least two generations, the author of the oldest Prātiśākhya, requires, in the first place, the remark that by the latter designation I mean the Prātiśākhya of the Rīgveda hymns.

Since Professor Weber, in his introduction to his edition of the Vājasaneyi-Prātiśākhya has given proofs that this work as well as the Atharvaveda-Prātiśākhya—and I infer too, that of the Taittirīya Samhitā—are more recent than the Rīk Prātiśākhya, and since these reasons are conclusive to my mind, I need not, by the addition of other proof to that which he has afforded us on this point, weaken the great pleasure I feel, in being able, for once in a way, to coincide with him in his views.

SAUNAKA WAS NOT THE AUTHOR OF THE RĪK PRĀTIŚĀKHYA

It is necessary, however, that I should first touch in a few words on the question of the authorship of this Rīk Prātiśākhya. It is adverted to in the first verse of this work, in a passage which contains all the information we possess on this point. The passage in question runs thus. "After having adored Brāhma, Śaunaka expressed the characteristic feature of the Rīg-veda verses."

Now, as it is not unusual in Sanskrit writings for the author to introduce himself in the commencement of his work by giving his name, and speaking of himself in the third person, this verse alone would not justify us in looking upon the words quoted as necessarily containing a mere report of Śaunaka's having delivered certain rules which another later author brought into the shape of the Rīk-Prātiśākhya as we now find it. But it must be admitted, also, that it does not absolutely compel us to ascribe this work to Śaunaka himself. It leaves us free to interpret its sense according to the conclusions which must be derived from the contents of the work itself.

These contents have already required us to establish the priority of Pāṇini's Grammar to this Prātiśākhya work. If, then, we find that Pāṇini speaks of Śaunaka as of an ancient authority,¹¹¹ while there is no evidence to show that the Śaunaka named in both works is not the same personage, there is from the point of view of my former 'literary' argument, a certainty that Śaunaka was not the author of the Prātiśākhya here named.¹¹² This inference, however, it must be admitted,

Kārikā शौराया etc.—Patanjali शौरायाविति यन्म्यम् । किमिदमयाविति । अनुसारपृष्ठ इति etc.—The same term यू occurs in Patanjali's Kārikā to VI 4 140 (see note 121). . . . यू लोपार्थनियदित्यम् etc., when Kātyayana observes पुराणदेवापात्ररूपं पूर्णपायेश्वरमि-दृष्ट्योप्यने

¹¹¹ IV 2, 103 पुराणमोर्त्तु माहायक्तरेण; 106 शौनकादिम्यरपृष्ठम् Compare also page 113.

¹¹² This is the view too of Lata the commentator on this Prātiśākhya. He says that Śaunaka's name is mentioned for the sake of remembering him. अप्यदृढं रमायार्थम् See Mr. Regnier's edition of the Rīk P. in the Journal Asiatique vol. VII. (1858), p. 153.

is only entitled to be mentioned thus at the beginning of the *historical* argument, in so far as it may *afterwards* strengthen and corroborate it, but not, if it had to be used in order to premise the conclusions which will have to be drawn.

ANOTHER WORD ON THE CRITICAL PRINCIPLES OF PROFESSOR WEBER

Another preliminary remark, also, must be devoted to the sweeping assertion of Professor Weber, already quoted, which is to this effect, that "sameness of names can never prove the identity of the persons" who bear these names. It is true he qualifies this *dictum* by adding after "names," "like Kātyāyana," but, even with this restriction, I cannot convince myself that literary criticism gains in strength by carrying Pyrrhonism beyond the confines of common sense. If great celebrity attaches to a name in certain portions of Sanskrit literature; and if the same name re-occurs in other and *kindred* portions of this same literature, I believe we are not only free, but compelled, to infer that the personage bearing this name in both such places is the same personage, unless there be particular and *good* reasons which would induce us to arrive at a contrary conclusion. I thus hold that a critic has no right to obtrude his doubts upon us until he has given good and substantial reasons for them.

After this expression of dissent from the critical principles of Professor Weber, I may now recall the fact I have mentioned on a previous occasion (p. 60), that there is a grammatical work, in a hundred thousand Ślokas, called *Sangraha*, whose author is *Vyādi* or *Vyāli*. I know of no other grammatical work bearing this name *Sangraha*, nor of any other celebrated grammarian named *Vyādi*. Both names, however, are not unfrequently met with in the grammatical literature. *Vyādi* is quoted several times in the *Rik-Prātisākhya*,²²² and there is no valid reason for doubting that he is there the same person as the author of the *Sangraha*. This same work and its author are sometimes alluded to in the illustrations which the commentators give of the *Sūtras* to Pāṇini or the *Vārtikas* of Kātyāyana,²²³ and both, indeed, as I shall show hereafter, appear to have stood in a close relation to the *Mahābhāshya* of Patanjali. We are, however, only concerned here with one instance with which Patanjali illustrates the second *Varttika* of Pāṇini's rule II. 3, 66.

PATANJALI CALLS VYĀDI, DĀKSHĀYANA

It is thus: "beautiful indeed is Dākshāyana's creation of the *Sangraha*"²²⁴

²²² *Rik* P. III, 14, 17, VI, 12, XIII, 12, 15. See Mr. Regnier's *Index des noms propres* to his edition of the *Rik Prātisākhya*, s.v. *Vyāli*.

²²³ Patanjali's commentary on v. 6 (of the Calcutta edition) to IV. 2, 60 gives the instances सर्ववेद् । सर्वतन्म । सवात्तिक । सत्प्रद्, or the *Kāśikā* to VI. 3, 79 समप्रद् याकरणमधीते.

²²⁴ This instance follows another which says "beautiful indeed is Pāṇini's creation of this *Sūtra*—" *Vārttika* 2 to II. 3, 66 शेषे विभाषा—Patanjali शोभनाश्च

From it we learn, then, in connection with the information we already possess of the proper name of the author of the *Sangraha*, that *Vyādi* and *Dīkshāyana* are one and the same grammatical authority. *Dīkshāyana*, however, is not only a descendant of *Daksha*, but of *Dālshi* also,¹¹⁵ and of the latter, at least in the third generation, while he may possibly have held a far more distant place in the lineage of this personage who is so often named in the ancient literature. For Pānini, who defines the term *yuran* as the son of a grandson or of a more remote degree in the lineage of a family chief,¹¹⁶ gives a role in reference to this term, which the principal commentators illustrate by the name of *Dālshāyana*.¹¹⁷

पाणिनेः सूत्रस्य कृतिः । शेभना खलु पाणिनिना सूत्रस्य कृतिः । शेभना खलु दाचायणस्य संग्रहस्य कृतिः । शेभना खलु दाचायणेन संग्रहस्य कृतिः ।

” Pānini, IV. 1, 95. अत इजः—Katyāyana इजो वृद्धावृद्धाभ्यां फिन्फिनौ विप्रतिपेधेन.—Patanjali इजो वृद्धावृद्धाभ्यां फिन्फिनौ भवति विप्रतिपेधेन। इजोऽवकाश । दाचिः etc—Kāsikā दक्षस्यापत्यं दाचिः:

” Pānini IV. 1, 162: अपत्यं पैत्रप्रभृति गोप्रम्, 163 जीवति तु वर्ये युवा, 164 आतरि च ज्यायसि, 165· वान्यस्मिन्सपिण्डे स्थविरतरे जीवति

” IV 1, 101 यजिनोऽश्वः. This Sūtra has no direct commentary by Patanjali, and I shall therefore first quote the Kāsikā on it यजन्तादिजन्ताचापये फङ्गप्रत्यगे भवति । गार्यायणः । वास्त्यायनः ॥ इन्नताद् । दाचायणः । द्वीपादनसमुद्देयन् (IV 3 10) (IV 2 80) सुतगमादिभ्य इजियतो न भवति ॥ गोप्रप्रहणेन यजिनौ विशेष्येते । तदेताद्युपेवायं प्रत्ययः (comp IV. 1, 94)—But there is no occasion for doubting the genuineness of this Sūtra on account of there being no *Bhashya* to it (compare note 139), for Patanjali refers to it in his comment on the fifth Parīthashā (in the Calcutta ed) to I 1, 72 and has also amongst others, the instance दाचायण, *viz* (ed Ballantyne, p 795), *Paribhashā* प्रत्ययप्रहणं चापद्म्याः । प्रत्ययप्रहणं च अपद्म्याः प्रयोजनम् । यजिनोः फङ्गभवति । गार्यायणः । वास्त्यायनः । परमगार्यायणः परमवास्त्यायनः । दाचायणः । परमदाचायणः etc—That *Dālshayana* is the *yuran*, not the son of *Dakshi* is sufficiently clear from the Kāsikā itself, since it refers to IV 1, 94. For this reason it also gives us an instance of a *yuran* to I 2, 66, besides गार्यायण, and वास्त्यायन (omitted in the Calcutta ed) the word दाचायणः—Patanjali contents himself with the instance गार्यायणः; but it commences its counter-instance to II 4, 58 in this way: अणिनोरिति किम् । दाचेरपयं युवा दाचायणः. We must, consequently, consider it an inaccuracy when the same Kāsikā gives its counter-instance to II 4, 60 in these words प्राचामिति किम् । दाचिः पिता । दाचायणः युवा. The Calcutta edition continues it, and Dr. Boecklingk, of course, reprints it without a single remark. In short, whenever we open his discreditable reprint, we understand perfectly well why he writes in his preface, p xxxviii “The Calcutta edition is very correct, so much so that only on the very rarest occasions have I had an opportunity of preferring the readings of the Manuscripts.”

PANINI IS THE SON OF DAKSHI HE THEREFORE PRECEDED VYADI
BY AT LEAST TWO GENERATIONS

If we now turn to Panini himself, we have it on the authority of Pantanjali that his mother bore the name of *Dal shi* ¹³ And *Dal shi* again, is on the faith of all commentators on the rule of Panini the female family head of the progeny of Daksha standing in the same relationship to Daksha as the male family chief *Dal shi*, she is, in other words the oldest sister (*iriddha*) of the latter personage ¹⁴ Vyādi, therefore, was a near relative of Panini, and Panini must have preceded him by at least two generations

VYADI IS QUOTED IN THE OLDEST PRATISAKHYA. PANINI IS THEREFORE
ANTERIOR TO IT. CONFIRMATION OF PANINI'S PRIORITY TO VYADI
BY THE LAGHULARIBHASHA VRTTI AND PATANJALI

Now since the Rik Pratisākhya quotes Vyādi as we have seen on several occasions and since the Pratisākhya of Kityayana is more recent than this work I must leave it to the reader to determine how many generations must in all probability, have separated Panini from the author of the Rik Pratisākhya on the one hand and from the author of the Vjasineya Pratisākhya and the Vaittilīs on the other.

After this statement which I fear, is entirely fatal to a great many chronological assumptions which I have hitherto been regarded as fully established and to the critical and linguistic results which have been built on these assumptions, it is not necessary—but it will nevertheless be interesting—to see that modern and ancient grammatical authorities contain additional testimony to the conclusion I have here arrived at.

When explaining the uncritical condition of the Pārbhāṣī collection I pointed out that if they were looked upon as an indivisible whole, there could be no doubt that they must be later than Pāṇini —since one of them uses the word *Pāṇiniya*. I pointed out too, that the compilers of these collections Vaidyanātha for instance, must have taken this view of their chronological relation to Pāṇini. Now at the end of the

“¹¹ Háriká to 1 1 20 सर्वे सर्वपदादेशा दावीपुत्रस्य पाणिन् etc

" I ananvi VI 4 148 यस्येति च —I atanjali इवर्णान्तस्येति । किमुदाहरण हे दाक्षा दाचेय । हे दाक्षि इति यदि लोपो न स्यात् etc —Ka yyati इवर्णान्तस्येति । हे दाक्षीति । दाक्षिशब्दादिता मनुष्यजातरिति (MS हे दाक्षनिदिविश००) (VI 1 ०५) दापि वृते तस्य संतुद्दौ इस्ये वृते etc —VI 1 ६० इतो मनुष्यजाते —I asika दाक्षी —VI 1 ०४ गोप्त्राद्यन्य-द्वियाम् —Kās kā अद्वियामिति किम् । दाक्षी I 2 ०८ द्वी पुंवश् (viro द्वी implies in reference to the 1st recelling Sutra वृद्धा द्वी, i.e. the eldest daughter of a grandson or a further descendant considered as the female head of the family) —Kās kā वृद्धो यूनति (I 7 ०८) च सर्वम् । द्वी वृद्धा यूना सह वचन शिष्यते । सामुद्दासद्वेव विरोपो भवति । पुस इवास्या (thus MS ८०० MS 2440 पृष्यास्या) कार्यं भवति । स्यथं पुमर्पद्वयति । गाम्भी च गाम्भायणश गाम्भी । यासी च यास्यायनश यास्यी । दाक्षी च दाक्षायणश दाक्षी (thus MS 2140 MS 623 दाक्षी)

Laghuparibhāshāvritti we read that "some ascribe the composition of all the Paribhāshas to the Muni *Vyādi*"¹¹⁰ They must consequently have considered him as posterior to Pāṇini.

I will at once, however, ascend to the author of the Great Commentary. In illustrating the first Vārttika to Pāṇini's rule VI 2, 36, Patanjali writes down the following compound: *Apisala Pāṇiniya Vyādiya Gautamīyah*¹¹¹ It tells its own tale if names first the disciples of *Āpisali*—of whom we know, through Pāṇini himself, that he preceded him—then those of *Pāṇini*, afterwards those of *Vyādi*, and ultimately those of *Gautama*. There can be no doubt that we have here a sequence of grammarians who wrote one after the other; but, if any doubt still existed, it would be dispelled by the grammatical properties of the compound itself; for a Vārttika to II 2, 34, teaches that—unless there be reason to prevent it—the name of the more important part must come first in a Dwandwa compound, and for a similar reason other Vārttikas teach that, for instance, in forming such a compound of the names of seasons, the name of the earliest season in the year must precede that of a subsequent one, or in compounding the names of castes, they must follow one another in their natural order; or in making a Dwandwa of the names of two brothers, the name of the older has precedence of the name of the younger¹¹² But as none of the grammatical reasons taught by Pāṇini in previous rules would compel the component parts of the compound alleged to assume another order than that which they have, we can only interpret their sequence in the manner I have stated¹¹³

¹¹⁰ *Laghuparibhāshāvritti* इदं भृत्यै हरिष्वन्म् । केचेतु व्यारथानतः (the first Paribhāshā) इत्यादि परिभाषा व्याडिमुनिविरचिता इत्यादु

¹¹¹ Pāṇini VI 2 36 आवार्भेष्वत्तर्वत्त्रानेतावी—Katyayana आवार्भेष्वत्तर्वत्त्रानेतेकस्यापि पूर्वपदव्यासदेह—Patanjali आवार्भेष्वत्तर्वत्त्रानेतेकस्यापि पदप्य पूर्वपदव्यासदेहो भवते । आपिशानपाणियं चार्डीयगौतमीयाः

¹¹² Pāṇini II 2 31 अद्यगच्छत्तरम्—Vārttika 3 (of the Calc. ed.) अभ्यहृतं च—Patanjali अभ्यहृतं रवे निरारीते वक्तव्यम् । मातापितौ श्रद्धामेषे—Vārttika 2 (of the Calc. ed.) श्रद्धुनव्यापासानुरूप्येण समानात्तराणाम्—Patanjali श्रद्धुनव्यापासानुरूप्येण समानात्तराणाम् विनिगतो वक्तव्यः । शिशिरप्रसन्ना—Vārttika 5 (of the Calc. ed.) वर्णनामानुरूप्येण—Patanjali वर्णनां चानुरूप्येण पूर्वनिपातो भवतीति वक्तव्यम् । वाह्य चक्षित्वेद्युद्धा—Vārttika 6 (of the Calc. ed.) भ्रातुष्व ज्यापत्ति—Patanjali भ्रातुष्व ज्यापत्ति पूर्वनिपातो भवतीति वक्तव्यम् । युधिष्ठिरात्मना

¹¹³ Such a case is unlikely for instance if one part of the compound belonged to the words technically called वि । ४ ७-९) for in such a case the वि would have precedence of a base ending in अ (compare II 2 31). On this account the names of the three grammarians व्याडियः, Gārgyāत्रोऽव्यादिः form in the Rik Pṛitiśikṣya, VIII. 12 the dwandwa व्यालिशास्त्रव्यादिः

CHRONOLOGICAL RELATION BETWEEN PĀṇINI AND THE PHITSŪTRAS

PROFESSOR MULLER HOLDS THAT THESE SŪTRAS HAVE PRECEDED
THE GRAMMAR OF PĀṇINI

The descent from the height of the *Pratisakhyas* to the level plain of the *Phitsūtras* would almost seem to require an explanation. Before I give it, however, I will refer to Professor Müller's Ancient Sanskrit Literature, and state its opinion on the relation of these Sūtras to Pāṇini. It is contained in the following words ¹⁴⁴

"As to Śāntanā's *Phitsūtras*, we know with less certainty to what period they belong. A knowledge of them is not pre-supposed by Pāṇini, and the grammatical terms used by Śāntanā are different from those employed by Pāṇini,—a fact from which Professor Boehlitz has ingeniously concluded that Śāntanā must have belonged to the eastern school of grammarians. As, however, these Sūtras treat only of the accent and the accent is used in the Vedic language only, the subject of Śāntanā's work would lead us to suppose that he was anterior to Pāṇini, though it would be unsafe to draw any further conclusion from this."

REFUTATION OF THIS VIEW

Once more I am unable to assent to the arguments of my learned predecessor on this subject. If the knowledge of a work, as he admits, is not pre-supposed by Pāṇini, it would seem to follow that such a work is not anterior but posterior to him, since it is scarcely probable that he could have ignored the information it contains. Nor has Professor Müller given any evidence to show that the contents of the *Phitsūtras* are restricted to the Vaidik language only. On the contrary, the great bulk of the words treated of in these Sūtras belongs with equal right, and, in some respect, with much greater right, to the classical language, in preference to that of the Vaidik hymns or Brahmanas. And as no word can be pronounced without an accent, it is not intelligible why such a treatise should not be of as great importance for the student who recites the *Mahābhārata* as for the priest who reads the *Rigveda* poetry. Pāṇini himself has, indeed, embodied in his rules on accentuation a great number of words no trace of which occurs in the *Samhitās*. But even if the statement made by Professor Müller were unobjectionable, why should it follow that an author who—and because he writes on a Vaidik subject, must, or is even likely to, be anterior to an author who treats of the classical literature? And Pāṇini moreover treated of both.

A DOUBT AS TO THE INGENUITY OF DR. BOEHLITZER

As little as I can avert, on these premises, the conclusions Prof. Müller draws, so little can I join in the compliments he pays to the

¹⁴⁴ Ancient Sanskrit Literature, p. 122

ingenuity of Dr. Boehltingk ^{**} For since Pāṇini himself, as I have shown before, makes use of the terms *prathamā*, *dvitīyā*, *tritīya*, *chaturthī*, etc., and of *anīg*, *aīg* (in the sense of an instrumental in the singular), ^{**} all of which are terms of the eastern grammarians, and, as everyone knows that Pāṇini did not belong to them, I can see no ingenuity in assigning Śantana to this school on the sole ground of his having used terms which differ from those of Pāṇini; especially when these terms have no grammatical influence whatever, like the *anubandhas* of Pāṇini, and are not distinctly defined in the commentary as terms of the eastern grammarians. ^{**}

^{**} As in the case of the Calcutta edition of Pāṇini, and of the Uṇnati Sūtras, the edition of the Phitsūtras also was entrusted by Dr Boehltingk to his compositor, who reprinted the text of these Sūtras from the Calcutta edition of the Siddhānta-kaumudi.—The difficulties offered by these Sūtras are not inconsiderable, and might have yielded good materials for many remarks. Dr Boehltingk's Commentary on them consists of 32 lines, which contain the substance of about 12, nearly all of which are insignificant. Even his very small Index to the Sūtras is imperfect, for it omits the Sūtra यथेति पादान्ते which he mistook for a part of the commentary on IV 15, and the Sūtra उपसर्गाश्चभिवर्ज which also he has reprinted as if it were a portion of the commentary on IV 12, though he himself is doubtful as to its proper position there. He professes, too, to have given an Index of the contents, 'for those who mean to pursue the subject.' But as one of the latter, I had to make a thorough Index of all the technical symbols in the Sutras, and also of a good number of real words which occur in the commentary and text, but which, in accordance with his notion of an Index or through his usual inaccuracy, are omitted in his Index; e.g., अशक II 13, अदिति IV 15, अभि IV 13, अस्त्वा I 2, आनन्द I 4, आर्यवृण्ण IV 11, इष्टका III 10, कृतु II 22, कृफलास II 22, कृतिका I 21, कृतिम II 8 and very many more. Of compounds he has never enabled the reader to find the latter part; and such general terms as उदात्त, स्वरित, अनुदात्त, असूर etc., which are as indispensable for a student as the individual words themselves, are of course, also omitted. And all these remarks are suggested by the edition of a text which comprises no more than 88 Sūtras. It is of course needless for me to add that the trouble of consulting or using a very valuable commentary on these Sūtras the Phitsūtra *ritti*, does not enter into the plan of an editor whose activity in editing grammatical Sanskrit texts only consists in putting the printed Calcutta works into different type.

^{**} See notes 107, 220 and Pāṇini: VII 3, 105

^{**} Dr Boehltingk enumerates the terms which induced him to draw the inference alluded to by Müller, that Śantana belonged to the eastern grammarians, and he adds also the Sutras where they occur, viz. अप II 4, 19 26, नप II 3, फिर I 1, यमन्वद् II 18, शिट II 6, स्फिक्क II 16, हृष II 25. Amongst these स्फिक्क does not occur in the text of the Sūtras of Bhattoji, but is a various reading mentioned by him in his commentary, which reports on this various reading that it is a term of the eastern grammarians. The text of his Sūtras has लृप instead of स्फिक्क. As to the other quotations given by Dr Boehltingk not one tells us that these terms are terms of the eastern grammarians. There was consequently, not a particle of evidence to draw from them that inference which he so positively draws. It is a mere guess the probable correctness of which is corroborated, but by such evidence as never occurred to him.

ANALOGY BETWEEN THE PHITSÛTRAS AND THE PRÂTISÂKHYAS.

The real reasons for this assumption, which I share in, must, in my opinion, be sought for elsewhere; and as they are connected with the question of the chronological relation of the Phitsûtras to Pânini, I will first explain why I speak of them after the Prâtisâkhyâ works.

It is because they stand on the same linguistic ground as the latter writings, and because it was safer to survey this ground in the wider field of the Prâtisâkhyâ literature than in the narrow precincts of the Sûtras of Sântana. This having been done, we need now merely recall the results obtained.

FURTHER ANALOGY BETWEEN THE PHITSÛTRAS AND THE PRÂTISÂKHYAS

We have seen that the Prâtisâkhyâs represent the mechanic treatment of the language, unlike Pânini's method, which is organic and shows the growth and life of the language he spoke. The same is the case in these Phitsûtras. Whereas Pânini endeavours to explain the accent of words by connecting it with the properties of the word,—whereas he seeks for organic laws in the accents of uncompounded or compounded words and, only reluctantly, as it were, abandons this path whenever he is unable to assign a general reason for his rules,—the Phitsûtras, like the Prâtisâkhyâs, deal merely with the ready-made word,^{**} and attach to it those mechanical rules which bewilder and confuse, but must have been well adapted for an intellectual condition fitted for admiring the Prâtisâkhyâ works. They belong, in my opinion, like the Prâtisâkhyâs, not to the flourishing times of Hindu antiquity, but to its decadence.

In the second place, we have seen that on the ground which is common to both, the Prâtisâkhyâs possess a far greater amount of linguistic material than Pânini does; and we had to conclude that Pânini could on no account have ignored the knowledge they conveyed, had they existed before his time. Precisely the same remark applies to the little treatise of Sântana; for, brief as it is, it is richer in many respects than the analogous chapter which Pânini devoted to the same subject, and it would be inconceivable that Pânini should bring forward his rules, so much more incomplete in substance than the Phitsûtras, had they been the precursor of his work.

But, thirdly, we were compelled to admit that, at least, one of the Prâtisâkhyâs, that of Kâtyâyana, was written with the direct intention of completing and criticising Pânini; and I may here observe, that Professor Weber has, with very good reasons, assigned to this grammarian a place within the Eastern school. These features, too, characterise the tract of Sântana.

SÂNTANA BELONGS TO THE EASTERN GRAMMARIANS

Some of his rules are delivered with the evident purpose of criti-

** I bitsûtra, 1.1 पितोऽत उदात् — I bitsûtravitti . . अर्थेष्वप्यत्तुरमत्ययः (comp. Pân. 1.2.45) पित् । एष उदात्यमापाश्चेति (comp. Pân. 1.2.45) — Compare also the end of note 235.

ing Pāṇini, and we meet on one occasion with the remark of the commentator that the *eastern grammarians* point out the difference between a rule of Pāṇini and one of Śāntanā, when the context in which this passage occurs leaves no doubt that they meant a criticism on Pāṇini. And from this remark alone I should conclude that Śāntanā was one of their school, while, from all these reasons combined, I draw the inference that he must have written after Pāṇini.

I will give some proof to substantiate this view, and to show, moreover, that there are grammatical authorities in India who expressly imply the view here taken of the posteriority of these Sūtras to Pāṇini.

BHATTOJIDIKSHITA MAINTAINS THAT THE PHITSŪTRAS ARE POSTERIOR TO THE GRAMMAR OF PĀNINI

According to Pāṇini's rule, VI. 1, 213, a word *ībhya* would have the *udātta* on the first syllable; Bhattojīdikshita, in his comment on the *Phitsūtras*, quotes this rule in order to show that Śāntanā gave his Sūtra I. 5, with a view of stating that Pāṇini's rule would not apply to this word ^{**} He quotes the same rule of Pāṇini for a similar purpose when he comments on I. 18, ^{**} for, according to this rule, *arya* is not *udatta* on the first, but on the last syllable; and also in his comment on IV. 8, for, according to this Sūtra, the words *tilya*, *sikhya* (*martya*), *dhānya* and *lānyā*, are not *udātta* on the first, but *swarrita* on the last syllable ^{**} On the rule I. 7, Bhattojī reports that, in the opinion of certain grammarians, Śāntanā gave it in order to "kill" Pāṇini's rule VI. 2, 2 ^{**} Santanā's rule I. 23, Bhattojī says contravenes Pāṇini's rule VI. 1, 197 ^{**} And it is the same grammarian who, when explaining that *saha*, as a part of Śāntanā's rule IV. 13, is *udātta* on the last syllable, reports: "The eastern grammarians inform us that *saha* in Pāṇini's rule VI. 3, 78, is *udatta* on the first syllable," and he adds the advice. "think on that" ^{**} But I find no

^{**} Pāṇini, VI. 1, 213 यतोऽनाव — Phitsūtra, I. 5 अथूर्वस्य स्त्रीविषयस्य — Bhattojīdikshita विषयप्रहरणं किम् । इभ्या.....यतोऽनाव इत्याद्युदात्त इभ्यशन्दः

^{**} Phitsūtra, I. 18 अर्यस्य स्वाम्याल्या चेत् — Bhattojīdikshita यान्तस्याल्यापूर्वमिति (III. 13) यतोऽनाव इति वाद्युदात्ते प्राप्ते वचनम् (where the word प्राप्ते sufficiently indicates Bhattojī's view of the chronological relation between Śāntanā and Pāṇini: The same rule is given by Kātyayana in his Vārttikā to Pāṇini III. 1, 103)

^{**} Phitsūtra IV. 8 तिल्यशिक्षयकास्मयंधान्यकन्याराजन्यमनुव्याख्यामित्त — Bhattojīdikshita स्वरित स्यात् । तिलाना भवते द्विंश्च तिल्यम् । यतोऽनाव इति प्राप्ते — The Phitsūtravārttikī reads this Sūtra तिल्यशिक्षयमयंकास्मयंधान्यम् ॥

^{**} Phitsūtra I. 7 हित्यसरतिशयान्तानाम् — Bhattojīdikshita संवासर । अव्ययपूर्व पदप्रहृतिस्वरो (comp. Pāṇ. VI. 2. 2) उदात्ताप्यत इत्यादु

^{**} Phitsūtra, I. 23 उपेष्टकनिष्टोर्वद्यसि — Bhattojīdikshita अन्त उदात्त स्यात् । येष्ट भाव घमया .. । इह निच्याद्युदात्त पूर्व (comp. Pāṇ. VI. 1. 197)

^{**} Phitsūtra VI. 14 (not 15) पूर्वादीनामत — Bhattojīdikshita एवमाशीनामिति पाण्डान्तरम् । पूर्व । पूर्वम् । नूनम् । सद । ते पुश्यसूरिमि सह । पष्टस्य तृतीये सहस्य स इति

evidence in the arguments of Dr Boehltingk, as regards the relation of Śāntanu to the eastern grammarians, of his having followed the advice of Bhattojīdīkshita

Nagojibhatta says that "the Phitsūtras when considered in reference to Pāṇini are as if they were made to-day"

Of equal importance with these observations of Bhattojī, is a passage in the notes of Nagojibhatta on Kātyāyana, when the latter accompanies the gloss of Patañjali to Kātyāyana's Vārttikā 6, to Pāṇini VI 1, 158, with his own remarks. For Nagojibhatta, after having observed that a rule of Pāṇini would contain a fault when compared with the standard of the Phitsūtras, pointedly winds up with the following words "But, on the other hand, these Phitsūtras, when considered in reference to Pāṇini, are as if they were made to day"***

It is clear, therefore, that the best Hindu grammarians, too, looked upon these Sūtras not only as not anterior to Pāṇini, but as quite recent, when compared with his work.

(Pāṇ. VI 3 78) प्रकरणे सहशब्द आयु दात्त इति प्राप्तु । तच्चिन्त्यम् — The statement of the Prāñchas mentioned by Bhattojīdīkshita is that of Patañjali in his comment on VI 3 78 v. 1 ॥१॥ आयु दात्तनिपातनं करिष्यते, and Kātyāyata in referring to I Phitsūtra 11 12 observes निपाता आयु दात्ता इति सहशब्द आयु दात्ता. But this reference of Kātyāyata by no means admits of the conclusion that he looked upon Pāṇini's rule as more recent than this Phitsūtra for this rule is not concerned with the accent of सह, it is Patañjali who alludes to it and Kātyāyata comments in the words alleged on Patañjali not on Pāṇini.

** Vārttikā 6 (of the Calcutta ed.) to VI 1 158 प्रकृतिप्रत्ययो स्वरस्य सावकाशवादप्रसिद्धि — Patañjali प्रकृतिप्रत्ययोः स्वरस्य सावकाशत्वादप्रसिद्धि स्यात् । प्रकृतिस्वरस्यादपाशः । यत्रानुदात्तप्रत्ययः । पचति । पठति ॥ प्रत्ययस्वरस्यावकाशः । यत्रानुदात्ता प्रकृति समाप्तम् । सिम त्वम् । इहोभयं प्राप्नोति । कर्तव्यम् । तंत्रिरीयम् । विप्रतिपेधाप्रत्ययस्वरो भविष्यति । नैप विप्रतिपेधप्रसिद्धिवृच्यते (1 4 2) न परं प्रत्ययस्वरः । नैप दोषः । इहवाची प्रत्ययस्वरः । विप्रतिपेधे परं यदिदृशद्वत्तीति — Vārttikā 7 (of the Calcutta ed.) विप्रतिपेधाप्रत्ययस्वर इति चेकाम्यायादित्युचिकारणम् — Patañjali विप्रतिपेधाप्रत्ययस्वर इति चेकाम्यायादयश्चित् कर्तव्याः । पुत्राम्यति । गोपायति । भूतीयतः । नैप दोषः । प्रकृतिस्वरोऽप्रयाप्तो भविष्यति । प्रकृतिस्वरोऽप्रत्ययस्वराभावः । कर्तव्यम् । तंत्रिरीयम् — Kātyāyata on the preceding passage विप्रतिपेधादिति । पूर्वविप्रतिपेधादिलयं । काम्यादय इति । काम्यचिच्छापरयं प्रत्ययायान ताकर्तव्यमेव... ॥ — Nagojibhatta 1: सम त्वमित्यत्र त्वाप्रसममिमेत्यनुचारीति (1 11-12) ॥त्र 11 10 प्रकृतिस्वदाचा । तितिरिः शहुनीनां च लघुरूपमिति (1 11-12) ॥त्र 11 21 मप्यो दात्त... ॥ । इट्टव्योऽपि पात्र पूर्वति तंत्रिरीये अपि दोषः । यदा फिट्टगृहाण्य पाणियं पैषया धारुनिश्चर्द्धाणीति परत्वं योज्यत् — The I Phitsūtra 11 21 referred to by Nagojibhatta, is read differently in Bhattojī's text from that of the Vārttikā. I will join both readings with their commentary, in order to illustrate at the same time the nature of the latter commentary as compared with that of Bhattojī. The latter reads

CHRONOLOGICAL RELATION BETWEEN PĀNINI AND YĀSKA

PROFESSOR MÜLLER HOLDS THAT PĀNINI IS ANTERIOR TO YĀSKA

On Yāska, Professor Müller expresses himself thus.²⁵⁵

"There are some discussions in the beginning of the Nirukta which are of the highest interest with regard to etymology. While in Greece the notions of one of her greatest thinkers, as expressed in the Cratylus, represent the very infancy of etymological science, the Brahmins of India had treated some of the vital problems of etymology with the utmost sobriety. In the Pritisākhya of Kātyāyana we find, besides the philosophical division of speech into nouns, verbs, prepositions, and particles, another division of a purely grammatical nature and expressed in the most strictly technical language 'Verbs with their conjugational terminations; Nouns, derived from verbs by means of Kūtsuffixes; Nouns, derived from nouns by means of taddhita-suffixes, and four kinds of compounds,—these constitute language' [Viśiṣṭa Prit. I 27.]

"In the Nirukta this division is no longer considered sufficient. A new problem has been started, one of the most important problems in the philosophy of language, whether all nouns are derived from verbs? No one would deny that certain nouns, or the majority of nouns, were derived from verbs. The early grammarians of India were fully agreed that *tartri*, a doer, was derived from *tar*, to do; *pāchala*, a cook, from *pach*, to cook. But did the same apply to all words? Sīkātiyāṇi, an ancient grammarian and philosopher, answered the question boldly in the affirmative, and he became the founder of a large school, called the *Nānatālas* (or Etymologists), who made the verbal origin of all words the leading principle of all their researches."²⁵⁶

शकुनीनां च लघुपूर्णम्, and comments पूर्वं लघुदातं स्यात् । कुकृट । तितिरि —The Phit sūtravṛtti reads शकुनीनां च लघुपूर्णाणाम्, and comments लघुपूर्णं येषा शकुनिगाचिनां लघवन्ते द्वयोरेच वहशो गुररदातो भवति । कुकृटाकु । कुकलाम । कपोता ॥ शकुनीनामिति किम् । घराह ॥ लघुपूर्णाणामिति किम् । कुकृट । तितिरि । सन्तरीट.—I may quote 'तितिरि' from Śiyāna's commentary on Pṛgveda I 1, in order to elaborate a misunderstanding of it. With regard to the accent of the word अग्नि he writes गार्यस्य मतेऽग्निशन्दस्याखण्डातिपदिक्याग्नियो ऽत उदात्त द्वयन्तदा च नम्. These words need not mean that Gārgya the predecessor of Pānini deducts from Phitśūtra I 1, the accent of अग्नि, but they may—and I conclude, do—mean 'since, according to the opinion of Gārgya, *agni* is an indivisible base (*i.e.* a base which must not be analysed, compare note 259) its accent is the *u* *lutta* on the last syllable agreeably to Phitśūtra I 1—The last reference therefore would belong to Śiyāna not to Gārgya and the only inference we might be allowed to draw from the words of Śiyāna would be that Gārgya looked upon *agni* as an *Uṇṇādi*-formation (compare p 131) and perhaps—but not necessarily—that already in his time there existed a rule on accentuation similar in import to that of the Phitśūtra alleged. It is not admissible therefore to allow this passage in proof that in Śiyāna's opinion the Phitśūtras were known to Gārgya.

²⁵⁵ Ancient Sanskrit Literature, p 163.²⁵⁶ In the continuation of this passage Professor Müller gives the statement similar to that which is contained above on page 131.

It is sufficiently clear from the preceding words that Professor Müllel considers Yāskā as more recent than Kātyāyana, and since he himself admits (see above p. 148) "that there is nothing in the style of the Prātiśākhya composed by Kātyāyana that could be used as a tenable argument why Kātyāyana, the author of the Prātiśākhya, should not be the same as Kātyāyana, the contemporary and critic of Pāṇini," he must also consider the author of the Nirukta as subsequent to Pāṇini.

Refutation of this view

To refute his view on the relative position of Kātyāyana and Yāskā, we need now merely point to the facts with which we are already familiar. Müllel's reason for Yāskas posteriority to Kātyāyana is founded, as we see, on the assumption that the problem of the derivability or non derivability of all nouns from verbs had not yet been proposed in the time of Kātyāyana. But whence does he know this? The Prātiśākhya of Kātyāyana is no sufficient testimony for establishing this theory. When Kātyāyana there says that nouns are either nouns derived from verbs, or nouns derived from nouns,—either krit or taddhiti derivatives,—he has already said too much in a work of this kind, which has nothing to do with the origin of words, and which alludes to this and other matters, foreign to a Prātiśākhya itself, only because, and *in so far as*, it concerns its *other purpose*, viz., that of criticizing Pāṇini. Whether or not therefore it dealt with a problem such as that of which Müllel is speaking, is merely a matter of chance.

But this problem itself, as we have seen, is epitomized in the term *unnādi*. A grammarian who uses this term shows at the same time that he is cognizant of that division between the old grammarians which Yāskā describes. For whichever side he espouse, he has expressed by the term *unnādi*, that there are krit derivatives which are of an exceptional kind and which are looked upon by some as being, strictly speaking, no derivatives at all. Now, I have quoted several instances which prove that Kātyāyana dealt with the question of *Unnādi* words. Hence he was aware of that problem discussed in the Nirukta; it was not "a new problem" to him; and all the inferences that may or may not be built on its absence in the Vājasaneyi-Prātiśākhya become invalidated at once.

But the knowledge possessed by Pāṇini, of this problem itself would, of course, not prove anything as to his priority or posteriority to Yāskā, who speaks of it. It leaves this question just where we find it, and we must seek for other evidence to settle it.

YĀSKA IS NAMED BY PĀṇINI.

Such, I hold, is afforded by the fact that Pāṇini knows the name of Yāskā, for he teaches the formation of this word and heads a Gaṇa with it.¹¹¹ And as we know at present of but one of real Yāskā in the whole ancient literature, a doubt as to the identity of the author of the

¹¹¹ Pāṇini, 11.4.63 यास्कादिक्ष्यो गोप्ये

Nirukta and the family chief adduced by Pāṇini, would have first to be supported with plausible arguments before it could be assented to.

A second and equally strong reason is, in my belief, afforded by the test I have established above, on the ground of the grammatical *saujanas* which occur in Pāṇini's work.

YĀSKA ON THE PREPOSITIONS.

PĀYINI ON THE PREPOSITIONS.

Amongst these terms there is one especially which allows us to judge of the relative position of Yāska and Pāṇini, viz., the term *upasat̄ga*, prefix or preposition. Pāṇini employs it in many Sūtras; he does not define it; it must consequently have been in use before he wrote. Yāska, however, enters fully into the notion expressed by it, as we may conclude from the following words of his Nirukta:—

²² Nirukta, I. 3 (according to the edition of Professor Roth) न निर्देश उपसर्गा अर्थात्तिराहुरिति शारुदायमो नामाख्यातयोरेत्यु कर्मोपसंयोगयोतका भवत्युचावचाः पदार्था भवत्तीति गार्थस्तथ पृषु पदार्थः प्राहुरिमे तं नामाख्यातयोरर्थविकरणम् । आ इत्यर्वागर्थे प्र परेयेतस्य प्रातिलोम्यमभिमुख्यं प्रतीयेतस्य प्रातिलोम्यमति सु इत्यभिमूजितार्थं निर्दुर्लिपेतयोः प्रातिलोम्यं न्यवेति विनिग्रहार्थीया डिव्येतयोः प्रातिलोम्यं समित्येकीभावं व्यपेयेतस्य प्रातिलोम्यमन्विति सादृश्यापरभावमपीति संसर्गमुपेत्युपजन्त परिति सर्वतोभावमधीस्युपरिभावमैश्वर्यं वैयमुचावचानर्थान्वाहुस्त उपेचित्याः ॥—
Of the commentary of Durga on this passage I subjoin here only those passages which are required for a justification of my translation, and of the instances added to the text of Yāska (MS. E. I. H., 206) । नामा ॥ तुरान्द्रैवधारणार्थः । नामाख्यातयोरेव योर्थः कर्म तत्रैव विशेषं कंचिदुपसंयुज्य द्योतयन्ति । स एष नामाख्यातयोरेवार्थविशेषं उपसर्गसंयोगे सति व्यज्यते ॥...॥ वचा भवत्तीति । वचाः (sic) पदार्था भवत्तीति गार्थः । उच्चाश्च । वचाश्च (sic) । वचावचाः । वदुग्रकारा इत्यर्थः । पृषामुपसर्गपदानामर्थः पदार्था भवन्ति । वियुक्तानामपि नामाख्याताभ्यामिति गार्थः । आचारों मन्यत इति धाक्षयोपः । एवं प्रादीनां नामाख्यात वियोगेऽप्यनेकप्रकारोर्थं इति प्राहुरेव तमिति उपसर्गपदविशेषा: वृथागपि सन्तः कः पुनरसाविन्युच्यते । नामाख्यातयोरर्थविकरणम् ॥...॥ आ इत्यर्वागर्थः । तथाथ । आ पर्वतादिति । अर्वागिति गम्यते ॥...॥ परेयेतस्य प्रातिलोम्यम् । प्रपरावैयेताखुपसर्गावैतस्यवाङ्गार्थस्य प्रातिलोम्यमाहुतः । प्रगतः । परागतः । अभीन्याभिमुख्यमाह । अभिगतः ॥ प्रतीयेतस्यवामेः प्रातिलोम्यमाह । प्रतिगत इति ॥ अति सु इत्येताग्भिमूजितार्थं वर्तते । अतिधनः । सुग्राहण इति ॥ निर्दुर्लिपेतयोः प्रातिलोम्यम् । निर्धनः । दुर्मालादृशं इति ॥ व्यवेति विनिग्रहार्थीयोः । निगृहात्यवृगृहाति ॥ डिव्येत्यमेकं पृषु द्योः प्रातिलोम्यमाह । उद्गृहातीति ॥ समि देकीभावमर्माह । संगृहातीति ॥ व्यपेयेतस्य प्रातिलोम्यमाहुतः । विगृहात्यपगृहातीति ॥ अन्विति सादृश्यापरभावमाह । अनुस्तुर्स्यमम्बेति सादृश्यम् । अनुगच्छतीयरभावम् ॥ अर्पाति संसर्गमाह । सर्पि पोर्पि स्वात् । मुनोर्पि म्यान् ॥ उपेयुपजन्तम् । उपजनमधिष्यम् । उपजायते । परीति सर्वतोभावमाह । परिथापर्यतीति ॥ अर्पातुपरिभावमाह । एष्यं पथा । अधितिष्ठति । अधिपतिरिति । आह । नामाख्यातप्रामन्तु कर्मोपसंयोगयोतका भवत्तीति । अग्र तामः कर्मोपसंयोगयोतका भवत्तीति । एवं न गृह्यन्ते । उपमगाः क्रियापेता इति (Pan. I. 1. 5), प्रसिद्धो इत्युपमर्गाणां क्रियापदेन योगो न नाम्न उपमगां हि क्रियाहस्त्वेनैव नामाख्याम्नद्यतीति.

"Sakatayana says that 'the prepositions when detached (from noun or verb) do not distinctly express a sense,' but Gārgya maintains that 'they illustrate the action which is the sense expressed by a noun or verb (in modifying it), and that their sense is various (even when they are detached from a noun or verb)' Now they express (even in their isolated condition) that sense which inheres in them; it is this sense which modifies the sense of a noun or verb. The preposition *ā* expresses the sense of limit (e.g., up to the mountain), *pi* and *parā* express, the reverse of *ā* (e.g., gone forth or away), *abhi*, the sense of towards (e.g., gone towards—in a friendly sense, *pi*), the reverse of *abhi* (e.g., gone against); *ati* and *su*, excellence (e.g., having much wealth, in excellent Brahmana), *ni* and *dur*, the reverse of these two (e.g., having no wealth, a bad Brahmana), *ni* and *ava*, downwardness (e.g., he takes down), *ud*, the reverse of these two (e.g., he takes up), *sam*, junction (e.g., he takes together); *vi* and *apa*, the reverse of *sam* (e.g., he takes away), *anu*, similarity or being after (e.g., having a similar appearance, he goes after), *api*, co-existence (e.g., let it be a drop of butter, a drop of honey);¹⁶⁰ *upa*, excess (e.g., he is born again), *pari*, surrounding (e.g., he puts round), *adhi*, being above and superiority (e.g., he stands over, a supreme lord). In this manner they express various senses, and these have to be considered."

This passage records, as we see, besides the definition of Yāska, the opinions of Śākatayana and of Gārgya; it is silent on Pāṇini. Yet how much more complete and scientific is his treatment of the prepositions! Durgā, the commentator of Yāska, feels this defect in Yāska, for at the end of his gloss he says "upasargas can only be joined to a verb, not to a noun, it is therefore only through the mediation of the former that they can ascend also to the latter" (*vir*, in so far as nouns are derived from verbal roots)

Pāṇini teaches that the first and general category to which prepositions belong, is that of *upātās* or particles. He then continues, that they are *upasargas* when they are joined to "verbal action" (i.e., to a verb), *gatis*, if the verbal roots to which they are attached become developed into a noun, and that they are *kāmopavachanīyas* if they are detached and govern a noun.¹⁶¹ Of such a distinction there is no trace in the Nirulata, which stops, as we see, at the speculations of Śākatayana and Gārgya, both predecessors of Pāṇini. Nor can the meanings which Yāska assigns to the prepositions, so far as completeness is concerned, be compared to those we meet with in the rules of Pāṇini. *Abhi*, for instance, has with him not only the sense mentioned by Yāska, but that of "towards, by (severally), with regard to, *ati*, that of "excellence and transgression, *apa*, that of "exception, *anu*, that of "in consequence of, connected with, less than, towards, by (severally), with regard to, to the share of," *pi*, the

sense of "towards, by (severally), with regard to, to the share of, instead of, in return of;" *pañi*, the sense of *prati*, except in the two last meanings, and that of an "expletive;" *adhi*, that of "superiority and of an expletive" ***

PĀNINI IS POSTERIOR TO YĀSKA

It seems impossible, therefore, to assume that Yāska could have known the classes of *upasarga* as defined by Pānini, and their meanings as enumerated by him when he wrote the words before quoted. But not knowing the grammar of Pānini, is, in the case of Yāska, tantamount to having preceded it

CHRONOLOGICAL RELATION BETWEEN PĀNINI AND BUDDHA

Though Yāska be older than Pānini, and Pānini older than Kātyāyana, there still remains the mystery as to the era of Panini. No work of the ancient literature, within my knowledge, gives us the means of penetrating it. But as the remotest date of Hindu antiquity, which may be called a real date, is that of Buddha's death, it must be of interest to know whether Panini is likely to have lived before or after this event

SĀKYAMUNI IS NOT MENTIONED BY PĀNINI

Not only is the name of *Sākyamuni*, or Sākyā, never adverted to in the Sūtras of Pānini, *** but there is another fact connected with this name which is still more remarkable

MIRVĀMA

The great schism which divided ancient India into two hostile creeds, centres in the notion which each entertained of the nature of eternal bliss. The Brahmanic Hindus hope that their soul will ultimately become united with the universal spirit, which, in the language of the Upanishads, is the neuter Brahman; and, in that of the sects, the supreme deity, who takes the place of this philosophical and impersonal god. And however indefinite this god Brahman may be, it is nevertheless, to the mind of the Brahmanic Hindu, an *entity*. The final salvation of a Buddhist is entire *non entity*. This difference between the goal of both created that deep and irreconcileable antagonism which allowed of none of the compromise which was possible between all the shades and degrees of the Brahmanic faith, from the most enlightened to the most degenerate. The various expressions for eternal bliss in the Brahmanic creed, like *apavarga*, *moksha*, *mukti*, *mihsreyasa*, all mean either "liberation from this earthly career" or the "absolute good,"

*** Compare I 4, 81-97

*** The formation शास्त्र occurs in three Ganas, as a derivative from शास्त्र with यज्ञ in the Gana to IV 1 105 with यज्ञ to IV 2, 02, but there it becomes doubtful, through the difference in the reading, of the MSS. and as a derivation from शास्त्र with यज्ञ in the Gana to IV 1, 151.

they therefore imply a condition of hope. The absolute end of a Buddhist is without hope; it is *niśvâna* or extinction. This word means literally "blown out;" but there is this difference, if I am not mistaken, between its use in the Brahmanic and in the Buddhistic literature,—that, in the former, it is employed, like other past participles, in any of the three genders, whereas in the latter it occurs only in the neuter gender, and there, too, only in the sense of an abstract noun, in that of extinction, i.e., absolute annihilation of the soul. I have no instance at my command in which *niśvâna*, when used in the classical literature, implies any other sense than the sense "blown out," or a sense immediately connected with it. Thus Patanjali, when illustrating the use of this past participle, gives the instances: "the fire is blown out by the wind, the lamp is blown out by the wind;" and Kātyayata who, on the same occasion, observes that a phrase, "the wind has ceased to blow," would not be expressed by "*niśvâno vâtah*, but by *nirvâto vâtah*," corroborates the instances of Patanjali with one of his own: "blowing out (has been effected) by the wind." But Pānini, who teaches the formation of this participle in rule VIII 2, 50, which has indirectly called forth all these instances, says. "(the past participle of *vâ* with prefix *niś* is) *nirvâna* (if the word means) 'free from wind', (or, 'not blowing, as wind')"¹¹⁶⁴

This is the natural interpretation of Pānini's rules. *Kātyâyana*, it is true, gives a Vârttika which corrects the word *avâte* into *avâtâbhûdhâne* "if it have not the sense of wind (or of blowing); " yet it is very remarkable that Patanjali, in commenting on this Vârttika, does not interpret its words in his usual manner, but merely adds to them the instances I have just named; it is remarkable, too, that he introduces them with the observation: "(this Vârttika is given in order to show) that (nirvâna) is also or is emphatically used in the following instances." Still he has no instance whatever for the sense stated by Pānini, and his word "also" or "emphatically" does not appear to be justified by the criticism of Kātyâyana, which simply corrects the word *avâte* into *avâtâbhûdhâne* without any additional remark.

PĀNINI IS ANTERIOR TO BUDDHA

In short, my opinion on this Vârttika is analogous to that which I have expressed in previous instances. The sense of *niśvâna*, "free from wind (or not blowing)," had become obsolete in the time of Kātyâyana, who merely knew that sense of it which found its ulterior and special application in the *niśvâna* of the Buddhistic faith. But since

¹¹⁶⁴ VIII 2, 50 निर्वाणोऽवाते — *kātyayana अवाताभिधाने* — Patanjali अवाताभिधान

इति वर्त्तव्यम् (these words have been mistaken for the Vârttika itself, in the Calcutta edition)। इहापि यथा स्यात् । निर्वाणोऽग्निर्वातेन । निर्वाणः प्रदीपो वातेनेति—*kātyayana अवाताभिधान* इति । तेन निर्वाणो वात इत्यनेत्र न तु भावे निष्ठायामिति निर्वाणं वातेनेति भावयमिति वात्तिकारस्य दर्शनम् । अन्ये तु वातस्तुके धावर्ये सर्वत्र निषेधमित्यन्ति । निर्वाणो वात । निर्वाणं वातेनेति । निर्वाणः प्रदीपो वातेनेत्र तु वात करणमिति प्रतिपेधाभावः ।

there is no logical link between this latter word and the *utthāna*, "wind still," of Pāṇini; and since it is not probable that he would have passed over in silence that sense of the word which finally became its only sense, I hold that this sense did not yet exist in his time, in other words, that his silence affords a strong probability of his having preceded the origin of the Buddhistic creed.

DATE AND EARLY HISTORY OF THE MAHĀBHĀSHYA

The task I had proposed to myself would now seem to have reached its natural close for the present, yet if, after this brief and imperfect attempt to do justice to one of the most difficult questions of Sanskrit literature, I were now to take leave of Pāṇini, even temporarily, without devoting a special word to Patanjali, I shoul' fail in gratitude to this great teacher, who has supplied us with nearly all the materials for this discussion and its results.

PROFESSOR MULLER HOLDS THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE THE DATE OF THE MAHĀBHĀSHYA, BUT PATANJALI HIMSELF STATES WHEN HE DID NOT LIVE AND WHEN HE DID

"At what time," says Professor Muller, ** "the Mahābhāshya was first composed, it is impossible to say. Patanjali, the author of the Great Commentary, is sometimes identified with Pingala; and on this view, as Pingala is called the younger brother, or at least the descendant of Pāṇini, it might be supposed that the original composition of the Mahābhāshya belonged to the third century. But the identity of Pingala and Patanjali is far from probable, and it would be rash to use it as a foundation for other calculations."

This is the only date, the fixing of which is called "impossible," in Muller's Ancient Sanskrit Literature; and as it has hitherto been my fate to differ from this work in all its chronological views, I seem merely to follow a predestined necessity in looking upon the date of Patanjali as the only one which I should venture to determine with anything like certainty.

I do so, because Patanjali, as if foreseeing the conjectural date which some future Pandit would attach to his life, or the doubt that might lift him out of all historical reach, once took the opportunity of stating a period before which we must not imagine him to have lived, while on another occasion he mentions the time when he actually did live.

PATANJALI SPEAKS OF THE MAURYAS AS A PAST DYNASTY

"If a thing," says Pāṇini, "serves for a livelihood, but is not for sale" (it has not the affix *ta*) This rule Patanjali illustrates with the words "Śiva, Skanda, Viśakha," meaning the idols that represent these divinities and at the same time give a living to the men who possess them,

—while they are not for sale. And 'why?' he asks "The *Māni* has wanted gold, and therefore established religious festivities. Good (Pāṇini's rule) may apply to such (idols as *the* / sold) but as to idols which are hawked about (by common people) for the sake of such worship as brings an immediate profit, their names will have the suffix *ka* ***"

Whether or not this interesting bit of history was given by Patanjali ironically, to show that even *āśvines* are the obedient servants of kings and must vanish before the idols which *they* sell because they do not take the money at the same time that the bargain is made—*the* poor people do—I know not. But, at all events he tells us distinctly by these words that he did not live before the first king of the Māṇava dynasty who was Chundi-gupta, and who lived 315 B.C. And I believe, too, if we are to give a natural interpretation to his words that he tells us, on the contrary, that he lived *after* the last king of this dynasty, or in other words later than 180 before Christ. But he has even been good enough to relieve us from a possibility of this doubt when commenting on another rule of Pāṇini or rather on a criticism attached to it by Katyāyana.

**PATANJALI MENTIONS THAT AYODHYA AND THE MADHYAMIKAS
WERE BESIEGED BY THE YAVANA AND THAT THESE EVENTS
TOOK PLACE WHEN HE LIVED**

In Sutra III 2 111, Pāṇini teaches that the imperfect must be used when the speaker relates a past fact belonging to a time which precedes the present day. Katyāyana improves on this rule by observing that it is used too when the fact related is *out of sight notorious* but could be seen by the person who uses the verb. And Patanjali again appends to this *Vāttikī* the following instances and remark.

The Yavana besieged (imperfect) *Ayodhyā*, the Yavana besieged (imperfect) the *Madhyamikas*. Why does Katyāyana say, 'out of sight'? (because in such an instance as) 'the sun rose' (the verb must be in the *perfect*) Why *notorious*? (because in such an instance as) *Devadatta* made a mat (the verb must be in the *preterit*) Why does he say 'but

१००९ नीविरप्य चारण्ये — Patanjali अपर्य इत्युच्यते तप्रेद न सिद्धति । शिव स्वन्दो विशाल इति । कि कारणम् । माँवर्द्धिर्ण्यार्थमिर्द्धा प्रकल्पिता । भवेत् । तासु न स्यात् । यास्येता संप्रतिपूजार्थं । तासु भविष्यति —॥१००९॥ यास्येता इति । या परिशृण्य गृहाशृग्मर्त्ति स्तस्तिवर्णं । यासु विकीर्णते तासु न भवति । शिववाच्चिकीर्णते इति ॥१०१०॥१०११॥ माँवर्द्धिर्ण्य विक्रेतु प्रतिमागिरुप्रत्यक्षर्त्तस्त्वर्णां कलिपता (१०१. १०१ माँवर्द्धिर्ण्य प्रतिमागिरुप्रत्यक्षर्त्तस्त्वर्ण०० sic १०११. १०१० माँवर्द्धिर्ण्य विक्रेतु प्रतिमागिरुप्रत्यक्षर्त्तस्त्वर्ण०० sic) विक्रेतु मिति शर्पोऽत्मामां पण्यात्तात्र प्रत्ययश्वरणप्रमाद इति भाव । तद्य प्रत्ययश्वरणमिटमेवति यद्यनुग्रह्यादाहरण दर्शयति । भवतिद्यादि । यास्येता इति च । संप्रतिपूजार्थं । संप्रतिपू जिमांष्यममाक्षमेव पत्नानिका या(रुमा जीविताप्रदद्यन तदर्थं इत्यर्थंदाह । या परि गृहरेति । यासु गृहे ऐस्यन्ते शिवमासु शिवामेदपुदे भवेत् भाद्रशुद्धयमारेत् प्रत्ययमैया चार । या गिर्येत्वा द्रष्टव्यम्

when the fact could be seen by the person who uses the verb?" (because in such an instance as) 'According to a legend Vāsudeva killed Kansa' (the verb must likewise be in the preterit) ^{**}

Hence he plainly informs us, and this is acknowledged also by Nāgojibhatta, that he lived at the time—though he was not on the spot—when "the Yavana besieged Ayodhyā," and at the time when "the Yavana besieged the Mādhyanīkas." For the very contrast which he marks between these and the other instances proves that he intended practically to impress his contemporaries with a proper use of the imperfect tense.

PROFESSOR MULLER HOLDS THAT BUDDHA'S DEATH TOOK PLACE 477 B.C.

Now, the *Mādhyamikas* are the well known Buddhistic sect which was founded by Nāgārjuna ^{**}. But here, it would seem, that at this early stage we are already at a chronological stand still. For the Northern Buddhists say that Nagarjuna lived 400, and the Southern Buddhists that he lived 500, years after Buddha's death. And again, while we believed that the researches of that admirable work of Professor Lassen had finally settled this latter date, and "for a last time,"—while we believed, in other words that it was 543 before Christ, Professor Müller seizes and shakes it once more and makes Buddha die 477 before Christ. Were I to agree with the opinion which he has elsewhere expressed, ^{**} that 'in the history of Indian literature, dates are mostly so precarious that a confirmation, even within a century or two, is not to be despised,' I should be out of all my difficulties. For

* III 2 111 अनन्यतने लङ—Kātyāyana परोचे च लोकविज्ञाते प्रयोकुर्दैर्शनविषये—Patanjali परोचे च लोकविज्ञाते प्रयोकुर्दैर्शनविषये लङ वक्त्व्य । अर्थात् वन साके सम् । अर्थात् वने मात्प्रमिकान् ॥ परोच इति किमर्थम् । उद्गादादित्य । लोकविज्ञात इति किमर्थम् । चकार कट देवदत्त ॥ प्रयोकुर्दैर्शनविषय इति किमर्थम् । जवान कस किल वासुदेव—Kātyāyana परीरे चेति । अननुभूतत्वात्परोक्षोऽपि प्रत्यक्षयोग्यतामात्रयेण दर्शनविषय इति विरोधाभाव् ।—Nāgojibhatta on these instances of Patanjali भाष्ये ज्यानेति किम् । स वधो हि नेदानीन्तनप्रयोकुर्दैर्शनयोग्योऽपीत्यव । अर्णदियुदाहरणे तु तुल्यकाल प्रव(ते)त(इ)ति वोच्यम्—That these instances concern the moment at which Patanjali wrote them is therefore certain beyond all doubt. But we obtain at the same time an insight into the critical condition of the later commentaries on Panini when we find for instance, that the Kāsikā copies these instances but without saying that they belong to Patanjali. The same is the case in the present edition of Pāṇini. On account of the importance of this passage of the Mābhāshya I will remind the reader that it is contained in the MS. E.I.H. no. 330 the only one I could consult. The two MSS. of the Kāsikā in the library of the E.I.H. have instead of मात्प्रमिकान्, a word मात्प्रमिकाम्, but since the latter is not only meaningless but grammatically wrong there can be no doubt that the reading of the MS. 330 is the only correct one.

** See Burnouf's Introduction à l'histoire du Buddhisme Indien vol. I p. 359 Lassen's Indische Alterthümer Ind. vol. II p. 1163 and the quotations there.

† Ancient Sanskrit Literature, p. 243.

since the difference stated as regards the life of Nâgârjuna would not amount to more than 166 years, it would fall within the allotted space. But I am not so easily satisfied. Dates in Sanskrit literature, as anywhere else, are either no dates at all—and then they are not so much as precursors—or they are dates, and then we must look closely at them.

The doubts which Prof. Muller has expressed in reference to the assumed date of Buddha's death, i.e., 543 B.C., are by no means mere vague and personal doubts. On the contrary, they are embodied in an elaborate discussion which not only proves a conscientious research, but is extremely valuable on account of the opportunity it gives of surveying the real difficulties of the question, and of forming one's own opinion, with greater safety and ease and, whether dissenting from him or not, one is happy to deal with his arguments.

OBJECTIONS TO HIS ARGUMENTS

My objection to them may be summed up in the commencing and the closing words of his own investigation.

'It has been usual,' he says in his *Ancient Sanskrit Literature* (p. 264), 'to prefer the chronology of Ceylon which places Buddha's death in 543 B.C. But the principal argument in favour of this date is extremely weak. It is said that the fact of the Ceylonese era being used as an era for practical purposes speaks in favour of its correctness. This may be true with regard to the times after the reign of Asoka. In historical times any era however fabulous its beginning will be practically useful, but no conclusion can be drawn from this its later use, as to the correctness of its beginning. As a conventional era that of Ceylon may be retained, but until new evidence can be brought forward to substantiate the authenticity of the early history of Buddhism, as told by the Ceylonese priests, it would be rash to use the dates of the Southern Buddhists as a corrective standard for those of the Northern Buddhists or of the Brahmins.'

And towards the close of his inquiry, he expresses himself thus (p. 298): 'At the time of Asoka's inauguration 218 years had elapsed since the conventional date of the death of Buddha. Hence if we translate the language of Buddhist chronology into that of Greek chronology, Buddha was really supposed to have died 477 B.C. and not 543 B.C. Again at the time of Chandragupta's accession 162 years were believed to have elapsed since the conventional date of Buddha's death. Hence Buddha was supposed to have died $515 + 162 = 477$ B.C.'

In quoting these two passages, I show at once that Professor Muller attaches no faith to the tradition which concerns the date of Buddha's death, but that he attaches faith to that which places Asoka 218 and Chandragupta 162 years after that event. But if tradition is to be believed in one portion of the history connected with the rise and progress of the Buddhist faith why not in another and in all? The arguments which are good for the one case will equally apply to the other and if tradition be wrong in fixing Buddha's death at 543 B.C. we must also reject it when giving the dates 162 and 218 and the sum total will then leave no quantities out of which it can be produced! And this

objection would seem to derive additional force from the very words of Professor Muller just quoted; for he says himself that the argument in favour of the date 543 B.C., so far as it is founded on the practical use made of this date, "may be true with regard to the times after the reign of Asoka". But 218 after Buddha's death, is the date of Asoka himself, and 162 that of Chandragupta, who preceded that king. Both, consequently, would, in Professor Muller's opinion, deserve the same amount of belief as the date of Buddha's death itself.

PROFESSOR LASSEN HOLDS THAT BUDDHA'S DEATH TOOK PLACE 543 B.C.

The grounds on which Professor Muller differs from Professor Lassen have been fully discussed by him, as already observed; but as the essentials of this discussion lie in a nutshell, they admit of being here stated in reference to the question which actually concerns us.

Both scholars assume—and so long as Greek chronology deserves any credit at all, they do so, I hold, without the possibility of a contradiction—that Chandragupta, who is Sandrocotus, reigned 315 B.C. Buddhist tradition, however, says that he lived 162 years after Buddha's death, which means that if this event took place 543 B.C., he reigned 381 B.C. But since 315 must be right, and 381 must be wrong, either Buddha's death occurred 477 B.C., or Chandragupta lived 66 years later than Hindu tradition allows him to live, *i.e.*, 228 years after 543 B.C. Lassen decides in favour of the latter alternative, no doubt, by saying to himself that since there is an error of 66 years, it was more likely committed by tradition in remembering the duration of the reign of kings who preceded Chandragupta, than in recording an event that was engrossing the national mind, and much more important to the national feeling and interest than an exact chronicle of by-gone, and some of them *insignificant*, kings. Muller prefers the precise tradition of 162 years, and therefore arrives at 477 B.C. as the date of Buddha's death.

Let us return, after this statement to the events which Patanjali tells us occurred in his time, and confront them with the opinions of the two scholars named.

If Nagarjuna lived 400 years after Buddha's death his date, according to Professor Lassen's conclusions, would be 143,—or, if he lived 500 years after this event, 43 years B.C. Again, his date, according to Professor Muller's conclusions, would be 77 B.C., or 23 after Christ. But I must mention, too, that Professor Lassen, on the ground occupied by him, supposes a further mistake of 66 years in the tradition which places Nagarjuna 500 years after Buddha's death, and that he thus also advocates the date of the founder of the Mādhyamikas as 23 years after Christ.¹¹⁰ Now since the sect which was founded by Nagarjuna existed not only simultaneously with, but after, him, that event which was contemporaneous with Patanjali and the Mādhyamikas, "the siege of Ayodhyā by the Yatana" must have occurred within or below the circle of these dates. The latter alternative, however, is again checked by the date of Abhimanyu, who reigned about 60 years after Christ, for we know from the chronicle of Kashmir that he introduced into his country the Commentary of Patanjali, which must consequently have been in existence during his reign.

In other words, the extreme points within which this historical event must have fallen, are the years 143 before, and 60 after Christ, and as in the time of Abhimanyu, the Great Commentary had already suffered much, according to the report of *Rijatarangini*, it is necessary to limit even the latter date by, at least, several years.

Yet the word "Yavana" carries with it another corrective of this uncertainty. According to the researches of Professor Lassen it is impossible to doubt that *within this period*, viz., between 143 before and 60 after Christ, this word Yavana can only apply to the Graeco-Indian kings, nine of whom reigned from 160 to 85 B.C.²⁷¹ And if we examine the exploits of these kings, we find that there is but one of whom it can be assumed that he in his conquests of Indian territory, came as far as Ayodhyā. It is Menandros, of whom so early a writer as Strabo reports that he extended his conquests as far as the Jumna river, and of whom one coin has actually been found at Mathurā. He reigned, according to Lassen's researches, more than twenty years, from about 144 B.C.²⁷²

THE EVENTS ALLUDED TO BY PATANJALI MUST HAVE FALLEN WITHIN
THE YEARS 140 AND 120 B.C., AND THIS MUST BE THEREFORE
THE DATE OF THE MAHĀBHĀSHYA

If then this inference be correct, Patanjali must have written his commentary on the *Vārttika* to Pāṇini III 2, 111, between 140 and 120 B.C., and this is the only date in the ancient literature of India which, in my belief, rests on more than mere hypothesis.

PROFESSOR LASSEN'S VIEW IS THUS CONFIRMED BY THE MAHĀBHĀSHYA

But it has also the merit of giving that "new evidence" which Professor Muller requires for a corroboration of the chronology of Ceylon. For none of the fluctuating dates I have mentioned will allow us to look upon Menandros and the Mihiravamilas as contemporaries, except the date 143, which was the extreme limit of the date of Nāgārjuna's life. And since, on the basis of tradition, this date again becomes impossible,—unless we claim amongst those alleged, 543 for the time of Buddha's death, and 400 years for the succession of Nāgārjuna,—Patanjali's Great Commentary becomes invaluable also in this respect, and more especially to those who are concerned in Buddhist chronology.

THE NAME OF PATANJALI'S MOTHER IS GONIKA, HIS BIRTHPLACE
IS GOVARDA

Of the lineage of Patanjali all the knowledge I possess is that the name of his mother was *Gonikā*.²⁷³ It occurs in the last words

²⁷¹ *Ibid.* vol II p 322

²⁷² *Ibid.* vol II p 328.

²⁷³ Patanjali after quoting the *Kārikās* to I 4, 51 gives his own opinion, and concludes with these words (MS. E. I. II. No. 171) अप्यपा गोपिकाप्यः —Nāgojī-*bhatta* गोपिकापुत्रो भाष्यकार दृष्ट्यादः (thus MS. E. I. II. 349 the MS. 1203 गोपिकाप्यः)

of Patanjali on a Kārikā to Pāṇini. Of more importance, however, is the information he gives us of his having resided temporarily in *Kashmir*,¹¹⁴ for this circumstance throws some light on the interest which certain kings of this country took in the preservation of the Great Commentary.

HE BELOWS TO THE EAST OF INDIA AND TO THE EASTERN GRAMMATIANS

His birthplace must have been situated in the East of India, for he calls himself *Gonardiya*,¹¹⁵ and this word is given by the Kārikā in order to exemplify names of places in the East. Patanjali's birthplace had therefore the name of *Gonarda*.¹¹⁶ But that he is one of the eastern grammarians is borne out also by other evidence. Kātyāyata calls him on several occasions *Achāryaśāya*.¹¹⁷ If we interpreted this word

¹¹⁴ III 2 114 विभाषा साकाङ्क्षे —Patanjali किमुदाहरणम् । अभिजानासि देवदत्त कश्मीरेषु वस्याम् । तत्र सत्कृत्यास्याम् । अभिजानासि देवदत्त कश्मीरानगच्छाम् । तत्र सत्कृत्यास्याम् । भवेत् । पुर्वं परमाकाङ्क्षीति साकाङ्क्षे स्यात् । परं तु कथं साकाङ्क्षम् । परमपि साकाङ्क्षम् । अस्त्वयमित्याकाङ्क्षेयते साकाङ्क्षम् —Katyāyana, विभाषा साकाङ्क्षे सर्वं —
Patanjali विभाषा साकाङ्क्षे सर्वंतेति वत्तच्यम् । क्व सर्वं । यदि चायदि च ॥ यदि तावत् । अभिजानासि देवदत्त यत्कश्मीरानामिष्याम् । यत्कश्मीरानगच्छाम् । यत्त्रौदानं भोक्ष्यामहे । यत्त्रौदानमभुज्जमहि ॥ अयदि । अभिजानासि देवदत्त कश्मीरानमिष्याम् । कश्मीरानगच्छाम् । तत्रौदानं भोक्ष्यामहे । तत्रौदानमभुज्जमहि ॥

¹¹⁵ Patanjali to I 1 21 v 2 (of the Calcutta edition p 412 ed. Ballantyne) गोनर्दीयस्वाह etc —Kātyāyata भाष्यकारस्वाह etc Nāgajibhalla गोनर्दीयपद्म व्याचन्ते । भाष्यकार इति —It is on this authority that the word *Gonardiya* has found a place amongst the epithets of Patanjali in Hemachandra's Glossary

¹¹⁶ The Kārikā to I 1, 75 पृष्ठ प्राची देशे, gives the instances पृष्ठीपचनीय । गोनर्दीय । भोजकटीय । गोनरीय (thus Ms E 1 H 2410, the Ms 829, which is generally more incorrect than the former has the plurals instead of the singulars —या) Professor Lassen (Indische Alterthumskunde vol II p 481) assumes a connection between *Gonardiya* and *Gonarda* the name of a king of *Kashmir* but I believe that my explanation is supported by the whole evidence combined

¹¹⁷ For instance Patanjali to VI 1 108 v 1 (of the Calcutta edition) writes यदि पुनरयमधिकारो विज्ञायेत् etc and Kātyāyata introduces his comment on these words with आचार्यदेशीय आह यदि पुनरिति and so on in a similar manner on other occasions. An instance however which will better bear out my conclusion, is afforded by the combined Vārtikā Kārikā of Kātyāyana (see note 114) and the commentaries to V 2 30. After the words of the Sūtra Patanjali says किमर्यं परिमाण इच्युच्यते । न प्रमाण इति वर्तते । एवं तद्विसिद्धे सति परिमाणप्रहरणं करोति तज्ज्ञा परिमाणाचार्य । अस्यप्रमाणमन्यत्परिमाणमिति, , then follows the first Vārtikā (or first portion of the Kārikā of Kātyāyana) दावतावर्द्धैरोप्याक्षिर्देश पृथगुच्यते, which again

according to Pāṇini's rules V. 3, 67 and 68, it would mean "an unaccomplished teacher," but as there is not the slightest reason for assuming that Kaiyata intended any irony or blame when he applied this epithet to Patañjali, it is necessary to render the word by the teacher "who belongs to the country of the Achārya." Now, since Kaiyata also distinctly contrasts āchārya, as the author of the Vārtikas, with āchārya-dēsiya, the latter epithet can only imply that Patañjali was a countryman of Kātyāyana. Kātyāyana, however, as Professor Weber has shown by very good arguments, is one of the eastern school, Kaiyata, therefore, must have looked upon Patañjali also as belonging to it.

Another proof is afforded by a passage in the comment of Bhatto Jidikshita on the Phitsūtis which I have quoted above ²². For when this grammarian tells us that the eastern grammarians attribute the accent in question of saha to Pāṇini's rule VI 3, 78, we find that it is Patañjali himself who gives us this information and without any intimation of his having obtained it from other authorities.

BHARTRIHARI'S ACCOUNT OF THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE MAHĀBHĀSHYA

I conclude these few remarks on our great teacher with an account which Bhartrihari gives of the early history of the Mahābhāshya. It is of considerable interest, inasmuch as we learn from it that there was a party of grammarians who preferred to it the Sungīhā (of Vyādi, and still more so, as it informs us, that Patañjali's Commentary was founded on this great grammatical work of the relative of Pāṇini. The passage in question occurs at the end of the second chapter of Bhartrihari's Vākyapadīya, and, in reference to the word Bhāshya, which immediately precedes it, makes the following statement ²²:

is followed by the further comment of Patañjali. In reference to this passage Kaiyata expresses himself in this way किमर्थमिति । प्रमाणपरिमाणशब्दयेरेकार्थत्वं मत्वाप्रश्न । न प्रमाण इति वर्तते इति । काक्षा न ज्ञ प्रयोगाद्वर्तते पूर्वेत्यर्थ । अथवानेकार्थत्वात्पातनाना ननुशब्दस्यार्थे नशब्दो वर्तते । आचार्यदेशीय आह । पवं तर्हीति । आचार्य आह डाताविति etc. He therefore contrasts dēcharja who is the author of the Vārtikas डातावर्य, with āchāryyadesiya who is Patañjali.

²² See page 167

²² The text of this passage belongs to the MS. No 954 in the Library of the Home Government for India which in a few days will have ceased to be the Library of the East India House. It bears on its outer leaf the corrupt title वाक्यपदीव्याकरण, but at the end of its three chapters the words इति श्रीभर्तृहरिष्ठिते वाक्यप्रदीपे ... प्रथमसंक्षेप (sic) .. द्वितीय कांडम्; .. तृतीय कांड — I call it Vākyapadīya because the MS in question being very incorrect I cannot give its reading any preference to the reading वाक्यपदीय by which this work is several times quoted in the portion of the Mahābhāshya edited by Dr. Ballantyne. For the identity of both results from a comparison I have made between the passages quoted in this highly valuable edition and the MS before me. It is right however to mention that the second chapter of the work concludes in this MS in the following manner भर्तृहरिष्ठिते

"After Patanjali had obtained the aid of [or had come to] grammarians who had mastered the new sciences more or less [literally: in their full extent and in their abridged form], and after he had acquired the *Sangraha* [of Vyādi], he, the Guru, well versed in the sacred sciences, connected all the original *nyāyas* in the *Mahābhāshya*. But when it was discovered that this Commentary could not be fathomed on account of its depth, and that the minds of those who were not quite accomplished floated, as it were, on the surface, in consequence, of their levity, those grammarians who liked dry reasoning, Vaijī, Saubhava, and Haryaksha, who were partisans of the *Sangraha*, cut in pieces the book of the Rishi [Patanjali]. That grammatical document [or manuscript of the *Mahābhāshya*], which was obtained from the pupils of Patanjali, then remained for some time preserved in one copy only amongst the inhabitants of the Dekhan Chāndī, again, and other grammarians, who went after the original of the *Bhāshya*, obtained this document from Parvata, and converted it into many books [that is to say, took many copies of it], and my Guru, who thoroughly knew the ways of logical discussion and his own *Darsana*, taught me the compendium of this grammatical work." ²⁰⁰

वाक्यप्रदीपे द्वितीयं काण्डम् । समाप्ता वाक्यपरदीपिका, where the reading वाक्यपरदीपिका, when corrected to ^०पिका, admits of a sense, but suggests also the conjecture that it may be a corruption of वाक्यप्रदीपिका. I now transcribe the passage in question literally, in order to show the condition of the MS, and also to enable the reader to supply better conjectures than I may have made, but some conjectures I have been compelled to make in order to impart a meaning to a few very desperate lines. These conjectures are added in [] 'After the word पूर्केरेष्य निर्देशो भाव्य पूर्व प्रदर्शितं which are connected with the subject treated of in the second chapter *Bhartṛihari* continues

प्रायेण संक्षेपतुचीनन्यविद्यापरिग्रहान् [प्रायेण संक्षेपतश्च नन्यविद्यापरिग्रहान्] । संग्राम्य वैयाकरणान् संप्राप्ते मुमापागते [संप्राप्त्य वैयकरणान्संप्र हे समुपागते] । कृते य पा पातंजलिना गुरुणा तीर्थदर्शिना [कृतेऽय पतंजलिना००] । सर्वेषां न्यायवीजानां महाभाव्ये निर्वर्धने [निवन्धने] । अलव्यगाये गामार्थोदुत्तान इव सौषधात् [अलव्यगाये गाम्भीर्यदुत्तान इव सौषधात्] । तस्मिन्वक्तु द्वुदीना नैगायास्थितनिश्चय [..नैवायस्य] । वैजिसौभवहर्वर्चे [हैं] शुक्तकर्णनुसारिभि । आर्ये निलाविते प्रये [प्रन्थे] संग्रहप्रतिक्रचुरे [कै] । य पातंजलिशिष्येभ्यो अर्थो व्याकरणगम् [य पतञ्जलिशिष्येभ्यो इभ्यष्टो] । कालेन दात्तिणायेषु ग्रंथमात्रे [प्रन्थ] व्याप्तिः । परंतादागमं लक्ष्या भाव्यवीजानुसारिभि । स नीतो बहुशास्त्रच चंद्राचार्यदिभि [चन्द्रा॑] पुन । न्यायप्रस्थानमार्गस्तानभ्यम् ए [स्वं] च दर्शनम् । प्रणीतो गुरुणासाक्षमयमागमसंप्रद [प्रणीतो गुरुणासाक्षमय] The subsequent words which conclude the second chapter, concern the subject matter of the work not the history of the *Mahābhāshya*

In interesting part, from the *Rājatarangini* blighted by Dr. Boehtlingk!

²⁰⁰ This passage will now aid us also in a correct understanding of the interesting verse from the *Rājatarangini* which has been quoted but blighted by Dr. Boehtlingk in the version he gives of it (vol II p. xx and xxi). This verse reads in the Colecutts edition of the latter work (I. 176) चन्द्राचार्यदिभिर्नव्याद्वरं तम्भासदागमम् । प्रयतिनं महाभाव्यं स्वं च व्याकरणं कृतम् । Mr. Trotter in his edition substitutes

BEARING OF THE FOREGOING INVESTIGATION ON THE STUDY
OF ANCIENT SANSKRIT LITERATURE

A perusal of the foregoing pages will probably have raised the question in the reader's mind, why I have attached an investigation of the place which Pânum holds in Sanskrit literature to the text of the present ritual work?

I will answer this question without reserve. It is because I hold that an inquiry like this was greatly needed in the present critical position of Sanskrit philology, and that no ancient text, whatever its nature, should remain any longer, — much less should come for a first time, — before the public without pre-supposing in its readers a full knowledge of the literary problems I have here been dealing with. For whether my views meet with approval or not, I have, I believe, at least shown that the mode in which these problems have hitherto been discussed, is neither adequate to the difficulties with which they are beset, nor to their bearings on the scientific treatment of the Sanskrit language itself.

No one, indeed, can be more alive than I am myself to the conviction of how much may be added, in the way of detail, to the facts I have adduced; for, however imperfect my present attempt and my own knowledge may be, I still could have largely increased the foregoing inquiry with materials taken from the Brâhma-, Upanishad-, and the philosophical literature. I have not done more than allude to the contents of Pânum's Grammaî and I have scarcely hinted at the linguistic results which may be derived from a comparison between Kâtyâyana and Patanjali, on the one side and the recent grammatical literature (which is represented by the Kâsikâ, the Siddhânta-kaumudi with its Praudhamanorâmâ, and the commentators on the Dhâtu-pâtha and the artificial poetry), on the other. For my present object was merely to

for the latter words चन्द्रव्याकरणं कृतम्. Both readings are alike good, for they convey the same sense and the correction लक्ष्यादेशं for लक्ष्यादेश, as proposed by Dr Boehtlingk is no doubt also good. But the double mistake he has committed in this single verse consists first in giving to आगम the sense of 'coming' whereas the passage from the *Lakṣyapadîya* proves that it must there have the sense of a written document or manuscript, and secondly, in arbitrarily assigning to the causal of प्रदृश् the sense of 'introducing' in its European figurative sense, which the causal of प्रदृश् never has. The verse in question would therefore not mean, as Dr Boehtlingk translates it: 'After the teacher Chandra and others had received from him (the King Abhimanyu) the order to come there (or to him) they introduced the Mahâbhâshya and composed a grammar of their own' — but 'After Chandra and the other grammarians had received from him (the King Abhimanyu) the order, they established a text of the Mahâbhâshya such as it could be established by means of his MS of this work (literally they established a Mahâbhâshya which possessed his — the King's — grammatical document, or, after they had received from him the order and his MS they established the text of the Mahâbhâshya) and composed their own grammars.' For we know now that Chandra and the other grammarians of King Abhimanyu obtained such an *grâma* or manuscript of the Mahâbhâshya from Parvata, and according to the corresponding verse of the *Râjatarangî*, it becomes probable that this MS came into possession of Abhimanyu.

convey a sense of the inherent difficulties of the questions I have been speaking of, and while tracing the outlines of my own results, to offer so much evidence as was strictly necessary for supporting them with substantial proof.

Before, however, I add some words on the *practical object* I had in view in entering upon this investigation, both justice and fairness require me to avow that the immediate *impulse* which led to the present attempt was due to Max Müller's Ancient Sanskrit Literature. So great is my reluctance to the public discussion of literary questions, if such a discussion requires a considerable amount of controversy, and so averse am I to rousing an edifice of my own, if, in order to do so, I am compelled to damage structures already in existence, that this feeling would in all probability have prevented me now, as it has done hitherto, from giving public expression to my views, had it not been for the importance I attach to Müller's work. This work reached me, as already mentioned, when the first pages of this Preface were completed; and it was the new material it brought to light, and the systematic and finished form by which its author imparted to his theories a high degree of plausibility, which induced me to oppose to it the facts I have here made known and the results I have drawn from them.

And, as everyone has his own way of paying compliments, this avowal is the compliment which I pay to Professor Müller's work. For as I myself care but little for blame, and much less for praise, so long as, I consider that I have fulfilled my duty, I could not but assume that he, too, would much prefer, to unconstructive panegyrics which anyone could inflict on him, such dissent as I have here expressed, as it can only lead either to confirmation of the opinions he has advanced, or, by correcting them, to an attainment of that scientific truth for which both of us are earnestly labouring.^{**}

And now I shall speak my mind as to the necessity I felt for writing these pages in view of the present critical position of Sanskrit philology.

The study of Sanskrit commenced, not with the beginning but with the end of Sanskrit literature. It could not have done otherwise, since it had to discover, as it were, the rudiments of the language itself, and even the most necessary meanings of the most necessary words. We have all been thankful and our gratitude will never suffer through forgetfulness—for the great advantage we have derived from an insight into the Mahābhārata, the Rāmāyaṇa, the Hitopadeśa, the Śakuntalā, through the labours of those great scholars, Sir William Jones, Schlegel, Bopp, and others, who are before the mind's eye of every Sanskritist. But the time of pleasure had to give way to a time of more serious research. The plays and fables are delightful in themselves, but they do not satisfy the great interests of Sanskrit philology. Our attention is now engrossed, and rightly so, by the study of grammar, of philosophy, and above all, of that literature of ancient India, which—very vaguely

^{**} Almost simultaneously with the last proof sheets I received the second edition of Professor Müller's History of Sanskrit Literature. As both editions entirely correspond in their typographical arrangement and I believe, in their contents also the quotations here made from the first edition, will be found on the same pages of the second.

and, in some respects, wrongly, but at all events conveniently —goes by the name of the Vaidik literature. With the commencement of that study we always associate in our minds such great names as those of a Colebrooke, a Wilson, a Burnouf, a Lassen, the courageous and ingenious pioneers who opened the path on which we are now travelling with greater safety and ease.

IMPORTANCE OF THE HINDU COMMENTARIES

But whence was it that they were able to unfold to us the first secrets of ancient Hindu religion of ancient Hindu philosophy and scientific research? It was through the aid of the commentaries, in the first rank of which stands that of Patanjali, in the second the works of those master minds, the most prominent of whom are Śinkara and Mādhaba Sāyaṇa. Without the vast information these commentators have disclosed to us,—without their method of explaining the obscurest texts,—in one word, without their scholarship, we should still stand at the outer doors of Hindu antiquity.

THE GRAMMATICAL ELEMENT IN THESE COMMENTARIES

THE TRADITIONAL ELEMENT IN THEM

But to understand the value of these great commentators and expositors, we must bear in mind the two essentials which have given them the vast influence which they have acquired. The first is the traditional, and the second the grammatical, element that pervades their works.

The whole religious life of ancient India is based on tradition. Śāṇti, or Veda was revealed to the Rishis of the Vaidik hymns. Next to it comes Smṛiti, or tradition, which is based on the revealed texts and which is authoritative only in so far as it is in accordance with them. Hence a commentator like Mādhaba Sāyaṇa, for instance, considered it as incumbent on him to prove that he had not merely mastered the Vaidik texts but the Mīmāṃsā also, one portion of which is devoted to this question of the relation between Śāṇti and Smṛiti works. It is known that he is one of the principal writers on the Mīmāṃsā philosophy. Without tradition, the whole religious development of India would be a shadow without reality, a phantom too vague to be grasped by the mind. Tradition tells us, through the voice of the commentators, who re-echo the voice of their ancestors, how the nation, from immemorial times understood the sacred texts, what inferences they drew from them, what influence they allowed them to exercise on their religious, philosophical ethical—in a word, on their national, development. And this is the real, the practical, and therefore the truly scientific interest they have for us, for all other interest is founded on theories devoid of substance and proof is imaginary and fantastical.

But it would be utterly erroneous to assume that a scholar like Sāyaṇa, or even a copy of him, like Mādhaba, contented him self with being the mouth piece of his predecessors or ancestors. They not only record the sense of the Vaidik texts and the sense

of the words of which these texts consist, but they endeavour to show that the interpretations which they give are *consistent with the grammatical requirements of the language itself*. And this proof, which they give whenever there is the slightest necessity for it—and in the beginning of their exegesis, even when there is no apparent necessity for it, merely in order to impress on the reader the basis on which they stand,—this proof is the great grammatical element in these commentatorial works.

In short, these great Hindu commentators do not merely explain the meanings of words, but they justify them, or endeavour to justify them, on the ground of the grammar of PĀṇINI, the Vārttikas of KĀTYĀYANA, and the Māhabhāshya of PATAÑJALI.

Let us recall, then, the position we have vindicated for Panini and Katyāyana in the ancient literature, and consider how far this ground is solid ground, and how far, and when, we may feel justified in attaching a doubt to the decisions of so great a scholar as Sāyana.

We have seen that within the whole range of Sanskrit literature, so far as it is known to us, only the Samhitās of the Rīg-Sama and Black-Yajurveda, and among individual authors, only the exegete Yaska preceded Pāṇini,—that the whole bulk of the remaining known literature is posterior to his eight grammatical books. We have seen, moreover, that Kātyāyana knew the Vājasaneyi-Samhitā and the Satapatha-brāhmaṇa, and that, in consequence, we may assign to him, without fear of contradiction, a knowledge of the principal other Brahmanis known to us, and probably of the Atharvaveda also.

Such being the case, we must then conclude that Sāyana was right in assenting to Patanjali, who, throughout his Introduction to Pāṇini, shows that Pāṇini's Grammar was written in strict reference to the Vaidik Samhitās, which, as I may now contend, were the three principal Samhitās. He is right, too, in appealing, wherever there is need, to the Vārttikas of Kātyāyana; for the latter endorses the rules of Pāṇini when he does not criticise them, and completes them wherever he thinks that Pāṇini has omitted to notice a fact. And since we have found that the Rīk-Prātiśikhya fulfills the same object as these Vārttikas, viz., that of completing the rules of Pāṇini, and that Kātyāyana's Prātiśikhya, which is later than that attributed to Saunaka preceded his own Vārttikas, we must grant, too, that he was right in availing himself of the assistance of those works, all of which are prior to the Vārttikas of Kātyāyana.

That analogous conclusions apply to the Ishtis of Patanjali and to the Phitśūtras of Śāntana is obvious.

The chronological position of the Grammatical Works is the only critical basis for judging of the correctness of the Commentaries.

But it is from the chronological position in which these works stand to one another that we may feel justified in occasionally criticising the decisions of Sāyana. Without a knowledge of it, or at least without a serious and conscientious attempt at obtaining it, all criticisms on Sāyana lay themselves open to the reproach of mere arbitrariness and superficiality.

For, if the results here maintained be adopted, good and substantial reasons—which, however, would first have to be proved—might allow us to doubt the correctness of a decision of Śāyana: if, for instance, he rejected an interpretation of a word that would follow from a rule of Pāṇini, on the sole ground that Katyāyana did not agree with Pāṇini; or, if he interpreted a word merely on the basis of a Vārttika of Kātyāyana, we might fairly question his decision, if we saw reason to apply to the case a rule of Pāṇini, perhaps not criticised by Kātyāyana. Again, if we had substantial reasons for doing so, we might oppose our views to those of Śāyana when he justified a meaning by the aid of the Phuṣṭras alone, though these Sūtras may be at variance with Pāṇini, for we should say that these Sūtras, “when compared to Pāṇini, are as if they were made to-day.”

In short, the greater the distance becomes between a Veda and the grammarian who appended to it his notes, the more we shall have a plausible ground for looking forward, in preference to him, to that grammarian who stood nearer to the fountain head. Even Pāṇini would cease to be our ultimate refuge, if we found Yāska opposed to him; and Gāṅgya, Śākalja, Śākatajana, or the other predecessors of Pāṇini, would deserve more serious consideration than himself, if we were able to see that they maintained a sense of a Vaidik word which is differently rendered by him.

This is the critical process to which I hold that the commentaries of Śāyana may be subjected, should it be deemed necessary to differ from them.

These remarks apply, of course, only to the Samhitās which preceded Pāṇini; for, as to the literature which was posterior to him, Kātyāyana becomes necessarily our first exegetic authority, and after him comes Patanjali. I need not go further, for I have sufficiently explained the method I advocate, and the exception I take to that dogmatical schooling of these ancient authorities, which, so far from taking the trouble of conscientiously ascertaining their *relative chronological position in the literature* merely exhibits, at every step, its own want of scholarship.

THE PRESENT CRITICAL POSITION OF SANSKRIT PHILOLOGY

THE SANSKRIT WORTERBUCH PUBLISHED BY THE RUSSIAN IMPERIAL ACADEMY

I must now, though reluctantly, take a glance at the manner in which the Vaidik texts, more especially their groundwork—the Samhitās, nay, how the whole Sanskrit literature itself, is dealt with by those who profess to be our teachers and our authorities. And still more reluctantly must I advert to one work especially, which, above all others, has set itself up as our teacher and authority—the great Sanskrit Dictionary published by the Russian Imperial Academy.

The principles on which this work deals with the Vaidik texts is expressed by Professor Roth in his preface to it, in the following

words.²²² "Therefore we do not believe, as H. H. Wilson does,²²³ that Sājana better understood the expressions of the Veda than any European exegete, and that we have nothing to do but repeat what he says; on the contrary, we believe that a conscientious European exegete may understand the Veda much more correctly and better than Sājana. We do not consider it the [our] immediate purpose to obtain that understanding of the Veda which was current in India some centuries ago,²²⁴ but we search for the meaning which the poets themselves gave to their songs and phrases. We consequently hold that the writings of Sājana and of the other commentators must not be an authority to the exegete, but merely one of the means of which he has to avail himself in the accomplishment of his task, which certainly is difficult, and not to be effected at a first attempt, nor by a single individual. On this account we have much regretted that the meritorious edition of the commentary on the Rigveda, by Müller, is not yet more advanced."²²⁵

"We have, therefore, endeavoured to take the road which is prescribed by philology: to elicit the sense of the text by putting together all the passages which are kindred either in regard to their words or their sense, a road which is slow and tedious, and which, indeed, has not been trodden before, either by the commentators or the translators. Our double lot has, therefore, been that of exegetes as well as lexicographers. The purely etymological proceeding, as it must be followed up by those who endeavour to guess the sense of a word, without having before them the ten or twenty other passages in which the same word recurs, cannot possibly lead to a correct result."²²⁶

It would be but common fairness to allow these words of Professor Roth to be followed by the entire preface which the lamented Professor Wilson has prefixed to the second volume of his invaluable translation of the Rigveda. the more so, as his views have been unscrupulously distorted in the statement here quoted, for though his views are supposed to be refuted by this passage, they could not

²²² "Sanskrit Wörterbuch herausgegeben von der Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften bearbeitet von Otto Bochtlingk und Rudolph Roth. Preface, p v

²²³ Note of Professor Roth. *Rig Veda Sanhita. A collection of ancient Hindu hymns etc. Translated from the original Sanskrit. By H. H. Wilson. London 1800* I p 25.

²²⁴ Note of Professor Roth. "Wilson 1 a O II p xxiii. But the page quoted by Professor Roth does not contain one single word in reference to the passage which it apparently intends to bear out."

²²⁵ The first part of the Dictionary of Professor Roth and Dr Bochtlingk was issued in 1802, the first volume which is prefaced by the words quoted, in 1805, the first and second part of the second volume in 1806, the third part of the same volume in 1807. Professor Müller's first volume of the Rigveda appeared in 1849, the second in 1851, the third in 1856.

²²⁶ In reference to this view of Professor Roth of the relation of the Hindu commentators to the Vaidik hymns, Professor Weber says in the "Zeitschrift der Deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft" vol 2 p 275. "Allem was darüber gesagt ist schliessen wir uns auf das Unbedingteste und Entschiedenste an," i.e., "To all that has been said on it [on this relation: in the Preface of the Wörterbuch] we (sic, does Professor Weber speak in his own name or in that of the whole Dictionary-company?) assent in the most unconditional and in the most peremptory manner."

shine brighter, in genuine modesty, in true scholarship, and in thorough common sense, than when placed by the side of this passage, which I will not qualify but analyze. But as I could not easily quote some twenty pages from Professor Wilson's excellent work, and as I should scarcely do justice to the manes of that distinguished man if I did not allow him to give his full answer, I must leave it to the reader to obtain for himself that contrast to which I here advert.

Sūtṛ Dicta and Critical Principles of Professor Roth

If, then, we analyze the ideas and principles presented in the passage just quoted, they come before us to the following effect —

(1) Sayana gives us only that sense of the Veda which was current in India some centuries ago.

(2) Professor Roth is far more able than Sayana and other commentators to give us the correct sense of the Veda.

(3) For, he can put together some ten or twenty passages referring to the same word, whereas Sayana and other commentators could not do this, but had to guess its sense.

(4) He is above confining himself to the purely etymological process, which is that of these commentators.

(5) His object is not to understand the sense of the Veda which was current in India a few centuries back, but to know the meaning which the authors of the hymns themselves gave to their songs and phrases.

(6) Professor Roth is a conscientious European exegete.

Before I give my Vārtikas to these six Sūtras, which define the exegetical position of the Sanskrit Wörterbuch I must observe that I am compelled, by the very nature of this Preface, to leave them in a similar position to that occupied by the Preface of Professor Roth himself. His Dictionary is the test of the assertions he makes. The test of my remarks would be a critical review of his Dictionary. I hereby promise him that my earliest leisure will be devoted to this review, especially as my materials for it are not only collected and ready, but so abundant as to give me a difficulty of choice. But my present answer must, of necessity, deal with his generalities only in general terms.

(1) Sayana or the other commentators give us, he intimates, only that sense of the Veda which was current in India some centuries ago.

A boldest statement I defy any scholar to have met with in any book. Sayana incessantly refers to Yaska. All his explanations show that he stands on the ground of the oldest legends and traditions — of such traditions, moreover, as have no connection whatever with the creed of those sects which represent the degenerated Hindu faith in his time, yet Professor Roth ventures to tell the public at large, authoritatively and *without a particle of evidence*, that these legends and his version of the Rigveda are but some centuries old. I believe, and every learned Hindu will hold with me, that Sayana would have been hooted out of the country where he lived, had he dared to commit the imposition implied in this charge, on King Bukkan, his lord, or on his countrymen. I hope, however, that Professor Roth will free

himself from the reproach expressed by these works by showing on what authority he gives such a piece of information which is either all important for Europe as well as for India or places him in the most ridiculous position that is conceivable.

(2) When an author tells us that he is able to do that which another author cannot do, we are entitled to infer that he is at all events, thoroughly acquainted with all that this author has done. I am well aware,—I may add through the pleasure of personal remembrances,—that Professor Roth passed some time at Paris and some little time in London also when collecting his valuable materials for his edition of *Yaska's Nirukta*. Only in London and at Oxford and in some small measure at Paris also are the materials requisite for studying the *Vaidik* commentators of *Siyana* obtainable in Europe. Does Professor Roth intimate by the statement above quoted, that his stay in these cities enabled him to study and copy, for his lexicographical purposes—then not thought of—all the works of *Siyana* or that he, at Tübingen, is in possession of all those materials the knowledge of which alone could entitle him to claim credit for a statement like that which he has ventured to make? But I need not pause for his reply. He regrets as we have read "that the meritorious edition by Müller of *Siyana's* Commentary was not further advanced when he closed the first volume of his Dictionary. Thus when he began his "exegetical work he was only acquainted with the Commentary of *Siyana* as far as the first *Ashtakā* and when he wrote these lines he may perhaps have known its continuation up to a portion of the third *Ashtakā*—in other words no more than a third of *Siyana's* whole Commentary on the *Rigveda* and yet he ventures to speak of the whole Commentary of *Siyana*, and to say that he can do what *Siyana* was unable to perform? But we almost forget that the words of Professor Roth are by no means restricted to the *Rigveda* Commentary alone, it embraces the commentaries to all the *Samhitās*. And here I am once more compelled to ask—Does he assert that he knew, when he wrote those words *Siyana's* Commentary on the *Samaveda* and the *Taittirīya Samhitā* or even *Siyana's* Commentary on the *Śatapatha Brahmana*? For surely he would not think of calling that *Siyana's* Commentary to this *Brahmana* which has been presented to us extracted and mangled in Professor Weber's edition of the *Śatapatha Brahmana*. And yet he has the courage to pass this sweeping condemnation on all these gigantic labours of the Hindu mind while ignorant of all but the merest fraction of them?

(3) Professor Roth no doubt enjoys a great advantage when he can put together some ten or twenty passages for examining the sense of a word which occurs in them but I beg to submit that there are many instances in which a *Vaidik* word does not occur twenty or ten nor yet five or four times in the *Samhitās*. How does he then muster his ten or twenty passages when nevertheless he rejects the interpretation of *Siyana*? For it would seem that in such a case the guessing of *Siyana* as he calls it stands on as good ground as his own. But the assurance with which he implies that *Siyana* was not capable of mustering ten or twenty passages which are at the command of Professor Roth presupposes indeed in his

readers a degree of imbecile credulity which is, no doubt, a happy condition of mind for those who rejoice in it, and perhaps that best fitted for reading assertions like these, but which may not be quite so universal as he seems to assume. Mādhyava-Sīyāna, one of the profoundest scholars of India, the exegete of all the three Vedas, as he tells us himself,—of the most important Brāhmaṇas and a Kalpa work,—Mādhyava, the renowned Mīmāṃsāst—he, the great grammarian, who wrote the learned commentary on the Sanskrit radicals, who shows at every step that he has Pāṇini and Kātyāyana at his fingers' ends,—Mādhyava, who, on account of his gigantic learning and his deep sense of religion, lives in the legends of India as an incarnation of Sīva, in short, the great Mādhyava, we are told, had not the proficiency of combining in his mind or otherwise those ten or twenty passages of his own *Veda*, which Professor Roth has the powerful advantage of bringing together by means of his little memoranda!

(4) "The purely etymological proceeding," he says, "as it must be followed up by those who endeavour to guess the sense of a word, cannot possibly lead to a correct result."

By these words he compels us to infer, in the first instance, that the meanings which Sīyāna gives to Vaidik words are purely etymological; for when he illustrates his statement in a subsequent passage, by alleging such instances as "power, sacrifice, food, wisdom, to go, to move," it is clear that his sweeping assertion cannot be considered as merely embracing these six words, which, in his opinion, sometimes admit of a modification of sense. Just as he cancels the whole spirit of Sīyāna's commentary, he tells us with the utmost assurance that the whole commentary of Sīyāna is purely etymological. There is, I admit an advantage in boldness; for if you tell a man while gazing on the noon day sun that he is actually in the darkness of midnight, he may probably prefer to doubt the evidence of his senses rather than venture to reject the extraordinary news you bring him. I open at random the three quarto's of Max Müller, I look at every page once, twice, many times. No doubt Professor Roth must be quite correct, for my eyes are blind. But, since I suffer under this sudden disability, I may at least be permitted to quote that very page from Wilson's preface to the second volume of his translation which Professor Roth quotes above, as if it bore out his statement concerning the "some centuries"

"As many instances of this elliptical construction," we read there, "have been given in the notes of both this and the former volume, a few additional instances will here be sufficient —thus (p 301, v 9) we have the 'grandson of the water has ascended above the crooked —,' 'the broid and golden —spread around.' What would the European scholar do here without the Scholiast? He might, perhaps, suspect that the term crooked, curved, or bent, or, as here explained, crooked-going, tortuous, might apply to the clouds; but he would hesitate as to what he should attach the other epithets to, and the original author alone could say with confidence, that he meant 'rivers,' which thenceforward became the traditional and admitted explanation, and is, accordingly, so supplied by the Scholiast."

Thus, has Sīyāna stopped at the etymological sense of "crooked-going," or of "gold-coloured?"

But, in the second instance, though Professor Roth, of course, possesses all the knowledge which these ignorant Hindu commentators were wanting in, he implies by his words, that the meanings he creates in overstepping the purely etymological process, nevertheless rest on it. Since my reply on this point would have to enter into detail, and since I have promised to give *much detail in the review* which will be the commentary on my present remarks, I will merely here state that I know of no work which has come before the public with such unmeasured pretensions of scholarship and critical ingenuity as this *Wörterbuch*, and *which has, at the same time, laid itself open to* such serious reproaches of the *profoundest grammatical ignorance*. And, as an etymological proceeding without a thorough knowledge of grammar is etymological thumblering, I must at least here prepare the reader who takes an interest in such plays, for a performance on the most magnificent scale. O! to speak plain prose, I shall prove to Professor Roth by means of those same authorities which I have so often impressed on the reader's mind, that his Dictionary has created many meanings without the slightest regard to the grammatical properties of the word, and, in consequence, that his *Vaidik exegesis in all these numerous and important instances has just that worth* which a *Veda* revealed by Professor Roth has in comparison with the *Veda* of India.

(5) The object of Professor Roth is "not to obtain that understanding of the *Veda* which was current in India a few centuries back, but to know the meaning which the poets themselves gave to their songs and phrases."

THE REVELATIONS RECEIVED BY PROFESSOR ROTH IN REGARD TO THE RIGVEDA

This is unquestionable most important intelligence. *Sivam* gives us the sense of the *Veda*, such as it was handed down to him—not indeed a few centuries ago, but from generation to generation immemorial—yet within this *Kaliyuga*, I suppose *Nigogibhitta*, again, we have seen,¹¹ tells us that in the various destructions of the world, the *Rishis* received new revelations from the divinity, which did not affect the eternal sense of the *Veda*, but merely the order of its words. But now we learn, for the first time, that Professor Roth has received a revelation at Tübingen, which as yet has neither reached the banks of the Thames nor those of the Ganges. He is going to tell us the sense which the original *Rishis* gave to their songs and phrases, at a period of Hindu antiquity which is as much within scientific reach as the commencement of the world itself. Who will not hail this revelation which dispenses with grammar and all that sort of thing, and who will not believe in it?

THE REVELATIONS RECEIVED BY HIM IN REGARD TO THE SAMA AND YAJUR-VEDA

And yet I have one word more to add in regard to Professor

¹¹ See note 171

Roth's "direct communication with the Hindu divinities." He does not attach any importance, as he tells us, and abundantly proves, to that Veda which is the foundation of the religious development of India; for that Veda is the Veda of Sāyana, and that Veda, too, which alone concerns us uninspired mortals. But even Professor Roth himself professes, in another part of his Preface, the greatest respect for the native commentaries on theological and ritual books. There he emphatically exclaims (p. iv). "Indeed, for one of the two portions of the Vaidik literature, for the works on theology and the rites, we cannot wish for any better guides than these commentators, accurate in every respect, who follow their texts word for word, who are untiring in repeating everywhere that which they have already said whenever there could arise even the appearance of a misunderstanding, and who sometimes seem rather to have written for us foreigners than for their priestly pupils grown up under these ideas and impressions." How far his work has embodied the conviction expressed in these words which could not have been expressed with greater truth, I shall have to examine in my review. But I fear that these eloquent words must have escaped his memory in the midst of all the revelations he received. On the Rigveda we have already exchanged our views; but not yet on the other Vedas. These are avowedly extracted, or "milked," as the Hindus say, from the Rik. That the Śimaveda is entirely taken from it, we have proof,^{***} and that the metrical part of the Yajus likewise rests on a version of it, no one will dispute. But both these Vedas are professedly not poetical anthologies. They are purely and simply ritual Vedas, and therefore belong—not only from a Hindu, but from an European point of view also—to the ritual literature. At the Jyotish-toma, for instance, the priest chants, not the Rig-, but the Sāma-veda hymns, though the verses are apparently the same in both. At the Aswamedha he mutters, not the Rig-, but the Yajur-veda hymns. This means that, whatever may have been the "original sense" of such Rigveda verses, in their Sāma- or Yajur-veda arrangement which, in numerous instances, has brought Rigveda verses of different hymns or books, into a new hymn,—the Śimaveda hymns and the Yajurveda hymns have only a value so far as their immediate object, the sacrifice, is concerned. Hence even the most transcendental and the most inspired critic has nothing to do in these two Vedas with "the sense which the poets themselves gave to their songs and phrases," he has simply to deal with that sense which religion or superstition imparted to these verses, in order to adapt them to the imaginary effects of the sacrifice. As little as it would be our immediate object, when assisting at the horse-sacrifice, to ask what is the etymology of horse? or as little as it would be seasonable to trace the linguistic origin of a cannon-ball when it whistles past our ears, just so little have we to impart "the original sense"—I mean that sense revealed to Professor Roth—to the verses of the Sāma- and Yajur-veda, even when we are "both exegetes and lexicographers." And yet I shall give abundant proof that, even on these two Vedas, Professor Roth has had revelations of a most astounding character.

^{***} See note 75.

(6) "We believe that a conscientious European exegete might understand much more correctly and thoroughly the sense of the Veda than *Siyana*." I should encroach on the judgment of the reader, if I ventured upon any remarks on this latter statement after what I have already said.

THE TREATMENT OF THE SCIENTIFIC AND CLASSICAL LITERATURE
IN THE WORTERBUCH BY DR BOEHTLINGK

In now adverting to the treatment which the scientific and classical literature has received in the Sanskrit Wörterbuch, I need only say that this department is in the hands of Dr Boehthlingk. In saying this, I have said everything. After such an expression of opinion, it will, of course be my duty to show, at the earliest opportunity, that Dr Boehthlingk is incapable of understanding even easy rules of *Pāṇini*, much less those of *Katyayana*, and still less is he capable of making use of them in the understanding of classical texts. The errors in his department of the Dictionary are so numerous and of so peculiar a kind—yet, on the whole, so thoroughly in accordance with the specimens I have adduced from his Commentary on *Pāṇini*, that it will fill every serious Sanskritist with dismay, when he calculates the mischievous influence which they must exercise on the study of Sanskrit philology.

THE WORTERBUCH CANCELS AUTHORITATIVELY AND WITHOUT
GIVING ANY REASON WHATEVER ALL THE BASES IN RI RI LRI ETC

On the present occasion, I must confine myself to these preliminary remarks, or at best content myself with adverting to one other passage in the Preface to the Wörterbuch. It runs thus (p. vii) "In order to facilitate the finding (of the words) for those who will make use of our Dictionary, we have to make the following observation. We have banished completely from the verbal roots the vowels *ri*, *ri*, and *lri*, as well as the diphthongs at their end for *ri* at the end of nominal bases we have substituted *o*."

Thus the Wörterbuch does not give like the Hindu grammarians a radical *kar*, but it gives *kar*, not *klrip*, but *kalp*, not *jri*, but *jar*, not *pitri*, but *pitar*, not *datri* but *datar*, etc. Now, this Dictionary professes to be a Dictionary of the Sanskrit language, not of some imaginary idiom which may be current at Tübingen or St Petersburg. One would therefore have supposed that the public was entitled to expect some reason for these changes,—to know by what scientific considerations the authors of this work were guided when they took upon themselves the responsibility of thus abolishing the radicals and nominal bases taught by *Pāṇini* and subsequent grammarians. But in the fullness of its authority, this work does not condescend to meet any such demand. It simply cancels whole categories of grammatical forms and those of the greatest importance and comprehensiveness. Whether I am right or not in inferring the arguments which were in the minds of

its writers when they presumed thus dictatorially to impose their theories on Sanskrit philology, may be a matter of doubt, but my supposition is that this innovation is founded on researches belonging to comparative philology. It cannot rest on mere Sanskritic ground, since all the forms they have cancelled really occur as thematic forms in the Sanskrit language itself. Thus, to use the same instances: *lī* occurs in *kri-ta*, *līp* in *klīp ta*, *pītī* in *pītri bhis*, *dātī* in *dātri bhis*, and as to *jrī*,—*jrīna* can only follow from *jrī*, not from *jar*. Their reasons, founded on comparative grammar, must then be these: that some bases in *ri* are represented in Latin by *er* and *or*, and in Greek by *ερ*, *ηρ*, and *ορ*, *pītri-*, for instance corresponds with Latin *pater-*, Greek *πατερ-*, *dātī* with *dator-* and *δοτηρ*, etc.

THE OPINION WHICH MUST BE ENTERTAINED OF SUCH A PROCEEDING

Now even supposing that such an argument had any weight at all in a dictionary of the Sanskrit language, the application made of it would be incongruous. For though *pītar-* corresponds with *pater-*, *dātar* does not correspond with *datōr-*, its representative would have had to assume the form *dātār-*. The whole theory, therefore, on the supposition I have made, would practically break down, and the innovation would be inconsistent with itself as well as at variance with comparative results.

But can such an argument be at all admissible? If a Sanskrit Dictionary were concerned, like Professor Bopp's Comparative Grammar, with eliciting from the forms of sister languages the forms of that parental language whence they may be supposed to have derived their origin, it would be defensible to give the forms of that parental language itself. But a Sanskrit Dictionary can have no such aim. Its immediate object is the actual language which it has to deal with. It must take it such as it is, in its very deviations from the germ whence it has sprung. Its function is not to correct the real historical language, but to record its facts; and in doing so, to collect the materials which are to be used as well by the special as by the comparative philologer. And in so far as its direct purpose is concerned, this is all it has to do. Any observations it may choose to attach to the real historical facts may of course be given; but it shows an utter want of judgment, to say nothing else, when it presumes to alter the very forms of the language itself.

I may venture also to add a few other observations on the forms thus cancelled in this "conscientious" Sanskrit Wörterbuch. It is known that many Sanskrit bases, and amongst them the bases in *ī*, undergo various changes in their declension and otherwise. *Pītri*, for instance, becomes *pītar*, in the accusative *pītar-am*, while it remains as it is, in the instrumental *pītri-bhis*, *dādī* remains so in *dādīl-bhis*, but its base is *dādhan* with the loss of *a*, in *dādhn-ā*; *asthī* forms *asthīl-bhis*, but *asthīn-ā*. Now there exists a paper of Dr. Bochtlingk on the Sanskrit declension, but whoever reads it must find that the language either played dice with these and similar forms, or is undergoing some remarkable cure. He talks of bases "which are strengthened as well as weakened," of bases "which are only strengthened," and of bases "which are

only weakened. Why language should nurse and physic its bases as we learn from him, no one will understand. But a sadder spectacle of the treatment of a language or of linguistic facts than is presented in that paper, it is not possible to imagine. The reasoning there is exactly on the same level as the reasoning in the *edition* of Panini, of which so many specimens have now become familiar to the reader of this Preface. Exactly the same game at dice or the same vagaries of disease reign in this Dictionary, thus, though the declension phenomena of *alshi*, *asthi*, *dadhi* are identical and acknowledged to be so by Dr Boehtlingk himself in his paper on Declension (§ 69) in his Dictionary he discourses on the first noun under *alshan*, and *agun* under *alshi*, while on the contrary if we look to *asthi* he refers us to *asthan*, and if under his guidance we now go to *dadhan* he requests us to seek for information under *dadhi*.

THE SANSKRIT LANGUAGE UNDER DR. BOEHTLINGK'S TREATMENT

But since the linguistic hospital which is opened in the works of Dr Boehtlingk, is fortunately not the place in which the Sanskrit language lies—for this language has had a sound and rational development—it will be obvious to everyone who happens not to be placed under Dr Boehtlingk's treatment that there must be reasons for this variety of thematic forms which constitute the declension of the same base. And as there are such reasons the immediate consequence is that we cannot decide, *a priori*, whether *kartar* be the "strengthened form of the original base *lartai*", or *kartai* the "weakened form of the original base *lartai*". Such a decision can only be taken after a thorough investigation of the influences which cause this change of the nature of these influences themselves and of the manner in which they work. And as language does not sit down like a school boy first to master the declensions then the conjugations and so on—but as the influences I am speaking of are influences which are traceable in the whole organism of language itself it is obvious too that such an investigation would not restrict itself to the phenomena of declension merely but extend over the whole area of the linguistic development.

When I myself assumed the responsibility of writing a Sanskrit Dictionary I considered it incumbent on me to devote a most serious research to those little facts which as we have seen are despatched in five lines by our modern exegetes and lexicographers. Six years have elapsed since I laid my first results so far as lexicographical purposes are concerned before the London Philological Society, and it is only the desire of giving them in their full bearing and extent that has hitherto delayed their presentation through the press. Now it is questions like these questions which in my mind ought to be decided with the very utmost circumspection and which cannot be decided without very laborious research—it is questions like these which have been trifled with in this *Wörterbuch* in the most unwarranted manner. It does not show that it even understands the important problem which lies in its path, it briefly informs the reader that it has cancelled all the bases in *ti*, *ri*, *li*, etc., and bids him good bye.

PATANJALI AND THE POTTERS

Patanjali,—let us for a moment repose after this dreary journey through the Wörterbuch,—Patanjali on one occasion thus speaks to us: “When a man is in want of a pot, he goes to the house of a potter and says (potter), make me a pot, for I have occasion for it. But (surely) a man who wants to employ words will not go, like the other, to the house of a grammarian and say (grammarian) make me some words, I have occasion for them . . . Happy Patanjali! blessed in thy ignorance! Here we have potters who can fabricate—and not simply meanings of words, but the very words themselves, and words, too, which you laboured so earnestly, so learnedly, so conscientiously, to save from the pottering of all future ‘exegetes and lexicographers’! Nay, we have, too, men who can repudiate these potters, and call for, and admire, their linguistic wares!

THE CHAMPIONS OF THE WORTERBUCH AND THEIR MEANS
OF DEFENCE PROFESSOR KUHN

When in the presence of these extraordinary facts, which, unhappily, must silence the expression of all the acknowledgment—nay, of all the admiration I really entertain for the immense industry displayed in this Wörterbuch,—when with that deep sense which I entertain of the duties and of the influence of a Dictionary, and, in the actual condition of Sanskrit philology, more especially of a Sanskrit Dictionary—when with these convictions, the earnestness of which, I believe, is proved throughout the whole of this investigation, —when—I will not conceal it—under the indignation and grief I felt in seeing a magnificent opportunity thrown away—as I shall abundantly prove that it has been thrown away in the case of the Sanskrit Wörterbuch—when under these impressions I uttered a warning, five years ago, in the “Westminster Review,” a warning contained in three pages, there ensued a spectacle which, during my literary experience, stands without a parallel.

Professor Kuhn,—not indeed a proficient in Sanskrit, nor having ever obtained any position amongst those who are earnestly engaged in Sanskrit philology, but as a contributor of quotations to the Wörterbuch, launched against me the grossest personal invectives which ever disgraced the pages of a scientific journal. As sound, literary argument was beyond his range, he indemnified himself, and gratified his employers, by calling me names. Unfortunately for him, his abuse could produce no effect upon me, for the following reason. Amongst the few critical remarks for which I had room in the “Westminster Review,” there was one which illustrated the manner in which Professor Roth had translated a ritual text. This remark was expressly

* *Malabhashya* Introduction (p. 52 ed. Bellantyne) धर्मे न कार्यं करित्यन्तुम्भकार-
कुर्मं गच्छ एव धर्मायमन एतिथामीति । न सदृश्यनान् प्रयुयुद्धमाणो धर्मापरणकुर्मं गच्छ
एव धर्माप्रयोक्त्य इति

written for Professor Kuhn's amusement as well as that of Professor Weber. For, at a small Sanskritic party which used to meet every fortnight at Berlin during the years 1847 and 1848, I had shown them the Commentary of Madhava on a Mimānsā work, the editing of which I had then commenced, this Commentary being the proof of the assertion I had made in 1855 in the "Westminster Review." Professor Kuhn heartily enjoyed, at one of these meetings, the precious translation of the passage in question from the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa, given by Professor Roth, in the preface (pp. xxxviii xli) to his edition of the Nirukta. Nay more, so anxious was he to possess its substance, before it was published, that my presence he took notes from the Commentary I am speaking of, *viz.*, that of the Jaiminiya nyāya māla vistara. And in the invectives to which I am alluding, he does not deny the existence, nor yet the value, of my evidence, but he words his defence of Professor Roth in so studied and so ambiguous a manner as to create in the minds of his readers a suspicion as to the reliability of the statement I had made, though its truth was perfectly familiar to him.²⁸⁰

Now, a writer who has recourse to such weapons as these has laid aside those qualities which are necessary to retain a man within

"In possession of the information I am speaking of he writes as follows: 'Der letzteren stellt der Verfasser eine bei leitend abweichende des Kommentators gegenüber, da er aber nur der Kommentator und nicht all the commentators order almost all the commentators sagt so ist stark zu vermuten dass noch andere Kommentare existieren welche den Text wahrscheinlich in der Rothschen Weise erklären werden dabei nehme ich natürlich den Fall als ganz unmöglich in dass der Verfasser (der nichts als die Übersetzung giebt) etwa selber den Kommentar missverstanden haben sollte' *i.e.*, In opposition to the latter [i.e. the version of Professor Roth of the passage in question] the reviewer gives another of the commentator which is considerably different from it but as he merely gives the commentator and not all the commentators or almost all the commentators, there is a strong probability (sic!) that there are other commentators who probably (sic!) explain the text in the manner of Professor Roth. With these words I assume it as a matter of course to be plainly impossible that the reviewer who gives nothing but the translation should have misunderstood the commentary — That Professor Kuhn had not the slightest doubt as to who was the author of the review in question even he will not venture to deny for he has stated the fact in letters and in conversation. But even if he had any such doubt he knew that I was in possession of the commentary for he had taken notes from it. If then the ascertainment of truth alone had been the object of his remark as the public might expect of an author and if his notes were not complete enough—which however I do not admit the time required for a letter to me and an answer back that is to say five days would have sufficed to give him all the information he could wish for. It requires however no statement from me that his object was not to inform his readers of the true state of the facts it better suited his purpose to insinuate a doubt as to the correctness of the translation I had given. Indeed Professor Weber who as I have mentioned possessed the same knowledge and had obtained it in the same manner as Professor Kuhn settles the point. Though he did not remain behind his colleague in scurrilous abuse and though in speaking of my translation he shows his usual levity he nevertheless plainly and openly acknowledges the full reliability of the translation I had given, on the ground of the Mimānsā work. He says 'erkennt nämlich offenbar nur die systematisirende Erklärung der Mimānsāschule etc' *i.e.* the reviewer obviously knows only the systematizing explanation of the Mimānsā school etc. Thus whatever be his opinion of this explanation he speaks of it from personal knowledge and admits that my account of it was correct and not liable to doubt."

the pale of a gentlemanly consideration, and his language however gross, and adapted to his own character, cannot touch one who does not stand on the same level with him

A FURTHER GLANCE AT THE CHAMPIONS AND THEIR MEANS
OF DEFENCE — PROFESSOR WEBER

A similar exhibition took place, I am grieved to say, in a journal of high standing and respectability in the 'Zeitschrift der Deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft'. It is a salutary practice in the journals of all learned societies not to admit into their pages scurrilous or libellous attacks against individuals and this practice has been rigidly adhered to in the journal to which I am advertising, with the single exception of my own case; Professor Weber who is also in the service of the Wörterbuch suddenly attacked me in this journal,—not indeed, with anything that deserves the name of argument but with personal abuse of the coarsest kind. Five years have passed by, and at last a sense of justice, which does credit to himself, has at entered the mind of Professor Weber and in the last number of the Zeitschrift, which reached me when this Preface was nearly completed in print he has fully and honestly retracted all his former calumnies, still, however, combining with the compliments he now pays to my Dictionary, the remark that my views of the Wörterbuch show a perfect derangement of my mental faculties, since I do not reject the authority of the greatest Hindu scholars as freely and easily as the work he so assiduously praises.

I am certainly in no humour to find fault with the opinion which he entertains of my mental condition, for it will always give me a sense of safety and satisfaction when I find him bearing testimony to the vast distance which separates our respective modes of studying and judging of, Hindu antiquity. But is he has chosen to connect his opinion of me with a piece of scientific advice, this seems a fitting opportunity for illustrating, once more his competence for passing a judgment on matters of Sanskrit philology.

He says — Another, third essential difference [between the Wörterbuch and my Dictionary] — I, myself, trust and hope that attentive readers will find many more essential differences than three between the two works] consists — in [my] not marking the accent of the words.

In his opinion therefore the Wörterbuch does mark the accent. Now, setting aside the very considerable quantity of words which are not marked with any accent in this work the instances in which it is marked there seem to satisfy the scientific requirements of Professor Weber. I ought, then to mention, in the first place, that in all such cases the accent is put there over the word without any further explanatory remark. But I have shown that there are *periods* in the known Sanskrit grammatical literature, — that the first period is that of Pāṇini, the second that of the Rik-Prātiśākhya, the third (perhaps fourth) that of Kātyāyana, the fourth (or perhaps fifth) that of the Phīlīṣṭras, and that, as we continue our descent, we have the period of the Kāśikī, Kaumudi, etc. Thus marking an accent

without saying to what period such an accent¹ belongs, and up to what period it remains in force, is giving evidence of the greatest superficiality,—it is showing, too, that the difficulties of the question we are speaking of, were not at all understood. As regards myself, I believe I might have entered into such detail, since I have considered it my duty to turn my researches into this channel also, and if the scientific and liberal disposition of my publishers could have disregarded all material considerations in the case—had could have added still more to the great concessions of space which they have already made me, to their own material detriment, since the publication of the third part of my Dictionary,—I should have been able not only to give quotations historically, which the Wörterbuch notwithstanding Professor Weber's bold assertion—I will not attach to it another epithet—does not give, and to discuss the matters of accent,—but even to re-edit, little by little, the Commentary to the Satapatha Brahmana as I have already done on several occasions in order to prove the meanings I give, and which meanings no one could gather from the text as edited by Professor Weber. No doubt I might have done all this had I been perfectly independent of material considerations. But, at all events, had I, in marking the accents, contended myself with that which satisfies completely Professor Weber's scientific wants, my Dictionary would have become as superficial as the book "which he has qualified as a work of the 'most scrupulous conscientiousness'"².

In advertising to Professor Weber's advice, I may as well quote one more instance from his impartial illustration of the difference between the two Dictionaries. It concerns the meanings of words in both. But as I have adverted to this subject before, I need now only say, that he describes the Wörterbuch in the following manner:

"It represents," he writes in the 'Zeitschrift' 'the Principle of reality in contrast with the historical proceeding of interpretation [which he says, is mine], by allowing the words to interpret themselves through the chronological order (*sic!*) of the quotations added to them, and through these quotations themselves, the authors always quoting the native exegesis also, but merely as a secondary means."³ And of myself he says, that my "orthodox faith in the authority of native exegetes and grammarians is something perfectly bewildering indeed it pre-supposes the "delangement of my mental faculties."⁴

¹ In his libel he says "dieses Werk ist beweislichenswerthesten Flösse des in der sorgsamsten Gewissenhaftigkeit"

² "Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft" vol. XIV p. 750. Da Hauptfödernd die er [e myself] hierbei verfolgt besteht eben—und das markiert einen ferneren Hauptunterschied von Boethius' *Reth*—darin dass er es sich zur Aufgabe macht die Ansichten der einheimischen Erklärer und Sprachforscher zur prägnanten Geltung zu bringen während Boethius' *gk Reth* diesem historischen Erklärungsverfahren gegenüber das sache ist das Prinzip vertreten die Wörter nämlich durch zeitliche Ordnung der betreffenden Stellen und durch eben diese Stellen selbst sich unmittelbar erklären zu lassen wobei es die einheimische Exegese zwar auch stets infliuern aber doch nur als sekundäres Hilfsmittel betrachten

³ Ibid p. 766. Personliche Beziehungen haben uns seitdem überzeugt dass der Verfasser bei Abschluss jenes für uns allerdings immer noch geradezu unbegreiflichen Angriffes auf das Petersburger Wörterbuch dennoch wirklich im vollen

It requires all the levity, on the one hand, and all the bumptiousness, on the other, which are the mixed essentials of Professor Weber's literary productions, to allow an author to come before the public with statements like these. As for myself, any one may see that there are various instances in my Dictionary where I plainly state that I differ from the etymologies or meanings given by the native authorities. These cases of dissent are certainly not frequent, because a serious investigation of the native grammarians led me in most instances to appreciate their scholarship and the correctness of its results; nor have I the presumption to supersede them with mere vague and vapouring doubts; but that I have ground sometimes to differ even from the views of a Katyāyana or a Patanjali, Professor Weber will have probably learned now from the foregoing pages, though he might have learned it already from my Sanskrit Dictionary, which he is good enough to favour with his advice. His statement, therefore, concerning my blind belief in all that the Hindu scholars say, is founded on that same overweening superficiality which, as we have seen, leads him to assume the responsibility of schooling Katyāyana, whom he does not even understand.

But as to his description of the Wörterbuch, I know not how to qualify it without using language which could only be used by a Professor Kuhn. It is one of my most serious reproaches against the Sanskrit Wörterbuch, that it not only creates its own meanings, and by applying them to the most important documents of the literature, practically falsifies antiquity itself, but deliberately, and nearly constantly suppresses all the information we may derive from the native commentaries. I have intimated that the great injury they have thus done to the due appreciation of Hindu antiquity, would have been lessened had they at least, as common sense would suggest, given by the side of their own inventions the meanings of Sāyana or Mahidhara or of other authorities, and thus enabled the student to judge for himself. Yet while the reader may peruse their Dictionary page after page, sheet after sheet, without discovering a trace of these celebrated Vaidik commentaries, while the exceptions to this rule are so rare as to become almost equal to zero, Professor Weber dares to speculate on the credulity of the public in telling it that this Dictionary *always quotes the native exegesis*!

When a cause has sunk so low as to have such defenders and require such means of defence as these, when its own contributors and its noisiest bards have no other praise to chant than such as this, it seems almost cruel to aggravate its agony by exposure or reproach.

THE CLIMAX

But the spectacle exhibited on the appearance of my remarks in the "Westminster Review" does not end here, and its epilogue is perhaps

Rech te zu sein glaubt. Es setzt dies fröhlich's rech unsrer Ansicht eine Art Verleirung des Denkvermögens voran, wie's sonst so stolzen Gelehrten nicht selten ist hierüber in der That bestreitet. Eine oft' bloxe Hungerei nüchlich an die Autorität der indischen Litteratur und Grammatiker, wie sie uns gegenüber diesen Harschjaltern die bei aller Sichtbarkeit denn doch gar oft' Jenen verbündeten Leitern gleichen, die den Mücken sezen und Kamelen verschlücken, sei r wenig am Platze schelut.

even more remarkable than the play itself. In the same "Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft" there followed another act, which is so characteristic of the system pursued in these attacks, that it deserves a special word, merely for the sake of curiosity. An individual whose sole connection with Sanskrit studies consists in lending Sanskrit books to those who read them, a literary braggart, wholly unknown, but assuming the airs of a Quintus, because it has figures before it that prompt it on,—this personage, who, as his own friends informed me, is perfectly ignorant of Sanskrit, he, too, was allowed to give his opinion on the Wörterbuch! I need not say that, in the absence of all knowledge of the subject itself, it merely vented itself in the most grandiloquent prose, but, to complete its mission, there was added to this fustian, language, in reference to me, such as certainly was never heard, or admitted, before in a respectable journal of any society. He need not tremble lest I should drag him into notoriety. Nature has not fitted him for estimating the ridicule to which he exposed himself in becoming the mouthpiece and the puppet of his instigators. If he deserve anything, it is not chastisement, but pity and the mercy of a charitable concealment of his name.

And all this outrage, not only against the interests of science and truth, but against the commonest rules of decency, was committed in a series of planned attacks, because I had warned the Sanskrit Wörterbuch of the danger of its career, and had not expressed any admiration for Dr. Boehltingk's competence or scholarship.

A FURTHER GLANCE AT THE CHAMPIONS—THE HIDDEN REASONS OF THE EDITOR OF PANINI

It was then, and on the ground of observations I had made in regard to his want of proficiency, that I was called upon by one of his men, not only to have respect for the editor of Panini" but even for the hidden reasons he might have had in foisting on the public his blunders of every kind. The "editor of Panini" was held before me as a symbol of scientific accomplishment, his "edition of Panini" was the great thunderbolt which was hurled at my head by one of these little Jupiters ^{**}.

^{**} Prof. Kuhn writes in his Zeitschrift the following words: Wo der alten grammätker nicht erwähnung gethan ist geschah es nur deshalb nicht weil ihre etymologie mit der der verfasser übereinstimmte stellten dieselben aber ohne jene zu erwähnen eigne etymologien auf so hess sich doch wohl voraussetzen dass der herausgeber des Pāṇini des Vopadeva: s n. dazu seine wohlern: genen grunde gehabt haben möchte ^{**} where no mention was made [in the Wörterbuch] of the old grammarians this was done because their etymology agreed with that of the authors of the Wörterbuch but when the latter made their own etymologies without naming the former it was but natural to suppose that the editor of Panini of Vopadeva etc., had his own well weighed reasons for doing so The real nature of this statement of Professor Kuhn will become apparent from the review which I shall give of the Wörterbuch. But his information is it is is not without great interest. Thus according to this quotation of the Wörterbuch its authors pass over in silence the labours of the Hindu grammarians—not because they see reason to adopt the results of the latter—but because these labours have the honour to meet with the approval of Dr. Boehltingk and Company Under any circumstances

For eighteen years I have been thoroughly acquainted with the value and the character of this "*edition*" of Pânini; and yet, from a natural disinclination to antagonize with those who have similar pursuits to my own, I have refrained from apprising the public of the knowledge I possessed in regard to it. Twelve years have passed since I explained my views on this book personally and privately, at our Sanskritic parties, to Professors Weber and Kuhn; and the longer the interval passed over, the less I felt disposed to speak of it in print. At present, after twenty years' time, I should have considered it almost unfair to take up the post; for a sense of charity would have told me that the moral and intellectual condition of a man may undergo considerable changes during so considerable a period of his life. But in spite of my strongest desire to combine the defense of literary interests with a regard for all the circumstances connected with the author himself, I am not allowed to remain silent, in consequence of the insolent provocations which I receive. Not only does Dr. Boehltingk quote his "*edition*" of Pânini, in his *Wörterbuch*,—not only does he thus force it, as it were, on us by the references he makes to it, and acknowledge it to this day as his legitimate child,—but one of his own scribes, well acquainted with the judgment I should pass on it, has the hardihood to defy me publicly, by bidding me have respect for the "editor of Pânini."

Well, then, I have taken up this impertinent challenge. In so far as my present subject permitted, I have illustrated the nature of this immaculate book; and it will not be my fault if I am compelled to recur to it again.

CONCLUSION

Still a provocation of this kind alone would have as little induced me to take up my pen now as it did heretofore; but when I see the public told authoritatively, yet without any proof, that Sâyanî teaches that understanding of the *Veda* which was current in India no longer than a few centuries ago;—when I see that the most distinguished and the most learned Hindu scholars and divines—the most valuable, and sometimes the only, source of all our knowledge of ancient India—are scorned in theory, mutilated in print, and, as a consequence, set aside in the interpretation of Vaidik texts; when I see that the most ancient records of Hindu antiquity are interpreted to the European public in such a manner as to cease to be that which they are;—when a clique of Sanskritists of this description vapours about giving us the sense of the *Veda* as it existed at the commencement of Hindu

however, it was but natural and rational to pass them over in silence and to suppress the information they give,—for, either they have the honour of being approved of by Dr. Boehltingk, or "the editor of Pânini" had probably his well weighed reasons for not agreeing with them, and, in the latter case there was of course not the slightest necessity that he should give or even allude to these important reasons. The passage quoted would alone quite suffice to illustrate the character of the false and adulterated and of the puffing advertisements—written, of course, exclusively by the employed scribes of the *Wörterbuch*—which for some years have made their appearance in some literary journals of Germany, and have not only misled, but imposed upon, the unacquainted or imperfectly acquainted with Sanskrit philology.

antiquity ;—when I see that the very forms of the language are falsified, and that it is made a principle to slur the grammar of Pāṇini, and to ridicule those who ~~try~~ stress on it ;—when I see that one of the highest grammatical authorities of India is schooled for a “want of practice and skill,” while this censure is passed without even an understanding of the work to which it refers ;—when I see that they who emphatically claim the epithet of “veracious,”¹¹¹ make statements which are the very reverse of truth ;—and when I consider that this method of studying Sanskrit philology is pursued by those whose words apparently derive weight and influence from the professorial position they hold ;—and when, moreover, deputing from rule and precedent, I see the journal of a distinguished Society—I fully hope through an oversight of its editor, though a Professor of Sanskrit himself—permanently made the channel for propagating such statements as I have described and qualified, together with these scurrilous personal attacks and calumnies,—then I hold that it would be a want of courage and a dereliction of duty, if I did not make a stand against these **SATURNIA OF SANSKRIT PHILOLOGY**.

On this ground I have raised my voice, however feeble and solitary for the moment, and have endeavoured to examine the competence of those who set themselves up as our masters and authorities. On this ground I have endeavoured to vindicate for Pāṇini the position he holds in Sanskrit literature, and the position he ought to hold amongst honest Sanskrit philologists.

¹¹¹ Professor Weber in his libel “einen um so peinlicheren Eindruck musses auf jeden wahrheitsliebenden Forscher machen, etc., i.e., ‘the more painful is the impression which must be produced on every veracious scholar, *sic!*, if he reads my opinion on the Wörterbuch, which opinion—I must add so far from having changed, is even more emphatic now than it ~~was when~~ I wrote the review which has so much displeased him]